1. Naemyŏnjŏk ŭro pyŏng ŭl alk'o innŭn munmyŏngsa ilmannyŏn -- 2. Yangsŏng ŭn pondi taedŭng sangbojŏk kwan'gye -- 3. Sŏng ch'abyŏl ŭi pyŏng ch'iyu nŭn ŏttŏk'e? -- 4. Chagakto e ŭihan kyohwa yobŏpchŏk sŏng p'yŏngdŭng ŭisik kaehyŏk undong -- 5. Chagakto : sunsu Chagakto -- 6. Sunsu ŭi segye, uwŏrham (ttwiŏnam) i hyŏngsŏng toenŭn segye -- 7. Kungmin Chagagwŏn mandŭlgi mit iltae kŏjokchŏk in Chagakto munhwa kyoyuk undong chŏn'gae -- 8. Sangjogye.

1. Tasan ŭi kyŏnghak kwa yŏkhak -- 2. Tasanhak chʻongnon -- 3. Tasanhak kwa mongmin simsŏ -- 4. Sirhak sasang kwa Han sasang -- 5.Kaesin yuhak ŭro pon Hanʼguk chʻŏrhaksa -- 6. Kugyŏk Tasan sasŏ -- 7. Sasang uĭhak kwa saengmyŏng ŭihangnon -- 8. Hanʼguk munhwa ŭi insik, kugyŏkkanyangnok -- 9. Chamnok, susangnok, purok.

a Haḳdamah la-Mishnah ule-ferushah -- Perush Mishnat Kol Yiśraʼel -- Shemonah peraḳim -- Igeret ha-shemad -- Igeret Teman be-targum R. Sh. Ibn Tibon -- Igeret Teman be-targum R. Naḥum ha-Maʻaravi -- Igeret teḥiyat ha-metim -- Beʼur milim me-Igeret teḥiyat ha-metim le-R. Sh. Ibn Tibon -- Shalosh teshuvot le-R. ʻOvadiah ger tsedeḳ -- Teshuvah le-R. Sh. Ibn Tibon be-ʻinyan targum ha-Moreh -- Igeret le-ḥakhme Lunil -- Igeret le-ḥakhme Marshiliʼah -- Igeret ha-Musar.

Haḳdmat ha-ʻorekh -- Le-harim et ha-shamayim -- Ḥalomot gedolim -- Zeman -- Torah -- Tefilah -- Teshuvah -- Ḥinukh -- Yaḥid ṿe-yaḥad -- Ahavat Yiśraʼel -- Ḥerut ṿe-ḥitḥadshut -- Galut ṿe-Geʼulah -- Adam ṿe-ʻolam -- Ish ha-maʻalah.

A broad introduction to Christian ethics based on a covenantal understanding of Christian life rooted in Scripture.

The number of ethical issues that demand a response from Christians today is almost dizzying. How can Christians navigate such matters? With an unflinching yet irenic approach, this volume invites engagement with the biggest ethical issues by drawing on real-life experiences and offering a range of responses to some of the most challenging moral questions confronting the church today.

We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions of an agent fit to be held morally responsible, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. We employ Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility to argue that even if robots were to have all the capacities required of moral agency, their history would deprive them from autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. (...) We will also study whether humans and technological artifacts like robots can form hybrid collective agents that could be morally responsible for their actions and give an argument against such a possibility. (shrink)

Page 1. Economics and Philosophy, 26 291--320 Copyright C Cambridge University Press doi: 10.1017 / S0266267110000386 TWO KINDS OF WE-REASONING RAUL HAKLI, KAARLO MILLER AND RAIMO TUOMELA University of Helsinki.

Various sources in the literature claim that the deduction theorem does not hold for normal modal or epistemic logic, whereas others present versions of the deduction theorem for several normal modal systems. It is shown here that the apparent problem arises from an objectionable notion of derivability from assumptions in an axiomatic system. When a traditional Hilbert-type system of axiomatic logic is generalized into a system for derivations from assumptions, the necessitation rule has to be modified in a way that (...) restricts its use to cases in which the premiss does not depend on assumptions. This restriction is entirely analogous to the restriction of the rule of universal generalization of first-order logic. A necessitation rule with this restriction permits a proof of the deduction theorem in its usual formulation. Other suggestions presented in the literature to deal with the problem are reviewed, and the present solution is argued to be preferable to the other alternatives. A contraction-and cut-free sequent calculus equivalent to the Hubert system for basic modal logic shows the standard failure argument untenable by proving the underivability of DA from A. (shrink)

