31 found
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Lawrence H. Davis [32]Lawrence Howard Davis [2]
  1. Functionalism and absent qualia.Lawrence H. Davis - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 41 (March):231-49.
  2.  19
    Intending and Acting: Toward a Naturalized Action Theory.Lawrence H. Davis - 1987 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (3):506-511.
  3.  55
    Self-consciousness in chimps and pigeons.Lawrence H. Davis - 1989 - Philosophical Psychology 2 (3):249-59.
    Chimpanzee behaviour with mirrors makes it plausible that they can recognise themselves as themselves in mirrors, and so have a 'self-concept'. I defend this claim, and argue that roughly similar behaviour in pigeons, as reported, does not in fact make it equally plausible that they also have this mental capacity. But for all that it is genuine, chimpanzee self-consciousness may differ significantly from ours. I describe one possibility I believe consistent with the data, even if not very plausible: that the (...)
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  4.  46
    Disembodied brains.Lawrence H. Davis - 1974 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):121-132.
  5.  19
    What are W and M awarenesses of?Lawrence H. Davis - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (2):318-319.
  6.  14
    Intentions, awareness, and awareness thereof.Lawrence H. Davis - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4):566-567.
  7.  94
    They Deserve to Suffer.Lawrence H. Davis - 1972 - Analysis 32 (4):136 - 140.
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  8. Germ-Line Gene Therapy and the Medical Imperative.Ronald Munson & Lawrence H. Davis - 1992 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 2 (2):137-158.
  9.  34
    Prisoners, Paradox, and Rationality.Lawrence H. Davis - 1977 - American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (4):319 - 327.
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  10.  70
    Individuation of actions.Lawrence H. Davis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (15):520-530.
  11.  41
    Theory of Action.Charles Marks & Lawrence H. Davis - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (4):634.
  12.  52
    Analytical Philosophy of Action.Lawrence H. Davis - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (4):99-107.
  13. Cerebral Hemispheres.Lawrence H. Davis - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 87 (2):207-222.
  14. They deserve to suffer.Lawrence H. Davis - 1972 - Analysis 32 (4):136.
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  15.  12
    Agency and Necessity.Lawrence H. Davis, Antony Flew & Godfrey Vesey - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (3):466.
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  16.  18
    Extensionality and singular causal sentences.Dale V. Gottlieb & Lawrence H. Davis - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 25 (1):69 - 72.
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  17.  12
    Intending.Lawrence H. Davis & John F. M. Hunter - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):652.
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  18. Functionalism and personal identity.Lawrence H. Davis - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):781-804.
    Sydney Shoemaker has claimed that functionalism, a theory about mental states, implies a certain theory about the identity over time of persons, the entities that have mental states. He also claims that persons can survive a "Brain-State-Transfer" procedure. My examination of these claims includes description and analysis of imaginary cases, but-notably-not appeals to our "intuitions" concerning them. It turns out that Shoemaker's basic insight is correct: there is a connection between the two theories. Specifically, functionalism implies that "non-branching functional continuity" (...)
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  19.  6
    Actions.Lawrence H. Davis - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (sup2):129-144.
    What distinguishes actions of persons from other events? Too big a question; we make a customary substitution: what distinguishes a person's raising his arm from a person's arm rising? In each case, the arm rises. But in the former, we have something in addition. Let us say that in the former case, the person causes the arm's rising. Our problem then is to interpret this notion of causation by an agent.It can be done, I believe, in terms of the notion (...)
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  20.  59
    Smart on Conditions of Identity.Lawrence H. Davis - 1973 - Analysis 33 (3):109 - 110.
  21. Functionalism, the Brain, and Personal Identity.Lawrence H. Davis - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (3):259-279.
    One might expect functionalism to imply that personal identity is preserved through various operations on the brain, including transplantation. I argue that this is not clearly so even where the whole brain is transplanted. It is definitely not so in cases where only the cerebrum is transplanted, a conceivable kind of hemispherectomy, and even certain cases in which the brain is "gradually" replaced by an inorganic substitute. These results distinguish functionalism from other accounts taking what Eric T. Olson calls the (...)
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  22.  68
    Book reviews. [REVIEW]John Bacon, Alan R. White, M. Glouberman, Lawrence H. Davis, Gershon Weiler, Jeffrey Bub, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Yehuda Melzer, Zeev Levy, S. Biderman, Joseph Raz, Irwin C. Lieb & Michael Ruse - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):319-384.
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  23.  38
    Book reviews. [REVIEW]Lawrence H. Davis - 1976 - Philosophia 6 (2):363-371.
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  24.  30
    No chain store paradox.Lawrence H. Davis - 1985 - Theory and Decision 18 (2):139-144.
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  25.  1
    Functionalism and Personal Identity.Lawrence H. Davis - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (4):781-804.
    Sydney Shoemaker has claimed that functionalism, a theory about mental states, implies a certain theory about the identity over time of persons, the entities that have mental states. He also claims that persons can survive a "Brain-State-Transfer" procedure. My examination of these claims includes description and analysis of imaginary cases, but-notably-not appeals to our "intuitions" concerning them. It turns out that Shoemaker's basic insight is correct: there is a connection between the two theories. Specifically, functionalism implies that "non-branching functional continuity" (...)
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  26.  24
    On the need for a computational psychology and the hope for a naturalistic one.Lawrence H. Davis - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):76-78.
  27.  20
    No report; no feeling.Lawrence H. Davis - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):647-648.
  28.  25
    The Importance of Reverence.Lawrence H. Davis - 1990 - Faith and Philosophy 7 (2):135-148.
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  29.  10
    Skinner as conceptual analyst.Lawrence H. Davis - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):623.
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  30.  12
    Wayward Causal Chains.Lawrence H. Davis - 1980 - Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 2:55-65.
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  31.  8
    Actions.Lawrence H. Davis - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 1 (2):129-144.
    What distinguishes actions of persons from other events? Too big a question; we make a customary substitution: what distinguishes a person's raising his arm from a person's arm rising? In each case, the arm rises. But in the former, we have something in addition. Let us say that in the former case, the person causes the arm's rising. Our problem then is to interpret this notion of causation by an agent.It can be done, I believe, in terms of the notion (...)
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