The present article explores the inner tensions of the legal culture in consumer society as a consequence of the interaction between democracy, liberalism and market economy under globalization. The interaction between democracy and modern political thought has given rise to liberal democratic society, moral and religious pluralism, and modern law. The interplay between liberal democracy and the market (“new liberalism”) has generated the idea of “instrumental reason”, whose penetration into many realms of life has transformed the structure of society and (...) democracy itself: consumer society and a dangerous tendency of social decline prevail. Under the expansion of globalization and social decline, instrumental law may not be enough to ensure the functioning of society. Consumer society does not understand modern law and thus renders it inefficient. (shrink)

La figura de Don Juan es uno de los lugares más recurrentes en el pensamiento español del siglo XX. La mayoría de los escritores y filósofos de la primera mitad del siglo escribieron algo sobre él; José Ortega y Gasset acudió a este personaje en su libro El tema de nuestro tiempo para escenificar su tesis de la razón vital. Este artículo revisa la lectura de Ortega, y plantea también la posibilidad de la permanencia de Don Juan en nuestro siglo.

The author of the article analyzes the constitutional doctrine of the dismissal of a judge from office upon the expiration of the term of powers. The author discusses the guarantees of the independence of courts and judges, one of which is the guarantee of the inviolability of the length of powers of judges. The previously valid Law on Courts used to provide that the President of the Republic could appoint a person as a judge of a local court when such (...) an appointment is made for the first time, for a five-year term, and that upon the expiration of the five-year term, the President of the Republic could appoint such a person as a judge of a local court without examination or selection until the person reaches the age of 65. Under the Law on Courts valid at present, judges of all courts are appointed at once for the term until they reach 65 years of age. It is asserted in the article that the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania has not established the right of a person, who was for the first time appointed as a judge of a local court for a five-year term, to be appointed as a judge until he reaches 65 years of age. (shrink)

The article deals with the criteria upon which the powers of the Seimas (the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania) and the Government are delimited in the constitutional jurisprudence of Lithuania. It analyses how the Constitutional Court construes the principle of separation of powers as entrenched in the Constitution and evaluates the meaning of the provision of the Constitution that corresponding ‘relations are regulated by law’. If the Constitution provides that certain relations are regulated by means of a law, such (...) relations may be regulated only by means of a legal act, which takes the form of a law, and it is, therefore, not permissible to regulate such relations by Government resolutions or other acts of the executive. The most important elements of legal relations must be regulated (established) by means of a law, whereas Government resolutions might establish the procedure for the implementation of such laws. Rulings of the Constitutional Court reveal that once the powers of a specific branch of state power have been directly established in the Constitution, an institution of state power may not assume the said powers fr om another state institution. It may not transfer or waive them; and such powers may not be amended or limited by means of a law. The question remains, whether the provision of the Law on the Diplomatic Service wh ereby the candidacy of a diplomatic representative must be reviewed by the Seimas Committee on Foreign Affairs in advance is not in conflict with the Constitution. (shrink)

The article deals with the legal acts which were adopted by the Supreme Council Reconstituting the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania on 11 March 1990, and which are related to the restoration of the independent State of Lithuania. The author discloses the chronology of the legal acts adopted on that day and investigates why some particular act was adopted first, and only later another act was passed; he investigates the circumstances which determined the content of the legal acts and (...) shows the interconnection between these acts. The sequence and content of the legal acts of restoration of independence were determined by the fact that the independent State of Lithuania could not arise from the so-called “Lithuanian SSR” which had never been a form of Lithuanian statehood. The restoration of independence could and had to be grounded only upon the continuation of the pre-war Republic of Lithuania. One had to draw a boundary line between the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR, which was elected in democratic and free elections on 24 February 1990, and which was a genuine representation of the Nation, from the former Supreme Soviets of the Lithuanian SSR—the essence and formation procedure of which was completely different. This was done by adopting the Declaration “On the Powers of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR” in which it was held that in the 24 February 1990 elections the Nation vested to the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR the mandate and the duty to restore the State of Lithuania and express the sovereign will of the Nation through this body, which, from 11 March 1990, 6 p.m., would be referred to as the Supreme Council of Lithuania. (shrink)

