This paper was originally presented as part of a panel entitled "Feminist Philosophy After Twenty Years" at the 1993 meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (APA). It is a discussion of the conditions that needed to be-and were-present in the United States in the 1970s in order for feminist philosophy to take root and flourish.

"I think many people would find it a useful resource, both in terms of information on particular philosophers and as a point of inspiration for designing courses that incorporate the work of women philosophers.... I expect I will refer individual students to this book as a resource for their own work and I will consult it in designing future courses." —Teaching Philosophy "With intelligence and agility, the writers [present] female thinkers who influenced the famous philosophers of their respective ages. This (...) should become a standard text in both philosophy and women’s studies classes and will have great appeal to lay readers as well. Highly recommended." —Library Journal This study of women philosophers from the Middle Ages to the 20th century covers a wide spectrum of ideas—from religion, to evolution, to political theory. This unique volume brings creative women thinkers into mainstream discussions of the history of philosophy. Contributors examine the work of, among others, Hildegard of Bingen, Vicountess Conway, Sor Juana, Mary Wollstonecraft, Hannah Arendt, Angela Davis, and Hypatia herself. (shrink)

This paper recovers and pays homage to the arguments in support of the equality of the sexes developed by the Seventeenth Century Cartesian philosopher François Poullain de la Barre (1647-1723).

Written in an engaging narrative style these philosophical investigations undermine racist hierarchies along with false natualistic conceptions of the meanings of race and universalistic understandings of gender, by considering whiteness as it shapes and is infused by gender, class, sexuality, and culture. Central to this project are questions about how it is that culture and the state create such a wide range of different people who understand themselves as white. The essays collected here discuss how one learns to be a (...) good white Southern woman, what it means to pass as white, and whether there really is a dilemma that accompanies white privilege. (shrink)

The idea that love changes who we are is widely shared, and has been mostly explored from a stance in the middle stage of love (i.e., when people already love each other). But how do we get there? And what happens when love ends? In this chapter, I explore how self-understanding may be shaped in different ways at different stages of love through the notions of narrative and existential feeling. As I will argue, love gains narrative momentum at the beginning, (...) which is maintained during the middle, and ultimately extinguished at the end. This momentum is triggered and later sustained by the existential feeling that ‘things make sense’, which keeps the lovers oriented towards each other. (shrink)

An ethic for wrongdoers -- Repaying moral debts : self-punishment and restitution -- Changing one's heart, changing the past : repentance and moral transformation -- Reforming relationships : the reconciliation theory of atonement -- Forgiveness, self-forgiveness, and redemption -- Making amends for crime : an evaluation of restorative justice -- Collective atonement : making amends to the Magdalen penitents.

Why does social injustice exist? What role, if any, do implicit biases play in the perpetuation of social inequalities? Individualistic approaches to these questions explain social injustice as the result of individuals’ preferences, beliefs, and choices. For example, they explain racial injustice as the result of individuals acting on racial stereotypes and prejudices. In contrast, structural approaches explain social injustice in terms of beyond-the-individual features, including laws, institutions, city layouts, and social norms. Often these two approaches are seen as competitors. (...) Framing them as competitors suggests that only one approach can win and that the loser offers worse explanations of injustice. In this essay, we explore each approach and compare them. Using implicit bias as an example, we argue that the relationship between individualistic and structural approaches is more complicated than it may first seem. Moreover, we contend that each approach has its place in analyses of injustice and raise the possibility that they can work together—synergistically—to produce deeper explanations of social injustice. If so, the approaches may be complementary, rather than competing. (shrink)

This book tells the story of the Scientific Buddha, "born" in Europe in the 1800s but commonly confused with the Buddha born in India 2,500 years ago. The Scientific Buddha was sent into battle against Christian missionaries, who were proclaiming across Asia that Buddhism was a form of superstition. He proved the missionaries wrong, teaching a dharma that was in harmony with modern science. And so his influence continues. Today his teaching of "mindfulness" is heralded as the cure for all (...) manner of maladies, from depression to high blood pressure.In this potent critique, a well-known chronicler of the West's encounter with Buddhism demonstrates how the Scientific Buddha's teachings deviate in crucial ways from those of the far older Buddha of ancient India. Donald Lopez shows that the Western focus on the Scientific Buddha threatens to bleach Buddhism of its vibrancy, complexity, and power, even as the superficial focus on "mindfulness" turns Buddhism into merely the latest self-help movement. The Scientific Buddha has served his purpose, Lopez argues. It is now time for him to pass into nirvana. This is not to say, however, that the teachings of the ancient Buddha must be dismissed as mere cultural artifacts. They continue to present a meaningful challenge, even to our modern world. (shrink)

