El filósofo alemán Alfred Schmidt analiza la relación entre naturaleza y hombre a partir del concepto de naturaleza de Marx. Schmidt explicita el “intercambio orgánico entre el hombre y la naturaleza”, resaltando que aunque la naturaleza se nos presenta siempre en el horizonte de formas históricamen..

L'apport des femmes à la production des soins revêt un caractère essentiel et universel tant dans l'histoire que dans la société actuelle, selon deux axes d'articulation : la protection du corps et le soutien par l'entraide et l'accompagnement. Les orientations actuelles des systèmes de santé occidentaux, comprenant une promotion idéologique de l'autonomie ayant pour conséquence la déqualification de certaines valeurs, notamment celle de l'interdépendance, compromettent l'avenir des soins dans la mesure où il n'existe pas de soin sans l'existence simultanée de (...) la dépendance et de l'interdépendance. Le soin représente une forme de rituel d'accompagnement dans les passages de la vie, un travail de médiation.Women's contribution to care production has been in the past, and remains in society today, of an essential and universal nature, regarding two principal concerns : care for the body and support through mutual aid and accompaniment. The current orientation of western healthcare systems, including an ideological promotion of autonomy that results in a diminishment of certain values, especially those of interdépendance, compromise the future of care to the extent that there is no care without the simultaneous existence of dépendance and interdépendance. Care represents a sort of ritual of accompaniment in life's passage, a work of mediation. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como objetivo examinar algunas ideas contemporáneas sobre el método científico inscritas en la corriente de pensamiento denominada "Racionalismo Crítico". En este sentido, destacan los planteamientos propuestos por Karl Popper, máximo representante de esta tesis; así como ..

This essay gives a situated introduction to body hacking, an underground surgical process that seeks to transform the body’s architecture, offering an ethnographic account of the affects that drive this corporeal intervention for performance artist Cheto Castellano, and later, for the author. A brief history of recent body modification movements is offered. Through these situated stories of corporeal transformation there is an exploration of Eva Hayward’s concept of transbecoming, exploring the perpetual change of the body in transition, particularly in relation (...) to posthumanistic transformations. The article closes with a speculative cyborg feminist body modification project titled 10,000 Generations Later, which explores how a subdermal archive of silicone implants stored under the author’s skin may assist her in a posthumanist transbecoming after the death of her companions species toy poodle Luk Kahlo, and perhaps even in a distant future. The author argues that this project becomes an apparatus of mestizaje between speculative cyborg feminism and significant otherness. (shrink)

Christians of the fourth and fifth centuries adopted Late Antique aesthetics, characterized by brilliance, dazzle and colors, to create a new form of imagination, where the corpses of the martyrs and their physical remains became shining bodies. Relics became a spiritual body, whose μετάληψις often produced roses or violets. Therefore there was a strict association in Late Antique Christianity among roses, relics and the colour red.

Il presente scritto e’ attualmante inedito. Per una versione in lingua inglese si veda Stefano Franchi, "Palomar, The Triviality of Modernity, and the Doctrine of the Void, ” New Literary History, 28, 4, 757-778. Si prega di non citare da questa versione senza previa autorizzazione.

This is a preprint version, please do not quote without authorization. The final version has appeared as Stefano Franchi, "Palomar, the Triviality of Modernity, and the Doctrine of the Void,“ New Literary History, 28 (1997), 4, 757-778. See: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/new_literary_history/toc/nlh28.4.html..

