Two works are attributed to Peter the Philosopher in the manuscripts, an author active in the reign of Manuel I Comnenos. The first, a letter condemning Patriarch Luke Chrysoberges' practice of astrology, highlights the author's attachment to medical knowledge. The second is a peculiar astronomical treatise that mixes Antiochene descriptions of a hemispherical universe with notions of spherical astronomy. Together these works emphasise Peter the Philosopher's attempt at defining boundaries within which one could study the stars. This article offers an (...) analysis of Peter the Philosopher's works in the context of twelfth-century Byzantine scholarship, an edition and translation of the treatise, as well as a translation of the letter. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the work of Józef Czapski, a Polish painter, writer, epistolographer and diarist who died in Maisons-Laffitte in 1993. The artist was also engaged in the matters of human life and politics. The article deals solely with his paintings. After a short presentation of Czapski’s artistic biography, a more in depth analysis of his works is provided. The article uses the artist’s letters and memoirs on top of the basic literature. The analysis shows that the Czapski’s (...) artistic work constitutes a closed whole; no new work, neither drawing nor painting will be added to his legacy, but, at the same time it is open because the threads of Czapski’s art remain unclosed. Czapski’s works constitute a logical whole in the sense that one can draw a circle around which they are arranged, except that the beginning of the journey does not coincide with the end. Czapski abandoned his first, rather inept expressionist works to take up in the broad sense a challenge of Post-Impressionism. However, not satisfied with the vision of Post-Impressionism and the painting focused on pure color delectations, he returned to his initial interest in de l’horreur de la vie, absorbing the lessons and experiences that his life gave him, digesting and consequently abandoning Post-Impressionism. To him, color is understood not as Impressionism understood it, but rather, as it was treated by Expressionism, howewer, he tempered it according to the school of Post-Impressionism and the French art. Czapski’s painting completes the full circle: his journey begins with “the scary head”, experiences post-impressionism, and blossoms with paintings depicting l’horreur de la vie and anxiety hidden in the stark colors of his late landscapes. The author describes Józef Czapski’s art as the great one, what is ultimately determined by the whole output, which, like a keystone brings together all the themes: of the painter, of the writer and of the man devoted to public affairs. (shrink)

One of the most famous gods of the pagan pantheon of Ancient Rus is the Thunder Perun. Usually, in the minds of modern humans, the image of Perun is perceived as the embodiment of the terrible and unaffiliated forces of nature, as the personification of thunderstorms, thunder and lightning. Certainly, such a perception came to us from the ancient pagan times as a kind of accumulation inherent in our ancestors ideological paradigm. However, the idea of ​​Perun as the personification of (...) thunder and lightning is confirmed by numerous linguistic intelligence. In particular, at one time, this well-known French researcher L. Lezhe found that the Slavic meaning of the word - lightning. The concept Perun in the Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Polish and Slovak languages ​​means the same thing. It is lightning. Apparently, in the pagan worldview, this god appears as a symbol of something scary, frightening. The ancient Slavs leaned over to Perun's force, as they generally bowed to any force, considering everything that was stronger than them, "strange", and therefore worthy of respect and worship. (shrink)

I argue that recent attempts to vindicate blame have failed to fully face the vengeful feelings and angry outbursts that have led to scepticism about blame’s ethical status. This paper ende...

Discover the great wonder and wild freedom the fear of the Lord can bring. What does the Bible mean when it says we are to fear God' Is it difficult for you to reconcile the two sides of God's nature'His wrath and His love' Mattie Montgomery teaches that a right pursuit of the fear, fire, and fullness of God can lead you into the knowledge of a side of God you may never have imagined before. He notes that the fear (...) of God does not mean that we should be afraid of God; but rather, that we should be afraid to be against Him. And, if we abide in Christ, we can live in the continual awareness of the mighty Warrior King who calls us beloved. That realization is the glorious convergence of respect, awe, reverence, adoration, instruction, honor, worship, discipline, confidence, thanksgiving, love, and yes...'fear. The result'a joyful experience of God's grandeur and a grateful realization that only through Him do we receive His provisions and protection and are able to echo the words of the apostle Paul in Romans 8:31, "If God is for me, who can be against me'. (shrink)

