17 found
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  1. Epistemic Existentialism.Laura Frances Callahan - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):539-554.
    Subjectivist permissivism is aprima facieattractive view. That is, it's plausible to think that what's rational for people to believe on the basis of their evidence can vary if they have different frameworks or sets of epistemic standards. In this paper, I introduce an epistemic existentialist form of subjectivist permissivism, which I argue can better address “the arbitrariness objection” to subjectivist permissivism in general. According to the epistemic existentialist, it's not just that what's rational to believe on the basis of evidence (...)
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  2. Intellectual humility: A no‐distraction account.Laura Frances Callahan - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):320-337.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  3. Humility for Everyone: A No‐Distraction Account.Laura Frances Callahan - 2021 - Wiley: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):623-638.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 104, Issue 3, Page 623-638, May 2022.
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  4.  98
    Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue.Laura Frances Callahan & Timothy O'Connor (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Is religious faith consistent with being an intellectually virtuous thinker? In seeking to answer this question, one quickly finds others, each of which has been the focus of recent renewed attention by epistemologists: What is it to be an intellectually virtuous thinker? Must all reasonable belief be grounded in public evidence? Under what circumstances is a person rationally justified in believing something on trust, on the testimony of another, or because of the conclusions drawn by an intellectual authority? Can it (...)
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  5.  80
    Why are Epistemic Reasons Normative?Laura Frances Callahan - 2024 - Episteme 21 (3):1048-1063.
    Normativism is the (controversial) view that epistemic reasons for belief are really, genuinely normative. Normativists might wonder – and anti-normativists might press the question – why, or in virtue of what, are epistemic reasons normative? Borrowing Korsgaard's metaphor, what's the “source” of their normativity? Here I argue that this question is both highly interesting and subtly distinct from other common questions in the literature. I also propose an initial taxonomy of stance-dependent and stance-independent answers, and I advocate a novel, hybrid (...)
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  6. What to Expect from the God of History.Laura Frances Callahan - 2022 - Faith and Philosophy 39 (4):549-572.
    I argue that our expectations for particular evil events, conditional on theism, ought to be informed by our empirical knowledge of history—that is, the history of what God, if God exists, has already allowed to happen. This point is under-appreciated in the literature. And yet if I’m right, this entails that most particular evil events are not evidence against theism. This is a limited but interesting consequence in debates over the evidential impact of evil.
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  7. Skill and knowledge.Ernest Sosa & Laura Frances Callahan - 2020 - In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 146-156.
     
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  8. On the Problem of Paradise.Laura Frances Callahan - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (2):129-141.
    Matthew Benton, John Hawthorne, and Yoaav Isaacs (BHI) claim that evil must be evidence against God’s existence, because the absence of evil would be (presumably excellent) evidence for it. Their argument is obviously valid on standard Bayesian epistemology. But in addition to raising a few reasons one might doubt its premise, I here highlight the rather misleading meaning, in BHI’s argument, of evil’s being evidence against God. BHI seek to establish that if one learned simply “that there was evil,” perhaps (...)
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  9.  89
    Moral reasons not to breastfeed: a response to Woollard and Porter.Laura Frances Callahan - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (3):213-214.
    Woollard and Porter argue that mothers have no moral duty to breastfeed their babies. Rather, mothers simply have moral reason(s) to breastfeed, stemming from the benefits of breast feeding for babies. According to Woollard and Porter, doing what one has moral reason to do is often supererogatory, not obligatory. I agree that mothers have no moral duty to breastfeed. However, it is misleading to suggest that mothers in general have moral reason to breastfeed and to liken not breastfeeding to not (...)
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  10. Moral Testimony.Laura Frances Callahan - 2019 - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 123-134.
  11. Could God Love Cruelty? A Partial Defense of Unrestricted Theological Voluntarism.Laura Frances Callahan - 2021 - Faith and Philosophy 38 (1):26-44.
    One of the foremost objections to theological voluntarism is the contingency objection. If God’s will fixes moral facts, then what if God willed that agents engage in cruelty? I argue that even unrestricted theological voluntarists should accept some logical constraints on possible moral systems—hence, some limits on ways that God could have willed morality to be—and these logical constraints are sufficient to blunt the force of the contingency objec­tion. One constraint I defend is a very weak accessibility requirement, related to (...)
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  12.  49
    (Joint) achievements and the value problem.Laura Frances Callahan - 2023 - Synthese 201 (2):1-16.
    In The Transmission of Knowledge (2021), Greco departs significantly from his earlier view of all knowledge as an individual achievement of the knower, allowing that in some testimonial knowledge cases (cases of “transmission”), a hearer’s believing truly will be due to competent joint agency, between herself and the speaker. Greco argues that the new, hybrid view of knowledge as individual or joint achievement is still sufficiently unified and – importantly – still provides a satisfying answer to the value problem for (...)
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  13.  51
    Perception, discrimination, and knowledge.Laura Frances Callahan - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):39-53.
    Philosophical Issues, Volume 30, Issue 1, Page 39-53, October 2020.
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  14.  33
    Motherhood and the moral load.Laura Frances Callahan - 2021 - Think 20 (58):55-68.
    Many of the decisions mothers face are morally intense. They're experienced as highly morally significant, and they are also often very morally complex, meaning that there aren't black-and-white, obvious answers to questions about what one morally may or must do. For example, I suggest that breastfeeding is complex in this way, despite a good deal of cultural pressure in favour of trying to do it. Acknowledging many of the decisions of motherhood as complex or as ‘grey areas’ is accurate, and (...)
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  15. Trust, Testimony, and Religious Belief.Laura Frances Callahan - 2023 - In John Greco, Tyler Dalton McNabb & Jonathan Fuqua (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
     
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  16.  38
    Disagreement, Testimony, and Religious Understanding.Laura Frances Callahan - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 41--64.
  17.  28
    Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Faith and Humility. [REVIEW]Laura Frances Callahan - 2019 - Ethics 130 (1):124-129.
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