The idea that love changes who we are is widely shared, and has been mostly explored from a stance in the middle stage of love (i.e., when people already love each other). But how do we get there? And what happens when love ends? In this chapter, I explore how self-understanding may be shaped in different ways at different stages of love through the notions of narrative and existential feeling. As I will argue, love gains narrative momentum at the beginning, (...) which is maintained during the middle, and ultimately extinguished at the end. This momentum is triggered and later sustained by the existential feeling that ‘things make sense’, which keeps the lovers oriented towards each other. (shrink)

Why does social injustice exist? What role, if any, do implicit biases play in the perpetuation of social inequalities? Individualistic approaches to these questions explain social injustice as the result of individuals’ preferences, beliefs, and choices. For example, they explain racial injustice as the result of individuals acting on racial stereotypes and prejudices. In contrast, structural approaches explain social injustice in terms of beyond-the-individual features, including laws, institutions, city layouts, and social norms. Often these two approaches are seen as competitors. (...) Framing them as competitors suggests that only one approach can win and that the loser offers worse explanations of injustice. In this essay, we explore each approach and compare them. Using implicit bias as an example, we argue that the relationship between individualistic and structural approaches is more complicated than it may first seem. Moreover, we contend that each approach has its place in analyses of injustice and raise the possibility that they can work together—synergistically—to produce deeper explanations of social injustice. If so, the approaches may be complementary, rather than competing. (shrink)

This book tells the story of the Scientific Buddha, "born" in Europe in the 1800s but commonly confused with the Buddha born in India 2,500 years ago. The Scientific Buddha was sent into battle against Christian missionaries, who were proclaiming across Asia that Buddhism was a form of superstition. He proved the missionaries wrong, teaching a dharma that was in harmony with modern science. And so his influence continues. Today his teaching of "mindfulness" is heralded as the cure for all (...) manner of maladies, from depression to high blood pressure.In this potent critique, a well-known chronicler of the West's encounter with Buddhism demonstrates how the Scientific Buddha's teachings deviate in crucial ways from those of the far older Buddha of ancient India. Donald Lopez shows that the Western focus on the Scientific Buddha threatens to bleach Buddhism of its vibrancy, complexity, and power, even as the superficial focus on "mindfulness" turns Buddhism into merely the latest self-help movement. The Scientific Buddha has served his purpose, Lopez argues. It is now time for him to pass into nirvana. This is not to say, however, that the teachings of the ancient Buddha must be dismissed as mere cultural artifacts. They continue to present a meaningful challenge, even to our modern world. (shrink)

Modèle d'une société en mal de cohésion, ou modelé par elle et ses normes, le corps construit l'identité, et rend possible l'aliénation. Apprêté, mis en scène, observé ou transformé, il donne son étoffe au héros, ses rouages au pantin, ses prothèses à l'homme en mal de puissance. À moins que, habité en conscience, il ne devienne la source vive où l'homme peut puiser sa joie. Les 27 et 28 mars 2017, dans l'amphithéâtre de l'École Nationale Supérieure d'Art de Bourges, s'est (...) tenu un colloque de philosophie sur le thème "Ce que peut un corps". Enseignants de philosophie, de sociologie, plasticien, maître d'arts martiaux se sont succédé pour faire état des états du corps."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

I argue that knowing and having points of view are fundamentally different epistemic states if we assume that having justified true beliefs is necessary for knowledge. Knowers necessarily possess justified true beliefs, but persons holding points of view may, for example, lack justification, have false beliefs, or both. I examine these differences and expose other crucial differentiating patterns between the structure of knowledge and points of view that make the latter more likely to lead to disagreements. I hypothesize that these (...) patterns remain invariant in alternative views of knowledge like contextualism as long as we preserve the classical structure. Yet there is much research to be done on the multiple and contrasting properties that emerge if we consider non‐classical analyses of knowledge and points of view. (shrink)

Pierre Duhem’s philosophy of science has influenced many philosophers in the twentieth century, and even today. Many of the subjects he addressed are still highly discussed today, especially the distinction between science and metaphysics. My aim in this paper will be to motivate a naturalistic approach where the difference between physics and metaphysics is only a matter of degree. I focus on whether it would be possible to articulate this gradual distinction from a duhemian point of view. Although Duhem thought (...) that metaphysics is an entirely different and more excellent activity than physics, I believe that Duhem’s philosophy of science also supports a naturalistic distinction in terms of degrees. I offer three reasons to justify this conclusion: Duhem’s notion of common sense; Duhem’s holism and his views on the generality of our theories, and Duhem’s notion of natural classification. At the end of the paper I will argue that a naturalistic approach accomplishes must of what Duhem wanted to achieve with his distinction. (shrink)

