Results for 'L��pez Quint��s'

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  1. Claves para la comprensión del pensamiento de Gabriel Marcel.Alfonso L.Ó, Pez QuintÁ & S. - 2005 - Anuario Filosófico 38 (82):443-474.
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  2.  26
    Quine’s Substitutional Definition of Logical Truth and the Philosophical Significance of the Löwenheim-Hilbert-Bernays Theorem.Henri Wagner - 2018 - History and Philosophy of Logic 40 (2):182-199.
    The Löwenheim-Hilbert-Bernays theorem states that, for an arithmetical first-order language L, if S is a satisfiable schema, then substitution of open sentences of L for the predicate letters of S...
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  3.  15
    Quine's Dilemma of Underdetermination.A. C. Genova - 1988 - Dialectica 42 (4):283-294.
    SummaryI examine an internal tension between Quine's empiricist methodology and his doctrine of naturalism — a tension that bears on his well‐known thesis of empirical underdetermination of scientific theory., viz., that there can be empirically equivalent but logically incompatible formulations of comprehensive scientific theory. Quine recognizes the tension and tries to resolve it via his distinction between the conditions that justify belief in a theory and the conditions that warrant the attribution of truth to a theory. I argue that Quine's (...)
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  4.  27
    Trading Ontology for Ideology: The Interplay of Logic, Set Theory and Semantics in Quine's Philosophy.Lieven Decock - 2002 - Boston, MA, USA: Synthese Library. Kluwer/Springer.
    The Interplay of Logic, Set Theory and Semantics in Quine's Philosophy L. Decock. In philosophy of science Quine's name is linked to the so-called Quine- Duhem thesis. The discussion of this thesis still continues even after several decades.9 ...
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  5.  13
    ""Quine's" Two Dogmas" as a Criticism of Logical Empiricism.Artur Koterski - 2012 - Filozofia Nauki 20 (1):45 - +.
    Dans les « Deux dogmes», Quine voulait démontrer que le positivisme logique n’était possible qu’en raison d’hypothèses injustifiées. L’intention de Quine était de montrer qu’il n’est possible de sauver l’empirisme que si l’on accepte une autre approche, holistique. Toutefois, l’article de Quine était anachronique dès le moment de sa publication. Le but de cet article est double. Tout d’abord, on esquissera l’argument de Quine et on le confrontera aux positions de Carnap et Dubislav. On montrera que la critique de Quine (...)
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  6.  15
    Quine’s Other Way Out.Hartley Slater - 2014 - Philosophia Scientiae 18:71-79.
    On montre que, avec la notion traditionnelle et grammaticale du prédicat comme ce qui reste de la phrase après l’enlèvement du sujet, le paradoxe de Russell, ou d’autres comparables comme le paradoxe de Grelling et le paradoxe de la prédication, ne posent aucun problème. L’interdit formel standard sur la substitution des prédicats impliquant des variables libres dans des schémas où ces variables deviendraient liées, suffit pour prévenir le développement des paradoxes standard. On discute ensuite des réarrangements requis dans les fondations (...)
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  7. "Tarski" "Brouwer" "Whitehead" "Quine's Mathematical Logic".Benjamin L. Curtis - 2010 - In Jon Williamson & ‎Federica Russo (eds.), Key Terms in Logic. Continuum Press.
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  8.  24
    George Goe. Modifications of Quine's ML and Inclusive Quantification Systems. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 33 , Pp. 39–42. [REVIEW]Robert L. Stanley - 1971 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (2):325-326.
  9. L. Decock, Trading Ontology for Ideology. The Interplay of Logic, Set Theory and Semantics in Quine s Philosophy.P. Valore - 2004 - Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 59:850-852.
     
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  10.  24
    Meaning as Hypothesis: Quine’s Indeterminacy Thesis Revisited: Dialogue.Serge Grigoriev - 2010 - Dialogue 49 (3):395-411.
    ABSTRACT: Despite offering many formulations of his controversial indeterminacy of translation thesis, Quine has never explored in detail the connection between indeterminacy and the conception of meaning that he had supposedly derived from the work of Peirce and Duhem. The outline of such a conception of meaning, as well as its relationship to the indeterminacy thesis, is worked out in this paper; and its merits and implications are assessed both in the context of Quine’s own philosophical agenda, and also with (...)
