This study investigates the relation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud in China. We document a significantly negative correlation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud using data on publicly traded firms between 2005 and 2010. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms penalize CEOs for fraud by lowering their pay. We also find that CEO compensation is lower in firms that commit more severe frauds. Panel data fixed effects and propensity score methods are used to demonstrate these effects. (...) Our results also indicate that corporate governance mechanisms influence the magnitude of punishment. We find that CEOs of privately controlled firms, firms that split the posts of CEO and chairman, and CEOs of firms located in developed regions suffer larger compensation penalties for committing financial fraud. Finally, we show that CEOs at firms that commit fraud are more likely to be replaced compared to those at non-fraud firms. (shrink)

This paper investigates the moderating role of industry regulation on the effectiveness of audit committees in restricting earnings management. Using comprehensive panel data of S&P 1500 firms between 2003 and 2007, we find that the proportion of CEO directors on an audit committee is positively associated with earnings management in unregulated industries, while this association is significantly weaker in regulated industries. Further, the proportion of financial experts on an audit committee is negatively associated with earnings management. Our results also indicate (...) that the average board tenure of audit committee members is negatively related to earnings management in regulated industries, but positively affects earnings management in unregulated industries. Finally, audit committee members’ average directorship increases earnings management in regulated industries, but reduces earnings management in unregulated industries. Overall, our results suggest that the effectiveness of audit committees in reducing earnings management and improving financial reporting quality is influenced by industry regulation. (shrink)

This paper examines the reactions of stakeholders to firms’ ESG information and how these reactions impact firms’ financial performance. We further explore how firms’ ESG performance and public attention moderate these relationships. Using a longitudinal dataset of Chinese listed firms from 2014 to 2023, we find that firms with vague ESG information are associated with increased financing constraints, diminished brand value, and reduced government environmental subsidies. Interestingly, these negative consequences are milder in firms with unusually poor ESG performance. Our findings (...) also reveal that stakeholders’ adverse responses deteriorate these firms’ future performance. Moreover, public attention as an information intermediary is a double-edged sword: heightened public scrutiny alleviates stakeholders’ negative reactions to vague ESG information but intensifies them when a firm’s ESG performance is extremely poor. These results remain robust across alternative measures, models, and sample selection treatments. Overall, our study demonstrates that vague ESG information elicits adverse responses from stakeholders and weakens firm performance. These effects, however, are contingent upon a firm’s ESG performance and the level of public attention it receives. (shrink)

This article evaluates effectiveness and costs of external regulation, in particular the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in restricting managerial malfeasance and safeguarding shareholder interests. It discusses the role of managerial ethics as an alternative corporate governance mechanism to protect shareholder value. This article builds a mathematical model to illustrate shareholders' choices of best corporate governance mechanisms, taking into account the influence of managerial ethics, effectiveness and costs of monitoring. We suggest that the best corporate governance design and the optimal (...) monitoring expenses are influenced by managerial types, monitoring efficiency, and effectiveness of ethics education. We conclude that stringent regulation and monitoring may not always enhance shareholder value. When managerial ethics could be improved by ethics education or social norms, ethics education may be a better alternative than stringent regulation. (shrink)