Old age is not normally associated with innovativeness and technical prowess. To the contrary, when treating age as a distinct category, policy makers, innovation scholars, and companies typically regard younger people as drivers of innovation, and the early adoption of new technology. In this paper, we critically investigate this link between age, ineptness, and technology adoption using a case study of the diffusion of electric bikes in the Netherlands. We demonstrate how, during the first wave of e-bike acceptance, old age (...) was constructed as an arena in which important learning processes took place, and where older persons became early adopters of e-bikes. Theoretically, this paper speaks critically to the prolific literature on innovation diffusion and its treatment of adopter categories as generic concepts. Using age as a central dimension, our research highlights the situated and constructed nature of adopter categories, and thus challenges age-based assumptions about innovation and technology use by younger and older persons. These insights about what we term the rejuvenation of e-bikes help us rectify existing biases of older persons as an inherently problematic group of technology users. (shrink)

Eighteenth-century Epicureanism is often viewed as radical, anti-religious, and politically dangerous. But to what extent does this simplify the ancient philosophy and underestimate its significance to the Enlightenment? Through a pan-European analysis of Enlightenment centres from Scotland to Russia via the Netherlands, France and Germany, contributors argue that elements of classical Epicureanism were appropriated by radical and conservative writers alike. They move beyond literature and political theory to examine the application of Epicurean ideas in domains as diverse as physics, natural (...) law, and the philosophy of language, drawing on the work of both major figures (Diderot, Helvétius, Smith and Hume) and of lesser-known but important thinkers (Johann Jacob Schmauss and Dmitrii Anichkov). -/- Table of Contents -/- Neven Leddy and Avi S. Lifschitz, Epicurus in the Enlightenment: an introduction -/- Elodie Argaud, Bayle’s defence of Epicurus: the use and abuse of Malebranche’s Méditations chrétiennes -/- Hans W. Blom, The Epicurean motif in Dutch notions of sociability in the seventeenth century -/- Thomas Ahnert, Epicureanism and the transformation of natural law in the early German Enlightenment -/- Charles T. Wolfe, A happiness fit for organic bodies: La Mettrie’s medical Epicureanism -/- Natania Meeker, Sexing Epicurean materialism in Diderot -/- Pierre Force, Helvétius as an Epicurean political theorist -/- Andrew Kahn, Epicureanism in the Russian Enlightenment: Dmitrii Anichkov and atomic theory -/- Matthew Niblett, Man, morals and matter: Epicurus and materialist thought in England from John Toland to Joseph Priestley -/- James A. Harris, The Epicurean in Hume -/- Neven Leddy, Adam Smith’s critique of Enlightenment Epicureanism -/- Avi S. Lifschitz, The Enlightenment revival of the Epicurean history of language and civilisation -/- Bibliography -/- Index. (shrink)

The article focuses on prosecutor's fallacy and interrogator's fallacy, the two kinds of reasoning in inferring a suspect's guilt. The prosecutor's fallacy is a combination of two conditional probabilities that lead to unfortunate commission of error in the process due to the inclination of the prosecutor in the establishment of strong evidence that will indict the defendant. It provides a comprehensive discussion of Gerd Gigerenzer's discourse on a criminal case in Germany explaining the perils of prosecutor's fallacy in his application (...) of probability to practical problems. It also discusses the interrogator's fallacy which was introduced by Robert A. J. Matthews as the error on the assumption that confessional evidence can never reduce the probability of guilt. (shrink)

Analytic philosophers usually emphasize the importance of logic, clarity and reason. Therefore when they address political issues one would expect that they would usually inject a dose of rationality in these discussions. But this book gives a lot of examples showing the unexpected level of political irrationality among leading contemporary philosophers.

Madness and Modernism provides a phenomenological study of schizophrenic disorders, criticizing some standard conceptions of these disorders. Sass argues that many aspects of this group of disorders can actually involve more sophisticated (albeit dysfunctional) forms of mind and experience.

