A truly realistic theory of law – the possibility of which is examined in this work – should have the following characteristics. It should be more general than current theories, that is, be applicable to both common law and civil law; in consequence, it should invert the relationship, commonly instituted by positivist theories, between legislation and adjudication. Both in historiography and in legal comparison, of which legal theory is an extension to a higher level of abstraction, adjudication is the central (...) moment of the legal process, while legislation can be seen as one of the many attempts, and perhaps not even the most successful, to limit and control adjudication. An example of the explanatory capacity of a truly realistic theory is the so-called crisis of sources: legislation institutes judges, but they are, ultimately, those who set the hierarchy of sources and the hierarchical position of legislation itself. (shrink)

‘Néoconstitutionnalisme’ est assurément le nouveau nom pour une famille de théories du droit bien connues: un nom jusqu'à maintenant utilisé seulement au sein de la théorie du droit du monde latin. Mais contrairement à une critique récente de Riccardo Guastini, et conformément à une plus large analyse de ce mouvement dans mon dernier livre, Manuale di filosofia del diritto, le néoconstitutionnalisme existe effectivement – exactement comme le droit naturel, le positivisme juridique ou encore le réalisme juridique existent. Dans cette contribution, (...) en fait, trois thèmes centraux du néoconstitutionnalisme sont examinés – la connexion droit-morale, la distinction règle-principes et le balancement ou pondération – afin d’en fournir une meilleure théorie positiviste. Ainsi, je reconnais une connexion contigente mais théoriquement essentielle entre le droit et la morale; j’admets une distinction quasiment radicale entre les règles et les principes juridiques, et je fournis une théorie du balancement positiviste, réaliste et axiologiquement pluraliste. (shrink)

Una teoría realmente realista del derecho –cuya posibilidad se examina en este trabajo– debería tener las siguientes características. Al mismo tiempo, debería ser más general que las teorías corrientes, es decir, valer tanto para el common law cuanto para el civil law; en consecuencia, debería invertir las relaciones, comúnmente instituidas por las teorías positivistas, entre legislación y adjudicación. Tanto en la historiografía cuanto en la comparación jurídica, de las cuales la teoría del derecho es una extensión a un nivel de (...) abstracción más alto, el momento central del proceso legal es la adjudicación, mientras que la legislación puede ser concebida como una de las tantas tentativas, y quizás ni siquiera la más lograda, de limitar y controlar a aquella. Un ejemplo de la capacidad explicativa de la teoría realmente realista es la llamada crisis de las fuentes: la legislación instituye a los jueces, pero son estos, en última instancia, los que fijan la jerarquía de las fuentes y la propia posición jerárquica de la legislación. (shrink)

The recent Catalanian crisis raises three issues, each of which is dealt with in a section of this intervention. First, the issue of a proper reconstruction of facts, which attributes the responsability to Spanish nationalism no less than Catalonian one. Second, the issue of a sociopolitical interpretation of Catalonian events, in a context charachterized by the difficulty of the various national establishments to handle the global challenges and the emergence of so-called populist movements. Third, the issue of a legal-constitutional way-out, (...) which could only consist of a federalist compromise. A very narrow way-out, however, entrusted more to the institutional fancy of jurists than to the agenzy of politicians. (shrink)

General theory of law (general jurisprudence, allgemeine Rechtslehre) has often claimed to deal with general or universal concepts, i.e., concepts which are deemed to be common to any legal system whatsoever. At any rate, this is the classic determination of such a field of study as provided by John Austin in the nineteenth century—a determination, however, which deserves careful analysis. In what sense, indeed, can one assert that some legal concepts are common to different legal systems? And, above all, in (...) what sense can one assert that some concepts are common to different languages and cultures? My paper sets out to discuss such questions—although, obviously, they are too complicated to be answered in a single paper. The first section reconstructs the Austinian argument for general jurisprudence by placing it in its historical context. The second section tries to apply to legal concepts some suggestions derived from the contemporary debate on conceptual relativism. The third section, returning to the Austinian problem, comes to the following conclusion: Even if conceptual relativism were true and there were no general or universal legal concepts, this would not invalidate in any way the didactic and scientific value of (general) theory of law. (shrink)

Istinski realistička teorija prava – čija se mogućnost ispituje u ovome radu – trebala bi imati sljedeća obilježja. U svakom slučaju, trebala bi biti općenitija od postojećih teorija, to jest vrijediti kako za common law tako i za kontinentalnoeuropsko pravo; posljedično tome, trebala bi obrnuti odnos između zakonodavstva i pravosuđenja kakav obično uspostavljaju pozitivističke teorije. I u historiografiji i u poredbenom pravu, pri čemu je teorija prava njihov produžetak na višoj razini apstrakcije, središnji trenutak legal processa je pravosuđenje, dok se (...) zakonodavstvo može shvatiti kao jedan od mnogih pokušaja, možebitno ne i najuspješniji, ograničavanja i nadziranja pravosuđenja. Primjer objašnjavalačke sposobnosti istinski realističke teorije prava jest tzv. kriza izvora: zakonodavstvo uspostavlja suce, no oni su ti koji potom, u konačnici, određuju hijerarhiju izvora prava i sam položaj zakonodavstva u hijerarhiji. (shrink)