Results for 'Lloyd J. Miller'

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  1.  40
    Book Review Section 1. [REVIEW]Maralyn Blachowicz, Lloyd J. Miller, Ezri Atzmon, Brian J. Spittle, Fred C. Rankine, Abdelhady Elsayed Abdu, Stafford Kay, Edward B. Goellner, Jerome F. Megna, Ronald Mark & Robert S. Griffin - 1981 - Educational Studies 12 (1):85-98.
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  2.  20
    Book Review Section 1. [REVIEW]Philip G. Altbach, Hilda Calabro, Lloyd J. Miller, Janice Ann Beran, Harvey G. Neufeldt, John Martin Rich, Clinton R. Bunke, John L. Brickell, Glorianne M. Leck & J. J. Chambliss - 1979 - Educational Studies 10 (1):94-113.
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  3.  17
    The Hand of the Lord. A Reassessment of the "Ark Narrative" of I Samuel.Lloyd Bailey, Patrick D. Miller & J. J. Roberts - 1979 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 99 (3):471.
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  4.  30
    Cardiovascular disease and non‐steroidal anti‐inflammatory drug prescribing in the midst of evolving guidelines.Timothy T. Pham, Michael J. Miller, Donald L. Harrison, Ann E. Lloyd, Kimberly M. Crosby & Jeremy L. Johnson - 2013 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 19 (6):1026-1034.
  5.  8
    Mental Time Travel in Animals: The “When” of Mental Time Travel.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & Rasmus Pedersen - forthcoming - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences.
    While many aspects of cognition have been shown to be shared between humans and non-human animals, there remains controversy regarding whether the capacity to mentally time travel is a uniquely human one. In this paper, we argue that there are four ways of representing when some event happened: four kinds of temporal representation. Distinguishing these four kinds of temporal representation has five benefits. First, it puts us in a position to determine the particular benefits these distinct temporal representations afford an (...)
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  6. Episodic Imagining, Temporal Experience, and Beliefs about Time.Anthony Bigg, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & Shira Yechimovitz - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    We explore the role of episodic imagining in explaining why people both differentially report that it seems to them in experience as though time robustly passes, and why they differentially report that they believe that time does in fact robustly pass. We empirically investigate two hypotheses, the differential vividness hypothesis, and the mental time travel hypothesis. According to each of these, the degree to which people vividly episodically imagine past/future states of affairs influences their tendency to report that it seems (...)
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  7. There’s No Time Like the Present: Present-Bias, Temporal Attitudes and Temporal Ontology.Natalja Deng, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2020 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), The Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    This paper investigates the connection between temporal attitudes (attitudes characterised by a concern (or lack thereof) about future and past events), beliefs about temporal ontology (beliefs about the existence of future and past events) and temporal preferences (preferences regarding where in time events are located). Our aim is to probe the connection between these preferences, attitudes, and beliefs, in order to better evaluate the normative status of these preferences. We investigate the hypothesis that there is a three-way association between (a) (...)
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  8.  7
    Colleges and commitments.Lloyd J. Averill - 1971 - Philadelphia,: Westminster Press. Edited by William W. Jellema.
    The nature and legitimacy of commitments. Objectivity vs. commitment, by H. Smith. Institutional commitment: a social scientist's view, by H. R. Davis. The sectarian nature of liberal education, by L. J. Averill. The identity of the Christian college, by W. W. Jellema.--Commitments and the dimensions of learning. Discursive truth and evangelical truth, by A. C. Outler. Natural order and transcendent order, by W. G. Pollard. Limited cognition and ultimate cognition, by R. W. Friedrichs. Academic teaching and human experience, by M. (...)
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  9.  8
    The Parameters of military ethics.Lloyd J. Matthews & Dale E. Brown (eds.) - 1989 - Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers.
    Essays omhandlende den etiske dimension i det militære liv.
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  10.  16
    Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries The Ethereal Aether. A History of Michelson-Morley-Miller Aether-Drift Experiments, 1880–1930. By Lloyd S. Swenson Jr Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972. Pp. xxii +361. £4.75. Nineteenth Century Aether Theories. By Kenneth F. Schaffner. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1972. Pp. x + 278. £3.25. [REVIEW]J. O. Marsh - 1974 - British Journal for the History of Science 7 (1):96-97.
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  11. Hedonic and Non-Hedonic Bias toward the Future.Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):148-163.