The distinguished philosopher Louis Loeb examines the epistemological framework of Scottish philosopher David Hume, as employed in his celebrated work A Treatise of Human Nature. Loeb's project is to advance an integrated interpretation of Hume's accounts of belief and justification. His thesis is that Hume, in his Treatise, has a "stability-based" theory of justification which posits that his belief is justified if it is the result of a belief producing mechanism that engenders stable beliefs. But Loeb argues that the (...) striking corollary to this theory is that no belief generating mechanism is fully stable - or fully justified - for a fully reflective person. This carefully argued and original interpretation of Hume makes sense of seemingly contradictory ideas and will provoke serious discussion among Hume scholars. (shrink)

This article traces the institutional context for the Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith in the 1960s and 1970s. It explores the origins of the stoicization thesis advanced by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie in their introductory essay to the TMS. Using the correspondence between the editors held at Glasgow University Special Collections, this article presents the development of editorial positions that would shape the twentieth-century reception of Smith's works.

It is nowadays a dominant opinion in a number of disciplines (anthropology, genetics, psychology, philosophy of science) that the taxonomy of human races does not make much biological sense. My aim is to challenge the arguments that are usually thought to invalidate the biological concept of race. I will try to show that the way “race” was defined by biologists several decades ago (by Dobzhansky and others) is in no way discredited by conceptual criticisms that are now fashionable and widely (...) regarded as cogent. These criticisms often arbitrarily burden the biological category of race with some implausible connotations, which then opens the path for a quick eliminative move. However, when properly understood, the biological notion of race proves remarkably resistant to these deconstructive attempts. Moreover, by analyzing statements of some leading contemporary scholars who support social constructivism about race, I hope to demonstrate that their eliminativist views are actually in conflict with what the best contemporary science tells us about human genetic variation. (shrink)

John Rawls famously holds that the basic structure is the 'primary subject of justice.'1 By this, he means that his two principles of justice apply only to a society's major political and social institutions, including chiefly the constitution, the economic and legal systems, and (more contentiously) the family structure.2 This thesis — call it the basic structure restriction — entails that the celebrated difference principle has a narrower scope than one might have expected. It doesn't apply directly to choices that (...) individuals make within the basic structure. Individuals can live up to the demands of justice simply by obeying whatever rules are set by, and by doing what is necessary to sustain, the basic .. (shrink)

One of the central theses of egalitarian liberals in the domain of distributive justice is that talented individuals should not be allowed to keep their entire market-income even if it flows solely from their greater abilities. This claim is usually supported by one of several arguments or some mixture of them, but in the present paper, I want to concentrate on the version that invokes equality of opportunity as its starting point. Namely, it is claimed that every human being should (...) enjoy an equal starting point in the life-race but that this is not secured insofar as some have greater natural talents than others. Therefore, egalitarians hold that results that arise from such an unfair situation are unjust and should be corrected by a redistributive taxation. I want to criticize this argument by hoping to show that it presupposes an untenable view about identity of persons. (shrink)

