Cette conférence présente une méditation sur un livre dans lequel les problèmes philosophiques semblent déborder tant les frontières du récit de fiction que le cadre du roman dit historique. Plutôt que d'entreprendre une analyse tant soit peu exhaustive du livre de Eco, elle s'étend, tout en s'inspirant des données fournies par celui-ci, sur une question préalable, mais qui commande en un sens toute lecture ultérieure, celle notamment des connivences entre le discours philosophique et le discours littéraire, question finalement assez proche (...) de celle du statut de la fiction dans son rapport au dire-vrai. L'auteur du Nom de la rose nous fait prendre conscience de ce rapport par la mise en place d'une série de dispositifs narratifs et discursifs relevant, d'une part, du moyen âge (la chronique, le raisonnement à partir de « principes premiers » ), d'autre part, de la modernité (le roman policier, la sémiotique ) ; il y a lieu de parler ici d'une structure polyphonique délibérément discordante, constamment traversée d'échos de livres anciens, nouveaux, voire inexistants. C'est dans ce jeu de textes se reflétant que le vrai et l'imaginaire s'entremêlent ; c'est là aussi que s'ouvre cet espace apocalyptique et ambigu où le sens momentanément en suspens est donné à se chercher et se redéfinir sur un mode encore inconnu et par conséquent catastrophique. L'image du labyrinthe acquiert ici tout son poids. L'effet signalé peut être défini comme un phénomène de dislocation. Ce même phénomène est ensuite approfondi à l'aide de trois points qui jouent dans Le nom de la rose un rôle important : 1. la rupture qu'opère dans le discours médiéval le personnage de William, 2. la signification de la souffrance dans sa relation au langage, 3. la dialectique du rire. C'est surtout ce dernier qui, à travers son rapport à l'idée de « césure » (césure du comique, césure du tragique), fait apparaître la theâtralité foncière de tout comportement humain. L'exposé se termine par l'hypothèse, prudemment avancée, que le discours littéraire comme le discours philosophique sont travaillés par des déplacements analogues. (shrink)

Recognition that the Principle of Respect for Autonomy fails to work in family-centric societies such as Singapore has recently led to the promotion of relational autonomy as a suitable framework within which to place healthcare decision making. However, empirical data, relating to patient and family opinions and the practices of healthcare professionals in Confucian-inspired Singapore, demonstrate clear limitations on the ability of a relational autonomy framework to provide the anticipated compromise between prevailing family decision-making norms and adopted Western led atomistic (...) concepts of autonomy. Evidence suggests that despite a growing infusion of Western influence, there is still little to indicate any major shift to individual decision making, particularly in light of the way society and healthcare are structured. Similarly, the lack of employing a shared decision-making model and data that discredit the notion that the complex psychosocial and cultural factors that affect the decision making may be considered “content neutral” not only prevents the application of relational autonomy but questions the viability of the values behind the Principle of Respect for Autonomy. Taking into account local data and drawing upon a wider concept of personhood that extends beyond prevailing family-centric ideals along with the complex interests that are focused upon the preservation of the unique nature of personhood that arises from the Ring Theory of Personhood, we propose and “operationalize” the employing of an authoritative welfare-based approach, within the confines of best interest decision making, to better meet the current care needs within Singapore. (shrink)

Discussing the visual system primarily in terms of spatial frequency analysis, the authors of this book present an integrated view of how we perceive spatial relations.

A selection of lively debates in the philosophy of time that outline, defend and object to contemporary issues in metaphysics, consciousness and God.