Modèle d'une société en mal de cohésion, ou modelé par elle et ses normes, le corps construit l'identité, et rend possible l'aliénation. Apprêté, mis en scène, observé ou transformé, il donne son étoffe au héros, ses rouages au pantin, ses prothèses à l'homme en mal de puissance. À moins que, habité en conscience, il ne devienne la source vive où l'homme peut puiser sa joie. Les 27 et 28 mars 2017, dans l'amphithéâtre de l'École Nationale Supérieure d'Art de Bourges, s'est (...) tenu un colloque de philosophie sur le thème "Ce que peut un corps". Enseignants de philosophie, de sociologie, plasticien, maître d'arts martiaux se sont succédé pour faire état des états du corps."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

In this book, as feminist, Marxist, postcolonial, and queer scholars, we argue that social reproduction is foundational to comprehending urbanization and urban transformations by contributing to the feminist project of writing social reproduction and everyday life into urban theory." Social reproduction is, of course, not just an analytical framing but also an organising call for feminist scholars and our contention is that if we want an urban theory for our time, it needs to be feminist. Feminism is not simply a (...) 'discipline,' 'theory', or 'ideology', but a worldview, a lived praxis that provides a platform for engaged analysis. The book's origins lie in our belief in the necessity of feminist urban knowledge production, a belief further endorsed by our prior critical engagement with the analytical framework of planetary urbanization and our collective ruminations during and post this engagement on the nature of urban theory (Reddy 2018; Ruddick et al. 2018). Not least the considerable response to the theme issue of Society and Space (Peake et al. 2018) showed us that there was an audience desirous of troubling the hegemony of urban theory. Moreover, our approach of working as a team across hierarchies of junior and senior scholars, generations, genders, sexualities, institutions, and disciplines-a praxis we refer to as "the intergenerational social reproductive labor of knowledge production" (Peake et al. 2018, p. 377)-had been fruitful and positive and we wanted it to continue. It was as much a pedagogical experience of reading and writing together, and sharing meals, as it was an exploration of our places within the academy and an intellectual foray into urban theory. And while Roza Tchoukaleyska left for Newfoundland, Elsa Koleth, a new post-doctoral fellow at the City Institute at York University, joined us. (shrink)

Abstract In this paper I argue that to understand the ethics of belief we need to put it in a context of what we care about. Epistemic values always arise from something we care about and they arise only from something we care about. It is caring that gives rise to the demand to be epistemically conscientious. The reason morality puts epistemic demands on us is that we care about morality. But there may be a (small) class of beliefs which (...) it is not wrong to hold unconscientiously. I also argue that epistemic values enjoy a privileged place in the panorama of what we care about because they are entailed by anything we care about. That means that when there is a conflict between caring about knowledge or true belief and caring about something else, that conflict cannot be resolved simply by following the one we care about the most because caring about knowledge in any domain is entailed by caring about that domain. Finally, I argue that whereas caring demands different degrees of conscientiousness in different contexts, contextualism about knowledge is less plausible. (shrink)

A group of philosophers suggests that a sense of mineness intrinsically contained in the phenomenal structure of all conscious experiences is a necessary condition for a subject to become aware of himself as the subject of his experiences i.e. self-awareness. On this view, consciousness necessarily entails phenomenal self-awareness. This paper argues that cases of delusions of thought insertion undermine this claim and that such a phenomenal feature plays little role in accounting for the most minimal type of self-awareness entailed by (...) phenomenal consciousness. First, I clarify the main view endorsing this claim i.e. the Self-Presentational View of Consciousness and formulate the challenge from thought insertion. After, I offer a systematic evaluation of all the strategies used by the advocates of this view to deal with this challenge. Finally, I conclude that most of these strategies are unsatisfactory for they rest in unwarranted premises, imprecisions about the agentive nature of cognitive experiences, and especially, lack of distinction between the different ways in which subjects can become aware of their own thoughts. (shrink)

This paper summarizes various interpretations of emotional arguments, with a focus on the emotional mode of argument introduced in the multi-modal argumentation model (Gilbert, 1994). From there the author shifts from a descriptive account of emotional arguments to a discussion about a normative framework. Pointing out problems with evaluative models of the emotional mode, a paradigmatic shift captured by the Amenable Argumentation Approach is explained as a way forward for the advancement of the emotional mode and multi-modal argumentation.