Rad se bavi umiješanošću promatrača kao ograničenjem u racionalnom spoznavanju svijeta i otvaranjem prostora za druge oblike spoznaje. U velikoj mjeri ta se problematika tiče odnosa znanosti i vjere, pa se u uvodnom dijelu rada polazi od odnosa vjere i znanosti, a koji je kroz povijest prolazio kroz različite faze. U prvom poglavlju analiziraju se upravo etape kroz koje je prolazio odnos vjere, odnosno religije i znanosti: jedinstvo u srednjovjekovnoj sintezi, razilaženje i sukob, dijalog i komplementarnost. Za ostvarenje dijaloga između (...) vjere i znanosti ponajprije je zaslužan papa Pio XII. svojom enciklikom Humani generis . Ipak, najveći doprinos dijaloškom odnosu vjere i znanosti dao je papa Ivan Pavao II. koji je smatrao da jedna drugoj može biti od velike koristi te da samo dinamički odnos između teologije i znanosti može otkriti granice koje čuvaju cjelovitost obiju disciplina. Na jednak način, veliki doprinos uspostavi dijaloga vjere i znanosti dali su i znanstvenici, kako sa strane teološko-filozofske misli, tako i sa strane prirodoslovnih znanosti, osobito fizičari.U ovom radu se čini jedan iskorak u pogledu određenosti i konkretnog sadržaja granice koju znanosti ne mogu prijeći i preko koje se nalazi prostor za druge oblike spoznaje i za vjeru. Polazi se od stava da je za proučavanje bilo koga predmeta taj predmet potrebno odvojiti od promatrača, kako bi ga ovaj mogao podvrgnuti objektivnom proučavanju. Sam po sebi, taj je stav opće prihvaćen u svim znanostima i filozofiji, ali je suviše uopćen da bi eliminirao sve oblike umiješanosti i rafinirane pogreške pri zaključivanju.Pokazuje se da se u termodinamici i u Newtonovoj mehanici može točno definirati takvo stajalište promatrača, kojim je on potpuno odvojen od pojave koju promatra i iz kojega je u stanju da promatranu pojavu objektivno ispita. Takvo se stajalište onda količinski razlikuje od drugih stajališta s kojima bi bio »umiješan« u pojavu koju proučava. U znanostima u kojima se to može učiniti eksperimentalno se osnivaju, nalaze i koriste zakoni koji se mogu zvati »objektivnima«. No i u takvim znanostima ima oblika umiješanosti koji mogu ostati skriveni desetljećima i duže. U radu se ukazuje na tri takva oblika diskretne umiješanosti u termodinamici i mehanici. Za znanosti u kojima se točno količinsko razdvajanje objektivnih i umiješanih stajališta promatrača nije moglo učiniti, ili se načelno ne može učiniti, ne može biti ni sigurnosti od umiješanosti i time od rafiniranih pogrešaka u racionalnom zaključivanju. Odatle se sa znatnom heurističkom snagom izvodi zaključak da se u područjima spoznaje kojima se bave znanosti i filozofija racionalnim zaključivanjem može učiniti rafinirana pogreška i da postoji prostor za druge oblike spoznaje i vjeru.The introductory part of the work deals with the relation between science and other forms of cognition which has undergone various phases throughout history. The first chapter analyses the stages through which the relation between faith, i.e. religion, and science has passed: unity in medieval synthesis, divergence and conflict, dialogue and complementarity. Much credit goes to Pope Pius XII with his encyclical Humani Generis for the development of dialogue between religion and science. However, Pope John Paul II made the greatest contribution to the dialogical relation between faith and science. He believed that their relation could be of great value and that only the dynamic relation between religion and science could discover the limits that hold the integrity of both disciplines. In the same way, scientists, those of the theological-philosophical thought as well as those of natural sciences, especially physicists, have made a great contribution to setting up a dialogue between religion and science.This work is a step forward regarding the determinateness and concrete content of the limit that sciences cannot cross and beyond which is a space for other forms of cognition and for faith. The starting point is a standpoint that if one wants to study a subject, that subject has to be set apart from the observer, so that it can be objectively studied. In itself, that standpoint has been universally accepted in all sciences and in philosophy too, but it is too generalized to eliminate all the forms of interference and refined errors when drawing conclusions.It is established that in thermodynamics and in Newton’s mechanics one can precisely define such a standpoint of the observer, by which he/she is completely detached from the phenomenon he/she is observing and from which he/she is able to research the observed phenomenon objectively. Such a standpoint quantitatively differs from other standpoints, by which he/she would be “involved” with the phenomenon he/she is investigating. In the sciences in which it is possible to do that, laws that can be called “objective” are experimentally passed and adopted. But even in such sciences there are forms of involvement that may remain hidden for decades and longer. This work points at such three forms of discrete involvement in thermodynamics and mechanics. For the sciences in which a precise quantitative separation between the observer’s objective and involved standpoints was not possible, or is not principally possible, there cannot be safety of involvement and consequently of refined errors in rational concluding. Hence, with considerable heuristic strength, the following conclusion is drawn: All sciences, including philosophy, should explicitly take and put forward a view that, by rational conclusions, it is possible to make a refined mistake in their areas of cognition and that there is room for other forms of cognition and for religion. (shrink)