A group of philosophers suggests that a sense of mineness intrinsically contained in the phenomenal structure of all conscious experiences is a necessary condition for a subject to become aware of himself as the subject of his experiences i.e. self-awareness. On this view, consciousness necessarily entails phenomenal self-awareness. This paper argues that cases of delusions of thought insertion undermine this claim and that such a phenomenal feature plays little role in accounting for the most minimal type of self-awareness entailed by (...) phenomenal consciousness. First, I clarify the main view endorsing this claim i.e. the Self-Presentational View of Consciousness and formulate the challenge from thought insertion. After, I offer a systematic evaluation of all the strategies used by the advocates of this view to deal with this challenge. Finally, I conclude that most of these strategies are unsatisfactory for they rest in unwarranted premises, imprecisions about the agentive nature of cognitive experiences, and especially, lack of distinction between the different ways in which subjects can become aware of their own thoughts. (shrink)

For ancient philosophers, philosophy was not only a theory about the big questions but also a way of life, yet it was not only a way of life but also a theory. Pierre Hadot showed the importance of philosophy as a way of life in antiquity. Moreover, he defended, as this paper demonstrates, the view that ancient philosophy was primarily a way of life and that philosophical discourse or theory played a secondary role. The paper argues against Hadot, taking the (...) paradigmatic Socratic way of life as an illustration, that theory is as crucial for philosophy as practice is. Doing spiritual exercises and living in a particular way was very important for the ancients, but so were truth and understanding reality. (shrink)

This book highlights the powerful impact of some important Spanish Jesuits on some relevant English thinkers such as Locke, Bacon, and others, regarding politics, law and natural rights, an influence sometimes hidden and always controversial.

The claim of the freedom of the will (understood as an individual who is transcendent to Nature) in the name of XXth century scientific knowledge, against the perspective of XVIIIth-XIXth century scientific materialism, is analysed and refuted in the present paper. The hypothesis of reductionism finds no obstacle within contemporary natural sciences. Determinism in classical physics is irrefutable, unless classical physics is itself refuted. From quantum mechanics, some authors argue that free will is possible because there is an ontological indeterminism (...) in the natural laws, and that the mind is responsible for the wave function collapse of matter, which leads to a choice among the different possibilities for the body. However, here I defend the opposite thesis because indeterminism does not imply free will, and because the considerations about an autonomous mind sending orders to the body is against neuroscience or evolutionary theories about human beings. The quantum theory of measurement can be interpreted without the intervention of human minds, but other fields of science cannot contemplate the mentalist scenario. A fatalistic or materialist view, which denies the possibility of a free will, makes much more sense in scientific terms. (shrink)

A substantial body of recent philosophy envisages a close, congenial relationship between blame and morality. It has been posited, assumed or argued, for instance, that blame is responsive to moral...

The leading assumption of this paper is that we can improve the methodology of conceptual engineering if we differentiate between the different functions of our concepts. There is a growing body of research that emphasizes the revisionist virtues of conceptual engineering against the descriptive task of conceptual analysis. Yet, it also has faced severe critiques. Among the difficulties raised are the problems of conceptual identification and continuity. That is why several philosophers are trying to resolve these problems and improve the (...) methodology by calling attention, for example, to the functions that concepts can play. I follow this line of argument and argue that we can increase the chances of success if we also clarify and differentiate them. Identifying and assessing the relationship between functions will help us avoid confusion, inconsistencies, and possible verbal disputes. Doing this not only serves our theoretical and practical purposes but helps us reconsider the potentialities and limits of the conceptual engineering program. (shrink)

What different relativist claims about a given domain are to be distinguished? Which of them is best placed to account for intuitive facts about disagreement in that domain? In a recent paper in this journal, ‘Indexical Relativism versus Genuine Relativism’ (2004), Max Kölbel distinguishes two forms of relativism, andargues that one of them, indexical relativism, faces problems in accounting for disagreement. In the first part of this discussion I present my own taxonomy of relativist positions in a given domain, which (...) is based on David Lewis’s 1980 essay, and I compare it with Kölbel’s and other recent suggestions. In the second part, I argue that the presuppositional defence of indexical relativism against related objections that I have elaborated elsewhere is also effective against Kölbel’s recent charges. (shrink)

