Many meta-ethicists are alethists: they claim that practical considerations can constitute normative reasons for action, but not for belief. But the alethist owes us an account of the relevant difference between action and belief, which thereby explains this normative difference. Here, I argue that two salient strategies for discharging this burden fail. According to the first strategy, the relevant difference between action and belief is that truth is the constitutive standard of correctness for belief, but not for action, while according (...) to the second strategy, it is that practical considerations can constitute motivating reasons for action, but not for belief. But the former claim only shifts the alethist's explanatory burden, and the latter claim is wrong—we can believe for practical reasons. Until the alethist can offer a better account, then, I argue that we should accept that there are practical reasons for belief. (shrink)

This chapter argues that the best way for a non-naturalist to explain why the normative supervenes on the natural is to claim that, while there are some sui generis normative properties whose essences cannot be fully specified in non-normative terms and do not specify any non-normative sufficient conditions for their instantiation, there are certain hybrid normative properties whose essences specify both naturalistic sufficient conditions for their own instantiation and sufficient conditions for the instantiation of certain sui generis normative properties. This (...) is the only metaphysical explanation for supervenience on offer, the chapter argues, that can both clearly maintain the pre-theoretical commitments of non-naturalism, and provide a metaphysical explanation not just for supervenience, but for all metaphysical necessities involving natural and normative properties. (shrink)

The pragmatism—anti-pragmatism debate concerns whether practical considerations can constitute genuinely normative wrong-kind reasons (WKRs) for and against doxastic attitudes, whereas the encroachment—anti-encroachment debate concerns whether practical considerations can affect what right-kind reasons (RKRs) one has or needs to have in order to enjoy some epistemic status. While these are two separate issues, my main aim is to show that pragmatists have a plausible debunking explanation to offer of encroachment cases: that the practical considerations in these cases only generate WKRs against (...) belief, rather than affect the RKRs one has or needs to have, so that the agents in these cases ought to withhold belief, but only in a practical or all-things-considered sense. Moreover, I argue that the pragmatist debunker's explanation of what's going on in encroachment cases is more plausible than the encroacher's because they're structurally identical to cases involving WKRs against other attitudes like admiration and fear. These analogous WKR-cases not only support the surprising conclusion that pragmatists should be anti-encroachers, but they also challenge the encroacher's view independently of whether pragmatism is true. (shrink)

Metaethicists often specify non-naturalism in different ways: some take it to be about identity, while others take it to be about grounding. But few directly address the taxonomical question of what the best way to understand non-naturalism is. That’s the task of this paper. This isn’t a merely terminological question about how to use the term “non-naturalism”, but a substantive philosophical one about what metaphysical ideology we need to capture the pre-theoretical concerns of non-naturalists. I argue that, contrary to popular (...) opinion, non-naturalism is best characterized not in terms of identity or grounding, but in terms of essence. First, I lay out some desiderata for a good characterization of non-naturalism: it should (i) speak to and elucidate the non-naturalist’s core pre-theoretical commitments, (ii) render non-naturalism a substantive, local claim about normativity, and (iii) provide the most general characterization of the view possible (iv) in a way that best fits the spirit of paradigm non-naturalist views. I then argue that identity characterizations fail to satisfy the former two desiderata, while grounding characterizations at best don’t satisfy the latter two. So, I propose a new essence characterization of non-naturalism and argue that it does a better job of satisfying all four desiderata. Moreover, I argue that this essence characterization has important implications for both metaethical and metaphysical theorizing. (shrink)

A good account of normative reasons should explain not only what makes practical and epistemic reasons a unified kind of thing, but also why practical and epistemic reasons are substantively differ...

ABSTRACT The literature surrounding Horgan and Timmons’s Moral Twin Earth scenarios has focused on whether such scenarios present a metasemantic problem for naturalist realists. But in Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund uses a similar scenario to illuminate a novel, distinctly metaphysical problem for normative realists of both naturalist and non-naturalist stripes. The problem is that it is not clear what would suffice for the sort of ardent realist view that normative realists have in mind – the view that reality itself favors (...) certain ways of acting and valuing. Eklund then offers a metasemantic view that he thinks can provide the best solution to this problem. In this reply to Eklund, I argue that Eklund’s treatment of the problem and his solution re-entangle metaphysical and metasemantic issues that ought to be kept separate. I also argue that there is a purely metaphysical solution to the problem at hand, which Eklund’s own solution seems to implicitly rely upon. While these criticisms do not suggest that Eklund’s positive view is false, they do undermine some of the broader lessons that Eklund hopes to draw from the view. (shrink)