La logique de Leibniz: d'apres des documents inedits / par Louis Couturat,...Date de l'edition originale: 1901Sujet de l'ouvrage: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1646-1716)Logique moderneCollection: Collection historique des grands philosophesCe livre est la reproduction fidele d'une oeuvre publiee avant 1920 et fait partie d'une collection de livres reimprimes a la demande editee par Hachette Livre, dans le cadre d'un partenariat avec la Bibliotheque nationale de France, offrant l'opportunite d'acceder a des ouvrages anciens et souvent rares issus des fonds patrimoniaux de la (...) BnF.Les oeuvres faisant partie de cette collection ont ete numerisees par la BnF et sont presentes sur Gallica, sa bibliotheque numerique.En entreprenant de redonner vie a ces ouvrages au travers d'une collection de livres reimprimes a la demande, nous leur donnons la possibilite de rencontrer un public elargi et participons a la transmission de connaissances et de savoirs parfois difficilement accessibles.Nous avons cherche a concilier la reproduction fidele d'un livre ancien a partir de sa version numerisee avec le souci d'un confort de lecture optimal. Nous esperons que les ouvrages de cette nouvelle collection vous apporteront entiere satisfaction.Pour plus d'informations, rendez-vous sur www.hachettebnf.frhttp: //gallica.bnf.fr/ark: /12148/bpt6k110843d. (shrink)

This volume will thus appeal to advanced students and scholars not just in the history of early modern philosophy but in epistemology and other core areas of ...

The paper analyzes the acceleration of the history we are witnessing in our time, which is evident in a series of events and crises that mark the world we live in, especially after the start of the war in Ukraine, which have not occurred in such significant intensity and frequency since the end of the Second World War. Considering these events and crises, the paper discusses the thesis of a historian Eric Hobsbawm that the “short” 20th century that had lasted (...) as “the age of extremes” since the First World War ended with the fall of “communism” and the Berlin Wall, after which we in fact entered the 21st century. Contrary to this thesis and to the well-known thesis on the “end of history”, our paper presents the view that we are still “politically” in the 20th century, because in our time there are similar tensions between the great powers that marked the 20th century and which in general mark the modern world since Westphalian peace in the 17th century. This general thesis is explained by the observation of the most basic lines of the dialectics of modern European and world history. The paper concludes that we are not only “politically” living in the “long” 20th century, but we are still “politically” living in the “longest” classical Westphalian age, which has been lasting for three and a half centuries in the same dialectical contradictions of world politics. Ultimately, the paper also discusses the task of philosophy in the times of the so-called “acceleration of history”, such as ours, and concludes that philosophy as a discipline in these times is obligated to offer, with theoretical creativity, a fresh philosophy of history, explaining in wider perspective a series of actual international occurrences. (shrink)

Since the mid-1970s, scholars have recognized that the skeptical interpretation of Hume's central argument about induction is problematic. The science of human nature presupposes that inductive inference is justified and there are endorsements of induction throughout "Treatise" Book I. The recent suggestion that I.iii.6 is confined to the psychology of inductive inference cannot account for the epistemic flavor of its claims that neither a genuine demonstration nor a non-question-begging inductive argument can establish the uniformity principle. For Hume, that inductive inference (...) is justified is part of the data to be explained. Bad argument is therefore excluded as the cause of inductive inference; and there is no good argument to cause it. Does this reinstate the problem of induction, undermining Hume's own assumption that induction is justified? It does so only if justification must derive from "reason", from the availability of a cogent argument. Hume rejects this internalist thesis; induction's favorable epistemic status derives from features of custom, the mechanism that generates inductive beliefs. Hume is attracted to this externalist posture because it provides a direct explanation of the epistemic achievements of children and non-human animals — creatures that must rely on custom unsupplemented by argument. (shrink)

In this book, Neven Sesardic defends the view that it is both possible and useful to measure the separate contributions of heredity and environment to the explanation of human psychological differences. He critically examines the view - very widely accepted by scientists, social scientists and philosophers of science - that heritability estimates have no causal implications and are devoid of any interest. In a series of clearly written chapters he introduces the reader to the problems and subjects the arguments (...) to close philosophical scrutiny. His conclusion is that anti-heritability arguments are based on conceptual confusions and misunderstandings of behavioural genetics. His book is a fresh and compelling intervention in a very contentious debate. (shrink)