The structure of Chiodi's book is based on Vuillemin's important hermeneutical thesis that existentialism is one more step in the program of the romantics to give an absolute foundation to finite reality through the establishment of necessary relations between subjectivity and being. These relations, once revealed, would dispel the facticity and contingency in which the natural world is enshrouded. The role of Heidegger in this tradition involves one further dialectical twist, since Heidegger centers all Western Philosophy, including his own, around (...) the problem of ground in the manner proposed by the romantics. The suggested dialectical twist is then Heidegger's Kehre, a step beyond the radical contingency of Dasein in Sein und Zeit. Indeed, this contingency, once reached, shows unequivocally the failure of the romantic program. The ground cannot be ontologically connected with any object nor with the subject; it is rather the necessary history of the ground that determines all categorial differentiations in the world, including the reflective differentiation of subject-objects. Thus it becomes important to distinguish Heidegger from Hegel since, in both, history and necessity are characteristics of the ground. Chiodi gets to the bottom of this matter by pointing to the transfer of negativity from the process of history to the end of history. For Heidegger what is necessary is the repeated withdrawal of the ground so that it may never be confused with that which is known in any revelation or through all of them. This move, though clear, would still leave a fundamental ambiguity in the later philosophy of Heidegger: language, which acts as messenger from the ground to the world, must reflect the superabundance of Being from the standpoint of the ground while it only reflects possibilities of being from the standpoint of the world. This is an ambiguity that Heidegger would want to maintain. Chiodi's interpretation of Heidegger as a neo-platonist totally destroys this ambiguity and with it the very delicate balance created by Heidegger between infinite meaning and the ability of finite words to dwell upon it.--A. de L. M. (shrink)

G. Deledalle is the author of a Histoire de la philosophie américaine, and of some excellent studies on Dewey, such as La pédagogie de Dewey, philosophie de la continuité, and "Durkheim et Dewey". These are all works that deserve full attention by students of the Golden Age of American philosophy. For a European, Deledalle has an unusual capacity to detect the vitality and freshness, but also the depth, of the growth of higher education in the U.S. in the first half (...) of this century. At the heart of this growth were philosophical ideas, and in particular those of Dewey. Philosophy did not have then dictatorial or competitive designs regarding education, the social and political sciences, psychology, or the natural sciences. It freely mingled with them, not just imparting methodological or epistemological rigor but also contributing some insights and giving the hypotheses and conclusions in these fields the character of "experiences." Experience is the guiding theme of this rich and complicated work, covering a multitude of subjects and positions. The treatment is divided into six parts dealing respectively with Dewey's leanings toward unitary experience, organic experience, dynamic experience, functional experience, instrumental experience, and transactional experience. In the study of the intellectual of Dewey's life practically all of his production is critically examined by Deledalle: a monumental task in itself, made possible by the critical bibliography of Milton Hasley Thomas. There is enough early biographical detail to make this work an effective and affectionate intellectual portrait. The best pages of this work are devoted to a thorough explication and comparative study of Dewey's final synthesis of experience. There are very helpful comparative references to Marx, Freud, Bergson, and Heidegger, and also indispensable parallels and contrasts with Peirce, James, and Whitehead. This is not a modest contribution from a regional point of view: Deledalle is, perhaps more than anybody else, aware of an ongoing international dialogue on Dewey, a dialogue that is preserving experience as a problem-complex at the front line of contemporary reflection.--A. de L. M. (shrink)

I explore some of the ways that assumptions about the nature of substance shape metaphysical debates about the structure of Reality. Assumptions about the priority of substance play a role in an argument for monism, are embedded in certain pluralist metaphysical treatments of laws of nature, and are central to discussions of substantivalism and relationalism. I will then argue that we should reject such assumptions and collapse the categorical distinction between substance and property.

Derrida et Bergson ne se sont jamais rencontres, et l'oeuvre du premier ne refere qu'avec circonspection a celle du second. Un dialogue entre eux n'en est pas moins possible, portant entre autres sur la delicate question du fondement de l'intuition. Une connaissance immediate, non langagiere, integrale et certaine est-elle envisageable? Le probleme en est un de droit plutot que de fait: quid juris? a ce probleme lourd d'implications epistemologiques, Derrida et Bergson ont repondu de facons distinctes: l'un a mis en (...) doute la possibilite de l'intuition, l'autre a defendu les droits de la methode intuitive. Le present ouvrage est le premier a serrer de pres la relation entre ces deux philosophes, dont les pensees refletent a elles seules certains des tournants qu'a connus le xxe siecle. Son objectif est triple: circonscrire etroitement l'objet du litige entre Derrida et Bergson, trop peu souligne par les commentateurs, et dont ce livre montre qu'il n'est pas annule par un accord partiel; tirer au clair les diverses raisons qui amenent l'un a s'en prendre a l'intuition, l'autre a embrasser la methode intuitive; etablir que certains arguments de Bergson, bien qu'ils connaissent un regain d'interet et engagent la pensee dans des voies prometteuses, complementaires de celles du realisme speculatif, semblent meriter un nouvel etayage. (shrink)