    It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that our first-person preferences regarding pleasurable and painful experiences exhibit a bias toward the future (positive and negative hedonic future-bias), and that our preferences regarding non-hedonic events (both positive and negative) exhibit no such bias (non-hedonic time-neutrality). Further, it has been assumed that our third-person preferences are always time-neutral. Some have attempted to use these (presumed) differential patterns of future-bias—different across kinds of events and perspectives—to argue for the irrationality of hedonic future-bias. This (...)
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  12. An Empirical Investigation of the Role of Direction in our Concept of Time.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (1):25-47.
    This paper empirically investigates one aspect of the folk concept of time by testing how the presence or absence of directedness impacts judgements about whether there is time in a world. Experiment 1 found that dynamists, showed significantly higher levels of agreement that there is time in dynamically directed worlds than in non-dynamical non-directed worlds. Comparing our results to those we describe in Latham et al., we report that while ~ 70% of dynamists say there is time in B-theory worlds, (...)
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  13. Is our naïve theory of time dynamical?Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Synthese 198 (5):4251-4271.
    We investigated, experimentally, the contention that the folk view, or naïve theory, of time, amongst the population we investigated is dynamical. We found that amongst that population, ~ 70% have an extant theory of time that is more similar to a dynamical than a non-dynamical theory, and ~ 70% of those who deploy a naïve theory of time deploy a naïve theory that is more similar to a dynamical than a non-dynamical theory. Interestingly, while we found stable results across our (...)
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  14. On Preferring that Overall, Things are Worse: Future‐Bias and Unequal Payoffs.Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):181-194.
    Philosophers working on time-biases assume that people are hedonically biased toward the future. A hedonically future-biased agent prefers pleasurable experiences to be future instead of past, and painful experiences to be past instead of future. Philosophers further predict that this bias is strong enough to apply to unequal payoffs: people often prefer less pleasurable future experiences to more pleasurable past ones, and more painful past experiences to less painful future ones. In addition, philosophers have predicted that future-bias is restricted to (...)
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  15. Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Christian Tarsney & Hannah Tierney - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):2053-2075.
    Empirical work has lately confirmed what many philosophers have taken to be true: people are ‘biased toward the future’. All else being equal, we usually prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. According to one hypothesis, the temporal metaphysics hypothesis, future-bias is explained either by our beliefs about temporal metaphysics—the temporal belief hypothesis—or alternatively by our temporal phenomenology—the temporal phenomenology hypothesis. We empirically investigate a particular version of the temporal belief hypothesis according to (...)
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  16. The community of self.J. Miller M. Mair - 1977 - In D. Bannister (ed.), New Perspectives in Personal Construct Theory. Academic Press. pp. 125--149.
     
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  17.  62
    Foundations of Logic Programming.J. W. Lloyd - 1987 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 52 (1):288-289.
  18. Why do people represent time as dynamical? An investigation of temporal dynamism and the open future.Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1717-1742.
    Deflationists hold that it does not seem to us, in experience, as though time robustly passes. There is some recent empirical evidence that appears to support this contention. Equally, empirical evidence suggests that we naïvely represent time as dynamical. Thus deflationists are faced with an explanatory burden. If, as they maintain, the world seems to us in experience as though it is non-dynamical, then why do we represent time as dynamical? This paper takes up the challenge of investigating, on the (...)
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  19. Do the Folk Represent Time as Essentially Dynamical?Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1.
    Recent research (Latham, Miller and Norton, forthcoming) reveals that a majority of people represent actual time as dynamical. But do they, as suggested by McTaggart and Gödel, represent time as essentially dynamical? This paper distinguishes three interrelated questions. We ask (a) whether the folk representation of time is sensitive or insensitive: i.e., does what satisfies the folk representation of time in counterfactual worlds depend on what satisfies it actually—sensitive—or does is not depend on what satisfies it actually—insensitive, and (b) (...)
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  20. An Empirical Investigation of Purported Passage Phenomenology.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (7):353-386.
    It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that most people unambiguously have a phenomenology as of time passing, and that this is a datum that philosophical theories must accommodate. Moreover, it has been assumed that the greater the extent to which people have said phenomenology, the more likely they are to endorse a dynamical theory of time. This paper is the first to empirically test these assumptions. Surprisingly, our results do not support either assumption. One experiment instead found the reverse (...)
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  21. Robust passage phenomenology probably does not explain future-bias.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Christian Tarsney & Hannah Tierney - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-23.
