Order:
Disambiguations
L. A. Paul [40]Leslie Paul [10]Laurie Paul [6]Ludwig Paul [4]
Laurie Ann Paul [4]Laurie A. Paul [3]Leslie Allen Paul [2]Lucas Paúl [2]

Not all matches are shown. Search with initial or firstname to single out others.

See also
L. A. Paul
Yale University
Linda Marie Paul
Wilkes University
  1. Transformative Experience.Laurie Ann Paul - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    How should we make choices when we know so little about our futures? L. A. Paul argues that we must view life decisions as choices to make discoveries about the nature of experience. Her account of transformative experience holds that part of the value of living authentically is to experience our lives and preferences in whatever ways they evolve.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   231 citations  
  2. Causation: A User’s Guide.L. A. Paul & Ned Hall - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Edward J. Hall.
    Causation is at once familiar and mysterious. Neither common sense nor extensive philosophical debate has led us to anything like agreement on the correct analysis of the concept of causation, or an account of the metaphysical nature of the causal relation. Causation: A User's Guide cuts a clear path through this confusing but vital landscape. L. A. Paul and Ned Hall guide the reader through the most important philosophical treatments of causation, negotiating the terrain by taking a set of examples (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   106 citations  
  3. Causation and Counterfactuals.John Collins, Ned Hall & Laurie Paul (eds.) - 2004 - MIT Press.
    Thirty years after Lewis's paper, this book brings together some of the most important recent work connecting—or, in some cases, disputing the connection ...
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   157 citations  
  4. What You Can't Expect When You're Expecting'.L. A. Paul - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):1-23.
    It seems natural to choose whether to have a child by reflecting on what it would be like to actually have a child. I argue that this natural approach fails. If you choose to become a parent, and your choice is based on projections about what you think it would be like for you to have a child, your choice is not rational. If you choose to remain childless, and your choice is based upon projections about what you think it (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   85 citations  
  5. Temporal Experience.L. A. Paul - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (7):333-359.
    The question I want to explore is whether experience supports an antireductionist ontology of time, that is, whether we should take it to support an ontology that includes a primitive, monadic property of nowness responsible for the special feel of events in the present, and a relation of passage that events instantiate in virtue of literally passing from the future, to the present, and then into the past.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   135 citations  
  6. Metaphysics as modeling: the handmaiden’s tale.L. A. Paul - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):1-29.
    Critics of contemporary metaphysics argue that it attempts to do the hard work of science from the ease of the armchair. Physics, not metaphysics, tells us about the fundamental facts of the world, and empirical psychology is best placed to reveal the content of our concepts about the world. Exploring and understanding the world through metaphysical reflection is obsolete. In this paper, I will show why this critique of metaphysics fails, arguing that metaphysical methods used to make claims about the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   130 citations  
  7. Logical parts.Laurie A. Paul - 2002 - Noûs 36 (4):578–596.
    I argue for a property mereology and for mereological bundle theory. I then apply this theory to the one over many problem (universals) and puzzles concerning persistence and material constitution.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   162 citations  
  8. Building the world from its fundamental constituents.L. A. Paul - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):221-256.
    In this paper, I argue that the spatiotemporalist approach way of modeling the fundamental constituents, structure, and composition of the world has taken a wrong turn. Spatiotemporalist approaches to fundamental structure take the fundamental nature of the world to be spatiotemporal: they take the category of spatiotemporal to be fundamental. I argue that the debates over the nature of the fundamental space in the physics show us that (i) the fact that it is conceivable that the manifest world could be (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   82 citations  
  9. A One Category Ontology.L. A. Paul - 2017 - In John A. Keller (ed.), Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes From the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 32-62.
    I defend a one category ontology: an ontology that denies that we need more than one fundamental category to support the ontological structure of the world. Categorical fundamentality is understood in terms of the metaphysically prior, as that in which everything else in the world consists. One category ontologies are deeply appealing, because their ontological simplicity gives them an unmatched elegance and spareness. I’m a fan of a one category ontology that collapses the distinction between particular and property, replacing it (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  10. Aspect Causation.L. A. Paul - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):235.
    A theory of the causal relate as aspects or property instances is developed. A supposed problem for transitivity is assessed and then resolved with aspects as the causal relata.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   91 citations  
  11. Counterfactuals and causation: history, problems, and prospects.John Collins, Ned Hall & L. A. Paul - 2004 - In John Collins, Ned Hall & Laurie Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. MIT Press. pp. 1--57.