This book highlights the powerful impact of some important Spanish Jesuits on some relevant English thinkers such as Locke, Bacon, and others, regarding politics, law and natural rights, an influence sometimes hidden and always controversial.

The claim of the freedom of the will (understood as an individual who is transcendent to Nature) in the name of XXth century scientific knowledge, against the perspective of XVIIIth-XIXth century scientific materialism, is analysed and refuted in the present paper. The hypothesis of reductionism finds no obstacle within contemporary natural sciences. Determinism in classical physics is irrefutable, unless classical physics is itself refuted. From quantum mechanics, some authors argue that free will is possible because there is an ontological indeterminism (...) in the natural laws, and that the mind is responsible for the wave function collapse of matter, which leads to a choice among the different possibilities for the body. However, here I defend the opposite thesis because indeterminism does not imply free will, and because the considerations about an autonomous mind sending orders to the body is against neuroscience or evolutionary theories about human beings. The quantum theory of measurement can be interpreted without the intervention of human minds, but other fields of science cannot contemplate the mentalist scenario. A fatalistic or materialist view, which denies the possibility of a free will, makes much more sense in scientific terms. (shrink)

A substantial body of recent philosophy envisages a close, congenial relationship between blame and morality. It has been posited, assumed or argued, for instance, that blame is responsive to moral...

Women, Art, and Power?seven landmark essays on women artists and women in art history?brings together the work of almost twenty years of scholarship and speculation.

What different relativist claims about a given domain are to be distinguished? Which of them is best placed to account for intuitive facts about disagreement in that domain? In a recent paper in this journal, ‘Indexical Relativism versus Genuine Relativism’ (2004), Max Kölbel distinguishes two forms of relativism, andargues that one of them, indexical relativism, faces problems in accounting for disagreement. In the first part of this discussion I present my own taxonomy of relativist positions in a given domain, which (...) is based on David Lewis’s 1980 essay, and I compare it with Kölbel’s and other recent suggestions. In the second part, I argue that the presuppositional defence of indexical relativism against related objections that I have elaborated elsewhere is also effective against Kölbel’s recent charges. (shrink)

A common approach in the philosophy of love defines love as caring about one another and promoting one another's interests, aims and values. The view faces several problems and has been re-formulated to avoid them. However, here I argue that a larger re-formulation of the definition of love is needed in order to accommodate three instances of what I call 'non-harmonious' relationships. I identify three types of non-harmonious love (featuring problematic interests, opposing interests and neutral interests the lovers do not (...) care about) and ultimately claim that our definition of love must incorporate conflict and self- interest, and we should then abandon the excessive focus on the sharing of values. (shrink)

En este artículo expongo y analizo la propuesta berkeleyana del conocimiento nocional, que representa entre otras cosas el intento del irlandés por conocer a la mente o espíritu, esto es, a aquella cosa pensante y activa que por su propia actividad resulta irrepresentable como idea. Como el conocimiento nocional ya se menciona en los Comentarios Filosófi cos me remitiré a ellos para conocer los orígenes del mismo; sin embargo, como tal conocimiento aparece con mayor detalle en obras posteriores me serviré (...) sobre todo del Tratado para abordar la compleja doctrina nocional. // In this paper I expose and analyze the berkeleian proposal of notional knowledge. Among other things, this proposal represents Berkeley ́s attempt to know the mind or spirit, that is, the thinking and active thing that by its own activity results unrepresentable as idea. As such knowledge is already mentioned in the Philosophical Commentaries, I will refer to them in order to know the origins of that proposal. However, as notional knowledge appears in more detail in later works, I will make use especially of the Treatise to address the complex notional doctrine. (shrink)