A common approach in the philosophy of love defines love as caring about one another and promoting one another's interests, aims and values. The view faces several problems and has been re-formulated to avoid them. However, here I argue that a larger re-formulation of the definition of love is needed in order to accommodate three instances of what I call 'non-harmonious' relationships. I identify three types of non-harmonious love (featuring problematic interests, opposing interests and neutral interests the lovers do not (...) care about) and ultimately claim that our definition of love must incorporate conflict and self- interest, and we should then abandon the excessive focus on the sharing of values. (shrink)

En este artículo expongo y analizo la propuesta berkeleyana del conocimiento nocional, que representa entre otras cosas el intento del irlandés por conocer a la mente o espíritu, esto es, a aquella cosa pensante y activa que por su propia actividad resulta irrepresentable como idea. Como el conocimiento nocional ya se menciona en los Comentarios Filosófi cos me remitiré a ellos para conocer los orígenes del mismo; sin embargo, como tal conocimiento aparece con mayor detalle en obras posteriores me serviré (...) sobre todo del Tratado para abordar la compleja doctrina nocional. // In this paper I expose and analyze the berkeleian proposal of notional knowledge. Among other things, this proposal represents Berkeley ́s attempt to know the mind or spirit, that is, the thinking and active thing that by its own activity results unrepresentable as idea. As such knowledge is already mentioned in the Philosophical Commentaries, I will refer to them in order to know the origins of that proposal. However, as notional knowledge appears in more detail in later works, I will make use especially of the Treatise to address the complex notional doctrine. (shrink)

This article presents an alternative understanding of corporations from the two problematic visions that see corporations as either the shareholders’ property or as nexuses of contracts. The alternative proposed here is based on the theories of pre-eighteenth-century philosophers, particularly Aristotle’s political philosophy, which Thomas Aquinas later refined. The article aims to advance a theory of corporate legal and moral responsibility for human rights based on the conception of corporations as imperfect communities whose purpose is to produce a good or service (...) through participatory work that allows individuals to self-develop while contributing to the community by satisfying consumers’ needs through collaborative work. The critical account of corporations presented here provides a sound foundation upon which to build a justification of corporate responsibility for human rights violations, providing a more accurate description of the reality of a corporation than most mainstream contemporary accounts do. (shrink)

It is fundamental that, in philosophy, we make sure that we are not mistaking merely verbal disputes, or “conceptual” disputes, for substantive ones. This essay presents a tripartite framework that is useful for clarifying cases where it is difficult to tell whether we are engaged in substantive or non-substantive disputes. For this purpose, the essay offers some combinatorial possibilities between the following levels: verbal, conceptual, and objectual. We need to distinguish whether we are arguing about the world, concepts, or words (...) to avoid talking at cross-purposes and to recognize when our disputes are not worth the time. Distinguishing between these three levels can also throw light and guide research on conceptual engineering, metalinguistic negotiations, metaontology, and so on. (shrink)

Shows the relevance of Schiller’s thought for contemporary philosophy, particularly aesthetics, ethics, and politics. This book seeks to draw attention to Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) as a philosophical thinker in his own right. For too long, his philosophical contribution has been neglected in favor of his much-deserved reputation as a political playwright. The essays in this collection make two arguments. First, Schiller presents a robust philosophical program that can be favorably compared to those of his age, including Rousseau, Kant, Schelling, and (...) Hegel, and he proves to be their equal in his thinking on morality, aesthetics, and politics. Second, Schiller can also guide us in our more contemporary philosophical concerns and approaches, such as phenomenology, hermeneutics, aesthetics, and politics. Here, Schiller instructs us in our engagement with figures such as Walter Benjamin, Michel Foucault, Jacques Rancière, Roberto Esposito, and others. María del Rosario Acosta López is Associate Professor of Philosophy at DePaul University. She has published several books, including La tragedia como conjuro: el problema de lo sublime en Friedrich Schiller. Jeffrey L. Powell is Professor of Philosophy at Marshall University and the editor of Heidegger and Language. (shrink)

We present PhrasIS, a benchmark dataset composed of natural occurring Phrase pairs with Inference and Similarity annotations for the evaluation of semantic representations. The described dataset fills the gap between word and sentence-level datasets, allowing to evaluate compositional models at a finer granularity than sentences. Contrary to other datasets, the phrase pairs are extracted from naturally occurring text in image captions and news headlines. All the text fragments have been annotated by experts following a rigorous process also described in the (...) manuscript achieving high inter annotator agreement. In this work we analyse the dataset, showing the relation between inference labels and similarity scores. With 10K phrase pairs split in development and test, the dataset is an excellent benchmark for testing meaning representation systems. (shrink)

I try to show that Steiner’s theory has very implausible normative consequences since it does not accept the prima facie character or rights. This theory is unable to solve the conflicts of interests in which the only intuitively plausible solution consists in overriding someone’s rights.