    Among the many philosophers who hold that causal facts1 are to be explained in terms of—or more ambitiously, shown to reduce to—facts about what happens, together with facts about the fundamental laws that govern what happens, the clear favorite is an approach that sees counterfactual dependence as the key to such explanation or reduction. The paradigm examples of causation, so advocates of this approach tell us, are examples in which events c and e— the cause and its effect— both occur, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  12. Coincidence as overlap.L. A. Paul - 2006 - Noûs 40 (4):623–659.
    I discuss puzzles involving coinciding material objects (such as statues and their constitutive lumps of clay) and propose solutions.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  13. Transformative Experience: Replies to Pettigrew, Barnes and Campbell.L. A. Paul - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):794-813.
    Summary of Transformative Experience by L.A. Paul and replies to symposiasts. Discussion of undefined values, preference change, authenticity, experiential value, collective minds, mind control.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  14. Transformative Choice: Discussion and Replies.L. A. Paul - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (2):473-545.
    In “What you can’t expect when you’re expecting,” I argue that, if you don’t know what it’s like to be a parent, you cannot make this decision rationally—at least, not if your decision is based on what you think it would be like for you to become a parent. My argument hinges on the idea that becoming a parent is a transformative experience. This unique type of experience often transforms people in a deep and personal sense, and in the process, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  15. First personal modes of presentation and the structure of empathy.L. A. Paul - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):189-207.
    I argue that we can understand the de se by employing the subjective mode of presentation or, if one’s ontology permits it, by defending an abundant ontology of perspectival personal properties or facts. I do this in the context of a discussion of Cappelen and Dever’s recent criticisms of the de se. Then, I discuss the distinctive role of the first personal perspective in discussions about empathy, rational deference, and self-understanding, and develop a way to frame the problem of lacking (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  16. The Paradox of Empathy.L. A. Paul - 2021 - Episteme 18 (3):347-366.
    A commitment to truth requires that you are open to receiving new evidence, even if that evidence contradicts your current beliefs. You should be open to changing your mind. However, this truism gives rise to the paradox of empathy. The paradox arises with the possibility of mental corruption through transformative change, and has consequences for how we should understand tolerance, disagreement, and the ability to have an open mind. I close with a discussion of how understanding this paradox provides a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  17. The Subjectively Enduring Self.L. A. Paul - 2017 - In Ian Phillips (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience: Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 262-271.
    The self can be understood in objective metaphysical terms as a bundle of properties, as a substance, or as some other kind of entity on our metaphysical list of what there is. Such an approach explores the metaphysical nature of the self when regarded from a suitably impersonal, ontological perspective. It explores the nature and structure of the self in objective reality, that is, the nature and structure of the self from without. This is the objective self. I am taking (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  18. De se preferences and empathy for future selves.L. A. Paul - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):7-39.
    As you face a life-defining change, you might ask yourself: Who will I become? This can be understood as a question about the nature and character of your future life, asked from your first person, or subjective, perspective. The nature and character of your conscious, first person, lived experience is a defining constituent of what it is like to be you. Framed this way, knowing the nature of your future lived experience is a way of knowing your future self. In (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  19. The Puzzles of Material Constitution.L. A. Paul - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (7):579-590.
    Monists about material constitution typically argue that when Statue is materially constituted by Clay, Statue is just Clay. Pluralists about material constitution deny that constitution is identity: Statue is not just Clay. When Clay materially constitutes Statue, Clay is not identical to Statue. I discuss three familiar puzzles involving grounding, overdetermination and conceptual issues, and develop three new puzzles stemming from the connection between mereological composition and material constitution: a mereological puzzle, an asymmetry puzzle, and a structural puzzle.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  20. Précis of Transformative Experience.L. A. Paul - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):760-765.
    I summarize the main argument of Transformative Experience (OUP 2014). The book develops familiar examples from classical philosophical debates, as well as original examples, to argue that an agent’s decision to undergo a transformative experience—an experience constituted by radical personal and epistemic change for the agent—must either be authentic or irrational, but not both. The Precis of Transformative Experience walks the reader through the main ideas involved in epistemically and personally transformative experiences, the problems they pose for rational decision-making, and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  21. II—L. A. Paul: Categorical Priority and Categorical Collapse.L. A. Paul - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):89-113.
