This study investigates the relations among Machiavellianism, the stakeholder orientation, and Italian managers' support for corporate social and environmental reporting (SER). These relationships have not previously been investigated among a sample of experienced managers but have important implications. As anticipated, Machiavellianism had a strong negative association with the support for SER. Machiavellianism was also negatively related to the stakeholder orientation, which in turn was positively correlated with the support for SER. Support for the stakeholder orientation partially mediated the association between (...) Machiavellianism and SER. The findings advance our understanding of the motivations for sustainability reporting by documenting that managers' fundamental personality traits and economic ideologies are closely associated and are important determinants of normative support for social and environmental disclosures. We further suggest that the results support the case for mandated compliance‐with‐standard sustainability reports coupled with a requirement that such reports be independently audited. (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to develop and test a model capturing the effects of ethics institutionalization on employee experiences in work life and overall life satisfaction. It was hypothesized that explicit ethics institutionalization has a positive effect on implicit ethics institutionalization, which in turn enhances employee experiences in work life. It was also hypothesized that employee work life experiences have a positive effect on overall life satisfaction and happiness, moderated by work–family life conflict. Data were collected though a (...) survey of marketing managers in Italy. The data provide good but partial support for the model. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed. (shrink)

Using an experiment with corporate financial managers, we find that when red flags are present in the financial statements under their review, managers identify those red flags and, in turn, have greater concerns over earnings quality. In addition, when pressure to meet a financial target is high, managers are more concerned about earnings quality when red flags are present. We also document that when red flags are present, managers are more likely to report both internally to their CEO and, if (...) their concerns are not resolved internally, externally to their auditor. Pressure to meet a financial target increases the likelihood managers report internally, but decreases their likelihood of reporting externally when red flags are present. Additional analyses document reporting differences between CFOs and controllers, and examine the important roles that short-term personal costs, job tenure, and a non-accounting background play in the ethical dilemma managers face when deciding whether to report externally. (shrink)