People who suffer brain damage to their ventromedial prefrontal cortex have a puzzling psychological profile: they seem to retain high intellect and practical reasoning skills after their brain injuries, but continually make poor decisions in many aspects of their lives. Adina Roskies argues that their behavior is explained by the fact that, although VM patients make correct judgments about what they ought to do, they are entirely unmotivated by those judgments. Roskies thus takes VM patients to be real-world counterexamples to (...) motivational internalism: the thesis that, necessarily, if S judges that she ought to φ in circumstances C, then S is somewhat motivated to φ in C. In this paper, however, I argue that the neuropsychological evidence that Roskies appeals to does not actually show that VM patients are entirely unmotivated by their normative judgments. Rather, I argue, the evidence suggests that VM patients form weaker normative judgments than normals during practical deliberation. And this affords the internalist with a plausible explanation for VM patients’ behavior: because VM patients form weaker normative judgments than normals, they are less motivated by their normative judgments than normals, which allows their decision-making to be overruled by their standing desires for greater and more immediate rewards. (shrink)

Pluralist pragmatists claim that there are both practical and epistemic reasons for belief, but should they also claim that there are both kinds of reasons for action? I argue that the pluralist pragmatist faces a puzzle here. If she accepts that there are epistemic reasons for action, she must explain a striking asymmetry between action and belief: while epistemic reasons play a large role in determining which beliefs one all-things-considered ought to have, they don’t play much of a role in (...) determining which action one all-things-considered ought to perform. But if the pluralist pragmatist denies that there are epistemic reasons for action, she has trouble explaining why there are no such reasons. After motivating this puzzle, I propose a solution to it. I argue that the pluralist can accept that there are epistemic reasons for action while nonetheless explaining why they don’t matter much to how we all-things-considered ought to act because, if there are epistemic reasons for action, they are so ubiquitous that in most choice situations we have equally strong epistemic reasons for doing anything, which makes any action epistemically permitted, but not required. (shrink)

Maternal opioid use during pregnancy is a growing national problem and can lead to newborns developing neonatal opioid withdrawal syndrome soon after birth. Recent data demonstrates that nearly every 15 min a baby is born in the United States suffering from NOWS. The primary treatment for NOWS is opioid replacement therapy, commonly oral morphine, which has neurotoxic effects on the developing brain. There is an urgent need for non-opioid treatments for NOWS. Transcutaneous auricular neurostimulation, a novel and non-invasive form of (...) electrostimulation, may serve as a promising alternative to morphine. tAN is delivered via a multichannel earpiece electrode worn on and around the left ear, targeting two cranial nerves—the vagus and trigeminal nerves. Prior research suggests that auricular neurostimulation exerts an anxiolytic effect on the body by releasing endogenous opioids and reduces withdrawal symptoms in adults actively withdrawing from opioids. In this first-in-human prospective, open-label trial, we investigated tAN as an adjuvant to morphine therapy in eight infants >33 weeks gestational age suffering from NOWS and receiving oral morphine treatment. Infants received tAN for 30 min 1 h before receiving a morphine dose. tAN was delivered at 0.1 mA below perception intensity at two different nerve targets on the ear: Region 1, the auricular branch of the vagus nerve; and Region 2, the auriculotemporal nerve. tAN was delivered up to four times daily for a maximum of 12 days. The primary outcome measures were safety [heart rate monitoring, Neonatal Infant Pain Scale, and skin irritation] and morphine length of treatment. tAN was well-tolerated and resulted in no unanticipated adverse events. Comparing to the national average of 23 days, the average oral morphine LOT was 13.3 days and the average LOT after tAN initiation was 7 days. These preliminary data suggest that tAN is safe and may serve as a promising alternative adjuvant for treating NOWS and reducing the amount of time an infant receives oral morphine. (shrink)