This article critically explores John Rawls’s contention that the personal assets of individuals, i.e. their mental and bodily powers, should not determine the size of their holdings. Since such an argument may have several forms, the first task is to establish which of them Rawls himself advocates. He relies, it is argued, on a version that attempts to convince us that personal assets should not play a decisive distributive role because they are undeserved. This account is then formally reconstructed, making (...) all the relevant premises visible and preparing the ground for a critique that concentrates on the argument’s separate steps. Coming under attack first is the claim that everything should be deserved. The discussion examines next the premise urging us to find an ultimate, indisputable ground for desert-claims. Debate about this issue reveals some fundamental weaknesses in Rawls’s position: that he demands too much and is inconsistent; that some strong counter-intuitive consequences follow from his demands; and that his entire project, were such a criterion taken seriously, is undermined. Final comments are directed against the assertion that the community should own everything an individual does not deserve, showing that this does not remove moral arbitrariness, allows for the use of some persons as resources for others, and cannot plausibly limit its range of application. Most of these criticisms are not original, but are in accord with this paper’s main intention of combining as many good points against Rawls as possible. (shrink)

Rad se bavi konstituisanjem tzv. postideoloske politike u novijoj evropskoj istoriji kao specificne politicke linije koja se suprostavlja svim ideologizacijama politike koje stupaju na snagu posle Francuske revolucije. Termin 'postideoloska politika' se objasnjava i prakticno se potkrepljuje analizom lika i dela trojice znacajnih evropskih drzavnika - Bizmarka Cercila i De Gola koji su prepoznati kao najsnaznije ispoljavanje onoga sto smo nazvali postideoloskom politikom, a koju pre svega karakterise kreativnost, fleksibilnost i izbegavanje svih rigidnih politickih formula. Koncept tzv. postideoloske politike pociva (...) na definiciji politike kao 'umetnosti moguceg' sto je zasticuje od bilo kakvog preteranog ideologizovanja. (shrink)

U radu se razmatra 'vladavina' tzv. postgradjanskog politickog centra koji korespondira sa poznatim konceptom otvorenog drustva, te se ispituju kako dobre, tako i rdjave strane te 'vladavine'. Istrazuje se pre svega stabilnost globalnog otvorenog drustva i paznja se posvecuje njegovim savremenim neprijateljima - od terorizma, preko organizovanog kriminala, sve do tzv. lokalnih legitimnosti koje se suprostavljaju univerzalnoj i globalnoj legitimnosti koju zastupaju pristalice otvorenog drustva iz prostora postgradjanskog politickog centra. Rad predstavlja polemiku sa Fukujaminom tezom o 'kraju istorije' buduci da (...) otvoreno drustvo, tj. globalni postgradjanski politicki centar, ima vidljive neprijatelje koji ne dozvoljavaju da dijalektika istorije miruje kao sto je smatrao Fukujama. Mesto Fukujaminog 'kraja istorije' rad zakljucuje da trenutnu globalnu situaciju obelezava postmoderni opozit liberalno-demokratskog postgradjanskog centra i ekstremnih antigradjanskih margina, odnosno opozit otvorenog drustva i njegovih neprijatelja, sto ce usloviti dalji hod istorije ka novim sociolosko-istorijskim oblicima. (shrink)

Rad se bavi konstituisanjem tzv. postideoloske politike u novijoj evropskoj istoriji kao specificne politicke linije koja se suprostavlja svim ideologizacijama politike koje stupaju na snagu posle Francuske revolucije. Termin 'postideoloska politika' se objasnjava i prakticno se potkrepljuje analizom lika i dela trojice znacajnih evropskih drzavnika - Bizmarka Cercila i De Gola koji su prepoznati kao najsnaznije ispoljavanje onoga sto smo nazvali postideoloskom politikom, a koju pre svega karakterise kreativnost, fleksibilnost i izbegavanje svih rigidnih politickih formula. Koncept tzv. postideoloske politike pociva (...) na definiciji politike kao 'umetnosti moguceg' sto je zasticuje od bilo kakvog preteranog ideologizovanja. (shrink)