In an era of rapidly rising health care costs, physicians and policymakers are searching for new and effective ways to contain health care spending without sacrificing the quality of services provided. These proposals are increasingly articulated in terms of an ethical duty of stewardship. The duty of stewardship in medicine, however, is not at present well understood, and it is frequently conflated with other duties. This article presents a critical analysis of the notion of stewardship, which shows that it has (...) an important and distinctive place in medical ethics. It claims that stewardship in medicine concerns the responsible use of a society’s medical resources and it discusses the extent to which medical professionals are the proper stewards of these resources. The article argues that the duty of stewardship is best understood as a duty that applies in a space between the obligations of health care providers to provide beneficent care to their patients on the one hand and the obligations of citizens to bring about and support a just health care system on the other. Seen with clear eyes, stewardship in medicine is neither a consequence of beneficent medical care nor a substitute for justice. (shrink)

There is ongoing ethical and legal debate about withdrawing life sup- port for patients with disorders of consciousness (DOCs). Frequently fu- eling the debate are implicit assumptions about the value of life in a state of impaired consciousness, and persistent uncertainty about the quality of life (QoL) of these persons. Yet there are no validated methods for assessing QoL in this population, and a significant obstacle to doing so is their inability to communicate. Recent neuroscientific discoveries might circumvent that problem (...) and help shed light on QoL in DOCs. There is an ethical imperative to prioritize QoL research in this patient population, to provide evidence to inform treatment, research, and end of life decisions. A minimalist and pragmatic model of QoL is proposed, targeting positive and negative affect as domains for which there is po- tential to reach across the communication gap, and restore to these voiceless persons some measure of control. (shrink)

The phenomenon whereby severely disabled persons self-report a higher than expected level of subjective well-being is called the “disability paradox.” One explanation for the paradox among brain injury survivors is “response shift,” an adjustment of one’s values, expectations, and perspective in the aftermath of a life-altering, disabling injury. The high level of subjective well-being appears paradoxical when viewed from the perspective of the non-disabled, who presume that those with severe disabilities experience a quality of life so poor that it might (...) make their lives not worth living. This presumption has profound consequences, for it may inform end-of-life choices made in advance directives, or influence decisions made by surrogates on behalf of persons who are unable to direct their own medical treatment. -/- Peterson et al propose a cautious, well-considered plan to use fMRI-based brain-computer interfaces to assess the decision making capacity of covertly aware, behaviorally non-responsive individuals who retain high levels of preserved cognition. Their plan, if it succeeds, could eventually restore autonomy and empower some severely disabled persons, allowing them to participate in clinical decision making. Peterson et al discuss possible in-principle objections to their proposal, among them the “argument from psychological health,” and the “changing sets of values” objection. These objections both presume that deviations from a pre-injury norm could indicate diminished decision making capacity. This presumption threatens the autonomy of the patient who is capable of making decisions, but whose post-injury decisions appear to diverge from pre-injury preferences or values. In light of the potential for response shift, and the disability paradox, it should not be inferred that changes in values or preferences are unreflective of the true current preferences of a brain-injured person, nor are they conclusive evidence of diminished capacity. Presuming diminished capacity on the basis of unexpected or unconventional preferences has, in the past, been used to disempower patients whose autonomy and capacity would not have been doubted had they made choices that accorded with the expectations or values of others. We must be cautious, and vigilant, to prevent similarly diminishing the autonomy of covertly aware, behaviorally non-responsive individuals on the basis of empirically and ethically questionable inferences about their decision making capacity. (shrink)

While central to the Christian religion, the act of faith has been notoriously difficult to define. This essay is an attempt to illuminate, with the aid of insights from cognitive science and process philosophy, what it means for a Christian to have faith, specifically in God. In doing so, the apriori and aposteriori aspects of faith are explored, along with its connections to science and empirical evidence, revelation, knowledge, doubt, morality, and additional Christian beliefs.