    I explore some of the ways that assumptions about the nature of substance shape metaphysical debates about the structure of Reality. Assumptions about the priority of substance play a role in an argument for monism, are embedded in certain pluralist metaphysical treatments of laws of nature, and are central to discussions of substantivalism and relationalism. I will then argue that we should reject such assumptions and collapse the categorical distinction between substance and property.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  22. The Context of Essence.L. A. Paul - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):170-184.
    I address two related questions: first, what is the best theory of how objects have de re modal properties? Second, what is the best defence of essentialism given the variability of our modal intuitions? I critically discuss several theories of how objects have their de re modal properties and address the most threatening antiessentialist objection to essentialism: the variability of our modal intuitions. Drawing on linguistic treatments of vagueness and ambiguity, I show how essentialists can accommodate the variability of modal (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  23. Mereological bundle theory.L. A. Paul - 2013 - In Hans Burkhardt, Johanna Seibt & Guido Imaguire (eds.), Handbook of Mereology. Philosophia Verlag.
    Bundle theory takes objects to be bundles of properties. Some bundle theorists take objects to be bundles of instantiated universals, and some take objects to be bundles of tropes. Tropes are instances of properties: some take instantiated universals to be tropes, while others deny the existence of universals and take tropes to be ontologically fundamental. Historically, the bundling relation has been taken to be a primitive relation, not analyzable in terms of or ontologically reducible to some other relation, and has (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  24. Counterfactual theories.Laurie Ann Paul - 2009 - In Helen Beebee, Peter Menzies & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  25.  12
    How the evaluability bias shapes transformative decisions.Yoonseo Zoh, L. A. Paul & M. J. Crockett - 2024 - Synthese 203 (2):1-22.
    Our paper contributes to the rapidly expanding body of experimental research on transformative decision making, and in the process, marks out a novel empirical interpretation for assessments of subjective value in transformative contexts. We start with a discussion of the role of subjective value in transformative decisions, and then critique extant experimental work that explores this role, with special attention to Reuter and Messerli (2018). We argue that current empirical treatments miss a crucial feature of practical deliberation manifesting across a (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. A New Role for Experimental Work in Metaphysics.L. A. Paul - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):461-476.
    Recent work in philosophy could benefit from paying greater attention to empirical results from cognitive science involving judgments about the nature of our ordinary experience. This paper describes the way that experimental and theoretical results about the nature of ordinary judgments could—and should—inform certain sorts of enquiries in contemporary philosophy, using metaphysics as an exemplar, and hence defines a new way for experimental philosophy and cognitive science to contribute to traditional philosophical debates.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  27. Real world problems.Laurie Paul & John Quiggin - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):363-382.
    In the real world, there can be constraints on rational decision-making: there can be limitations on what I can know and on what you can know. There can also be constraints on my ability to deliberate or on your ability to deliberate. It is useful to know what the norms of rational deliberation should be in ideal contexts, for fully informed agents, in an ideal world. But it is also useful to know what the norms of rational deliberation should be (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  28. Causation and preemption.Ned Hall & Laurie Ann Paul - 2003 - In Peter Clark & Katherine Hawley (eds.), Philosophy of Science Today. Oxford University Press UK.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  29. Constitutive Overdetermination.L. A. Paul - 2007 - In J. K. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. S. Silverstein (eds.), Causation and Explanation. MIT Press. pp. 4--265.
    Our best philosophical and scientific pictures of the world organize material objects into a hierarchy or levels or layers- microparticles at the bottom, molecules, cells, and persons at higher layers. Are objects at higher layers identical to the sums of objects at lower layers that constitute them? (Note that this question is different from the question of whether composition- as opposed to constitution- is identity.).
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  30. Keeping track of the time: Emending the counterfactual analysis of causation.L. A. Paul - 1998 - Analysis 58 (3):191–198.
    Counterfactual analyses of causation can provide elegant analyses of many cases of causation. However, they fail to give intuitively correct analyses of cases involving a commonplace variety of late preemptive causation. I argue that a small emendation can solve the problem.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  31. Truth conditions of tensed sentence types.L. A. Paul - 1997 - Synthese 111 (1):53-72.
