14 found
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  1.  53
    How Privacy Rights Engender Direct Doxastic Duties.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 56 (4):547-562.
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  2. Privacy rights and ‘naked’ statistical evidence.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3777-3795.
    Do privacy rights restrict what is permissible to infer about others based on statistical evidence? This paper replies affirmatively by defending the following symmetry: there is not necessarily a morally relevant difference between directly appropriating people’s private information—say, by using an X-ray device on their private safes—and using predictive technologies to infer the same content, at least in cases where the evidence has a roughly similar probative value. This conclusion is of theoretical interest because a comprehensive justification of the thought (...)
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  3. What Relational Egalitarians Should (Not) Believe.Andreas Bengtson & Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 27 (2).
    Relational egalitarianism is a theory of justice according to which justice requires that people relate as equals. According to some relational egalitarians, X and Y relate as equals if, and only if, they (1) regard each other as equals; and (2) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that relational egalitarians must give up 1.
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  4. Consensual Discrimination.Andreas Bengtson & Lauritz Aastrup Munch - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    What makes discrimination morally bad? In this paper, we discuss the putative badness of a case of consensual discrimination to show that prominent accounts of the badness of discrimination—appealing, inter alia, to harm, disrespect and inequality—fail to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. In view of this, we present a more promising account.
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  5.  72
    The Right to Privacy, Control Over Self‐Presentation, and Subsequent Harm.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2020 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 37 (1):141-154.
    Andrei Marmor has recently offered a narrow interpretation of the right to privacy as a right to having a reasonable amount of control over one's self‐presentation. He claims that the interest people have in preventing others from abusing their personal information to do harm is not directly protected by the right to privacy. This article rejects that claim and defends a view according to which concerns about abuse play a central role in fleshing out the appropriate scope of a general (...)
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  6. Proper Address and Epistemic Conditions for Acting on Sexual Consent.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2023 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 52 (1):69-100.
    Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 52, Issue 1, Page 69-100, Winter 2024.
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  7.  22
    What We Owe Past Selves.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2023 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 40 (5):936-950.
    Some say that we should respect the privacy of dead people. In this article, I take this idea for granted and use it to motivate the stronger claim that we sometimes ought to respect the privacy of our past selves.
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  8. Doxastic Affirmative Action.Andreas Bengtson & Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2024 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 27 (2):203-220.
    According to the relational egalitarian theory of justice, justice requires that people relate as equals. To relate as equals, many relational egalitarians argue, people must (i) regard each other as equals, and (ii) treat each other as equals. In this paper, we argue that, under conditions of background injustice, such relational egalitarians should endorse affirmative action in the ways in which (dis)esteem is attributed to people as part of the regard-requirement for relating as equals.
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  9.  62
    Digital Self-Defence: Why you Ought to Preserve Your Privacy for the Sake of Wrongdoers.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2):233-248.
    Most studies on the ethics of privacy focus on what others ought to do to accommodate our interest in privacy. I focus on a related but distinct question that has attracted less attention in the literature: When, if ever, does morality require us to safeguard our own privacy? While we often have prudential reasons for safeguarding our privacy, we are also, at least sometimes, morally required to do so. I argue that we, sometimes, ought to safeguard our privacy for the (...)
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  10. The Privacy Dependency Thesis and Self-Defense.Lauritz Aastrup Munch & Jakob Thrane Mainz - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-11.
    If I decide to disclose information about myself, this act can undermine other people’s ability to effectively conceal information about themselves. One case in point involves genetic information: if I share ‘my’ genetic information with others, I thereby also reveal genetic information about my biological relatives. Such dependencies are well-known in the privacy literature and are often referred to as ‘privacy dependencies’. Some take the existence of privacy dependencies to generate a moral duty to sometimes avoid sharing information about oneself. (...)
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  11. The Moral Significance of Privacy Dependencies.Lauritz Aastrup Munch & Jakob Thrane Mainz - 2023 - Philosophy and Technology 36 (4):1-19.
    Often, when we share information about ourselves, we contribute to people learning personal things about others. This may happen because what we share about ourselves can be used to infer personal information about others. Such dependencies have become known as privacy dependencies in the literature. It is sometimes claimed that the scope of the right to privacy should be expanded in light of such dependencies. For example, some have argued that inferring information about others can violate their right to privacy. (...)
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  12. What We Owe Past Selves.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2023 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 40 (5):936-950.
    Some say that we should respect the privacy of dead people. In this article, I take this idea for granted and use it to motivate the stronger claim that we sometimes ought to respect the privacy of our past selves.
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  13.  35
    Why ‘Negative Control’ is a Dead End: A Reply to Mainz and Uhrenfeldt.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2021 - Res Publica 27 (4):661-667.
    Mainz and Uhrenfeldt have recently claimed that a violation of the right to privacy can be defined successfully under reliance on the notion of ‘Negative Control’. In this reply, I show that ‘Negative Control’ is unrelated to privacy right violations. It follows that control theorists have yet to put forth a successful normative account of privacy.
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  14.  13
    Correction to: Privacy rights and ‘naked’ statistical evidence.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3797-3797.
    A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01640-1.
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