Conceptual analysis has been typically recognized as a traditional methodology within analytic philosophy, but many philosophers have heavily criticized it. In contrast, the methodology of Carnapian explication has been undergoing a revival as a methodological alternative due to its revisionary aim. I will make explicit the shared structural properties and goals of Carnapian explication and the kind of conceptual analysis advanced by the advocates of the Canberra Plan. Also, I will argue that although their goal to make philosophy more scientific (...) is desirable, they cannot achieve their goal of clearly distinguishing philosophy from science. Moreover, since traditional conceptual analysis is an element of both revisionary methodologies, it is also unable to mark a clear distinction between them. The comparison throws some light on the relationship between traditional conceptual analysis and the two revisionary methodologies, their implicit theoretical commitments and deficiencies. (shrink)

Las artes visuales, marginadas de otras áreas del conocimiento, por la fragmentación epistemológica propi-ciada por el positivismo y con afán de responder al desarrollo vertiginoso y complejo de nuevas tecnologías, han perdido la más importante de sus tareas, la reflexión. La especulación sobre la acción artística y la entrega de juicios críticos acerca de sus manifestaciones implica la introspección y el pensar sobre sus procesos y parámetros de desarrollo. Imaginar y crear en las artes visuales se ha convertido en las (...) reacciones espontáneas resultantes de la intuición del instante, olvidando etapas importantes de concentración, abstracción, especulación y transformación de la experiencia estética. Hoy las artes son la provocación de una cadena de reacciones físicas: repulsión, sorpresa, rechazo, etc., de las transgresiones a la forma y no al fondo, hay un abismo entre el pensamiento y la razón. Hay un olvido de los contenidos, por los que lucharon Klee, Kandinsky, Arnheim o Gombrich y que hizo comprensible la obra de Cézanne, Duchamp o Beuys. Se trata de una reflexión sobre la importancia del dominio epistemológico en las artes visuales, una llamada a regresar a su conceptualización y a reconstruir la filosofía y la teoría del arte visual de nuestro tiempo. Estas disciplinas tienen un aspecto teórico referente a los conceptos que las sustentan, un aspecto técnico concerniente a los medios por los cuales se crea la obra o la acción artística y un aspecto poético, que establece un nexo entre quien crea la obra y quienes la perciben y contemplan, éstos entre sí y entre éstos y la obra. Lo anterior requiere de los conocimientos indis-pensables para reconocer y comprender tanto el excedente de sentido de las artes visuales como la socialización sus valores culturales, son indispensables las estructuras y concepciones teóricas porque, de un mismo objeto o acción se dan diversas interpretaciones igualmente válidas, siempre y cuando estén sustentadas cognoscitivamente. Las artes visuales son una unidad de saber, un conjunto de conocimientos unificados merced a ciertos principios, pero no es un cuerpo de verdades cerradas, al contrario, se hallan en relación permanente y dinámica con otros ámbitos cognoscitivos, influyen en algunos y son influenciadas por otros. La conceptuación de las artes visuales es valiosa porque tiene efectos directos en la forma de pensamiento, en la conducta y en las acciones y decisiones de los seres humanos, en virtud de que se conciben como generadoras de valores y bienes culturales. (shrink)

This book highlights the powerful impact of some important Spanish Jesuits (Suárez, Acosta, Ribadeneira, Mariana) on some relevant English thinkers such as Locke, Bacon, and others, regarding politics, law and natural rights, an influence sometimes hidden and always controversial.

