The article investigates the interplay of moral rules in computer simulation. The investigation is based on two situations which are well-known to game theory: the prisoner''s dilemma and the game of Chicken. The prisoner''s dilemma can be taken to represent contractual situations, the game of Chicken represents a competitive situation on the one hand and the provision for a common good on the other. Unlike the rules usually used in game theory, each player knows the other''s strategy. In that way, (...) ever higher levels of reflection are reached reciprocally. Such strategies can be interpreted as moral rules.Artificial morality is related to the discipline of Artificial Life. As in artificial life, the use of genetic algorithms suggests itself. Rules of behaviour split and reunite as chromosome strings do. (shrink)

Since Aristotle it is recognised that a valid syllogism cannot have two particular premises. However, that is not how a lay person sees it; at least as long as the premises read many, most etc, instead of a plain some. The lay people are right if one considers that these syllogisms do not have strict but approximate (Zadeh) validity. Typically there are only particular premises available in everyday life and one is dependent on such syllogisms. – Some rules on the (...) usage of particular premises are given below. (shrink)

Computational approaches to the law have frequently been characterized as being formalistic implementations of the syllogistic model of legal cognition: using insufficient or contradictory data, making analogies, learning through examples and experiences, applying vague and imprecise standards. We argue that, on the contrary, studies on neural networks and fuzzy reasoning show how AI & law research can go beyond syllogism, and, in doing that, can provide substantial contributions to the law.