The Essay is describing one of the most important structural changes that are brought by post modern age comparing the classical modernism. That structural change is recognised in eruption of so called post materialistic values that are obvious in the fact that in post modern age major requirement becomes the requirement for recognising and identity, what results creating new post modern identities as specific combination of traditional forms of identities and some new forms discovered in the meantime. The eruption of (...) post materialistic values is witnessed by the peace between civil (democratic) society and conventional religions after The World War II, which gives the new post modern identity to the epoch. The promotion of post materialistic values is among the social movements contributed also by research results of so called positive, related to natural sciences, and that new specific reality of science in practice will be recognised in two new modern paradigms – general relativity and quant mechanics. Finally, the Essay is coming to conclusion that in the phenomenon of post materialistic values the era of new post modern «enchantment» is visible and is opposite to the Weber’s modernistic «un enchantment» (Entzauberung) of reality. (shrink)

U radu se razmatra 'vladavina' tzv. postgradjanskog politickog centra koji korespondira sa poznatim konceptom otvorenog drustva, te se ispituju kako dobre, tako i rdjave strane te 'vladavine'. Istrazuje se pre svega stabilnost globalnog otvorenog drustva i paznja se posvecuje njegovim savremenim neprijateljima - od terorizma, preko organizovanog kriminala, sve do tzv. lokalnih legitimnosti koje se suprostavljaju univerzalnoj i globalnoj legitimnosti koju zastupaju pristalice otvorenog drustva iz prostora postgradjanskog politickog centra. Rad predstavlja polemiku sa Fukujaminom tezom o 'kraju istorije' buduci da (...) otvoreno drustvo, tj. globalni postgradjanski politicki centar, ima vidljive neprijatelje koji ne dozvoljavaju da dijalektika istorije miruje kao sto je smatrao Fukujama. Mesto Fukujaminog 'kraja istorije' rad zakljucuje da trenutnu globalnu situaciju obelezava postmoderni opozit liberalno-demokratskog postgradjanskog centra i ekstremnih antigradjanskih margina, odnosno opozit otvorenog drustva i njegovih neprijatelja, sto ce usloviti dalji hod istorije ka novim sociolosko-istorijskim oblicima. (shrink)

Evidentno je postojanje veceg broja filozofsko politickih paradigmi u savremenoj politickoj teoriji i praksi. Svaka od njih (liberalna, radikalna konzervativna, socijalisticka) poseduje odredjene prednosti, ali je i bremenita - odredjenim opasnostima. Autor je misljenja daje neophodna njihova sinteza u pokusaju da se one primene na aktuelni drustveni trenutak u Srbiji. Proces transformacije drustva u svakoj drzavi je specifican i svaka mora da nadje sopstveni model za pristup pomenutom procesu. Clanak namerava da istrazi mogucu sintezu politickih paradigmi i da predlozi nacin (...) njihovog spajanja. U obzir ce se uzeti. pre svega, liberalna, ali i konzervativna i savremeno-socijalisticka (socijaldemokratska) filozofsko-politicka paradigma i promisljati ce se o mogucnosti njihovog ukrstanja. (shrink)

Racial profiling has come under intense public scrutiny especially since the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement. This article discusses two questions: whether racial profiling is sometimes rational, and whether it can be morally permissible. It is argued that under certain circumstances the affirmative answer to both questions is justified.