    People are ‘biased toward the future’: all else being equal, we typically prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. Several explanations have been suggested for this pattern of preferences. Adjudicating among these explanations can, among other things, shed light on the rationality of future-bias: For instance, if our preferences are explained by unjustified beliefs or an illusory phenomenology, we might conclude that they are irrational. This paper investigates one hypothesis, according to which future-bias (...)
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  22. How Much Do We Discount Past Pleasures?Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):367-376.
    Future-biased individuals systematically prefer pleasures to be in the future and pains to be in the past. Empirical research shows that negative future-bias is robust: people prefer more past pain to less future pain. Is positive future-bias robust or fragile? Do people only prefer pleasures to be located in the future, compared to the past, when those pleasures are of equal value, or do they continue to prefer that pleasures be located in the future even when past pleasures outweigh future (...)
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  23. Capacity for simulation and mitigation drives hedonic and non-hedonic time biases.Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (2):226-252.
    Until recently, philosophers debating the rationality of time-biases have supposed that people exhibit a first-person hedonic bias toward the future, but that their non-hedonic and third-person preferences are time-neutral. Recent empirical work, however, suggests that our preferences are more nuanced. First, there is evidence that our third-person preferences exhibit time-neutrality only when the individual with respect to whom we have preferences—the preference target—is a random stranger about whom we know nothing; given access to some information about the preference target, third-person (...)
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  24. Future bias in action: does the past matter more when you can affect it?Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, James Norton & Christian Tarsney - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11327-11349.
    Philosophers have long noted, and empirical psychology has lately confirmed, that most people are “biased toward the future”: we prefer to have positive experiences in the future, and negative experiences in the past. At least two explanations have been offered for this bias: belief in temporal passage and the practical irrelevance of the past resulting from our inability to influence past events. We set out to test the latter explanation. In a large survey, we find that participants exhibit significantly less (...)
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  25. Exploring Arbitrariness Objections to Time-Biases.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Jordan Oh, Sam Shpall & Wen Yu - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association.
    There are two kinds of time-bias: near-bias and future-bias. While philosophers typically hold that near-bias is rationally impermissible, many hold that future-bias is rationally permissible. Call this normative hybridism. According to arbitrariness objections, certain patterns of preference are rationally impermissible because they are arbitrary. While arbitrariness objections have been levelled against both near-bias and future-bias, the kind of arbitrariness in question has been different. In this paper we investigate whether there are forms of arbitrariness that are common to both kinds (...)
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  26. Time in a one‐instant world.Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - 2020 - Ratio 33 (3):145-154.
    Many philosophers hold that ‘one-instant worlds’—worlds that contain a single instant—fail to contain time. We experimentally investigate whether these worlds satisfy the folk concept of time. We found that ~50% of participants hold that there is time in such worlds. We argue that this suggests one of two possibilities. First, the population disagree about whether at least one of the A-, B-, or C-series is necessary for time, with there being a substantial sub-population for whom the presence of neither an (...)
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  27. Are the Folk Functionalists About Time?Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - 2022 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 60 (2):221-248.
    This paper empirically investigates the contention that the folk concept of time is a functional concept: a concept according to which time is whatever plays a certain functional role or roles. This hypothesis could explain why, in previous research, surprisingly large percentages of participants judge that there is time at worlds that contain no one-dimensional substructure of ordered instants. If it seems to participants that even in those worlds the relevant functional role is played, then this could explain why they (...)
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  28. Our Naïve Representation of Time and of the Open Future.Batoul Hodroj, Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - forthcoming - Dialectica.
    It’s generally thought that we naively or pre-theoretically represent the future to be open. While philosophers have modelled future openness in different ways, it’s unclear which, if any, captures our naïve sense that the future is open. In this paper we focus on just one way the future might count as being open: by being nomically open, and empirically investigate whether our naïve representation of the future as open is partly constituted by representing the future as nomically open. We also (...)
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  29.  69
    Is future bias a manifestation of the temporal value asymmetry?Eugene Caruso, Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Future-bias is the preference, all else being equal, for positive states of affairs to be located in the future not the past, and for negative states of affairs to be located in the past not the future. Three explanations for future-bias have been posited: the temporal metaphysics explanation, the practical irrelevance explanation, and the three mechanisms explanation. Understanding what explains future-bias is important not only for better understanding the phenomenon itself, but also because many philosophers think that which explanation is (...)