Organized by Richard Kearney and Joseph S. O’Leary, the 1979 Colloquium Heidegger et la question de Dieu was of critical importance for the development of phenomenology of religion in France. This special issue introduces the event and its ensuing publication to the English-speaking world. The editors’ historical and thematic contextualizing essay is followed by contributions from six leading philosophers. Richard Kearney sets the stage by updating his original foreword, while Jean-Yves Lacoste presents the central moments in the history of (...) Heidegger’s complicated relationship to Christian thinking. Paul Ricoeur’s “Introductory Note” delivers a well-known challenge to Heidegger in a piece whose brevity belies its impact. Finally, three participants of the 1979 Colloquium, Joseph S. O’Leary, Jean Greisch, and Jean-Luc Marion, reflect back on the significance of this event and its role in developing their own groundbreaking work. The special issue closes with a brief reflection on where we find ourselves in philosophy today. (shrink)

De Marco _et al_ 1 argue that the standard account of medical ‘invasiveness’ (as ‘incision’ or ‘insertion’) fails to capture three aspects of its existing use, namely that invasiveness can come in degrees, often depends on features of alternative medical interventions and can be non-physical. They propose a new schematic account that suggests that medical interventions can possess ‘basic invasiveness’ (which can come in degrees and of which they suggest at least two types: physical and mental), and ‘threshold invasiveness’ which (...) can depend on the alternatives a specific intervention is being compared with. While we agree that the standard account of invasiveness fails to capture existing use and are supportive of their aim, here we express scepticism about the practical utility of De Marco _et al_’s revised account. Our scepticism concerns the application of De Marco _et al’s_ revised account in the narrow context of clinician–patient communication and... (shrink)

Transitioning to food systems that are equitable, resilient, healthy and environmentally sustainable will require the cultivation and diffusion of transformational sociotechnical innovations—and grassroots movements are an essential source of such innovations. Within the literature on strategic niche management, government-provided ‘protected spaces’ where niche innovations can develop without facing the pressures of the market is an essential part of sustainability transitions. However, because of their desire to _transform_ rather than _transition_ food systems, grassroots movements often struggle to acquire such protected spaces (...) and so must determine how and where to generate change whilst being marginalised and exposed to unprotected spaces. The aim of this research is to gain a precise view of the multiple touchpoints of marginalisation that exist across the grassroots-government interface and to apply a new framework for conceptual analysis of these touchpoints that can help to identify where and how grassroots movements might be able to push against this marginalisation. The study finds that, by applying a ‘who, what, where’ framework of analysis to policies across this interface, it is possible to find pathways forward for achieving small wins towards food systems transformation. (shrink)

"New foreword by Rhian Evans Allvin"--Cover.

Stephanie Kleiner beschreibt das Musiktheater in der Ära einer krisengeladenen klassischen Moderne und über die Zäsur des Ersten Weltkriegs hinweg als Ort sozialer Praxis und als Medium politischer Sinnbildung. Konkret nimmt sie die beiden damals preußischen Städte Frankfurt am Main und Wiesbaden in den Blick. Entlang einer Reihe von herausragenden Festanlässen werden einige markante Stationen der politischen Festkultur beider Städte abgeschritten und ihre Bedeutung für die staatliche Repräsentation bewertet.

After nearly fifty years of mea culpas and explanatory additions, the biopsychosocial model is no closer to a life of its own. Bolton and Gillett give it a strong philosophical boost in The Biopsychosocial Model of Health and Disease, but they overlook the model’s deeply inconsistent position on dualism. Moreover, because metaphysical confusion has clinical ramifications in medicine, their solution sidesteps the model’s most pressing clinical faults. But the news is not all bad. We can maintain the merits of holism (...) as we let go of the inchoate bag of platitudes that is the biopsychosocial model. We can accept holism as the metaphysical open door that it is, just a willingness to recognize the reality of human experience, and the sense in which that reality forces medicine to address biological, psychological, and social aspects of health. This allows us to finally characterize Engel’s driving idea in accurate philosophical terms, as acceptance of consciousness in the context of medical science. This will not entirely pin down medicine’s stance on dualism, but it will position it clearly enough to readily improve patient care. (shrink)

There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cognitive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mechanism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors that are crucial for the reproductive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model, (...) together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature. It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empathy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of development, and situations. Key Words: altruism; cognitive empathy ; comparative; emotion; emotional contagion; empathy ; evolution; human; perception-action; perspective taking. (shrink)