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  11.  85
    Carnap on Analyticity and Existence: A Clarification, Defense, and Development of Quine’s Reading of Carnap’s Views on Ontology.Gary Ebbs - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (5):1-31.
    Does Carnap’s treatment of philosophical questions about existence, such as “Are there numbers?” and “Are there physical objects?”, depend on his analytic–synthetic distinction? If so, in what way? I answer these questions by clarifying, defending, and developing the reading of Carnap’s paper “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” that W. V. Quine proposes, with little justification or explanation, in his paper “On Carnap’s Views on Ontology”. The primary methodological value of studying Quine’s reading of “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” is that it prompts (...)
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  12. De Quine à Carnap: L'empirisme logique aujourd'hui.S. Laugier - 1997 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 51 (202):541-555.
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  13.  8
    William S. Hatcher. La Notion D′Équivalence Entre Systèmes Formels Et Une Généralisation Inductive du Système Dit “New Foundations” de Quine. Comptes Rendus Hebdomadaires des Séances de l'Académie des Sciences , Vol. 256 , Pp. 563–566. [REVIEW]Steven Orey - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):172-173.
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  14.  64
    Quine and Slater on Paraconsistency and Deviance.Francesco Paoli - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (5):531-548.
    In a famous and controversial paper, B. H. Slater has argued against the possibility of paraconsistent logics. Our reply is centred on the distinction between two aspects of the meaning of a logical constant *c* in a given logic: its operational meaning, given by the operational rules for *c* in a cut-free sequent calculus for the logic at issue, and its global meaning, specified by the sequents containing *c* which can be proved in the same calculus. Subsequently, we use the (...)
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  15.  12
    L’indétermination de la traduction chez Quine : contenu et arguments.Ève Gaudet - 2005 - Philosophiques 32 (2):369-382.
    Dans la première section du présent article, mon but est d’extraire le contenu de la thèse de l’indétermination de la traduction, à partir d’une revue de plusieurs formulations de Quine. Je tente d’identifier ce qui est constant et ce qui varie dans celles-ci. Je retiens ce qui est constant comme le coeur de la thèse et je considère ce qui varie comme secondaire. J’arrive ainsi à lire une seule thèse à travers les diverses formulations. Je dois admettre, par ailleurs, que (...)
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  16.  14
    Quine : l'analyticité par l'assentiment.Sandra Laugier - 2008 - Archives de Philosophie 4 (4):563-578.
    L’A. revient, dans le prolongement de son ouvrage L’anthropologie logique de Quine sur un élément souvent négligé de la thèse d’indétermination de la traduction, à savoir la reconstruction/identification des connecteurs logiques par l’assentiment et le dissentiment. Après avoir examiné diverses objections à l’utilisation par Quine des « fonctions de verdict » dans la traduction, l’A. en vient à la véritable motivation de Quine dans son recours à l’assentiment, qui émerge dans l’ouvrage méconnu The Roots of Reference. Quine revient, par cet (...)
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  17.  21
    Quine.Christopher Hookway - 2013 - Polity.
    This book provides a clear and comprehensive introduction to the work of Willard van Orman Quine, the most important and influential American philosopher of the post-war period. An understanding of Quine's work is essential for anyone who wishes to follow contemporary debates in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. Hookway traces the development of Quine's work from his early criticisms of logical positivism and empiricism to his more recent theories about mind and meaning. He gives particular (...)
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  18. Du Point de Vue Logique: Neuf Essais Logico-Philosophiques.Willard Von Orman Quine, C. Alsaleh, B. Ambroise, D. Bonnay, S. Bozon & M. Cozic - 2003 - Vrin.
    Du point de vue logique est le premier ouvrage philosophique de Quine et peut-être son plus important. Il rassemble des articles fondamentaux, en philosophie de la logique épistémologie, ontologie et philosophie du langage. Le lecteur pourra y découvrir l’ensemble des enjeux philosophiques de l’œuvre de Quine. Le livre contient notamment « Sur ce qu’il y a », texte-clé de la réflexion ontologique contemporaine « Deux dogmes de l’empirisme », qui a suscité un grand nombre de discussions en philosophie analytique, ainsi (...)
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  19.  94
    W.V. Quine on Analyticity: “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” in Context: Dialogue.Andrew Lugg - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (2):231-246.
