The medieval computus was intended primarily for literate and numerate ecclesiastical users; reading the Latin computus required a good knowledge of technical Latin, while understanding its calculations presupposed some formal education in arithmetic and astronomy. By the mid-thirteenth century, users would have included a small group of literate and numerate laymen; by the mid-fifteenth century, users would have included the less educated and even semiliterate, as a consequence of a more extensive range of computus material made available for the purpose (...) in the vernacular. (shrink)

According to the dominant position among philosophers of language today, we can legitimately ascribe determinate contents to natural language sentences, independently of what the speaker actually means. This view contrasts with that held by ordinary language philosophers fifty years ago: according to them, speech acts, not sentences, are the primary bearers of content. François Recanati argues for the relevance of this controversy to the current debate about semantics and pragmatics. Is 'what is said' determined by linguistic conventions, or is it (...) an aspect of 'speaker's meaning'? Do we need pragmatics to fix truth-conditions? What is 'literal meaning'? To what extent is semantic composition a creative process? How pervasive is context-sensitivity? Recanati provides an original and insightful defence of 'contextualism', and offers an informed survey of the spectrum of positions held by linguists and philosophers working at the semantics/pragmatics interface. (shrink)

In "Literal Meaning," John Searle claims to refute the view that sentences of a natural language have a meaning independent of the social contexts in which their utterances occur. The present paper is a reply on behalf of this view. In the first section, I show that the issue is not a parochial dispute within a narrow area of the philosophy of language, of interest only to specialists in the area, but is at the heart of a (...) wide range of important philosophical problems, those on which the recent linguistic turn in philosophy has properly taken a grammatical perspective. In the second section, I reply to Searle's criticisms of the view. (shrink)

This paper argues that the literal meaning of words in a natural language is less conventional than usually assumed. Conventionality is defined in terms that are relative to reasons; norms that are determined by reasons are not conventions. The paper argues that in most cases, the literal meaning of words—as it applies to their definite extension—is not conventional. Conventional variations of meaning are typically present in borderline cases, of what I call the extension-range of (...) class='Hi'>literal meaning. Finally, some putative and one or two genuine exceptions are discussed. (shrink)

Literal meaning is often identified with conventional meaning. In A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs Donald Davidson argues (1) that literal meaning is distinct from conventional meaning, and (2) that literal meaning is identical to what he calls first meaning. In this paper it is argued that Davidson has established (1) but not (2), that he has succeeded in showing that there is a distinction between literal meaning and conventional (...) class='Hi'>meaning but has failed to see that literal meaning and first meaning are also distinct. This failure is somewhat surprising, since it is through a consideration of Davidson's notion of radical interpretation that the distinction between literal meaning and first meaning becomes apparent. (shrink)

Traditionally, the dominant theory of metaphor has taken the form of saying that metaphor is a matter of using a word with a figurative meaning, that is, a meaning which deviates from standard, literal, meaning. The present article challenges the assumption on which such a characterization rests: that there are standard meanings for words fixed by conventions normative for our use of words. It argues that the most sophisticated defence of such a conception of meaning‐that (...) of David Lewis‐gives an account of convention that cannot be coherently applied to the case of language, and which misdescribes the phenomena of language. The fluidity and flexibility exhibited in our normal literal uses of words is such that to say that a meaning deviates from past meanings assigned to a word registers no contrast between the metaphorical use of words and the literal. Hence if we contrast the literal and the metaphorical, we must do it in some other way than by talking about what happens to the meanings of words. (shrink)

The Buddhist concept of skillful means , as introduced inMahāyāna sūtras, exposes a new awareness of the gap between text and meaning. Although the term is sometimes taken to point to the Buddha's pedagogical skills, this interpretation ignores the provocative use of the term in Mahāyāna texts. Treating skillful means as a universal Buddhist concept also fails to explain why and for what purpose it first became predominant in the Mahāyāna. Looking at the use of skillful means in the (...) Lotus Sūtra and in the Skill in Means Sūtra reveals a hermeneutic device aimed at criticizing an existing corpus of Buddhist literature. As such, skillful means is used to demonstrate that the old doctrine and the life of the Buddha contained fictitious features and were nothing but skillful means. This indicates a growing awareness of a gap between literal expressions and their hidden meaning that can only arise after some kind of religious corpus has been established. (shrink)

The Buddhist concept of skillful means, as introduced in Mahay ana sutras, exposes a new awareness of the gap between text and meaning. Although the term is sometimes taken to point to the Buddha's pedagogical skills, this interpretation ignores the provocative use of the term in Mahayana texts. Treating skillful means as a universal Buddhist concept also fails to explain why and for what purpose it first became predominant in the Mahayana. Looking at the use of skillful means in (...) the Lotus Sutra and in the Skill in Means Sutra reveals a hermeneutic device aimed at criticizing an existing corpus of Buddhist literature. As such, skillful means is used to demonstrate that the old doctrine and the life of the Buddha contained fictitious features and were nothing but skillful means. This indicates a growing awareness of a gap between literal expressions and their hidden meaning that can only arise after some kind of religious corpus has been established. (shrink)

In this work, it is shown that given a correct understanding of the nature of reference and of linguistic meaning generally, it is possible to produce non-revisionist analyses of the nature of -/- *Perceptual content, *Mental content generally, *Logical equivalence, *Logical dependence generally, *Counterfactual truth, *The causal efficacy of mental states, and *Our knowledge of ourselves and of the external world. -/- In addition, set-theoretic interpretations of several semantic concepts are put forth. These concepts include truth, falsehood, negation, and (...) conjunction. (shrink)

COMPLETE SET OF FIGURES FOR 'LITERAL MEANING'.