    Quentin Smith has argued that the new tenseless theory of time is faced with insurmountable problems and should be abandoned in favour of the tensed theory of time. Smith;s main argument attacks the fundamental premise of the tenseless theory: that tenseless truth conditions for tokens of tensed sentences adequately capture the meaning of tensed sentences. His position is that tenseless truth conditions cannot explain the logical relations between tensed sentences, thus the tensed theory must be accepted. Against Smith, this paper (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  32. In defense of essentialism.L. A. Paul - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):333–372.
    If an object has a property essentially, it has that property in every possible world according to which it exists.2 If an object has a property accidentally, it does not have that property in every possible world according to which it exists. Claims about an object’s essential or accidental properties are de re modal claims, and essential and accidental properties are de re modal properties. Take an object’s modal profile to specify its essential properties and the range of its accidental (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  33.  10
    Causation and Preemption.Ned Hall & L. A. Paul - 2003 - In Peter Clark & Katherine Hawley (eds.), Philosophy of Science Today. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 100-130.
    Causation is a deeply intuitive and familiar relation, gripped powerfully by common sense. Or so it seems. As is typical in philosophy, however, that deep intuitive familiarity has not led to any philosophical account of causation that is at once clean, precise, and widely agreed upon. Not for lack of trying: the last thirty years or so have seen dozens of attempts to provide such an account, and the pace of development is, if anything, accelerating. (See Collins et al. [2003a] (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  34. Whose Preferences?L. A. Paul - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics 20 (8):65-66.
    Commentary on Walsh, E. 2020. Cognitive transformation, dementia, and the moral weight of advance directives. The American Journal of Bioethics. 20(8): 54–64.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  35. Transformative Treatments.L. A. Paul & Kieran Healy - 2017 - Noûs:320-335.
    Contemporary social-scientific research seeks to identify specific causal mechanisms for outcomes of theoretical interest. Experiments that randomize populations to treatment and control conditions are the “gold standard” for causal inference. We identify, describe, and analyze the problem posed by transformative treatments. Such treatments radically change treated individuals in a way that creates a mismatch in populations, but this mismatch is not empirically detectable at the level of counterfactual dependence. In such cases, the identification of causal pathways is underdetermined in a (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  36.  25
    Experience and the Arrow.L. A. Paul - 2014 - In Alastair Wilson (ed.), Chance and Temporal Asymmetry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-193.
    The debate over the temporal arrow is a debate over what fundamental ontology is needed for the temporal asymmetry of the universe, which determines the fact that time seems to be oriented or directed from earlier to later. This temporal asymmetry underlies (or, as some might argue, is the same as) the asymmetrical fact that the past is fixed while the future is open, as well as the global asymmetries of counterfactual, causal and agential direction. I explore the metaphysics of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  37. The First Time as Tragedy, the Second as Farce.L. A. Paul - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (11-12):145-153.
    Commentary on Montero, B. (2020) What experience doesn’t teach: Pain-amnesia and a new paradigm for memory research, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 27 (11–12).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  38.  12
    Experience, Metaphysics, and Cognitive Science.Laurie Paul - 2016 - In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), A Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley. pp. 419–433.
    This chapter explores how to understand the contributions of experience, especially with respect to the role of cognitive science, in developing and assessing metaphysical theories of reality. Further, it develops a methodological basis for the idea that, independently of work in experimental philosophy focused on explications of concepts, contemporary metaphysical theories with a role for experiential evidence can be fruitfully connected to empirical work in psychology, especially cognitive science. While there are different ways to flesh out the connection between cognitive (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  39.  69
    Experience, Metaphysics, and Cognitive Science.L. A. Paul - 2016 - In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Wiley. pp. 419-433.
    This chapter presents an opinionated account of how to understand the contributions of experience, especially with respect to the role of cognitive science, in developing and assessing metaphysical theories of reality. I develop a methodological basis for the idea that, independently of work in experimental philosophy focused on explications of concepts, contemporary metaphysical theories with a role for experiential evidence can be fruitfully connected to empirical work in psychology, especially cognitive science. My argument is not that cognitive science should replace (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  40. Problems with late preemption.L. A. Paul - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):48–53.
    In response to counterexamples involving late preemption, David Lewis (1986) revised his original (1973) counterfactual analysis of causation to include the notion of quasi-dependence. Jonardon Ganeri, Paul Noordhof and Murali Ramachandran (1998) argue that their ‘PCA*-analysis’ of causation solves the problem of late preemption and is superior to Lewis’s analysis. I show that neither quasi-dependence nor the PCA*-analysis solves the problem of late preemption.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  41.  21
    Reply to Symposiasts.Laurie A. Paul - 2019 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 10 (3):357-367.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  42.  63
    Phenomenal Feel as Process.Laurie Paul - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):204-222.