    ABSTRACT: It is not W.V. Quine’s aim in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” to prove against all-comers that the analytic/synthetic distinction is untenable or to provide a novel conception of our knowledge. He aims to undermine the empiricist’s appeal to the distinction and show what empiricism unencumbered by dogma comes to. Focusing on §§1-3 and §6, I argue that his treatment of analyticity is framed by important philosophical assumptions and the conception of knowledge he defends is one to which he had (...)
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  20.  1
    Hatcher William S.. La Notion D′Équivalence Entre Systèmes Formels Et Une Généralisation Inductive du Système Dit “New Foundations” de Quine. Comptes Rendus Hebdomadaires des Séances de l'Académie des Sciences , Vol. 256 , Pp. 563–566. [REVIEW]Steven Orey - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):172-173.
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  21. Carnap and Quine on Truth by Convention.Gary Ebbs - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):193-237.
    According to the standard story W. V. Quine ’s criticisms of the idea that logic is true by convention are directed against, and completely undermine, Rudolf Carnap’s idea that the logical truths of a language L are the sentences of L that are true-in- L solely in virtue of the linguistic conventions for L, and Quine himself had no interest in or use for any notion of truth by convention. This paper argues that and are both false. Carnap did not (...)
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  22. Genèse Et Structure d'Un Interchamp Orthopédique (Pr. M. Du XIXe S.): Contribution À l'Histoire de l'Institutionnalisation d'Un Champ Scientifique. [REVIEW]Quin Grégory - 2011 - Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 64 (2):323-347.
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  23.  33
    Feminist Epistemology and American Pragmatism: Dewey and Quine.Alexandra L. Shuford - 2010 - Continuum.
    Birthing feminist pragmatist epistemologies -- Feminist epistemologies -- Embodiment -- Project overview -- Quine's naturalized epistemology -- A brief history of objectivity in western philosophy -- Quine's empiricism -- Holism -- Ontological and epistemological impact -- Antony's analytic feminist empiricism -- Objectivity and the bias paradox -- Quine's naturalized epistemology solves bias paradox -- Anti-quinean realism -- Nelson's holistic feminist empiricism -- Nelson's holism -- Communities as knowers -- Facts/values -- Dewey's theory of inquiry -- Epistemology and inquiry -- Biological (...)
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  24.  68
    Internal Relations and Analyticity: Wittgenstein and Quine.Michael Hymers - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):591 - 612.
    L'A. défend la thèse selon laquelle Wittgenstein développe une conception pragmatique et linguistique des relations internes qui définissent les vérités nécessaires: 1) qui n'implique pas l'analyticité de toutes les propositions exprimant des relations internes, 2) qui établit une distinction entre l'analytique et le synthétique, 3) qui s'avère compatible avec la critique de l'analyticité entreprise par Quine.
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  25.  16
    Hochberg Herbert. The Ontological Operator. Philosophy of Science, Vol. 23 , Pp. 250–259.Cartwright Richard L.. Comments on Dr. Hochberg's Paper. Philosophy of Science, Vol. 23 , Pp. 260–265.Hochberg Herbert. Professor Quine, Pegasus, and Dr. Cartwright. Philosophy of Science, Vol. 24 Pp. 191–203. [REVIEW]Alan Ross Anderson - 1959 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 24 (2):183-184.
  26.  16
    Frege's Way Out.James L. Hudson - 1975 - Philosophy Research Archives 1:135-140.
    I show that Frege's statement of a way to avoid Russell's paradox is defective, in that he presents two different methods as if they were one. One of these "ways out" is notably more plausible than the other, and is almost surely what Frege really intended. The well-known arguments of Lesniewski, Geach, and Quine that Frege's revision of his system is inadequate to avoid paradox are not affected by the ambiguity of Frede's statement. But a rectnt argument by Linsky and (...)
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  27.  4
    Fundamentals of Logic.R. L. S. - 1967 - Review of Metaphysics 20 (4):723-724.
    This text, serving as an introduction to Aristotelian, symbolic, inductive, and practical logic, presents the techniques of these approaches to logic, some of the philosophical problems of logic, and some of the attempts to solve philosophical problems by means of various logical techniques. It discusses the problem of universals and null classes; briefly introduces the theory of types; and presents Lukasiewicz's formalization of Aristotelian syllogistic logic as an example of a formal system. Classical logic and propositional logic are carefully and (...)
