Gaisi Takeuti has recently proposed a new operation on orthomodular lattices L, ⫫: $\scr{P}(L)\rightarrow L$ . The properties of ⫫ suggest that the value of ⫫ $(A)(A\subseteq L)$ corresponds to the degree in which the elements of A behave classically. To make this idea precise, we investigate the connection between structural properties of orthomodular lattices L and the existence of two-valued homomorphisms on L.

Has exclusion of Darwin's views on evolution distorted 20c philosophy? Cunningham suggests a reappraisal.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Philosophical Rhetoric of Socrates’ MissionRobert Metcalf"We shall dismiss this business of Chaerephon, as it is nothing but a cheap and sophistical tale [sophistikon kai phortikon diegema]"—Colotes, according to Plutarch's Moralia 14, 1116f-1117a.Socrates' account of his "mission" on behalf of the god at Delphi is one of the most memorable parts of his most famous memorial in Plato's Apology. But it is also controversial as to what it means (...) to Socrates and what it should mean to readers of Plato's text.1 First, there is the curious fact that the story occurs nowhere outside the competing versions of Socrates' defensespeech in Plato and Xenophon, and in the latter version the oracular report differs significantly in content and import: there the Pythia proclaims, not that no one is wiser than Socrates, but that no one is more generous or more just or more "soundminded" (sophron), and Xenophon's Socrates uses this as evidence that he "outshone the rest of mankind" and "deserves congratulations from gods and men alike" (Apology 14-18).2 Furthermore, the sequence of events that make up Socrates' "mission" is itself difficult to discern, from its apparent prompting by the oracular message to Chaerephon, to Socrates' initial effort to refute it, to his ultimate practice of elenchos in order that the oracle (or, at least, his interpretation of the oracle) might remain unrefuted.3 Not surprisingly, it was already a matter of controversy in the third century BC, as we read in the above quotation from Plutarch's Moralia. Whereas Arcesilaus interpreted the story of the Delphic oracle, and the account of elenctic practice occasioned by the oracle, as a model for his own skeptical orientation, Colotes, the Epicurean, charged that he had been duped by Socrates' sophistic oratory.4 To be sure, Colotes' charge of sophistry is meant to be abusive and has value for us only insofar as it counters a piously uncritical reading of Socrates' self-portrayal in Plato's Apology.5 In what follows I shall argue that an appreciation of the irony and mock-humility with which Socrates accounts for his "mission" to philosophize [End Page 143] affords us insight into the philosophical rhetoric that is essential to Socrates' practice of elenchos.But let us begin by examining those strange elements in Socrates' account that have made it "notorious" in the way suggested by the ancient debate.6 Socrates introduces the story of the oracle only after he dismisses, somewhat cursorily, the charges circulated by his "first accusers"—namely, that he investigates the things under the earth and heavenly things, and that he educates people for money (19b-20c). Insisting that he does not dishonor the knowledge involved in these activities (19c, 20b-c), Socrates nonetheless offers little defense apart from simply disowning such knowledge, presumably because these activities are not related to that "matter" (pragma) which has earned him his peculiar reputation (20c-d). It is here, in his explanation of this matter, that Socrates recounts the story of Chaerephon and the Pythia.7 As he begins the story he repeats his vow from the beginning of his defense to tell the jury only the truth (20d), assures them that he is not joking, and then is compelled to plead with them not to make any disturbances—"even," he says, "if I seem to you to be boasting [mega legein] somewhat" (20e). These successive declarations are all necessary, for the story has it that Socrates acquired his reputation through the human wisdom for which Socrates was singled out by the oracle at Delphi (20d-e).Socrates' puzzlement over the oracle and his effort to subject it to elenchos are offered as an explanation for the elenctic practice by which he comes, over time, to acquire his reputation.8 Although he does not say that his practice of elenchos begins with his investigation of the oracle's meaning, he does portray his subsequent practice of elenchos as being "in accordance with the god [kata ton theon]" (22a), an activity for which the god stands as a trustworthy witness (20e), and thus as a "matter of the god [to tou theou]" (21e). Ironically, the account Socrates... (shrink)

Jusqu'ici l'emplacement de l'antique Méthone n'avait pu être exactement déterminé : on la mettait le plus souvent au Sud du village de Néa Agathoupolis, près de l'actuelle Méthoni, où cependant il n'y a plus de vestiges antiques (mis à part quelques tombes). La localisation désormais assurée de Pydna et d'Aloros, cités entre lesquelles se trouvait Méthone selon les sources écrites (notamment Strabon, avec indication des distances) permet de situer cette ville juste au Nord de Néa Agathoupolis. De fait, les auteurs (...) ont repéré là deux sites importants, l'un tout proche du village et caractérisé par une céramique essentiellement archaïque et classique, l'autre un peu plus éloigné et datant visiblement d'une époque plus tardive. Il semble donc que le premier puisse être identifié de façon sûre avec la ville fondée (à la fin du vme siècle?) par des Érétriens et détruite en 354 av. J.-C. par Philippe II, tandis que l'autre pourrait être la bourgade hellénistique, puis romaine, où les survivants du siège avaient reçu l'autorisation de s'installer. Les témoignages antiques sur l'histoire de Méthone sont réexaminés à la lumière de cette double identification. Chemin faisant, les auteurs proposent de rapporter à Méthone de Magnésie une citation de l'historien Théopompe qui, d'après Strabon (VII fr. 20C et VIII 6,15; cf. FGrH 115 F 384) concernerait la ville de Piérie, Méthone dite tantôt de Macédoine, tantôt (plus anciennement) de Thrace. (shrink)

Post-modernist thought represents the latest skeptical turn in a revolution going back to the overthrow of speculative thought in and after Hegel's time, whose principal phases are traced from its dogmatic origins in 19c scientism and absolutism, through the 20c. schools of meta-philosophy, to the explicitly post-philosophical positions of Derrida, Rorty and others who would finally abandon or suspend all engagement with the tradition of philosophical reason. The progress toward this denouement has brought with it progressive distortion of the understanding (...) of classical philosophical arguments on their own terms, an understanding which now needs to be recovered from a standpoint that takes account of the legacy of the ultra-philosophical critique but now knows it as itself limited. (shrink)

During the last third of the 20C, public discourse in the United States has become increasingly acerbic. Parallel to this development there has been an increasing enrollment in College level logic courses, courses that focus on arguments and their appraisal. Could there be a connection? A number of majorphilosophers do not just see arguments as either 100% correct or 100% incorrect. Notable in this regard are Plato, Aquinas and Hume. Their approach to “logic” and that of others is offered as (...) a palliative to the types of logic that we now teach. (shrink)

Pragmatism is the idea that philosophical concepts must start with, and remain linked to human experience and inquiry. This book traces and assesses the influence of American pragmatism on British philosophy, with emphasis on Cambridge in the inter-war period, post-war Oxford, and recent developments.