In 1976, Hilary Putnam set forth his model-theoretic argument, claiming that it showed that the semantic realist’s program1 was ‘unintelligible’, since it implied, contra the realist view, that reference is radically indeterminate. Although I find the conclusion that reference is indeterminate unattractive, I argue that the descriptivist position needs to be supplemented with a premise about the sorts of kinds or structure that our world includes. The need for this premise gives a counterintuitive result: the descriptivist account of reference makes (...) the very possibility of determinate reference contingent upon the kinds that happen to make up the world. The need for this premise paves the way towards a new kind of skepticism about what we may and may not assume about the nature of the world. (shrink)

K.E. Løgstrups monografi om Immanuel Kants erkendelsesteoretiske hovedværk 'Kritik af den rene fornuft'. Med efterskrift af Peter Aaboe Sørensen. "De metafysiske spørgsmål bliver stående; de er givet med vor fornufts naturanlæg. Måske mere end nogen anden videnskab er metafysikken lagt i os, og dens spørgsmål er alt andet end tilfældige. Man kan lige så lidt vente, at menneskets ånd helt ville opgive metafysiske undersøgelser, som man kan vente, at vi ville indstille at trække vejret for at undgå at indånde uren (...) luft. Om bogens efterskrift m.m.: "... han [Peter Aaboe Sørensen] gør det glimrende. Vi får for eksempel at vide, at bogens hovedafsnit udkom første gang så tidligt som i 1952, i en periode, hvor de teologiske professorer i Århus bestræbte sig på at skrive små filosofi-historiske monografier til deres studerende. Aaboe gør også meget relevant rede for den biografiske baggrund for Løgstrups engagement i Kant: Som studerende havde han selv haft enorme vanskeligheder med at forstå den tyske gigant. Først i det tredje studieår lykkedes det ham ved ren stædighed og vilje at få fat. Nu ville han forstå det. Dette resultat af veloverstået kamp kom senere tiders studerende og nutidens læsere til gode i den klare og myndige præsentation af Kants tanker, som er temmelig vanskelige at gå til uden mellemled." Nils Gunder Hansen, Kristeligt Dagblad. (shrink)

The man in the street to-day is aware that recent developments in the physical sciences have necessitated a fundamental revision of the concepts of physics; he finds that Einstein is no less upsetting to his ideas than was Copernicus to those of his own time or than Darwin was to Bishop Wilberforce. The plain man who has “ philosophical leanings ” is aware that questions previously regarded as metaphysical—and about which philosophers have written much that is unintelligible—are now recognized as (...) falling within the scope of physics. Every reader of this Journal is aware that the criticism to which the main concepts of physics—space, time, matter—have been subjected is so fundamental that it is no longer possible to say that there are material bodies in space, which have events happening to them at a given time. We must substitute the conception of a fourfold continuum within which space, time and matter are inextricably involved. Finally, we are told that this new way of regarding the classical trinity suggests the consequence that we know nothing about the “ inner nature ” of the terms with which we deal, we can make no assertions as to the ultimate nature of that to which they may refer. In this respect the prevailing temper of the present-day scientist is to be contrasted with the cocksureness of most nineteenth-century physicists l who, even if they did not go so far as to say “ we know what matter is,” at least suggested that only the metaphysician had, or could have, any doubts as to its nature and reality^. (shrink)

ABSTRACT‘Green’ concerns about nature, the environment or the climate have traditionally been juxtaposed with concerns about economic growth or job creation. Recently, however, a new type of conflict has appeared, in which different green concerns, for instance regarding mitigation of climate change and protection of landscape qualities, seem to collide. These environmental conflicts have so far received little scholarly attention. This article addresses the issue by a study of national and in particular local news media discussion on the construction of (...) wind turbines in Denmark, bringing together research traditions from environmental communication, discourse analysis, and place studies. Analytically, the study employs the notion of topos as the key meaning unit, referring to the premises upon which an argument is based. In addition to the empirical findings, the study points to methodological potential of the concept of topos to integrate qualitative and quantitative approaches within a discourse studie... (shrink)

