In this paper I wish to examine in detail the arguments which Spinoza uses in a very brief section of the Ethics, the lemmas following Proposition 13 of Part II. My aim in this analysis will be twofold: to attempt a preliminary sketch of the nature of a physical system in Spinoza’s view, and to clarify what Spinoza means by speaking of certain items as “individuals.” At least a partial fulfillment of the first aim is a necessary condition for the (...) second, since most of what Spinoza has to say about individuation in the Ethics and elsewhere is expressed in terms of individual bodies. His own solution of the mind-body problem entails that there will be correlative statements true at the ideational level; but, unfortunately, he usually leaves such correlations to his reader. I use the term “ideational” herein in preference to “mental” to avoid any dualistic connotation. Ideational and extensional levels for Spinoza refer to a dualism of denoting complexes, but not to a dualism of objects denoted by these. (shrink)

Spinoza semble adopter une position pleinement nominaliste lorsqu'il discue des notions universelles dans l'Ethique, mais on y trouve aussi plusieurs arguments où, semble-t-il, des universaux sont présupposés. La solution avancé par plusieurs commentateurs, y compris Haserot, est que le système spinoziste est d'inspiration platoniste, et qu'il faut réinterpréter les passages d'apparence nominaliste pour les accorder avec le platonisme ou l'essentialisme. J'argumente qu'un tel procédé n'est justifié ni par le texte ni par la structure du système de Spinoza. L'interprétation du spinozisme (...) que je propose le place dans le cadre logique du nominalisme contemporain, à l'instar du système de Nelson Goodman, par exemple. (shrink)

I ARGUE THAT SPINOZA’S DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF ’CONATION’ IS A CONSISTENT ANALYSIS BASED UPON HIS CLAIM THAT TELEOLOGICAL OR FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATION IS EITHER REDUCIBLE TO CAUSAL EXPLANATION (IN TERMS OF DRIVES) OR IS NOT GENUINELY EXPLANATORY. SEVERAL IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCES OF THIS FOR SPINOZA’S ACCOUNT OF HUMAN APPETITION ARE PURSUED, AND SOME CONSEQUENCES FOR HIS POLITICAL THEORY ARE MENTIONED IN CLOSING.

My examination of Spinoza's arguments for the infinity of extended substance lead to a comparison of his views with the anti-Kantian arguments offered by Moritz Schlick, and finally to some general remarks concerning Spinoza's concept of infinite magnitude, and its limitations from a contemporary perspective.

I argue that Spinoza’s account of appetition, and its application to human sexuality, is more original than many commentators suggest; and that it offers resolutions to several puzzles in the philosophy of sex. The paper first situates these puzzles in contemporary debates, offers a detailed analysis of Spinoza’s remarks on love in general and sexual love in particular, and concludes with some of the normative consequences which Spinoza attempts to derive from these.

I examine the new analysis of gay community and liberation offered by Dennis Altman in The Homosexualization of America. Three distinctive theoretical constructs are analyzed and criticized: (1) a new view of psychosocial development; (2) a new concept of gay identity; and (3) A set of causal hypotheses designed to explain the new direction of the gay subculture.

Following a brief historical account of the relationship between the PSSI and the TTP (as well as their respective authors), I provide a summary of Meyer’s arguments (in the first two parts of the PSSI) for his claim that philosophy provides the unique norm of interpretation for Scripture. My third section is devoted to an analysis of the analytic relations between the PSSI and the TTP. A brief closing section offers several speculations on the clarifications which Meyer’s work may bring (...) to Spinoza’s own development of a different account of scriptural exegesis in the TTP. (shrink)

It is often claimed that Spinoza regards aesthetic values as inherently subjective and relative. I suggest in my opening section that this reading is derived from Leibniz's misconception of Spinoza's method, and go on to develop a spinozistic account of aesthetic experience which is relational, but which sees it as rooted in human sensibility (imagination). In the closing section I take up the issue of intersubjective valuation, and the question how aesthetic values are shared within the human community. I suggest (...) also that Spinoza's somewhat out-of-fashion approach to aesthetic valuation through the concepts of 'beauty' and 'well-being' are worthy of further attention and development by contemporary aestheticians. (shrink)