In philosophical action theory there is a wide agreement that intentions, often understood in terms of plans, play a major role in the deliberation of rational agents. Planning accounts of rational agency challenge game- and decision-theoretical accounts in that they allow for rationality of actions that do not necessarily maximize expected utility but instead aim at satisfying long-term goals. Another challenge for game-theoretical understanding of rational agency has recently been put forth by the theory of team reasoning in which the (...) agents select their actions by doing their parts in the collective action that is best for the group. Both planning and team reasoning can be seen as instances of a similar type of reasoning in which actions are selected on the basis of an evaluation of a larger unit than an individual’s momentary act. In recent theories of collective agency, both planning and team reasoning have been defended against orthodox game theory, but, interestingly, by different authors: Raimo Tuomela has defended team reasoning in his theory of group agency, but he ignores temporally extended planning in this context. Michael Bratman has extended his theory of planning to the case of shared agency, but he does not seem to see a role for team reasoning in understanding shared intentional activities. In this paper, we argue that both accounts suffer from this one-sidedness. We aim to combine the main insights of Tuomela’s we-mode approach and Bratman’s planning approach into a fruitful synthesis that we think is necessary for understanding the nature of group agency. (shrink)

I will study the concept of solidarity by looking at patterns of practical reasoning leading to behaviour that can be taken to exemplify solidarity. By studying which kinds of premisses are necessary for taking the motivation to display solidarity, in contrast to altruistic or moral motivation, I try to find necessary conditions for solidarity. I will argue that practical reasoning leading to solidary behaviour is a form of we-reasoning in which some of the premisses are in first person plural form (...) and attribute actions or attitudes to a collective. If this is correct, solidarity is a group concept, and intentional solidary behaviour presupposes identification with a group where others have shared goals or interests. This distinguishes solidary motivation and behaviour from altruistic or moral motivation and behaviour. (shrink)

In this paper, I criticize John Bigelow's account of number and present my own account that results from the criticism. In doing so, I argue that proper understanding of the nature of number requires a radical departure from the standard conception of language and reality and outline the alternative conception that underlies my account of number. I argue that Bigelow's account of number rests on an incorrect analysis of the plural constructions underlying the talk of number and propound an analysis (...) of numerical sentences, such as "Quine and Goodman are two", that conforms to the natural understanding of the plural constructions. The analysis leads to the account of number according to which natural numbers are properties, i.e., one-place relations: the number two, for example, is the property indicated by "to be two", which, I argue, is a one-place predicate that can combine with plural terms like "Quine and Goodman". (shrink)

Endorsing the idea of group knowledge seems to entail the possibility of group belief as well, because it is usually held that knowledge entails belief. It is here studied whether it would be possible to grant that groups can have knowledge without being committed to the controversial view that groups can have beliefs. The answer is positive on the assumption that knowledge can be based on acceptance as well as belief. The distinction between belief and acceptance can be seen as (...) a refinement of the ordinary language concept of belief, and it may be useful in understanding the nature of epistemic justification and classifying various types of epistemic subjects. (shrink)

Epistemic justification of non-summative group beliefs is studied in this paper. Such group beliefs are understood to be voluntary acceptances, the justification of which differs from that of involuntary beliefs. It is argued that whereas epistemic evaluation of involuntary beliefs can be seen not to require reasons, justification of voluntary acceptance of a proposition as true requires that the agent, a group or an individual, can provide reasons for the accepted view. This basic idea is studied in relation to theories (...) of dialectical justification in which justification is taken to require ability to justify. Since the reasons offered can in principle always be challenged, there is no ultimate end to the dialectical chain of justification. This makes justification of acceptance, and thus group belief, social and, in a way, contextual, but this does not seem to entail strong forms of epistemic relativism. (shrink)

This volume offers eleven philosophical investigations into our future relations with social robots--robots that are specially designed to engage and connect with human beings. The contributors present cutting edge research that examines whether, and on which terms, robots can become members of human societies. Can our relations to robots be said to be "social"? Can robots enter into normative relationships with human beings? How will human social relations change when we interact with robots at work and at home? The authors (...) of this volume explore these questions from the perspective of philosophy, cognitive science, psychology, and robotics. The first three chapters offer a taxonomy for the classification of simulated social interactions, investigate whether human social interactions with robots can be genuine, and discuss the significance of social relations for the formation of human individuality. Subsequent chapters clarify whether robots could be said to actually follow social norms, whether they could live up to the social meaning of care in caregiving professions, and how we will need to program robots so that they can negotiate the conventions of human social space and collaborate with humans. Can we perform joint actions with robots, where both sides need to honour commitments, and how will such new commitments and practices change our regional cultures? The authors connect research in social robotics and empirical studies in Human-Robot Interaction to recent debates in social ontology, social cognition, as well as ethics and philosophy of technology. -/- The book is a response to the challenge that social robotics presents for our traditional conceptions of social interaction, which presuppose such essential capacities as consciousness, intentionality, agency, and normative understanding. The authors develop insightful answers along new interdisciplinary pathways in "robophilosophy," a new research area that will help us to shape the "robot revolution," the distinctive technological change of the beginning 21st century. (shrink)