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  28. Carnap and Quine on Some Analytic-Synthetic Distinctions.Lieven Decock - unknown
    I want to analyse the Quine-Carnap discussion on analyticity with regard to logical, mathematical and set-theoretical statements. In recent years, the renewed interest in Carnap’s work has shed a new light on the analytic-synthetic debate. If one fully appreciates Carnap’s conventionalism, one sees that there was not a metaphysical debate on whether there is an analytic-synthetic distinction, but rather a controversy on the expedience of drawing such a distinction. However, on this view, there can be no longer a single analytic-synthetic (...)
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  29. ‘Frederick L. Will’s Pragmatic Realism: An Introduction’.Kenneth R. Westphal - 1997 - In K. R. Westphal (ed.), Frederick L. Will, Pragmatism and Realism. Rowman & Littlefield.
    This critical editorial introduction summarizes and explicates Frederick Will’s pragmatic realism and his account of the nature, assessment, and revision of cognitive and practical norms in connection with: the development of Will’s pragmatic realism, Hume’s problem of induction, the oscillations between foundationalism and coherentism, the nature of philosophical reflection, Kant’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’, the open texture of empirical concepts, the correspondence conception of truth, Putnam’s ‘internal realism’, the redundancy theory of truth, sociology of knowledge, the governance of practice by norms (...)
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  30.  11
    Fundamentals of Logic. [REVIEW]L. S. R. - 1967 - Review of Metaphysics 20 (4):723-724.
    This text, serving as an introduction to Aristotelian, symbolic, inductive, and practical logic, presents the techniques of these approaches to logic, some of the philosophical problems of logic, and some of the attempts to solve philosophical problems by means of various logical techniques. It discusses the problem of universals and null classes; briefly introduces the theory of types; and presents Lukasiewicz's formalization of Aristotelian syllogistic logic as an example of a formal system. Classical logic and propositional logic are carefully and (...)
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  31. Quine's Monism and Modal Eliminativism in the Realm of Supervenience.Atilla Akalın - 2019 - International Journal of Social Humanities Sciences Research (JSHRS) 6 (34):795-800.
    This study asserts that W.V.O. Quine’s eliminative philosophical gaze into mereological composition affects inevitably his interpretations of composition theories of ontology. To investigate Quine’s property monism from the account of modal eliminativism, I applied to his solution for the paradoxes of de re modalities’ . Because of its vital role to figure out how dispositions are encountered by Quine, it was significantly noted that the realm of de re modalities doesn’t include contingent and impossible inferences about things. Therefore, for him, (...)
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  32. Naturalism Reconsidered: Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty.Robert G. Brice & Patrick L. Bourgeois - 2012 - Philosophy Today 56 (1):78-83.
    While naturalism is used in positive senses by the tradition of analytical philosophy, with Ludwig Wittgenstein its best example, and by the tradition of phenomenology, with Maurice Merleau-Ponty its best exemplar, it also has an extremely negative sense on both of these fronts. Hence, both Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein in their basic thrusts adamantly reject reductionistic naturalism. Although Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology rejects the naturalism Husserl rejects, he early on found a place for the “truth of naturalism.” In a parallel way, Wittgenstein accepts (...)
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  33. Quine’s Conjecture on Many-Sorted Logic.Thomas William Barrett & Hans Halvorson - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3563-3582.
    Quine often argued for a simple, untyped system of logic rather than the typed systems that were championed by Russell and Carnap, among others. He claimed that nothing important would be lost by eliminating sorts, and the result would be additional simplicity and elegance. In support of this claim, Quine conjectured that every many-sorted theory is equivalent to a single-sorted theory. We make this conjecture precise, and prove that it is true, at least according to one reasonable notion of theoretical (...)
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  34.  5
    Entre l’injustifiable et le superfétatoire.Isabelle Delpla - 2005 - Philosophiques 32 (1):149-168.
    Les justifications a priori ou pragmatiques des normes rationnelles d’interprétation, comme le principe de charité, placent l’interprétationnisme devant un dilemme : soit échouer à justifier ces normes, soit les rendre inutiles et impertinentes par cette justification même. Les justifications a priori du principe de charité, proposées par Davidson, reposent sur un retour implicite à l’analycité et à une forme de détermination du sens incompatibles avec la position interprétationniste. La même critique s’applique à la justification pragmatique de ces normes opérée par (...)