Alice Crary has recently developed a radical reading of J. L. Austin's philosophy of language. The central contention of Crary's reading is that Austin gives convincing reasons to reject the idea that sentences have context-invariant literal meaning. While I am in sympathy with Crary about the continuing importance of Austin's work, and I think Crary's reading is deep and interesting, I do not think literal sentence meaning is one of Austin's targets, and the arguments that Crary (...) attributes to Austin or finds Austinian in spirit do not provide convincing reasons to reject literal sentence meaning. In this paper, I challenge Crary's reading of Austin and defend the idea of literal sentence meaning. (shrink)

Islam and Literalism: Literal Meaning and Interpretation in Islamic Legal Theory. By Robert Gleave. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012. Pp. xii + 212. $120, £75 ; $39.95, £24.99.

The meaning of morpheme (a minimal unit of linguistic significance) cannot diverge from what it is taken to mean. But the meaning of a complex expression can diverge without limit from what it is taken to mean, given that the meaning of such an expression is a logical consequence of the meanings of its parts, coupled with the fact that people are not infallible ratiocinators. Nonetheless, given Chomsky’s distinction between competence (ability) and performance (ability to deploy ability), (...) what a complex expression means does, after a fashion, coincide with what it is taken to mean: to the extent that speaker-performance approximates to speaker-competence---i.e. to the extent that people are able to operationalize their linguistic competence---what speakers take complex expressions to mean coincides with they in fact mean; and herein lies an answer to the question “what is linguistic meaning?” that holds with respect to both simple and complex expressions. (shrink)

Résumé de mon livre Literal Meaning (Cambridge University Press, 2004), à paraître dans la rubrique DISPUTATIO la revue canadienne Philosophiques, suivi de comptes rendus critiques par Steven Davis, Brendan Gillon, et Michel Seymour et de mes réponses.

Many theorists take the view that literal meaning can be one of a number of factors to be weighed in reaching a legal interpretation. Still others regard literal meaning as having the potential to legally justify a particular outcome. Building on the scholarly response to HLA Hart’s famous ‘vehicles in the park’ hypothetical, this article presents a formal argument that literal meaning cannot be decisive of what’s legally correct, one which, unusually, makes no appeal (...) to controversial theories within philosophy of language or literary criticism. If the argument is sound, it follows that an enactment’s literal meaning neither weighs in the determination of correct legal outcomes nor permits the application of a sequencing model, ie a non-monotonic logic, to its interpretation. These implications are considerably more controversial within contemporary legal theory than the idea that a statute’s literal meaning is not necessarily its legal meaning. Yet we see that, given an intuitive notion of legal truth, they follow from it nonetheless. (shrink)

What role does literal meaning play in people’s understanding of indirect and figurative language? Scholars from many disciplines have debated this issue for several decades. This chapter describes these debates, especially focusing on the arguments between the author and Marcelo Dascal. I suggest that Dascal’s defense of “moderate literalism” may have some validity, contrary to some of my earlier arguments against this point of view. The chapter acknowledges the strong contribution that Marcelo Dascal has made to interdisciplinary discussions (...) on language and thought. (shrink)

Recanati, Literal Meaning argues against what he calls “literalism“ and for what he calls “contextualism“. He considers a wide spectrum of positions and arguments from relevance theory to hidden variables theory. In the end, however, he seems to hold that semantic and pragmatic theorizing must answer to broadly introspective or folk psychological constraints — they don't exist in “heaven“. After surveying Recanati's wide-ranging and provocative discussion of these issues, we wonder why parity of reasoning does not condemn syntax (...) and phonology, as customarily practiced. (shrink)

One of the main arguments in favor of metalinguistic predicativism is the uniformity argument. The article discusses one of its premises, according to which the Being Called Condition gives the literal meaning of proper names. First, the uniformity argument is presented. Second, the article examines a challenge by Jeshion and a recent response by Tayebi. It is then argued that Tayebi’s response is unsound. Finally, two sets of facts are discussed, which provide independent evidence against the literal (...) meaning thesis. (shrink)