Open peer commentary on the target article “From Objects to Processes: A Proposal to Rewrite Radical Constructivism” by Siegfried J. Schmidt. Upshot: I focus my commentary on the fundamental metaphysical issue that Siegfried J. Schmidt’s very stimulating paper addresses in §45 and particularly upon the relationship between the ontological status of the processes from which worlds emerge and the temporality of the objects to be found therein. I argue that Schmidt’s emphasis on world-forming processes raises many questions concerning the temporal (...) stability of objects and the relationship between objects and actors belonging to different worlds. I suggest that some classic as well as contemporary thinkers (e.g., Fichte, Hegel, Heidegger, Gadamer, Foucault, and S. J. Gould) have faced similar problems and discuss how their answers could be integrated within Schmidt’s revised radical constructivism. (shrink)

Following the example of classical literature, Christian texts of the fourth century portray dreams of pregnant mothers. In such dreams, the mother sees her son or daughter, and knows the name of the infant and the great future for which the infant is destined. The dreams of Emmelia, Nonna and Monica are described in the writings of their sons (Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory of Nazianzus and Augustine, respectively). Thanks to her visions and dreams about her child, each mother becomes a (...) mediatrix of God. (shrink)

Possiamo ipotizzare che le reti sociali sollecitino nuove forme di collaborazione tra gli individui? Di che natura č la collaborazione che si realizza nelle reti? Il web 2.0 cambia radicalmente il modo in cui gli individui accedono alle risorse informative, per la facilitÀ dell'accesso alle stesse, la velocitÀ, la pluralitÀ delle fonti, ma soprattutto per il loro crescente intreccio con gli scambi interpersonali. Il filtro soggettivo carica ogni informazione di un forte contenuto emotivo, ne stabilisce una particolare veritÀ, quella, appunto, (...) attribuita al messaggio dal soggetto che lo utilizza. La testimonianza in prima persona diventa la chiave attorno a cui si organizzano le informazioni. Partendo dall'analisi delle pagine create su Facebook nella fase successiva ad un evento traumatico come il terremoto, argomentiamo come la collaborazione nelle reti si realizzi a partire dalla condivisione emotiva dell'esperienza e dal peculiare intreccio tra informazione e comunicazione. (shrink)

Summary The First Sacred War was hotly debated in the 4th century. The crimes committed by the Crisaeans in this war were later equated to those committed by the Phocians during the Third Sacred War, or those committed by the Locrians of Amphissa during the Fourth Sacred War. This paper shows how the parallels drawn between the First and Third Sacred Wars (SW1–SW3) and between the First and Fourth Sacred Wars (SW1–SW4) were respectively shaped and used as an argument in (...) two different milieus: in pro-Macedonian intellectual circles in Athens, and in the Athenian forensic and deliberative arena. The main aim of this paper is to understand why ‘SW1–SW3’ is not used as an argument in the latter. In fact, Athens’ most prominent politicians had to cope with the Athenian support for the Phocians in the so-called Third Sacred War. Thus, the Phocians were depicted as guilty, but not to the point that they were compared to the Crisaeans. The legacy of the latter was ambivalent and lent itself to this shift in meaning. (shrink)

The book brings into relief the variety of approaches and disciplines that have informed the quest for a theory of cognition. The center of interest are the historical, geographical, and theoretical peripheries of classic AI's mainstream research program. The twelve chapters bring back into focus the variety of strategies and theoretical questions that researchers explored while working toward a scientific theory of cognition and pre-cognition. The volume is organized in four parts, each one including three essays. The first one deals (...) with cybernetics, the approach that may be considered as the most important periphery of classic AI research. The second part focuses on the geographical periphery of AI research. It examines how the theories and techniques developed on AI's home ground were translated into countries with different cultures and traditions: Italy, France, and the Soviet Union. The third part focuses on AI's periphery understood in the cultural and historical meaning of the term. It contains essays that locate some of the central concepts of AI, like representation and computability, within a broader philosophical (Descartes, Aristotle, Leibniz) and technical background (programming theory and practice). The fourth and final part of the volume is focused directly on the limitation of Turing's classic computability theory and its possible alternatives, some of which were studied in the early years of AI's research (e.g. Ashby's re-entrant information model), while others have been intensely studied in recent times (quantum automata). (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “What Can the Global Observer Know?” by Diana Gasparyan. Upshot: While I agree with Gasparyan’s incisive critique of the concept of the “general observer,” her use of the concept of “event” is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, she equates “events” to Wittgenstein’s and “configurations of objects” or “states of affairs” and she consider the world as a collection of such states of affairs. On the other hand, she cites Badiou’s work in support of (...) her criticism of the “general observer.” Yet Badiou’s conception of events is very different from Wittgenstein’s: they are locally produced by historically situated agents in their concrete inter-subjective activities. I argue that a resolution of the target article’s ambiguity in favour of Badiou’s conception of events would allow constructivism to escape a narrow epistemological reading of its basic thesis in favor of a broader interpretation. (shrink)