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  35.  42
    Indétermination de la traduction et sous-détermination chez Quine.Eve Gaudet - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (2):313-330.
    RÉSUMÉ: Je propose iei une interprétation de la position quinienne sur l’asymetrie entre l’indétermination de la traduction et la sous-détermination. Je discute les articIes de Chomsky, Rorty et Friedman, qui prétendent montrer que l’asymétrie défendue par Quine est inacceptable. J’examine en outre les points de vue de Føllesdal et Gibson, deux auteurs en accord avec Quine au sujet de l’asymétrie. Je défends l’idée selon laquelle il faut admettre le réalisme de Quine, mais pas son physicalisme, pour être en mesure de (...)
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  36. Quine's Argument From Despair.Sander Verhaegh - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (1):150-173.
    Quine's argument for a naturalized epistemology is routinely perceived as an argument from despair: traditional epistemology must be abandoned because all attempts to deduce our scientific theories from sense experience have failed. In this paper, I will show that this picture is historically inaccurate and that Quine's argument against first philosophy is considerably stronger and subtler than the standard conception suggests. For Quine, the first philosopher's quest for foundations is inherently incoherent; the very idea of a self-sufficient sense datum language (...)
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  37. ‘‘Quine’s Evolution From ‘Carnap’s Disciple’ to the Author of “Two Dogmas.Greg Frost-Arnold - 2011 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1 (2):291-316.
    Recent scholarship indicates that Quine’s “Truth by Convention” does not present the radical critiques of analytic truth found fifteen years later in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” This prompts a historical question: what caused Quine’s radicalization? I argue that two crucial components of Quine’s development can be traced to the academic year 1940–1941, when he, Russell, Carnap, Tarski, Hempel, and Goodman were all at Harvard together. First, during those meetings, Quine recognizes that Carnap has abandoned the extensional, syntactic approach to philosophical (...)
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  38.  18
    Empirisme, naturalisme et signification chez Quine.Layla Raïd - 2008 - Archives de Philosophie 4 (4):579-598.
    La thèse d’indétermination de Quine est souvent considérée comme découlant de l’adoption d’un point de vue naturaliste. Contre cette lecture, qui manque la distinction entre empirisme et naturalisme, nous montrons comment l’indétermination est fondée dans une philosophie demeurant empiriste malgré la critique des deux dogmes de l’analyticité et du réductionnisme. Cet empirisme entre en conflit avec certaines thèses de l’épistémologie naturalisée défendue par Quine.Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy is often seen as grounded in his naturalism. Against this interpretation, which confuses empiricism (...)
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  39.  60
    Quine’s Intuition: Why Quine’s Early Nominalism is Naturalistic.James Andrew Smith - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1199-1218.
    According to a growing consensus in the secondary literature on Quine, the judgment Quine makes in favor of the nominalism outlined in “Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism” is in tension with the naturalism he later adopts. In this paper, I show the consensus view is mistaken by showing that Quine’s judgment is rooted in a naturalistic standard of clarity. Moreover, I argue that Quine late in his career is committed to accepting one plausible reading of his judgment in 1947. In (...)
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  40.  40
    Quine's Responses.W. V. Quine - 2000 - In A. Orenstein & Petr Kotatko (eds.), Knowledge, Language and Logic: Questions for Quine. Kluwer Academic Print on Demand. pp. 407--430.
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  41. Quine's ‘Needlessly Strong’ Holism.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 61:11-20.
    Quine is routinely perceived as having changed his mind about the scope of the Duhem-Quine thesis, shifting from what has been called an 'extreme holism' to a more moderate view. Where the Quine of 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' argues that “the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science” (1951, 42), the later Quine seems to back away from this “needlessly strong statement of holism” (1991, 393). In this paper, I show that the received view is incorrect. I distinguish (...)
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  42. Al-Bi⃛r¯Uj¯I’s Theory of the Motions of the Fixed Stars.J. L. Mancha - 2004 - Archive for History of Exact Sciences 58 (2):143-182.