La profesión médica siempre ha estado dispuesta al servicio del hombre, lo cual ha exigido, históricamente, que se establecieran y desarrollaran diferentes juramentos, códigos y leyes sobre el actuar del médico, así como la aplicación de responsabilidades y gratificaciones o castigos derivados de sus actos. Este trabajo pretende definir y analizar la presencia de los principios rectores de la bioética en el juramento hipocrático, la declaración de Ginebra y en la fórmula para hoy del Juramento de Hipócrates del doctor Herranz, (...) así como busca demostrar la importancia de su cumplimiento en la práctica médica contemporánea. Para finalizar se presenta, la que se considera la mejor propuesta de juramento de acuerdo con los principios rectores de la bioética personalista con fundamentación ontológica. (shrink)

Patients suffering from delusions of thought insertion (TI) report that external agents of different nature have placed thoughts into their minds. The symptom involves distressing feelings of intromission and exposition, loss of mental privacy, diminished ego boundaries, and a – often neglected – peculiar “physicality”. A dominant approach within cognitive sciences characterizes TI as involving alterations in the experience of being the author of certain thoughts. For the advocates of this so-called Standard Approach to TI, the absence of a sense (...) of agency for certain thoughts would lead to their externalization, this explaining the general structure of the clinical reports. In this paper, I problematize the phenomenological picture of everyday thoughts that the standard approach adopts when trying to make sense of TI. I claim that the standard approach neglects two more fundamental aspects of TI, namely the multimodal nature of thinking in psychosis and the deeply social dimension of the phenomenology of delusions in schizophrenia. After this, a broader descriptive phenomenological characterization of TI is provided. Finally, I establish some connections between the characterization of TI developed here and current research in social perception and clinical practice. (shrink)

Critique has been a central theme in the German philosophical tradition since the eighteenth century. The main goal of this book is to provide a history of this concept from its Kantian inception to contemporary critical theory. Focusing on both canonical and previously overlooked texts and thinkers, the contributors bring to light alternative conceptions of critique within nineteenth- and twentieth-century German philosophy, which have profound implications for contemporary philosophy. By offering a critical revision of the history of modern European philosophy, (...) this book raises new questions about what it means for philosophy to be “critical” today. (shrink)

La exploración sobre la naturaleza, el significado y la estructura del concepto de crisis, y la definición misma de una crisis social convocan, primero, al uso, por lo general, ambiguo del término y, segundo, a las condiciones que manifiesta el mundo contemporáneo. Así, en este libro se procura analizar el, popularmente empleado pero poco esclarecido, concepto de crisis, sobre todo, en dos autores de la segunda generación de la teoría crítica, Habermas y Offe. La intención fundamental del texto es crear, (...) a partir de estos autores, un enfoque para estudiar las dinámicas patológicas de las sociedades contemporáneas. (shrink)

Two basic kinds of communitarians are discriminated. Weak communitarians reject only the liberal metaethical theses that I call universalism and neutralism, but endorse liberal norms and institutions at the normative level. Strong communitarians condemn liberalism at both levels: they reject not only universalism and neutralism, but also substantive liberal norms defending communitarian values. This article intends to show certain internal paradoxes of these two versions of communitarianism.

"Años después, el vital y vitalista encargado de la primera comisión etílica del siglo asiste en vivo y en directo a la muerte de la Escuela de Frankfurt y, lo que es verdaderamente decisivo, a la desaparición de las comisiones etílicas. Entretanto, ha manoseado territorios, aporías e intensidades, se ha fugado y se ha confesado como un filósofo: excesivo y excedido, sacudido por el canto escéptico y a un tiempo candoroso de su propia risa afirmativa. Experiencia y deseo es la (...) ponencia indecible, aforística, desnuda, esa que sólo se comparte en el seminario permanente de la noche"--. (shrink)

La digitalización en la educación, acelerada por el reciente confinamiento por COVID-19, muestra que una alta proporción del aprendizaje está fuera de las aulas y que no es posible un retorno pos-pandémico a un estado anterior en el proceso de enseñanza - aprendizaje. Así, siendo el objetivo documentar cómo el avance de la tecnología educativa cambió la docencia, se propone: (i) llevar el constructo de modalidades educativas por plan de estudios a un proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje híbrido: con mediación digital y (...) mediación docente; (ii) y para ello, los participantes deberán asumir responsabilidades en la conducción de la nueva realidad educativa. (shrink)

Hinge epistemology is a family of views that offers a novel approach to avoiding skeptical conclusions about the possibility of a posteriori justification of our empirical beliefs. They claim that at the basis of our empirical beliefs lie certain commitments whose rational status is not determined by our evidence. These are called hinge commitments. Prominent hinge epistemologists have claimed that hinge commitments are either rational or arational but yet not beliefs. I argue that such views are subject to decisive objections. (...) I then offer what I consider to be the best version of hinge epistemology. On this view, hinge commitments are best understood as arational beliefs that contingently inform our worldview. I call this view the Arational Beliefs View. (shrink)