Abstract:Social contracting has a long and important place in the history of political philosophy (Hardin, 1991; Waldron, 1989) and as a theory of justice (Baynes, 1989; Rawls, 1971). More recently, it has been developed into an individual rights-based theory of organizations (Keeley, 1980, 1988), and as a way to integrate ethics and moral legitimacy into corporate strategy and action (Donaldson, 1982; Freeman&Gilbert, 1988). Currently, it is being proposed as an integrative theory of economic ethics (Donaldson&Dunfee, forthcoming). This paper will extend (...) the Donaldson and Dunfee approach by arguing thatsocial contracting can best be understood and applied in organizational settings if it is perceived and treated as a network governance process. This insight can benefit management scholars and practitioners alike, since it calls attention to the processes by which trust is created and sustained in on-going contractual relationships. It also strongly suggests that a new approach to applying managerial discretion, asmoral agency, is needed to realize the full competitive and ethical potential of emerging network forms. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to identify the paradoxes of industry self-regulation and to draw parallels between recent work on collaboration with the notion of control and regulation. Various examples of collaborative control are identified and self-regulation is used to illustrate how the process happens. Suggestions are offered on how collaboration is necessary for future regulatory issues.

Sustainability is an issue for the global food industry. The production of more protein as incomes rise, the use of food for energy, and government subsidization of the industry are challenges to both developed and less developed economies. This paper discusses the paradoxes of food and the challenges to its sustainability in the global economy.