There are some problems in the implementation of rulings of the Constitutional Court. The legislator should make more efforts for implementing the concept of the provisions of the Constitution provided in the reasoning parts of rulings of the Constitutional Court. The Statute of the Seimas should be supplemented with provisions obligating structural sub-units of the Seimas to carry out permanent and systemic analysis of reasoning parts of rulings of the Constitutional Court. It would allow timely to prepare proposals how to (...) amend still unchallenged legal regulation which, however, from the constitutional standpoint is doubtful. One should consider whether the norm of Item 4 of Paragraph 1 of Article 64 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, which allows one to challenge the compliance of a legal act with the Constitution on the grounds of the procedure for adoption regardless of any terms expired after the adoption of a law or other legal act, should be amended. It is to be presumed that the principles of legal certainty and legal security entrenched in the Constitution, as well as other constitutional provisions, imply a certain reasonable period of time within which the subjects provided for in the Constitution may apply to the Constitutional Court with a petition requesting to investigate whether a law or other legal act is not in conflict with the Constitution according to the procedure of their adoption. This period of time should not be a long one, for example, half a year or a year since the official publishing of the law; this term should be a prescriptive one–after it has finished, it would not be allowed to challenge the compliance of a law or other legal act with the Constitution according to the procedure of their adoption. In order to speed up the consideration of cases at the Constitutional Court, one would have to change the procedure of consideration of cases in this Court in essence. (shrink)

The article aims to assess whether the procedural innovations introduced by the reform of the civil procedure law of the Republic of Lithuania have brought changes in judges’ behaviour, which the reform intended to achieve. The study analyses the driving reason behind the reform of the civil procedure law, its objectives, and the ways the five innovations brought about by the reform changed the behaviour of the judges. The analysis of the legal sources and the empirical study show that some (...) of the innovations introduced by the Civil Procedure Code have not yet been properly assimilated and that the code, which has been in force for twenty years, is still not fully operational and understood. (shrink)

An interesting trend of recent scholarship on Santayana’s thought is focused on his criticism of modernity and brings him together with the major figures of postmodern philosophy, especially with Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, and Rorty. In my opinion, while the criticism of modernity certainly offers a relevant key to understand Santayana’s philosophy, it should be rooted first and foremost in some cultural and philosophical linkages that Santayana himself makes explicit throughout his writings, namely, a classical Latin author such as Lucretius, and (...) a modern author such as Giacomo Leopardi. Answering the question in my title, it seems to me that, ultimately, Santayana is a timely/untimely philosopher, if his concepts of rationality and spirituality can be viewed and understood within the framework labeled by Michel Foucault as epimeleia heautou or cura sui. (shrink)

This book takes part in the current revival of social-scientific interest in the study of moralities by seeking to introduce as its foundation a cross-civilizational framework that makes it possible to subject all traditions seeking to induce socially responsible behavior, both religious and secular, to systematic investigation.

The present article aims to show the effects that the coalescence of liberal democracy and globalisation has on the law as a social institution. The law as a social institution is one of the key foundations for the social integration of modern society, which is why we may suggest a reasonable assumption that the role of the law in modern Western societies should be growing in significance. However, the coalescence of liberal democracy and globalisation is a consequence of the evolution (...) of modern Western civilisation and the main context of its further development that gives feedback to the very development process. The analysis of the crisis of the financial capital makes us question the previous assumption because the essence of the law as a social institution lies not in its legal regulation but in its self-regulation that should increase the society’s trust in different institutions, including the financial capital. The present research makes an attempt to answer the following questions: 1) what is the traditional role of the relationship between society and the law as a social institution? 2) what are the most important social consequences of the coalescence of liberal democracy and globalisation? 3) what is the significance of the legal culture under the circumstances of the coalescence of liberal democracy and globalisation? These questions have determined the structure of this paper. (shrink)