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  30. Temporal Dynamism and the Persisting Stable Self.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & Shira Yechimovitz - manuscript
    Empirical evidence suggests that a majority of people believe that time robustly passes, and that many also report that it seems to them, in experience, as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists deny that time robustly passes, and many contemporary non-dynamists—deflationists—even deny that it seems to us as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists, then, face the dual challenge of explaining why people have such beliefs and make such reports about their experiences. Several philosophers have suggested the stable-self explanation, according to which (...)
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  31.  65
    The Moving Open Future, Temporal Phenomenology, and Temporal Passage.Batoul Hodroj, Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - forthcoming - Asian Journal of Philosophy.
    Empirical evidence suggests that people naïvely represent time as dynamical (i.e. as containing robust temporal passage). Yet many contemporary B-theorists deny that it seems to us, in perceptual experience, as though time robustly passes. The question then arises as to why we represent time as dynamical if we do not have perceptual experiences which represent time as dynamical. We consider two hypotheses about why this might be: the temporally asperspectival replacement hypothesis and the moving open future hypothesis. We then empirically (...)
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  32.  98
    Agentive Explanations of Temporal Passage Experiences and Beliefs.Anthony Bigg, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & Shira Yechimovitz - manuscript
    Several philosophers have suggested that certain aspects of people’s experience of agency partly explains why people tend to report that it seems to them, in perceptual experience, as though time robustly passes. In turn, it has been suggested that people come to believe that time robustly passes on the basis of its seeming to them in experience that it does. We argue that what require explaining is not just that people report that it seems to them as though time robustly (...)
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  33. Locating Temporal Passage in a Block World.Brigitte Everett, Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.
    This paper aims to determine whether we can locate temporal passage in a non-dynamical (block universe) world. In particular, we seek to determine both whether temporal passage can be located somewhere in our world if it is non-dynamical, and also to home in on where in such a world temporal passage can be located, if it can be located anywhere. We investigate this question by seeking to determine, across three experiments, whether the folk concept of temporal passage can be satisfied (...)
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  34.  27
    Moral Intensity Revisited: Measuring the Benefit of Accounting Ethics Interventions.Tara J. Shawver & William F. Miller - 2017 - Journal of Business Ethics 141 (3):587-603.
    The purpose of this study was to determine whether accounting students’ perception of moral intensity could be enhanced through a limited ethics intervention in an Advanced Accounting course. Ethical decisions are heavily influenced by the intensity of the moral problem: the more egregious the act, the more the people view it as unethical. This controlled experiment measures the change in perceptions of moral intensity with the pre- and post-test instruments using five accounting specific vignettes containing moral dilemmas which are progressively (...)
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  35. Can we turn people into pain pumps?: On the Rationality of Future Bias and Strong Risk Aversion.David Braddon-Mitchell, Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 1:1-32.
    Future-bias is the preference, all else being equal, for negatively valenced events be located in the past rather than the future, and positively valenced ones to be located in the future rather than the past. Strong risk aversion is the preference to pay some cost to mitigate the badness of the worst outcome. People who are both strongly risk averse and future-biased can face a series of choices that will guarantee them more pain, for no compensating benefit: they will be (...)
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  36.  16
    Rethinking Sexuality: Foucault and Classical Antiquity.David H. J. Larmour, Paul Allen Miller & Charles Platter - 2021 - Princeton University Press.
    In this collection of provocative essays, historians and literary theorists assess the influence of Michel Foucault, particularly his History of Sexuality, on the study of classics. Foucault's famous work presents a bold theory of sexuality for both ancient and modern times, and yet until now it has remained under-explored and insufficiently analyzed. By bringing together the historical knowledge, philological skills, and theoretical perspectives of a wide range of scholars, this collection enables the reader to explore Foucault's model of Greek culture (...)
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  37.  32
    Correction to: The implicit decision theory of non-philosophers.Preston Greene, Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & Michael Nielsen - 2024 - Synthese 203 (3):1-2.
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  38. Quantum gravity, timelessness, and the folk concept of time.Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9453-9478.
    What it would take to vindicate folk temporal error theory? This question is significant against a backdrop of new views in quantum gravity—so-called timeless physical theories—that claim to eliminate time by eliminating a one-dimensional substructure of ordered temporal instants. Ought we to conclude that if these views are correct, nothing satisfies the folk concept of time and hence that folk temporal error theory is true? In light of evidence we gathered, we argue that physical theories that entirely eliminate an ordered (...)
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  39.  31
    Why we should have seen that coming.M. J. Wolf, K. Miller & F. S. Grodzinsky - 2017 - Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 47 (3):54-64.
