Shelly Kagan argues in his ‘What's Wrong with Speciesism?’ for four provocative claims: 1. speciesism is not necessarily a mere prejudice; 2. most people are not speciesists; 3. ‘modal personism’ more closely reflects what most people believe, and 4. modal personism might be true. In this article, I object to Kagan's account of what constitutes a ‘mere prejudice’, and I object to the sort of argument he uses to show that most people are not speciesist. I then attempt to motivate, (...) and defend what I take to be the best version of modal personism; answer several problems for the view; and raise other problems that I think are harder to answer. (shrink)

This article is an attempt to deepen our understanding of trust. To this end, several elements frequently present in trust-relationships are first identified, and then three underappreciated puzzles about trust are described. Next, it is argued that certain leading analyses of trust are unsatisfactory, in part, because they are unable to solve these puzzles succesfully. Finally, an alternative way of thinking about trust is proposed. It is argued that this new way of thinking about trust is bothindependently plausible and better (...) able to solve these puzzles about trust. (shrink)

Humane farming can be defined as the practice of raising animals for food in an environment that is good for them and where they are killed in a manner that is relatively painless. Many people who oppose factory farming think that humane farming is morally permissible, even morally laudable. In what follows, I focus on one argument in support of humane farming that emphasizes its good consequences, not only for producers, and consumers, but for the animals themselves. I discuss problems (...) for this argument and explain how it can be revised to overcome those problems. In the end, I explain why even the strongest version of the good‐consequences argument fails to show that most cases of humane farming are morally permissible. However, my objections to this argument suggest that humane farming may be morally permissible in rare cases. (shrink)

The paper advances a consequence-based argument in support of the American Medical Association's policy that a physician may not ethically refuse to treat a person with HIV solely because the patient is seropositive. A limited number of alternative arguments, both in support of and in opposition to this policy are also considered, but are found wanting. The paper then concludes with a discussion of some of the other obstacles to quality health care that persons with HIV must often confront.

In this updated second edition, Debating Health Care Ethics explores contemporary moral challenges in health care, providing students with the essential tools to understand and critically evaluate the leading arguments in the field and to develop their own arguments on important moral problems in health care. Written in a clear and concise way, the textbook’s first three chapters explore the nature of arguments and ethical theories, while the remaining chapters introduce students to moral problems in health care through case studies (...) and dramas that feature complex scenarios involving patients, family members, and health care providers. Each case study and drama is followed by a lively debate where the authors defend their unique approaches to the dilemma. This new edition now includes more gender inclusive dramas, an expanded discussion of feminist ethics, a case study on euthanasia that highlights changes to Canadian law, and an update on fetal consciousness that informs the debate on abortion. Emphasizing critical issues in health care from a Canadian perspective, this essential textbook will benefit students in philosophy, nursing, and health studies. (shrink)

It seems clear that a fortunate life for a human being is very different from a fortunate life for a dog. But it is not clear what the appropriate measure is for determining whether a life is fortunate or not. Jeff McMahan rejects the Species Norm Account and defends the Intrinsic Potential Account of overall lifelong fortune. In this article, I argue that the Intrinsic Potential Account fails. More specifically, I will argue that it is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples; fails (...) for the same basic reason that McMahan rejects the Species Norm Account; and is insensitive to a consideration that is morally significant. (shrink)

It seems clear that a fortunate life for a human being is very different from a fortunate life for a dog. But it is not clear what the appropriate measure is for determining whether a life is fortunate or not. Jeff McMahan rejects the Species Norm Account and defends the Intrinsic Potential Account of overall lifelong fortune. In this article, I argue that the Intrinsic Potential Account fails. More specifically, I will argue that it is vulnerable to numerous counterexamples; fails (...) for the same basic reason that McMahan rejects the Species Norm Account; and is insensitive to a consideration that is morally significant. (shrink)

The meaning of pain is the subject of this text, providing a philosophical perspective on coping with this debilitating condition. The book presents a discussion and review of world philosophy and literature relevant to the problem of human suffering.

The current emphasis on rising educational standards in Australian society (eg A Commonwealth Government Quality Teacher Initiative, 2000) has stimulated a growing interest in Vygotsky's socio-cultural theory widely renowned for its profound understanding of teaching and learning. The metaphor of scaffolding commonly viewed as underpinned by socio-cultural theory and the zone of proximal development in particular, has become increasingly popular among educators in Australia (Hammond, 2002). Teachers find the metaphor appealing as it "offers what is lacking in much literature on (...) education - an effective conceptual metaphor for the quality of teacher intervention in learning" (Hammond, 2002, p.2). However, there is no consensus of opinion among educators on the specific characteristics that constitute successful scaffolding. On the contrary, the current interpretation of scaffolding seems to have been drifting away from the Vygotskian view of teaching and learning and appears to have become an umbrella term for any kind of teacher support (Jacobs, 2001) and therefore, cannot serve the purpose of justifying the quality of teacher intervention. Furthermore, when taken out of its theoretical context, scaffolding tends to be interpreted as a form of direct instruction (Donovan & Smolkin, 2002), which invalidates the Vygotskian idea of teaching as co-construction of knowledge within student-centred activities. Such an interpretation of the metaphor of scaffolding is an unfortunate step back to a traditional, pre-Piagetian way of teaching which is adult-driven in nature and often results in "the imposition of a structure on the student" (Searle, 1984, in Stone, 1998, p. 349). In spite of a number of limitations of the metaphor, that have been discussed by socio-cultural theorists (e. g., Stone, 2001), it remains highly popular among educators. To fulfil teachers' expectations of scaffolding as being an effective teaching tool, it needs to be understood within the framework of its underlying theory. This project aims to analyse understanding of the concept of scaffolding by educational researchers and practitioners in its connection to the Vygotskian view of the role of instruction in nurturing children as active learners. (shrink)