    Quarum causas in orbibus sub suppremo collocatis indagantes, in suppremo enim uniformitas semper cernitur, exploratum habuerunt id prouenire ex motibus giratiuis lulabinis appellatis, factis quidem a permistione motus orbis super suis polis cum motu eiusdem super polis alterius, itaque ex multis motibus simul collectis unus fit motus. Quae quidem theorica phisicis conformis rationibus cunctis ueteribus ad Aristotelem philosophorum principem usque uigebat, quin immo sui summi acie ingenii eam 2 de coelo textu commentario 35 teste Auerroe innuere non desinit. Qalo Qalonymos.
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  43.  43
    A History of Philosophy in America 1720–2000 By Bruce Kuklick, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2001.T. L. S. Sprigge - 2004 - Philosophy 79 (2):348-350.
    Ranging from Joseph Bellamy to Hilary Putnam, and from early New England Divinity Schools to contemporary university philosophy departments, historian Bruce Kuklick recounts the story of the growth of philosophical thinking in the United States. Readers will explore the thought of early American philosphers such as Jonathan Edwards and John Witherspoon and will see how the political ideas of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson influenced philosophy in colonial America. Kuklick discusses The Transcendental Club (members Henry David Thoreau, Ralph (...)
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  44.  40
    Quine's Naturalism.Alan Weir - 2013 - In Gilbert Harman & Ernie Lepore (eds.), A Companion to W.V.O. Quine. pp. 114-147.
    Starting with the distinction between epistemological and ontological naturalism, this chapter focuses most on Quine’s epistemological naturalism, not the ontological anti-naturalism he thought it leads to. It is argued that naturalised epistemology is not central to Quine’s epistemology. Quine’s key epistemological principle is:- follow the methods of science, and only those. Can Quine demarcate scientific methods from non-scientific ones? The problems which have been raised here, e.g. in the case of mathematics, are considered. A main theme is the relationship between (...)
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  45.  9
    Comments on Laudan's "Methodology: Its Prospects".Philip L. Quinn - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:355 - 358.
    These comments address two of the main topics discussed by Laudan. First I take issue with the correctness-conditions and the acceptability-conditions he proposes for methodological rules. Then I criticize his suggestion about how to naturalize the axiology of scientific inquiry. I note that the realizability of a goal is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of its worthiness of pursuit, and I argue that this leaves room for conventional choice of scientific goals. In concluding, I respond to Laudan's attacks (...)
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  46. Proxy Functions and Inscrutability of Reference.Steven L. Reynolds - 1994 - Analysis 54 (4):228 - 235.
    Objection to Quine's argument for the inscrutability of reference. The proxy functions don't preserve the relations to experience, contrary to Quine's claims.
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  47.  5
    Quine’s Ontology and the Islamic Tradition.Abbas Ahsan - 2019 - American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 2 (36):20-63.
    Analytic theologians seem to unreservedly prioritize a realist view in the way they approach theological dogmas. I have previously argued that this particular type of realist methodological approach is inconsistent with the Islamic tradition. I demonstrated that this inconsistency lies between two primary theses which constitute realism and an absolutely transcendent and ineffable God of the Islamic tradition. I had established how each of these theses proved responsible, in different ways, for divesting the Islamic God of His absolute transcendence. In (...)
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  48. Quine's Interpretation Problem and the Early Development of Possible Worlds Semantics.Sten Lindström - 2001 - In Ondrey Majer (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2000. Filosofia.
    In this paper, I shall consider the challenge that Quine posed in 1947 to the advocates of quantified modal logic to provide an explanation, or interpretation, of modal notions that is intuitively clear, allows “quantifying in”, and does not presuppose, mysterious, intensional entities. The modal concepts that Quine and his contemporaries, e.g. Carnap and Ruth Barcan Marcus, were primarily concerned with in the 1940’s were the notions of (broadly) logical, or analytical, necessity and possibility, rather than the metaphysical modalities that (...)
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    Quine’s Argument From Despair.Sander Verhaegh - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (1):150-173.
    Quine’s argument for a naturalized epistemology is routinely perceived as an argument from despair: traditional epistemology must be abandoned because all attempts to deduce our scientific theories from sense experience have failed. In this paper, I will show that this picture is historically inaccurate and that Quine’s argument against first philosophy is considerably stronger and subtler than the standard conception suggests. For Quine, the first philosopher’s quest for foundations is inherently incoherent; the very idea of a self-sufficient sense datum language (...)
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  50. Quine's Empirical Assumptions.Noam Chomsky - 1968 - Synthese 19 (1-2):53 - 68.
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