This article presents an alternative understanding of corporations from the two problematic visions that see corporations as either the shareholders’ property or as nexuses of contracts. The alternative proposed here is based on the theories of pre-eighteenth-century philosophers, particularly Aristotle’s political philosophy, which Thomas Aquinas later refined. The article aims to advance a theory of corporate legal and moral responsibility for human rights based on the conception of corporations as imperfect communities whose purpose is to produce a good or service (...) through participatory work that allows individuals to self-develop while contributing to the community by satisfying consumers’ needs through collaborative work. The critical account of corporations presented here provides a sound foundation upon which to build a justification of corporate responsibility for human rights violations, providing a more accurate description of the reality of a corporation than most mainstream contemporary accounts do. (shrink)

It has been argued by disability advocates that supported decision-making must replace surrogate, or substituted, decision-making for people with cognitive disabilities. From a moral perspective surrogate decision-making it is said to be an indefensible form of paternalism. At the heart of this argument against surrogate decision-making is the belief that such paternalistic action expresses something fundamentally disrespectful about those upon whom it is imposed: that they are inferior, deficient or child-like in some way. Contrary to this widespread belief, I will (...) argue that surrogate decision-making sometimes expresses more respect for people with life-long, ‘severe’ or ‘profound’ cognitive disabilities than does the adoption of supported decision-making.. Specifically, I argue that in some cases supported decision-making can arguably express that people with severe or profound cognitive disabilities lack equal moral value. I also argue that supported decision-making for people with profound cognitive disabilities can arguably express that they lack complex and rich inner lives. If our aim is to ensure our behaviour and practices express respect for people with life-long ‘severe’ or ‘profound’ cognitive disabilities, then sometimes surrogate rather than supportive decision-making will be a better option. (shrink)

Just what sort of a theory is psychoanalytic theory? -- Did Kant precede Freud on a-rational thought? -- Why primary process is hard to know -- Representational a-rational thinking : a proper function account for phantasy and wish -- Drive theory and primary process -- Phantasies, neurotic-beliefs, and beliefs-proper -- Desire and the readiness-to-act -- Compare and contrast : Gardner, Lear, Cavell, and Brakel.

History education holds strong potential for students to examine how racism and other intersecting forms of oppression embedded within U.S. institutions have and still impact today’s social fabric. When rooted in Martell and Stevens’ “thinking like an activist” framework, history education provides opportunities for preservice teachers (PSTs) to see, understand, and disrupt the dominant narrative. They can begin to reimagine their roles as future leaders in the classroom and beyond to ensure that all students thrive and not just survive. Thus, (...) for this qualitative study, we engaged our PST in a book study of A Different Mirror for Young People: A History for Multicultural America. Through intentional content and pedagogical choices, we investigated the question, “ How do preservice teachers make sense of history using the ‘thinking like an activist’ framework?” Findings indicated how Takaki’s different mirror, as a counternarrative centering the perspectives and experiences of historically marginalized groups, allowed PSTs 1) to unlearn oppressive structures (cultural preparation), 2) begin to develop a sociopolitical consciousness of systemic oppression, albeit through an outsider’s perspective (critical analysis), and 3) to analyze how collective action in the past enacted change–although through an already, but not yet, understanding of their role in social change in the present (collective action). (shrink)

In this timely book, a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter trains an autobiographical lens on a moment of remarkable transition in American journalism. Just a few years ago, the mainstream press was wrestling with whether labeling waterboarding as torture violated important norms of neutrality and objectivity. Now, major American newspapers regularly call the president of the United States a liar. Clearly, something has changed as the old rules of "balance" and "two sides to every story" have lost their grip. Is the change (...) for the better? Will it last? In Just a Journalist, Linda Greenhouse--who for decades covered the U.S. Supreme Court for The New York Times--tackles these questions from the perspective of her own experience. A decade ago, she faced criticism from her own newspaper and much of journalism's leadership for a speech to a college alumnae group in which she criticized the Bush administration for, among other things, seeking to create a legal black hole at Guantánamo Bay--two years after the Supreme Court itself had ruled that the detainees could not be hidden away from the reach of federal judges who might hear their appeals. One famous newspaper editor expressed his belief that it was unethical for a journalist to vote, because the act of choosing one candidate over another could compromise objectivity. Linda Greenhouse disagrees. Calling herself "an accidental activist," she raises urgent questions about the role journalists can and should play as citizens, even as participants, in the world around them. (shrink)