it is common in reid scholarship to use the notion of intentionality both to explicate his notion of conception and to explain his talk of acts such as perception having objects distinct from themselves. With regard to conception, Reid states that every act of conception “must have an object; for he that conceives, must conceive something.”1 Using the notion of intentionality, commentators interpret this to mean that, through conception, the mind is directed on an object, and that acts of conception (...) are always of an object or about something.2 Commentators further explicate the purported intentionality of conception in terms of it being an act of representing something or having representational content, where... (shrink)

Commentators have argued that along with adopting a mechanical view of nature, Descartes developed two innovative views concerning sensation: sensation occurs without the involvement of an entity resembling the sensation, and sensations represent features of objects but without resembling them. When Descartes is interpreted as making both of these claims, it appears that in removing resemblance from the causal process of sensation, Descartes preserves the notion that sensations represent features of objects and that he does this by introducing a new (...) conception of representation — one not requiring resemblance.It is important to recognize that the two claims are distinct. The first claim, that the physical process of sensation does not involve something resembling the qualitative content of the sensation, does not in and of itself entail anything about the representational nature of the sensation. Or rather, what it does entail is that if sensations do represent their causes in objects, then it cannot be by presenting those causes to the mind as they exist in objects. (shrink)

The past thirty years have seen substantive debate on the nature of Robert Boyle’s self-described “Mechanical” or “Corpuscularian” philosophy, its treatment of kinds and qualities, its relation to his experimental studies, its relation to other sixteenth- and seventeenth-century matter theories, and its role in the development of chemistry. Using several different strands from this literature, Marina Banchetti-Robino aims to show how Boyle addresses issues relevant to philosophy of chemistry today: the emergent nature of chemical properties, the mereology of fundamental chemical (...) wholes, and the nonreducibility of chemistry to physics. The last issue frames the whole book, which she describes... (shrink)