/Analyticity theorists/, as I will call them, endorse the /doctrine of analyticity in ontology/: if some truth P analytically entails the existence of certain things, then a theory that contains P but does not claim that those things exist is no more ontologically parsimonious than a theory that also claims that they exist. Suppose, for instance, that the existence of a table in a certain location is analytically entailed by the existence and features of certain particles in that location. The (...) doctrine implies that the table's existence requires nothing more of the world than that those particles exist and bear the features in question. Analyticity theorists have alleged that this idea may be used to defend controversial existence claims against a battery of objections. I argue that this style of defense fails, because the doctrine faces counter-examples. An existence claim may be analytically entailed by some truth and still report a substantial further fact. (shrink)

In his criticism of my paper on the concept of race (Sesardic, 2010), Adam Hochman raises many issues that deserve further clarification. First, I will comment on Hochman’s claim that I attack a straw man version of racial constructionism. Second, I will try to correct what I see as a distorted historical picture of the debate between racial naturalists and racial constructionists. Third, I will point out the main weaknesses in Hochman’s own defense of constructionism about race. And fourth, I (...) will briefly comment on why I think that Hochman unjustifiably dismisses one of the potential sources of racial differentiation that were suggested in my paper. Before I start, though, a preliminary clarification is in order. Hochman kindly calls my article ‘‘one of the strongest defenses of racial naturalism in recent times’’, which might suggest to the reader that my goal was to offer a full-fledged biological explication of the concept of race. But in fact my ambition was more limited. As I explained: My aim in this paper was not to prove the biological reality of race. Rather, more modestly, I have tried to show that typical attempts to disconnect the concept of race from genetics have too quickly and too uncritically been accepted by many ‘‘race critics’’. (Sesardic, 2010, p. 160; italics added) I will continue defending the same position in this article. (shrink)

Hume's claim that a state is a belief is often intertwined—though without his remarking on this fact—with epistemic approval of the state. This requires explanation. Beliefs, in Hume's view, are steady dispositions (not lively ideas), nature's provision for a steady influence on the will and action. Hume's epistemic distinctions call attention to circumstances in which the presence of conflicting beliefs undermine a belief's influence and thereby its natural function. On one version of this interpretation, to say that a belief is (...) justified, ceteris paribus, is to say that for all that has been shown the belief would be steady in its influence under suitable reflection. On a second version, it is to say that prima facie justification is an intrinsic property of the state, in virtue of its steadiness. These versions generate different understandings of the relationship between Parts iii and iv of Book I of the Treatise. (shrink)

There is a curious bifurcation in the literature on ground and its logic. On the one hand, there has been a great deal of work that presumes that logical complexity invariably yields grounding. So, for instance, it is widely presumed that any fact stated by a true conjunction is grounded in those stated by its conjuncts, that any fact stated by a true disjunction is grounded in that stated by any of its true disjuncts, and that any fact stated by (...) a true double negation is grounded in that stated by the doubly-negated formula. This commitment is encapsulated in the system GG axiomatized and semantically characterized by [deRosset and Fine, 2023] (following [Fine, 2012]). On the other hand, there has been a great deal of important formal work on “flatter” theories of ground, yielding logics very different from GG [Correia, 2010] [Fine, 2016, 2017b]. For instance, these theories identify the fact stated by a self-conjunction $$(\phi \wedge \phi )$$ with that stated by its conjunct $$\phi $$. Since, in these systems, no fact grounds itself, the “flatter” theories are inconsistent with the principles of GG. This bifurcation raises the question of whether there is a single notion of ground suited to fulfill the philosophical ambitions of grounding enthusiasts. There is, at present, no unified semantic framework employing a single conception of ground for simultaneously characterizing both GG and the “flatter” approaches. This paper fills this gap by specifying such a framework and demonstrating its adequacy. (shrink)

In 1980, at the end of the most intensely political period of his work and life, Louis Althusser penned Philosophy for Non-philosophers. Available here for the first time in English, Philosophy for Non-philosophers constitutes a rigorous and engaged attempt to address a wide reading public unfamiliar with Althusser's project. As such, the work is a concentration of the most fundamental theses of Althusser's own ideas, and presents a synthesis of his sprawling and disparate philosophical and political writings. Nowhere else (...) does Althusser push the distinction between philosophy and other disciplines as far, or develop in such detail the concept of 'practice'. Rather than a work of 'popular philosophy', Philosophy for Non-philosophers is a continuation and conglomeration of Althusser's thought; a thought whose radicality is still perceptible in those that have followed since. Philosophy for Non-philosophers thus provides a vivid encapsulation of Althusser's seminal influence on the leading thinkers of today, including Ranciere, Badiou, Balibar, and Žižek. (shrink)

Did modernity begin with the Renaissance and end with post-modernism? Dupre challenges both these assumptions, discussing the roots, development and impact of modern thought and tracing the principles of modernity to the late 14th century.