    Phenomenal character is the what-it's-likeness of subjective experience. I develop an ontology of phenomenal feel as process. My being in some phenomenal state R is the process of my instantiating R’s neurological correlate. The ontology explains why we have asymmetric epistemic access to phenomenal characters: the ontological ground for the subjective or first-personal stance is different from the ontological ground for the objective or third-personal stance. I end by situating my account in debates about physicalism.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  43. Limited realism: Cartwright on natures and laws.L. A. Paul - 2002 - Philosophical Books 43:244-253.
    A leaf falls to the ground, wafting lazily on the afternoon breeze. Clouds move across the sky, and birds sing. Are these events governed by universal laws of nature, laws that apply everywhere without exception, subsuming events such as the falling of the leaf, the movement of the clouds and the singing of the birds? Are such laws part of a small set of fundamental laws, or descended from such a set, which govern everything there is in the world?
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  44. Metaphysically Reductive Causation.Ned Hall & L. A. Paul - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):9-41.
    There are, by now, many rival, sophisticated philosophical accounts of causation that qualify as ‘metaphysically reductive’. This is a good thing: these collective efforts have vastly improved our understanding of causation over the last 30 years or so. They also put us in an excellent position to reflect on some central methodological questions: What exactly is the point of offering a metaphysical reduction of causation? What philosophical scruples ought to guide the pursuit of such a reduction? Finally, how should answers (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  45. Realism about Structure and Kinds.L. A. Paul - 2013 - In Stephen Mumford & Matthew Tugby (eds.), Metaphysics and Science. Oxford University Press.
    In 1976, Hilary Putnam set forth his model-theoretic argument, claiming that it showed that the semantic realist’s program1 was ‘unintelligible’, since it implied, contra the realist view, that reference is radically indeterminate. Although I find the conclusion that reference is indeterminate unattractive, I argue that the descriptivist position needs to be supplemented with a premise about the sorts of kinds or structure that our world includes. The need for this premise gives a counterintuitive result: the descriptivist account of reference makes (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  46. The Worm at the Root of the Passions: Poetry and Sympathy in Mill's Utilitarianism: L. A. Paul.L. A. Paul - 1998 - Utilitas 10 (1):83-104.
    I claim that Mill has a theory of poetry which he uses to reconcile nineteenth century associationist psychology, the tendency of the intellect to dissolve associations, and the need for educated members of society to desire utilitarian ends. The heart of the argument is that Mill thinks reading poetry encourages us to feel the feelings of others, and thus to develop pleasurable associations with the pleasurable feelings of others and painful associations with the painful feelings of others. Once the associations (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  47. Transformative Experience and the Problem of Religious Disagreement.Joshua Blanchard & Laurie Paul - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 127-141.
    Peer disagreement presents religious believers, agnostics, and skeptics alike with an epistemological problem: how can confidence in any religious claims (including their negations) be epistemically justified? There seem to be rational, well-informed adherents among a variety of mutually incompatible religious and non-religious perspectives, and so the problem of disagreement arises acutely in the religious domain. In this paper, we show that the transformative nature of religious experience and identity poses more than just this traditional, epistemic problem of conflicting religious beliefs. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Learning that there is life after death.L. Harris Paul & Astuti Rita - 2006 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (5):475-476.
    Bering's argument that human beings are endowed with a cognitive system dedicated to forming illusory representations of psychological immortality relies on the claim that children's beliefs in the afterlife are not the result of religious teaching. We suggest four reasons why this claim is unsatisfactory.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49.  27
    Distinguishing self-involving from self-serving choices in framing effects.M. J. Crockett & L. A. Paul - 2022 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45:e224.
    We distinguish two types of cases that have potential to generate quasi-cyclical preferences: self-involving choices where an agent oscillates between first- and third-person perspectives that conflict regarding their life-changing implications, and self-serving choices where frame-based reasoning can be “first-personally rational” yet “third-personally irrational.” We argue that the distinction between these types of cases deserves more attention in Bermúdez's account.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  38
    Stress reactivity to an electronic version of the Trier Social Stress Test: a pilot study.Sage E. Hawn, Lisa Paul, Suzanne Thomas, Stephanie Miller & Ananda B. Amstadter - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 76