This article focuses on the analysis of the main positions of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in the cases of intellectual property law. In the article three judgments and the positions of the Constitutional Court extracted therefrom are analysed. The Constitutional Court has formed several important positions with reference to intellectual property law regarding usage of property protection norms for the protection of intellectual property, requirements of application of compensation as an alternative to damages compensation and the (...) calculation of criterions thereof as well as functional legal protection of trademarks. It should be noted that Article 23(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania has extended protection to property and, as the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania has noted, the constitutional protection of property covers not only the protection of tangible, but also of intellectual property. In the same judgment, the Constitutional Court stated another important intellectual property related rule, namely that constitutionally established property protection rights have to be implemented regardless of whether a corresponding international treaty has not been ratified, as protection of authors’ rights is granted under Articles 23 and 42(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. However, the second position stating that the rights of foreign subjects are to be implemented even though a corresponding international treaty has not been signed is to be criticised as by coming to such a conclusion the Constitutional Court has ignored the otherwise generally recognised principle of territoriality of intellectual property rights. In two other cases the Constitutional Court has made important statements relevant to intellectual property law. First of all, the Court stated that compensation instead of claiming actual damages is constitutional. By analysing the positions formulated by the Court, an indirect conclusion can be made to the effect that compensation instead of claiming actual damages is necessary in order to ensure effective protection of intellectual property rights. In other words, the purposes of compensation can be recognised: restoring (compensating) the infringed interests of the injured party; simplifying judicial proceedings, whereby faster proceedings (litigation) and easier substantiation is sought; and the preventive purpose (strong preventive effect). However, the Court’s argument regarding the criterion of compensation calculation, saying that the damages incurred by the intellectual property rights owner depend on the sale value of the product concerned is criticisable, as it is rarely the case that the licence fee or profit acquired in the result of unauthorised use of intellectual property objects is calculated with reference to the final sale price of the product. Notwithstanding the arguably weak argument of the Court, the Court’s position regarding the criterion of final sale price itself does not preclude the possibility of reaching a fair final decision. Finally, the Court acknowledged that trademark protection was limited to the economic functions of the trademark and the full protection thereof. (shrink)

The heritage of civilizations in geopolitics is progressively used to consolidate the vision of a multipolar world and, thereby, to establish its important place in the arena of international affairs. Civilizational heritage and civilizational imagination become increasingly important geopolitical factors which begin to shape the relations between China, Russia, Turkey, the United States and the European Union. In global politics during the last decades, in one way or another, Samuel Huntington’s ideas of the interactions between civilizations and their development externalised (...) with the stress on the increase of civilizational conflicts. These ideas made great impact on political elites of main world powers. The author of this article—drawing attention to the importance of cultural and especially religious factors for civilizational processes and the interactions between civilizations, which were also raised by Huntington—examines the peculiarities of the Russian and Turkish civilizational and geopolitical discourses, and connects to those discourses the current geopolitics pursued by the political elites of these countries. The promotion of the current role of the civilization and its geopolitical legacy highlights the uniqueness of civilizations and creates an effort to strengthen the civilizational imagination and to use the civilizational imperial experience and its cultural heritage in current political events. The Russian discourse is characterised by the historical anti-Western and anti-European attitude of Eurasian Messianic civilizational distinctiveness, while the Turkish rhetoric is characterised by the elevation of the imperial Ottoman Islamic cultural and political heritage. Both the discourses are linked by an imperial mentality, orientation towards a multi-civilizational and multi-polar world as well as the demand to create a new world order in line with such an emerging worldview. The article also discusses some of the ideas prevailing in the European Union that underpin the policy of creating a post-national European cosmopolitan community. However, such discourse lacks a cultural, civilizational as well as religious heritage, which brings people together and can form a long-lasting sense of civilizational community. (shrink)