Fascinating and well-documented in its details of cultural migration and evolution, this book offers a well-balanced perspective on the mutual influence of Arabic and Western worlds during the Middle Ages. It traces the transmission of Greek philosophy and science to the Islamic world, forming a portrait of medieval Muslim thought that illustrates its commonalities with Judaic and Christian teachings as well as its points of divergence. He shows how a particular type of Hellenistic culture made its way through the Syrian (...) Church, the Zoroastrians of Persia, and the pagans of Harran to the Islamic community, attaining its final metamorphosis in northeast Italy, where it constituted an anti-ecclesiastical influence that helped to pave the way for the Renaissance. Bibliography. Chronological Table. Index. (shrink)

The Dark Posthuman: Dehumanization, Technology, and the Atlantic World explores how liberal humanism first enlivened, racialized, and gendered global cartographies, and how memory, ancestry, expression, and other aspects of social identity founded in its theories and practices made for the advent of the category of the posthuman through the dimensions of cultural, geographic, political, social, and scientific classification. The posthuman is very much the product of world-building narratives that have their beginnings in the commercial franchise and are fundamentally rooted in (...) science, governance, and economics around the hegemonic appropriation of environments and commodification of bodies that initially fuelled white settler life worlds and continue to be operational in the way we conceive of these worlds as continuous ontological formations. The want has always been for ownership of any of these dimensions of being without regard to condition, to not remain stranded as the subsidiary of another's being, to another's claim to humanity, and finally, to escape the suffocating confines of an instrumental ontology that suggests a subcategory of humanity without rights onto itself. The Dark Posthuman distinguishes the posthuman's place within both the liberal and neoliberal imaginary and reveals how its appearance first entrenched itself through the avarice of English settler colonialism, and subsequently, through the paranoia of American slavery. This same figure of the posthuman played a crucial role in the functional adaptation of Cold War behavioural cybernetics, and thereafter, in the fetishization of technology within the era of global financialization. The shadowing of this arrangement during and beyond the long duration of humanity's domination of this world becomes the structural web work of this book. Stephanie Polsky is an interdisciplinary writer and academic working in the areas of Media Studies and Visual Culture. Her work explores the confluence of power around race and gender as technologies of governance. She has lectured widely in media and cultural studies, critical theory, and visual culture at a number of prestigious institutions including Goldsmiths University, Regent's University London, University of Greenwich, and Winchester School of Art. Most recently she has worked at California College of the Arts in Critical Studies and Diversity Studies. She holds a PhD in Visual Cultures from Goldsmiths, University of London and an MA in Media Studies from the University of Sussex. Her books include The End of the Future: Governing Consequence in the Age of Digital Sovereignty (Academica Press, 2019), Ignoble Displacement: Dispossessed Capital in Neo-Dickensian London (Zero Books, 2015), and Walter Benjamin's Transit: A Destructive Tour of Modernity (Academica Press, 2009). (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the question of who has duties regarding poverty and what those duties demand, from within the perspective of contemporary analytic normative philosophy. The chapter is structured in three sections. Section 1 considers the duties of those living in poverty, which might be either self-regarding or other-regarding duties, and which must be tempered by concerns of overdemandingness. Section 2 considers the duties of affluent individuals. These are imperfect duties grounded in affluent individuals’ relations to the structures that (...) produce poverty: relations of contribution, benefit, and ability to change. Section 3 considers duties of collective agents – including states, for-profits, charities, and civil society groups. The poverty-related duties of these collective agents are sometimes perfect and sometimes imperfect, and include both primary and secondary duties, and both positive and negative duties. (shrink)

Ethics and Educational Technology explores the creation and implementation of learning technologies through an applied ethical lens. The success of digital tools and platforms in today's multifaceted learning and performance contexts is dependent not only on effective design and pedagogical principles but, further, on an awareness of these technologies' interactions with and implications for users and social systems. This first-of-its-kind book provides an evidence-based, process-oriented model for ethics in technology-driven instructional design and development, one that necessitates intentional reflective practice, a (...) critical and theoretically informed interrogation of technology, and a participatory, emancipatory approach to technology design and applications. Rich with real-world ethics examples and design cases, supported by reflection questions and applied activities, and attentive to ethical codes among preeminent educational technology organizations, this is an ideal resource for students, faculty, researchers, and professionals across educational technology, instructional design, learning sciences, learning engineering, organizational training, and other disciplines. (shrink)

