Offering both a discussion of feminism in its postmodern context and a critique of contemporary theory, the author here challenges feminists to move away from a theory-based approach, which focuses on securing or contesting "women" as an ...

Critics of Hannah Arendt's Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy argue that Arendt fails to address the most important problem of political judgment, namely, validity. This essay shows that Arendt does indeed have an answer to the problem that preoccupies her critics, with one important caveat: she does not think that validity is the all-important problem of political judgment--the affirmation of human freedom is.

This essay examines the significantly different approaches of John Rawls and Hannah Arendt to the problem of judgment in democratic theory and practice.

Democracy and the problem of judgment -- Judging at the "end of reasons": rethinking the aesthetic turn -- Historicism, judgment, and the limits of liberalism: the case of Leo Strauss -- Objectivity, judgment, and freedom: rereading Arendt's "Truth and politics" -- Value pluralism and the "burdens of judgment": John Rawls's political liberalism -- Relativism and the new universalism: feminists claim the right to judge -- From willing to judging: Arendt, Habermas, and the question of '68 -- What on earth is (...) a "form of life"? Judging "alien" cultures according to Peter Winch -- The turn to affect and the problem of judgment: making political sense of the nonconceptual -- Conclusion: judging as a democratic world-building practice. (shrink)

A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. Wittgenstein.

If one is a woman, one is often surprised by a sudden splitting of consciousness, say in walking down Whitehall, when from being the natural inheritor of that civilization, she becomes, on the contrary, outside of it, alien and critical. Virginia Woolf.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:This Universalism Which Is Not OneLinda M. G. Zerilli (bio)Ernesto Laclau. Emancipation(s). London: Verso, 1996.Judging from the recent spate of publications devoted to the question of the universal, it appears that, in the view of some critics, we are witnessing a reevaluation of its dismantling in twentieth-century thought. One of the many oddities about this “return of the universal” 1 is the idea that contemporary engagements with it are (...) more or less of a piece, and that they reflect a growing consensus that poststructuralist political theories are incapable of generating a viable alternative to the collective fragmentation that characterizes late modernity. 2 The putative return to the universal marks, on this view, both a homecoming to Enlightenment ideals—purified of their more poisonous elements, of course—and a reconciliation of sorts between those who refuted these ideals and those who sought to realize them. Now that “we” all know and agree that poststructuralism is critically valuable but politically bankrupt; now that we all know and agree that the “old universal” was indeed a “pseudo-universal,” so the homecoming narrative goes; we can get on with the project of constructing a “new universal.” 3 This authentic universal would really be inclusive of all people, regardless of race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nationality, and whatever else attaches to the “embarrassing etcetera” that, as Judith [End Page 3] Butler reminds us, inevitably accompanies such gestures of acknowledging human diversity.Before signing on to this felicitous agreement about “the necessity of universalism,” we may wish to know whether we have anything like a minimal agreement in language, that is, whether we who speak of this universal are even speaking about the same thing. Apart from the not insignificant problem of translating from a philosophical to a political idiom, the whole question of this agreement is virtually occluded by the rush to rescue politics from the virulent particularisms that admit no common ground or sense of collective belonging. Presented in terms of the familiar binary couple, the choice between universalism and particularism seems settled by merely pointing to global and domestic political realities. Universalism is the only alternative to social fragmentation, wild child of the collapse of communism, the rise of deadly nationalisms, and the multiculturalist romance with particularism. To invoke the name of the universal in any affirmative sense is already to sign on to the political diagnosis and its solution.One of the many virtues of Ernesto Laclau’s Emancipation(s) is that it offers both an alternative to the binarisms spawned by the “return” to the universal (for example, false universalism/true universalism) and a trenchant critique of the original binary couple itself (universalism/ particularism). Demonstrating the imbrication of the universal and the particular, Laclau shows why it is a matter not of choosing one over the other but of articulating, in a scrupulously political sense, the relation between the two. He thus explicitly rejects the notion that this relation is one of mutual exclusion, and shows that the tendency to see it as just that has led to the impasse of the contemporary debate, an impasse that is glossed over in some highly visible academic cases by proclaiming the necessary return to the universal. Although the language of universalism as spoken by Laclau searches for some common ground between particularists and universalists, it is more by way of articulating their mutual contamination, that is, how each is rendered impure by the irreducible presence of the other.The Problem of UniversalsLaclau situates his collection of essays in the context of the increasingly polarized debate over multiculturalism, a debate in which the classical universalism of the philosophical tradition has come under serious question. Reading his essays, one comes to see the deep dependence of the entire contemporary discussion on this tradition, even when its metaphysical assumptions are explicitly rejected (as, say, in the work of Seyla Benhabib) or insufficiently comprehended (as in most of the popularized political discourse). Laclau’s book can help us to see that the political question of universalism cannot be posed properly as long as it remains tethered to the classical philosophical “problem of universals.” At stake in sorting out the affinities and... (shrink)