After the Provisional Basic Law (Provisional Constitution) had been adopted on 11 March 1990, it soon became clear that it did not meet the new needs of the society and the state. It became clear that the new Constitution had to be drafted promptly. Its drafting was taking place at the time of heated discussions about various things, but especially about the structure of branches of state power, the empowerment thereof and their interrelations. The author of the article was a (...) member of the working group drafting the new Constitution. In his article, the author presents passages from the notes made by him about the sittings of the Provisional Commission for Drafting the Constitution and those of its working group. The notes disclose the variety of the views of the deputies and legal specialists and show the difficult way of emergence of the draft Constitution. This is confirmed by the time-line of drafting the Constitution. In 1990 and at the beginning of 1991, the first draft Constitutions were published, which had been drafted by the members of the societies of Lithuanian philosophers and lawyers, by the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party, etc. Prior to the resolution of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania of 7 November 1990, a group of deputies was formed for drafting an outline of the concept of the Constitution. On 22 October 1991, the Council of the Seimas of the Lithuanian Sąjūdis Movement made a statement “On the Restoration of the Institution of the President of the Republic”. On 5 November 1991, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania adopted a Resolution “On the Development of the Lithuanian Constitutionalism”, whereas by its resolution of 10 December 1991 it formed the Provisional Commission for Drafting the Constitution. On 3 March 1992, the said Provisional Commission approved the draft Constitution that it prepared; it was submitted to the Supreme Council. Three members of the Provisional Commission had submitted alternatives to a number of articles of the Constitution. On 21 April 1992, the Supreme Council assented to the work done by the Provisional Commission and decided to publish the draft Constitution so that it could be discussed by the public. On 6 May 1992, the Lithuanian Sąjūdis Movement, the Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Lithuanian Nationalist Union formed a coalition for drafting an alternative draft Constitution; soon the press published the alternative draft Constitution prepared by the Sąjūdis Movement Coalition “For the Democratic Lithuania”. On 23 May 1992, the referendum on the restoration of the institution of the President of the Republic took place—that referendum did not approve the proposal. Thus, two alternative draft Constitutions appeared. The essential difference between those drafts was a different approach to the system of branches of state powers, their empowerment and their interrelation. The draft Constitution prepared by the Provisional Commission was based on the parliamentary republic form of governance, whereas in the draft prepared by the Sąjūdis Movement Coalition “For Democratic Lithuania” the model of half-presidential republic was dominant. In order to prepare a single draft Constitution, which could then be proposed for the referendum of the Nation, political and legal compromises were sought. For this purpose, the Group for the Adjustment of Constitutional Issues was formed. At the end of September and at the beginning of October 1992, one single (the so-called “compromise”) draft Constitution was prepared from the existing two alternative drafts. The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania was adopted by the Nation in the referendum of 25 October 1992 and came into force on 2 November 1992. (shrink)

Under Article 63 of the Constitution, a gross violation of the Law on Elections to the Seimas is one of the grounds for discontinuation of the powers of the Member of the Seimas. The Constitution does not reveal expressis verbis as to what is a gross violation of the law on election. The establishment of this is within the discretion of the legislator. While defining what a gross violation of the Law on Elections to the Seimas is, the legislator is (...) bound by the norms and principles of the Constitution. Although the Constitution does not define expressis verbis as to what a gross violation of the law on election is, the fact that, under Item 6 of Article 63 of the Constitution, the powers of a Member of the Seimas shall cease on this ground, implies at least several things: first, not every violation of the law on election can be regarded as a gross one, thus, if the law on election has not been grossly violated, it is not permitted on this ground to recognise that the Member of the Seimas lost his mandate, or that the powers of the Member of the Seimas ceased; second, only such violations may be regarded as gross ones, upon commission of which there appear reasonable doubts whether during the election the genuine will of the voters was expressed, whether their will was not distorted to the extent that the results of the election do not reflect the genuine will of the voters and the mandates of Members of the Seimas have been distributed unfairly. (shrink)

Under Article 74 of the Constitution, for gross violation of the Constitution or breach of oath, or if it transpires that a crime has been committed, the President of the Republic may be removed from office under procedure for impeachment proceedings. In the article the content of the constitutional delict is analysed. The President of the Republic may be brought to constitutional responsibility only for the actions which he committed while in office of the President of the Republic. The President (...) of the Republic may be removed from office not for any violation of the Constitution, but only for gross violation thereof. While implementing the powers established to him in the Constitution and laws, the President of the Republic may not breach the oath. Under Article 74 of the Constitution, the President of the Republic may be removed from office “if it transpires that a crime has been committed” – this provision means that the Constitution provides for the right of the Seimas to remove the President of the Republic from office in the absence of a court judgement recognising that the President of the Republic is guilty of commission of a crime. The Constitution commissions only the Constitutional Court to establish the fact of violation of the Constitution – whether there has been a gross violation of the Constitution and breach of oath by actions of the person. The Seimas may not change or question the conclusion of the Constitutional Court. On the grounds of the conclusion of the Constitutional Court that the actions of the President of the Republic are in conflict with the Constitution, it is only the Seimas that decides whether to remove the President of the Republic from office. The removal of the President of the Republic from office under procedure of impeachment proceedings due to a suspicion that the crime has been committed is not binding upon a court of general jurisdiction which considers the criminal case. (shrink)