Why do we watch and like horror films? Despite a century of horror film-making and en-tertainment, little research has examined the human motivation to watch fictional horror and how horror film influences individuals’ behavioural, cognitive and emotional re-sponses. This review provides the first synthesis of the empirical literature on the psy-chology of horror film using multi-disciplinary research from psychology, psychotherapy, communication studies, development studies, clinical psychology, and media studies. The paper considers the motivations for people’s decision to watch horror, why (...) people enjoy horror, how individual differences influence responses to, and preference for, hor-ror film, how exposure to horror film changes behaviour, how horror film is designed to achieve its effects, why we fear and why we fear specific classes of stimuli, and how lik-ing for horror develops during childhood and adolescence. The literature suggests that (1) low empathy and fearfulness are associated with more enjoyment and desire to watch horror film but that specific dimensions of empathy are better predictors of people’s re-sponses than are others; (2) there is a positive relationship between sensation-seeking and horror enjoyment/preference but this relationship is not consistent; (3) men and boys prefer to watch, enjoy and seek our horror more than do women and girls; (4) women are more prone to disgust sensitivity or anxiety than are men and this may mediate the sex difference in the enjoyment of horror; (5) younger children are afraid of symbolic stimuli whereas older children become afraid of concrete or realistic stimuli; (6) in terms of coping with horror, physical coping strategies are more successful in younger children; priming with information about the feared object reduces fear and increases children’s enjoyment of frightening television and film. A number of limitations in the literature are identified, including the multifarious range of horror stimuli used in studies, disparities in methods, small sample sizes, and a lack of research on cross-cultural differences and similarities. Ideas for future research are explored. (shrink)

Le philosophe Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007) a-t-il vraiment existé? Que reste-t-il de lui? "Une élégance certaine de la pensée", affirme l'un de ses meilleurs interprètes, François L'Yvonnet. Le philosophe de La Société de consommation, des Stratégies fatales et des Cool Memories s'attachait à l'idée du fragment comme mode de pensée : car dans le détail, tout est parfait, c'est dans sa reproduction que tout se complique. François L'Yvonnet explore cinq fragments de la philosophie de Jean Baudrillard et de sa biographie pour (...) mieux saisir l'éclat et la jubilation d'une pensée toujours vivante et contemporaine. (shrink)

Thought, according to Hegel, is not only the product of a faculty of a subject, or a means by which a thinking subject tries to grasp a world that is alien to him. It is also the very structure of the world, that is disclosed to a subject through the thinking activity of a subject. The fundamental question that crosses the whole post-Kantian philosophy is that of the relation between thought and reality, i.e. the question of whether reality depends on (...) the categorial requirements imposed by the thinking subject, or whether reality maintains some form of independence from the thinking subject. Seen from this standpoint, Hegel can be read both as an author who radicalizes Kant’s transcendental perspective, and also as a critic of that perspective. In other words, he can be seen as an idealist: according to Hegel, any philosophy is idealist if it claims that something finite, qua finite, is essentially connected with something other. He can also be seen as an anti-idealist: insofar as his philosophy aims to overcome a hyper-transcendentalist perspective, i.e. it is so since it rejects idealism as subjective idealism. Moreover, Hegel’s anti-idealism can be characterized as realism. This is because, if we admit that overcoming transcendentalism without falling back again on a pre-critical conception of thought and of reality involves an idea of thought which is not reducible to a "mentalistic" conception of it, we need to conceive of thought as something that is not alien to reality. Hegel conceives of thought as intimately connected with the world, as its own rational structure. This “realism” of thought is what makes Hegelian idealism, so to speak, anti-idealistic. Through this "realism" of thought Hegel pursues two goals. On the one hand, Hegel attempts to overcome a subjectivistic and instrumentalistic conception of thought, according to which a subject talks and relates to a reality that is always only a construction of him, and so it is necessarily the simulacrum of something that remains inaccessible in its truth. On the other hand, Hegel attempts to overcome a conception of reality characterized merely as alien and opposite to thought itself, and which is the counterpart of the subjectivistic and instrumentalistic conception of thought. By pursuing these two goals it should be gained a conception of reality which could warrant some form of objectivity, but which cannot be equated with the substantialistic conception of the pre-Kantian metaphysics. (shrink)