Given the apparent nondisplaceability and noncancellability of the derogatory content of slurs, it may appear puzzling that non-derogatory uses of slurs exist. Moreover, these uses seem to be in general available only to in-group speakers, thereby exhibiting a peculiar kind of context-sensitivity. In this paper the author argues that to understand non-derogatory uses we should consider slurs in terms of the kind of social practice their uses instantiate. A suitable theory of social practices has been proposed by McMillan. In typical (...) uses the practice is one of bigotry and discrimination. Non-derogatory uses are only possible to the extent that they consitute acts of an alternative, non-derogatory practice. In the core cases it must be a subversive practice of satire or reappropriation. The social identity of speakers is not an ultimately decisive factor but it is an important constitutive condition: most non-derogatory practices of slur-use can only be performed by a member of the target group. (shrink)

Most accounts of the derogatory meaning of slurs are semantic. Recently, Nunberg proposed a purely pragmatic account offering a compelling picture of the relation between derogatory content and social context. Nunberg posits that the semantic content of slurs is identical to that of neutral counterparts, and that derogation is a result of the association of slur use with linguistic conventions of bigoted speakers. The mechanism responsible for it is a special kind of conversational implicature. However, this paper argues that Nunberg’s (...) proposal suffers from technical and conceptual problems regarding the application of the concepts of implicature and convention. It is proposed that the implicature mechanism should be replaced by expressive commitment attribution. The account advocated here preserves crucial insights of Nunberg’s analysis, 25–48, 2013a, Analytic Philosophy 54, 350–363, 2013b; Bolinger Nous, 51, 439–462, 2017), giving them a firmer conceptual basis. It supports a distinction between derogation and offensiveness of slurs that improves on the one proposed by Hom and May, 293–313 2013), and sheds light on puzzling borderline cases: the use of slurs by ignorant speakers and controversies surrounding the status of some words as potentially slurs. (shrink)

This paper offers a general model of the semantics of lexicalized social meanings, i.e. semiotic properties of certain expressions in a socio-political context. Examples include slurs, problematically charged expressions such as inner city, as well as terms such as mother, which also carry implicit ideological associations. Insofar as their linguistic properties are concerned, social meanings can be construed as context-structuring devices: without introducing specific at-issue contents, they evoke background assumptions which shape the context of conversation. An inferentialist model of discourse (...) is developed to account for this effect, in which the discursive significance of an utterance is defined as the set of inferences it licenses relative to a discursive context. A discursive context is a set of propositions that can serve as auxiliary premises in material inferences, together with a salience ranking that makes some of these propositions more readily available and therefore more relevant to determining discursive significance. Social meanings are defined as functions on discursive contexts that modify the salience ranking, increasing the salience of certain assumptions and stereotypes. As a result, they impact the discursive significance of utterances indirectly and independently of at-issue contents. They are also largely independent of speaker intentions in virtue of the ideological nature of discursive contexts. (shrink)

The topic of the article is St. Anselm’s ontological argument. This is not, however, an attempt to interpret or evaluate the proof itself, but rather to place it in a broader theoretical context. The proper aim of the article is to present a proposal of a theory of metaphysics within which this proof could be considered and acknowledged as correct. This proposal is presented in two steps: in the first the author presents a sketch of a formal theory of being (...) and properties; in the second he offers a sketch of a model that is appropriate for this theory. His intention is also that the proposed theory be as close as possible to Anselm’s theory as it is found in his writings. He also considers Anselm’s position in the matter of universals and the suggested nominalist interpretation of his metaphysics. The final part of the article shows Anselm’s originality, especially as regards his method of reasoning. (shrink)

The subject of the article is a comparison of the work of Heraclitus with the utterances of Delphic oracle. The author analyzes the character of those utterances, pointing to their “two-layeredness”, i.e. to their having two meanings: one litteral – apparent and the other hidden – proper. The proper meaning is allegoric and is in such a relation to the litteral as the latter is to the sign. To settle for the litteral meaning is a mistake that makes it impossible (...) understand the prophecy properly. Some essential fragments of Heraclitus have a similar character – they also have both an apparent sense and a proper, hidden sense. One can guess that the philosopher intentionally made his work resemble Pythia’s utterances to give it a unique status. The pattern [sign/apparent meaning = apparent meaning/hidden meaning] can be also suitable for Heraclitus’s vision of the world. The relation that appears in each of these three areas is a peculiar kind of “indicating”. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to reveal and criticize some of the hidden assumptions of the discussion on the nature of proper names. Those assumptions work in favor of the New Theory of Reference (NTR), which in fact seems more plausible than it should, were the assumptions made explicit. Three theses, it is argued, are assumed with no proof by all sides of the proper names debate: (1) proper names refer to their objects in a different way than common (...) names do; (2) proper names are rigid designators; (3) "we know what we say", i.e. the meaning of a sentence is identical to some cognitive content that is associated with it by the speaker. It is shown that the main source of plausibility of those assumptions, which serve as premises in arguments for the NTR, is the NTR itself. (shrink)

The paper concerns mutual relations between two metaphysical positions: “superessentialism,” claiming that all properties of every object are essential, i.e.necessary, and “necessitarianism,” claiming that everything is necessary, i.e. there is only one possible world. The theories of Spinoza and Lewis serve as examples. In section I the two positions are characterized. In section II and III interpretations of Spinoza’s and Lewis’s metaphysics are presented, and it is explained to what extent they can both be considered superessentialists and necessitarians. In section (...) IV the two theories are compared. In section V three possible ways of arguing for superessentialism are presented. It is then shown that the premises of these arguments appear, at least implicitly, in both of the theories. In section VI additional premises are numbered which have to be further assumed to prove necessitarianism. In the final section it is shown how Lewis can claim that there are contingent facts, while being a superessentialist and a necessitarian. It is argued that his claim of contingency is a matter of semantics, not of metaphysics. (shrink)