Scott Soames (2002) has recently developed and defended strategies for (i) accounting for the meaning of Millian terms, and (ii) extending Kripke's insights from proper names to natural kind terms. In this paper I argue that if we accept these strategies, and their implausible assumptions and consequences, then we can present a novel defence of descriptivism for at least some natural kind terms – those for substances – on that basis. The conclusion, then, will be that there is just no (...) motivation for being a Soamesian Kripkean for an important class of natural kind terms. (shrink)

As part of the debate on multifaceted conceptions of education, non-formal education, a field difficult to define and characterize, emerges within in-between spaces abandoned by the dominant institutional system to serve a marginalized public to whom the right to education does not extend. Beyond a mere rejection of its form, the author uses the specific context of Mali to shed light on the flexibility and capacity for adaptation of community initiatives undertaken in the field of non-formal education, such as the (...) REFLECT approach, which is directly inspired by the learners' immediate environment. This approach serves as an illustration of certain methods of encountering otherness, the other in their individuality, and acts as a starting point for (re) thinking the education for excluded and highly vulnerable populations. (shrink)

Argues that positive changes in perspective and deeper spiritual connections to things greater than oneself can influence the world for the better.

The new mobilities paradigm has yet to have the same impact on archaeology as it has in other disciplines in the social sciences - on geography, sociology and anthropology in particular - yet mobility is fundamental to archaeology: all people move. Moving away from archaeology’s traditional focus upon place or location, this volume treats mobility as a central theme in archaeology. The chapters are wide-ranging and methodological as well as theoretical, focusing on the flows of people, ideas, objects and information (...) in the past; they also focus on archaeology’s distinctiveness. (shrink)

Though grassroots organizations have mobilized against US environmental injustices since; the 1980s, academic definitions of environmental justice (EJ) remain limited in important ways, including: a tendency to privilege cases where activists achieve a successful, ‘tidy’ outcome; inattention to roles natural resource dependence and free market systems play in structuring environmental inequality; and a tendency to under-analyze alternative notions of EJ that result, utilized by activists who prioritize local autonomy and procedural justice in land-use decision making. Here, I argue that these (...) alternative notions of EJ help mobilize divergent forms of EJ activism-‘sites of resistance’ to industrial production systems and their risks, and ‘sites of acceptance’ to those same practices. To illustrate, I explore extensive mixed method data in the context of energy development and sites of acceptance related to uranium production in the southwestern United States. I show how alternative notions of EJ are shaped by identification with uranium production, persistent poverty and economic insecurity, and faith that increased uranium production will fuel US nuclear power production and help combat global climate change. (shrink)

Business and Society Review, Volume 127, Issue S1, Page 283-298, Spring 2022.

Owned objects are typically viewed as non-fungible-they cannot be freely interchanged. We report three experiments (total N=312) demonstrating this intuition in preschool-aged children. In Experiment 1, children considered an agent who takes one of two identical objects and leaves the other for a peer. Children viewed this as acceptable when the agent took his own item, but not when he took his peer's item. In Experiment 2, children considered scenarios where one agent took property from another. Children said the victim (...) could take back her own property from the perpetrator, but that she could not take an identical object belonging to the perpetrator. Finally, in Experiment 3A and 3B, children considered scenarios where a teacher could give a child either of two objects to play with-an object that the child had recently played with, or another object that looked the same. Children were more likely to say that the teacher should give the object recently played with when it belonged to the child, compared with when it belonged to the teacher. These findings are informative about the basis of judgments that property is non-fungible, and about young children's representation of ownership rights. They show that children's representation of ownership rights is not limited to principles protecting owners from being deprived. Our findings instead suggest that ownership rights are viewed as pertaining to individual objects. (shrink)

A surfeit of research confirms that people activate personal, affective, and conceptual representations when perceiving the states of others. However, researchers continue to debate the role of self–other overlap in empathy due to a failure to dissociate neural overlap, subjective resonance, and personal distress. A perception–action view posits that neural-level overlap is necessary during early processing for all social understanding, but need not be conscious or aversive. This neural overlap can subsequently produce a variety of states depending on the context (...) and degree of common experience and emotionality. We outline a framework for understanding the interrelationship between neural and subjective overlap, and among empathic states, through a dynamic-systems view of how information is processed in the brain and body. (shrink)