Recanati (2004), Literal Meaning argues against what he calls ¿literalism¿ and for what he calls ¿contextualism¿. He considers a wide spectrum of positions and arguments from relevance theory to hidden variables theory. In the end, however, he seems to hold that semantic and pragmatic theorizing must answer to broadly introspective or folk psychological constraints ¿ they don¿t exist in ¿heaven¿. After surveying Recanati¿s wide-ranging and provocative discussion of these issues, we wonder why parity of reasoning does not condemn (...) syntax and phonology, as customarily practiced. (shrink)

I propose that an account of metaphor understanding which covers the full range of cases has to allow for two routes or modes of processing. One is a process of rapid, local, on-line concept construction that applies quite generally to the recovery of word meaning in utterance comprehension. The other requires a greater focus on the literal meaning of sentences or texts, which is metarepresented as a whole and subjected to more global, reflective pragmatic inference. The questions (...) whether metaphors convey a propositional content and what role imagistic representation plays receive somewhat different answers depending on the processing route. (shrink)

In this paper I show that two conflicting theories of literal meaning can be found in Donald Davidson's philosophy of language. In his earlier writings, Davidson espoused the common sense idea that words have literal meanings independently of particular contexts of use. In his later writings, however, Davidson insisted that the literal meaning of a word is a function of the speaker's intentions in using it, from which it follows that words do not have (...) class='Hi'>literal meanings independently of particular contexts. In this paper I examine and evaluate the transition from Davidson's earlier to his later view of literal meaning. I show that the change in view came about through Davidson's efforts to extend a theory of literal meaning to malapropisms but that Davidson's understanding of malapropisms is seriously flawed. I conclude that Davidson had no good reason for espousing his later intentions-based theory of literal meaning. (shrink)

A summary of François Recanati's book Literal Meaning, followed by his response to the critical reviews of the same book by Stefano Predelli and Manuel García-Carpintero. /// Este texto da respuesta a los que, en este mismo número, Predelli y García-Carpintero dedican a mi libro Literal Meaning. En la primera seccíon hago un breve resumen de esta obra; en la segunda respondo a los comentarios críticos de Predelli y en la tercera a los de García-Carpintero.

Pragmatic difficulties are considered a hallmark of autism spectrum conditions (ASC), but remain poorly understood. We discuss and evaluate existing hypotheses regarding the literalism of ASC individuals, that is, their tendency for literal interpretations of non‐literal communicative intentions. We present evidence that reveals a developmental stage at which neurotypical children also have a tendency for literalism and suggest an explanation for such behaviour that links it to other behavioural, rule‐following, patterns typical of that age. We discuss evidence showing (...) that strict adherence to rules is also widespread in ASC, and suggest that literalism might be linked to such rule‐following behaviour. (shrink)

In this essay, I focus on Recanati's treatment of 'What is said' in his book Literal Meaning. I discuss Recanati's conception of Minimalism, his views on propositional completeness, and his understanding of the processes governing the semantic interpretation of meaning-controlled contextuality. In the final sections, I draw some conclusions pertaining to Recanati's assessment of the interface between pragmatic and semantic processes. /// En este ensayo me enfoco en el trato que le da Recanati a "lo que se (...) dice" en su libro Literal Meaning. Discuto su concepción del minimismo, su posición sobre la completud proposicional y su comprensión de los procesos que rigen la interpretación semántica de la contextualidad controlada por el significado. En las secciones finales, extraigo algunas conclusiones acerca de la evaluación que Recanati hace de la interfase entre procesos semánticos y pragmáticos. (shrink)

Assuming that legal science, specifically with regard to interpretation, has to provide the tools to reduce the uncertainty of legal solutions arising from the use of natural languages by legal orders, it becomes a central matter to identify, in this limited domain, the spectrum of semantic variation (and its boundaries) that language brings to the definition of a norm expressed by a norm sentence. It is in this framework that the present paper, analyzing norm sentences as a specific kind of (...) speech act, examines the relation of the legal order to natural language rules, the limits of linguistic uncertainty, and alternatives of meaning as distinct possibilities of norms covered by the text (that are, because of this, still within what literal meaning is). Considering interpretation just as the linguistic decoding process, the reverse of the process of creating norm sentences, the paper also argues that subjects not connected with the relation between norm sentences and norms (mainly, normative defeasibility) are analytically distinct and should be removed from the field of language. (shrink)

Impairments in pragmatic abilities, that is, difficulties with appropriate use and interpretation of language – in particular, non-literal uses of language – are considered a hallmark of Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASC). Despite considerable research attention, these pragmatic difficulties are poorly understood. In this paper, we discuss and evaluate existing hypotheses regarding the literalism of ASC individuals, that is, their tendency for literal interpretations of non-literal communicative intentions, and link them to accounts of pragmatic development in neurotypical children. (...) We present evidence that reveals a developmental stage at which neurotypical children also have a tendency for literal interpretations and provide a possible explanation for such behaviour, one that links it to other behavioural, rule-following, patterns typical of that age. We then discuss extant evidence that shows that strict adherence to rules is also a widespread feature in ASC, and suggest that literalism might be linked to such rule-following behaviour. (shrink)