The ethics of Kant and the ethics of Crusius are strikingly similar. This is manifested in a whole range of principles and concepts. Crusius’ moral teaching hinges on the rigorous moral law which has to be obeyed absolutely, and which makes it different from other prescriptions that are binding only to a relative degree. This is very close to the Kantian distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Another salient feature of Crusius’ moral teaching is the stress laid on the sphere (...) of internal motives. It is the inner motive that determines the morality of an act, rather than the external form of the act. These and some other features of Crusius’ ethics suggest a possible influence of Crusius on Kant. The possibility of such influence has repeatedly come under close scrutiny. The first works devoted to this problem date to the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Pointers to the possibility of such influence are semantic and structural similarities of the two thinkers’ systems. Besides, it is an unchallengeable fact that Kant was fairly familiar with the main theses of Crusian philosophy. Some scholars proceed from the study of Kantian vocabulary. Some of the terms Kant uses, especially in his early works which later formed the basis of his ethical teaching in the critical period, can be traced to the terms of Crusian philosophy. However, an alternative view is that Kant was primarily influenced by Wolffian philosophy (mainly through Baumgarten), while the direct influence of Crusius remains unproven. I examine both points of view and propose my own solution to the problem. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous analysons les textes de G. W. Leibniz qui portent sur la censure et la liberté d’expression, notamment par rapport aux auteurs qu’il qualifie de « libertins » ou d’« athées ». Nous explorons le dispositif théorique qu’il propose pour déterminer les limites justes entre la censure et la liberté de pensée; dispositif qui permet, dans chaque cas, de choisir entre la réfutation savante et la suppression autoritaire des textes estimés pernicieux pour la morale ou la piété.

Anna Elisabetta Galeotti’s theory of ‘toleration as recognition’ has been criticised by Peter Jones for being conceptually incoherent, since liberal toleration presupposes a negative attitude to differences, whereas multicultural recognition requires positive affirmation hereof. The paper spells out Galeotti’s justification for recognition as a requirement of liberal justice in detail and asks in what sense the policies supported by Galeotti are policies of recognition. It is argued that Jones misrepresents Galeotti’s theory, insofar as this sense of recognition actually is compatible (...) with liberal toleration. This does not prove Jones’s criticism to be wrong, since the justification may have implications unacknowledged by Galeotti, which might be liberally problematic. The paper considers this problem and possible ways of responding to it, but concludes that Galeotti’s theory is incomplete in respects that need to be filled out in order to secure compatibility with liberalism, and that this may prove problematic. (shrink)

The need to protect the public against the spread of communicable disease provides a good example of the need for a commonsense approach to the use of confidential data. Laboratories need to notify different professionals in order to trace the sources of outbreaks of infection and eradicate the cause. It is often not possible to obtain consent from individual patients, given the rapid time scale required. In doing so, however, laboratory staff and others would contravene the Data Protection Act in (...) passing on information without consent. Section 60 of the Health and Social Care Act was designed to overcome barriers to research relying on data accumulated in the past and this type of public health work. But this is proving a sluggish procedure. It is an awkward solution to the problem of data use without specific consent. This problem will be overcome only when the public can have sufficient trust in safeguards that are in place to protect their safety and confidentiality so that these important activities can be pursued without specific informed consent. (shrink)

The article consider the concept of religious pluralism by M. Mendelssohn and some aspects of his theory of knowledge and linguistic theory, lying in the foundation of the pluralism concept. The article shows that Mendelssohn expressed views that are far ahead of his time. His theory of knowledge repeats some lines of Hume's philosophy, which he praised highly, what was not characteristic of the German Enlightenment as a whole. By virtue of this, Mendelssohn can be considered as Kant's predecessor in (...) a positive assessment of Hume. Some of Mendelssohns ideas are further developed in phenomenology. The author argues that Mendelssohns views on the interaction of religions, although they have a number of features that make this thinker related to other thinkers of the Enlightenment, also have a fundamental difference with them. As a result, his religious pluralism concept is close to the modern understanding of religious pluralism. The author also attempts to reveal the reasons why Mendelssohn, despite his great significance for both German philosophy and Jewish culture, was almost forgotten for a long time. (shrink)