The article deals with the doctrine of the returning of the powers of the Government upon the election of the President of the Republic formulated in the Constitutional Court ruling of 10 January 1998. Attention is focused on the arguments of the Constitutional Court upon which this doctrine is based–these are the arguments regarding the expression of no-confidence in the Prime Minister and the new empowerment of the Government (after more than a half of the ministers are changed). In the (...) opinion of the author, some of such arguments are subject to discussion. The constitutional regulation regarding the returning of the powers of the Government upon the election of the President of the Republic is inexhaustive and unclear. Although the wording of the provisions of the Constitution regarding the returning of the powers of the Government after the elections of the Seimas and after the elections of the President of the Republic is almost the same, there is one essential difference: the Constitution provides that after the elections of the Seimas the Government must return its powers to the President of the Republic and must resign, whereas the Constitution does not provide that the Government must resign after the elections of the President of the Republic as well. (shrink)

Taxation of residential property is difficult to be implemented in many jurisdictions and in this respect Lithuania is not an exception. Many taxpayers do not comprehend why property should be levied by the government. Indeed, any owner of real estate would usually resist to any attempts to increase this tax burden. However, even when the threshold is once overstepped and a new unpopular statutory framework is introduced, the government still faces new dilemmas regarding the administration of this tax. Sometimes weak (...) tax administration but not the tax itself undermines the credibility of the public. Commercial premises as well as land have been continuously levied in the Republic of Lithuania since 1990. Thus, the taxes paid by enterprises and the land tax were not a big issue of public debate in Lithuania. The burden of this tax was not very significant in the light of all taxes paid by enterprises or land owners. The most problematic issue remains the taxation of residential property. (shrink)

The paper deals with the paradox that rationality demands rational substantiation which can’t be given in principle. Thus it is argued that only intuition can prevail against skepticism and subjectivism. But intuition is "transcendent" to rationality and therefore its acceptance as the substantiation of rationality implies existence of transcendental reality. In itself it has infinite regress qua infinite reiteration of reality levels without any qualitative ontological alteration, therefore only infinite transcendence is able to ground a finite immanence.

According to the general rule explaining apparent authority, if the behaviour of a principal gives reasonable grounds for the third party to think that the principal has appointed the other person to be his agent, contracts concluded by the third party in the principal’s name shall be binding on the principal, notwithstanding the fact that the agent was not authorised by the principal to conclude particular contracts. In the absence of evidence of apparent authority the agent shall have to redress (...) the damage incurred on a third party in cases where the third party was not aware, and was under no obligation to be aware, of circumstances that the person acted in other person’s name without their express authorisation or in excess of their authority. The principal shall be liable for actions of the apparent agent if the following three requirements are proven: words or conduct of the principal caused the impression of authority; third party could reasonably presume the existence of sufficient authority; third party acted in good faith. The third party’s legitimate expectations must be aligned with the principal’s will in order to apply the doctrine of apparent authority efficiently. (shrink)

The author tries to explore several new amendments to the penal code of Lithuania, made by the Law on 2 December 2010. The first amendment concerns article 72 of the Penal code of Lithuania (confiscation of property). Prior to the year 2003, confiscation of property implied the right of the court to confiscate any property in possession of the sentenced person. However the Penal code of 2003 set up a new concept of confiscation: just proceeds of the crime or objects (...) intended to be used in committing a crime should be confiscated. However practice was very poor. New law aimed at boosting practice of confiscation, particularly from third persons, to whom usually the offender transfers property. Previous wording of the law provided for that the property should be confiscated from the third person just in case the person knew or could know that the property that he possesses is from a crime. The law of 2010 added new alternative conditions. (shrink)