Neste texto refletiremos sobre a importância da imagem como possibilidade de construção mental e social. Investigaremos o discurso laico em representações imagéticas dos monarcas franceses Francisco I e Henrique II. Nesse período, a sociedade passava por mudanças sociais entre o Medievo e a Modernidade, implicando a construção da ideia de Estado, como organizador social. Entendemos que as imagens além de revelar as relações sociais, eram também, um veículo formador. Acreditamos, assim, na relevância da realização de pesquisas na História, na Educação (...) e na Arte, nos oportunizando a compreensão da formação do sujeito social. (shrink)

Herbert Simon’s work presents a curious anomaly to the historian and philosopher trying to understand the development of classic Artificial Intelligence (AI). Simon was one of most influential figures in AI since its birth, and yet it is always with some difficulties that his work can be made to fit within the received canon of AI’s development and goals. In fact, he differed from every other figure in early AI on most counts: in terms of the recognized intellectual heritage of (...) AI, of his own background and training, of the goals he set for his own AI work and the assessment criteria he accepted. I will argue that these differences provide important clues toward a reevaluation of the relationship between Artificial Intelligence and Herbert Simon’s work that may change our current understanding of both. On the one hand, classic Artificial Intelligence (or Complex Information Processing, as Simon preferred to call it for a number of years), provided the tool he needed to pursue a much broader research agenda that strove to encompass human beings in their cognitive, emotional, social, and political dimensions. On the other hand, AI’s curious status as the discipline that straggles the boundaries between engineering, science, and philosophy can be recast as the tool that allowed researchers to pursue philosophy’s old goals with an alternative methodology. From this perspective, Simon’s version of Artificial Intelligence becomes a full-fledged form of ”anti-philosophy” as ambitious and broad-ranging as old-fashioned metaphysics and as revolutionary as the latter in the radical refashioning of its methodology. It follows that a philosophical assessment of AI, at in least in its Simonian incarnation, must be more farreaching than it is usually thought. At the methodological level, it must discuss whether AI’s invention of computer simulation as the tool that overcomes the a-priori/a-posteriori distinction by actually producing the behavior it wants to explain is really adequate to the job at hand.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hunters, Cooks, and Nooks:Two Interpretations of the Tangled Relationship Between Philosophy and ScienceStefano Franchi (bio)Knowledge is the measure of all things.—Plato, Prot. 361b1Preliminaries: Double QuestioningWhen philosophers ask questions about science, they usually do so in the context of one specific discipline whose latest results or whose historical development seem to pose genuinely philosophical problems: for instance, the nature of space/time, the nature of intelligence, the nature/nurture debate. It (...) is rarer to hear a philosopher asking questions about the general relationship between philosophy and science, even when, as in the cases above, the answer to this question provides the necessary ground for any specific investigation of the allegedly genuine philosophical problems arising in physics, biology, or cognitive science.The main difficulty lies in the intrinsic ambiguity of the term "science." On the one hand, "science" can be considered as a descriptive term: it is the genus of the empirically given, scientific disciplines (the "sciences," in the plural). On the other hand, "science" (episteme, scientia, Wissenschaft) (always in the singular) is a theoretical term that denotes a form of knowledge. More precisely, it refers, as philosophers say, to a "conceptually unified body of objective knowledge." Traditionally, the latter meaning includes philosophy itself within its denotation. Thus, when both meanings of the term "science" are considered, to interrogate the relationship between philosophy and science is always, and preliminarily, to question the nature of philosophy itself, even when the question as such is not explicitly raised. In all these cases, a characterization of the nature of philosophy is presupposed by a philosophical analysis of scientific results.However, unless the specificity of concrete scientific investigations is denied from the outset, the questioning, even when conducted from a circumscribed philosophical standpoint, cannot be reduced to a single gesture that interrogates the scientificity of philosophy. On the contrary, it must also concurrently question the possibility of a specific relation between a determinate philosophical endeavor and specific scientific pursuits. Any questioning of the relationship between philosophy and science will always imply a double gesture: on the one hand, a question about what makes or does not make philosophy a science; on the other, what brings philosophy closer, or moves [End Page 98] it farther apart, from the sciences. Most often, philosophers focus their attention on just one aspect of this double question. In this paper, I would like to address both sides of the issue. In particular, I would like to examine the two very different answers to this general problem given by Plato and by Michel Foucault. Although their answers address fundamentally the same issue, they are so diametrically opposed, as I will show, that they may be considered as the external boundaries of a very broad range of possible responses.2SignpostsLet me begin with Plato. In a well-known passage from the Euthydemus, the main characters are discussing which kind of knowledge is required by wisdom. In this context, to the delighted although belated surprise of Crito, the young Cleinias introduces a crucial distinction between hunters and cooks: the former know how to find the prey, but only the latter know how to use it:No art of actual hunting, [Cleinias] said, extends any further than pursuing and capturing; whenever the hunters catch what they are pursuing they are incapable of using it, but they and the fishermen hand over their prey to the cooks. And again, geometers and astronomers and calculators (who are hunters too, in a way, for none of these make their diagrams; they simply discover those which already exist), since they themselves have no idea of how to use their prey but only how to hunt it, hand over the task of using their discoveries to the dialecticians—at least, those of them who are not completely useless [anoetoi].[290b–c]1Cleinias's account acknowledges the reality and value of the knowledge gained by the sciences, but denies that scientists have full awareness of what they are doing and of the implications of their own work. Scientific knowledge lacks both self-reflexivity and transparency: it does not have the ability to bring to full evidence the principles it rests upon... (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Constructivism and Computation: Can Computer-Based Modeling Add to the Case for Constructivism?” by Manfred Füllsack. Upshot: While I do agree with Füllsack’s positive assessment of the use of computer simulations in advancing constructivism’s program, I am less convinced by the alleged opposition between computers and constructivism he builds up. In my opinion, his depiction of computers and computation is inaccurate in several respects. As a result, the alleged incompatibility with constructivism Füllsack objects to disappears, (...) and his whole essay could then be construed as a classic straw man fallacy. This is unfortunate, because it could lead to an unwarranted dismissal of his positive contribution. (shrink)