    In this paper we examine the case of Tay, the Microsoft AI chatbot that was launched in March, 2016. After less than 24 hours, Microsoft shut down the experiment because the chatbot was generating tweets that were judged to be inappropriate since they included racist, sexist, and anti-Semitic language. We contend that the case of Tay illustrates a problem with the very nature of learning software that interacts directly with the public, and the developer's role and responsibility associated with it. (...)
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  40. Lexicalisation and the Origin of the Human Mind.Thomas J. Hughes & J. T. M. Miller - 2014 - Biosemiotics 7 (1):11-27.
    This paper will discuss the origin of the human mind, and the qualitative discontinuity between human and animal cognition. We locate the source of this discontinuity within the language faculty, and thus take the origin of the mind to depend on the origin of the language faculty. We will look at one such proposal put forward by Hauser et al. (Science 298:1569-1579, 2002), which takes the evolution of a Merge trait (recursion) to solely explain the differences between human and animal (...)
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  41.  6
    The effect of ordering on the strength and dislocation arrangements in the Ni3Mn superlattice.M. J. Marcinkowski & D. S. Miller - 1961 - Philosophical Magazine 6 (67):871-893.
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  42. On Scepticism About Personal Identity Thought Experiments.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Caroline West & Wen Yu - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 1.
    Many philosophers have become sceptical of the use of thought experiments in theorising about personal identity. In large part this is due to work in experimental philosophy that appears to confirm long held philosophical suspicions that thought experiments elicit inconsistent judgements about personal identity, and hence judgements that are thought to be the product of cognitive biases. If so, these judgements appear to be useless at informing our theories of personal identity. Using the methods of experimental philosophy, we investigate whether (...)
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  43. Pure and Impure Time Preferences.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):277-283.
    This paper investigates two assumptions of the exponential discounted utility theory (EDU) to which Callender draws our attention: namely that we can cleanly distinguish pure from impure temporal preferences, and that past discounting can be ignored. Drawing on recent empirical work in this area, we argue that in so far as one might have thought that past-directed preferences are more pure than future ones, then there is evidence that people’s pure preferences (in so far as we can make sense of (...)
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  44.  27
    Tripolitania - D. J. Mattingly: Tripolitania. Pp. xix + 265, 89 figs, 39 plates. London: Batsford, 1995. Cased, £55. ISBN: 0-7134-5743-2.J. A. Lloyd - 1997 - The Classical Review 47 (2):362-364.
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  45. Philosophical Methodology and Conceptions of Evil Action.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (3):296-315.
    There is considerable philosophical dispute about what it takes for an action to be evil. The methodological assumption underlying this dispute is that there is a single, shared folk conception of evil action deployed amongst culturally similar people. Empirical research we undertook suggests that this assumption is false. There exist, amongst the folk, numerous conceptions of evil action. Hence, we argue, philosophical research is most profitably spent in two endeavours. First, in determining which (if any) conception of evil action we (...)
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  46. Investigating Non-philosophers’ Judgements about the Asymmetry of Metaphysical Explanation.Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - manuscript
    It is often supposed that metaphysical explanation is asymmetric: that for all x and y, if x metaphysically explains y, then y does not metaphysically explain x. Even amongst those who hold that metaphysical explanation is not asymmetric, but nonsymmetric, it is assumed that a relatively small number of particular explanations are symmetric: by and large, if x metaphysically explains y, then y does not metaphysically explain x. Both parties agree that as a matter of fact we at least typically (...)
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  47. Is it identity all the way down? From supersubstantivalism to composition as identity and back again.Michael J. Duncan & Kristie Miller - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1.
    We argue that, insofar as one accepts either supersubstantivalism or strong composition as identity for the usual reasons, one has (defeasible) reasons to accept the other as well. Thus, all else being equal, one ought to find the package that combines both views—the Identity Package—more attractive than any rival package that includes one, but not the other, of either supersubstantivalism or composition as identity.
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  48.  12
    Correction to: Against a normative asymmetry between near- and future-bias.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & James Norton - 2023 - Synthese 201 (5):1-2.
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  49. Geoffrey Hill and British Poetry 1956-1986: An Analysis of Poetic Language and Poetic Voice.J. F. Lloyd - 1991
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  50. Julia Annas, on Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy by Jacques Brunschwig.J. Lloyd - 1996 - European Journal of Philosophy 4:369-372.
     
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