Growing up in Ionia -- Travels far and wide -- Settling in Croton -- Pythagorean beliefs -- A lasting legacy.

The authors offer a "first" summary of Teilhard's thoughts on love, a central element in his evolutionary spirituality, presented in accessible language for the ordinary reader. They explore the implications of Teilhard's evolutionary perspective on love as it affects friendships, marriages, parent-child relationships, and teams (larger groups).

The history and philosophy of affective terms and concepts contains important challenges for contemporary scientific accounts of emotion regulation. First, there is the problem of moral undertow. This arises because stipulating the ends of emotion regulation requires normative assumptions that ultimately derive from values and morals. Some historical precedents are considered to help explain and address this problem. Second, there is the problem of organization. This arises because multiple emotions are often organized and oriented in very particular ways over the (...) life of the individual in a manner that cannot be adequately explained using the concept of “emotion.” A modern variant of the traditional concept of passion is invoked to help address this problem. (shrink)

This article aims to shed light on both the foundations and the consistency of the position regarding akrasia Xenophon attributes to Socrates in the Memorabilia. As does Plato's Socrates, Xenophon's Socrates maintains that akrasia is impossible in the presence of knowledge. On the other hand, he differs from the platonic Socrates by granting to enkrateia, instead of knowledge, the role of foundation for virtue. If enkrateia is the very condition for acquiring knowledge and virtue, consequently the responsibility for countering akrasia (...) falls to enkrateia. (shrink)

L'ouvrage retrace la genèse des études sur les systèmes dynamiques auto-organisateurs (Ashby, Von Foerster, Prigogine, von Bertalanffy) et leurs applications en neurosciences et sciences cognitives. Réalisées aux Etats-Unis en particulier, ces dernières s'inscrivent dans ce que l'on appelle, depuis les années 1980, l'Hypothèse Dynamique. Dès les années 1970, de nouvelles recherches sur le cerveau (neurodynamique) voient le jour. Des neurophysiologistes et biologistes tels Freeman, Katchalsky, Yates et Basar l'envisagent comme dynamique, non-linéaire, fait de combinaisons chaotiques, d'états de métastabilité, d'instabilité s'équilibrant (...) vers un état d'autoorganisation globale. Ces conclusions sont ensuite illustrées dans les neurosciences comportementales (dynamique de coordination sensorimotrice) et aussi par des interrogations sur le rôle des oscillations et synchronisations neuronales dans la perception et la mémoire, avec notamment le binding problem, problème du liage ou de la liaison des données sensorielles dans le cerveau. Sans oublier la découverte de neurones miroirs amenant à l'idée d'une "simulation" à la fois corporelle et psychique de ce qui est perçu par un individu. Ce concept, entre autres, et aussi les principes de codage/décodage et de prédiction de l'information issus de travaux de physiciens et mathématiciens russes et américains, anciens et récents, permettent à l'auteur de proposer un modèle précis de ce que pourrait être une nouvelle théorie esthétique. (shrink)

In a 2018 referendum, the Irish electorate voted in favour of repealing Ireland's quasi-total legal ban on abortion. The referendum campaign saw important public discussions regarding gender roles in twenty-first century Ireland. While the constitutional ban on abortion was condemned by abortion rights advocates for marginalising women's agency, the legislation which replaced it has not escaped criticism either. Therefore, questions surrounding the conceptualisation of women's agency in the 2018 referendum are still relevant today. Adopting a multimodal critical discourse analysis approach, (...) this paper analyses signage from the weeks before the vote to examine the discursive construction of women's agency in the linguistic landscape of the referendum campaign. I argue that many mainstream campaign organisations – including those arguing for liberalisation of abortion laws – were complicit in the discursive diminishment of women's agency, suggesting that the campaign did not necessarily challenge prevailing ideologies of gender and agency. (shrink)