Upshot: The target article suggested that Ashby’s device, the homeostat, embodies and illustrates a conception of life as a passive-contingent phenomenon. It advocated renewed experiments with updated and extended versions of his device that would allow us to understand better what passive-contingent life “would be like.” In assessing the proposal, we should be particularly careful when dealing with the concept of “passivity,” and we should not mistake the proposed theoretical exploration for a substantial metaphysical thesis about life in general.

Research in Artificial Intelligence has always had a very strong relationship with games and game-playing, and especially with chess. Workers in AI have always denied that this interest was more than purely accidental. Parlor games, they claimed, became a favorite topic of interest because they provided the ideal test case for any simulation of intelligence. Chess is the Drosophila of AI, it was said, with reference to the fruit-fly whose fast reproductive cycle made it into a favorite test bed for (...) genetic theories for almost a century. In this paper I will try to show Artificial Intelligence’s relationship to games is quite different from what this analogy suggests. In fact, I will argue that AI is, at core, a theory of games and a theory of subjectivity as game-playing. (shrink)

Peristephanon X, a hymn on the martyrdom of St. Romanus of Antioch, may be considered the masterpiece of Prudentius’ poetry on the Christian martyrs. Romanus is represented as a Christian hero. As a rhetor, he defends his faith against paganism as if he were a lawyer; as a martyr, he follows Christ’s example in accepting torture and death. Prudentius’ poetry aims to stimulate and revivify the Christian belief of his audience.