Anyone who goes beyond procedural questions of a discourse theory of morality and ethics and, in a normative attitude … embarks on a theory of the well-ordered, or even emancipated, society will very quickly run up against the limits of his own historical situation.For some time now, a certain strand of contemporary critical theory has understood its task not as providing a substantive critique of power relations, let alone an alternative normative conception of what social relations might be, but as (...) how to justify critique as such: how to justify those elements which critique owes to its philosophical origins, albeit in a nonfoundationalist manner.1 This focus on—if not obsession with—the theoretical problem of... (shrink)

Although many phrases are invoked to describe the precarity of democracy today, perhaps none resonates more than "post-truth." The rapid rise of disinformation, conspiracy theories, and the loss of confidence in the possibility of impartial evidence has led to a situation in which highly partisan opinions threaten to devolve into a state where no one believes anything anymore. In the face of this danger, it seems imperative to affirm the existence of objective Truth. However, falling prey to the ideal of (...) Truth is as dangerous for democracy as being truth denialists. In this book, political theorist Linda M. G. Zerilli considers what happens when we take seriously the Socratic idea that there is truth in opinion. Drawing on the work of Arendt, Foucault, and Wittgenstein, A Democratic Theory of Truth critically interrogates the concept of truth presupposed in the "post-truth" debate. Whatever their disagreements, the critical literature on post-truth sees in the ongoing hemorrhaging of objective facts to subjective opinion a genuinely new threat to democracy. In Zerilli's reading, the part played by citizen subjects in determining the existence or value of truth is given in the structure of truth itself. This book restores the rightful place of plurality, dissent, and citizen opinion in the democratic debate about truth and truthfulness today. (shrink)

Max Tomba aims to reconstruct how historical actors reconstructed the past to open the future in ways that diverged from the trajectory of the dominant modernity. Insurgent Universality would break open the dead logic of the juridical, political, and economic trajectory of modernity that limits what is given and constrains what is possible. This essay reflects on the practice and the role of the historian. Beyond merely adopting insurgents’ perspectives, the historian must engage in a practice of critical and reflective (...) judgment. The essay draws on Michel-Rolph Trouillot on the silencing of the past, Reinhard Koselleck on the priority of the future, and Marisa Fuentes on the limits of the archives for voicing marginalized points of view. It concludes by calling for judgment and imagination where the archives run dry. (shrink)

Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy is the go-to text for readers interested in Hannah Arendt’s theory of judgment. Arendt’s discussion of Kantian aesthetic judgments of taste is typically associated with her own view. However, readers who find her interpretation idiosyncratic, if not wrongheaded, distinguish the author of the Critique of Judgment from Arendt’s Kant. Rather than debate who got Kant ‘right’, this essay explores what Arendt discovered about judging politically by reading Kant in her own Arendtian way. Judgment was present (...) early in her political thinking, for judgment deals with the particular and ‘the problem of the new’. As such, judgment concerns the realm of human affairs that the Western philosophical tradition has found unworthy of serious study due to its ever-changing and contingent nature. Beholden to the standards set by philosophy, political thought has been unable to make sense of its subject matter, which is action and ‘men in the plural’. Clarifying what it means to judge politically was crucial to Arendt’s lifelong effort to disentangle politics from philosophy and its focus on ‘Man in the singular’. (shrink)

Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy is the go-to text for readers interested in Hannah Arendt’s theory of judgment. Arendt’s discussion of Kantian aesthetic judgments of taste is typically associated with her own view. However, readers who find her interpretation idiosyncratic, if not wrongheaded, distinguish the author of the Critique of Judgment from Arendt’s Kant. Rather than debate who got Kant ‘right’, this essay explores what Arendt discovered about judging politically by reading Kant in her own Arendtian way. Judgment was present (...) early in her political thinking, for judgment deals with the particular and ‘the problem of the new’. As such, judgment concerns the realm of human affairs that the Western philosophical tradition has found unworthy of serious study due to its ever-changing and contingent nature. Beholden to the standards set by philosophy, political thought has been unable to make sense of its subject matter, which is action and ‘men in the plural’. Clarifying what it means to judge politically was crucial to Arendt’s lifelong effort to disentangle politics from philosophy and its focus on ‘Man in the singular’. (shrink)

John Locke famously sets the arts of rhetoric at odds with the pursuit of knowledge. Drawing on the work of Ernesto Grassi, this article shows that Locke’s epistemological and political arguments are parasitic on the very tropes and figures he would exclude in any serious discourse. Accordingly, Locke’s attack on the divine right of kings and his famous argument for the social contract is read as exhibiting a rhetorical structure. This structure is crucial to Locke’s critique of heteronomy and his (...) attempt to facilitate the identification of oneself as a free subject. (shrink)