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 1 Seiten: 1-25.

Context: W. R. Ashby’s work on homeostasis as the basic mechanism underlying all kinds of physiological as well as cognitive functions has aroused renewed interest in cognitive science and related disciplines. Researchers have successfully incorporated some of Ashby’s technical results, such as ultrastability, into modern frameworks (e.g., CTRNN networks). Problem: The recovery of Ashby’s technical contributions has left in the background Ashby’s far more controversial non-technical views, according to which homeostatic adaptation to the environment governs all aspects of all forms (...) of life. This thesis entails that life is fundamentally “heteronomous” and it is conceptually at odds with the autopoiesis framework adopted by Ashby’s recent defenders as well as with the primacy of autonomy in human life that most of the Western philosophical tradition upholds. The paper argues that the use of computer simulations focused on the more conceptual aspects of Ashby’s thought may help us recover, extend and consequently assess an overall view of life as heteronomy. Method: The paper discusses some computer simulations of Ashby’s original electro-mechanical device (the homeostat) that implement his techniques (double-feedback loops and random parameter-switching). Results: First simulation results show that even though Ashby’s claims about homeostatic adaptivity need to be slightly weakened, his overall results are confirmed, thereby suggesting that an extension to virtual robots engaged in minimal cognitive tasks may be successful. Implications: The paper shows that a fuller incorporation of Ashby’s original results into recent cognitive science research may trigger a philosophical and technical reevaluation of the traditional distinction between heteronomous and autonomous behavior. Constructivist content: The research outlined in the paper supports an extended constructionist perspective in which agency as autonomy plays a more limited role. (shrink)

Replete with stories of gods and men interacting with animals, classical literature also affords a broad range of relationships between women and animals. Such a rich series of symbolic animals finds fertile ground in the biblical world, too. Apart from symbolic animals, early Christianity knows a direct contact with wild animals during the persecutions carried out by the Roman Empire. By analyzing the martyrdom of some women in connection with the animals they had to face, we can note that animals (...) acquire a symbolic meaning. They become the pieces of an allegorical and exegetical framework whose major purpose is to celebrate God. (shrink)

The article offers a fundamental comparison between a passage in the dialogue of Methodius of Olympus calles De libero arbitrio, and one in the Hexaemeron of George of Pisidia. The starting point is represented by a description of the stormy sea, contained in the De libero arbitrio. After a poetical scene full of epical elements , Methodius gives us an original representation of the sea: as the servant can't refuse to obey his master and mumbles by himself, so the sea (...) has to restrain its anger and remain in its limits, even if it wants to be free. According to Job 38.11, it is forced to sacrifice its will, because there is a divine power that governs the universe. This passage may have influenced the composition of George of Pisidia. In fact, in his Hexaemeron the poet has come to personify the sea, first of all, with the image of a fugitive slave, then with a Bacchante who, taken by an impulse, wishes to go beyond the limits, and finally, with a female slave who is dragged away; this is created to support the conception that nature, in spite of natural impulse, is not independent and free, but is governed by God. Even if George of Pisidia inserts in his scene more details, the comparison of the sea with human subjects and the impossibility for it to be free refer to Methodius' passage. That the poet knew Methodius' writings is confirmed by one of his epigrams, in which he praises the bearing of the style of Methodius' works, based on evident lines of reasoning and divine inspiration. (shrink)

In classical and Christian literature mountain symbolism takes many forms deriving from height and center. In so far as mountains are tall, lofty, and rise abruptly to touch heaven, they form part of the symbolism of transcendence and, in so far as they are often numinous places where the gods have revealed their presence, they share in the symbolism of manifestation. According to Gospel’s tradition, in Nonnus’ Paraphrase of St. John’s Gospel, the mountain, visible home of the invisible God, situated (...) next to the deity on account of its high peak and solitude, takes on a symbolic value in revealing the role of Christ and his future elevation on the Cross. (shrink)