For many decades, Duhem has been considered a paradigmatic instrumentalist, and while some commentators have argued against classifying him in this way, it still seems prevalent as an interpretation of his philosophy of science. Yet such a construal bears scant resemblance to the views presented in his own works—so little, indeed, that it might be said to constitute no more than a mere phantom with respect to his actual thought. In this article, we aim to deconstruct this phantom, tracing the (...) sources of the misconceptions surrounding his ideas and pinpointing the sources and/or causes of its proliferation. We subsequently point out and discuss those elements of his philosophy that, taken together, support the view of him as a scientific realist of a sophisticated kind. Finally, we defend our own interpretation of his thought against suggestions to the effect that it is oriented towards neither instrumentalism nor scientific realism. (shrink)

Andrzej Kisielewicz’s praise of common senseI present here the evaluation and comments on the position of Andrzej Kisi­elewicz presented in his latest book, Logic and Arguments: A Practical Course in Critical Thinking. I recognize that this book can be of great benefit to a very diverse group of potential recipients. It is original in design, inspiring and even provoking the reader to discuss some of its main theses. I am debating some of the author’s views, in particular I draw attention (...) to the relationship between logic and formal logic presented by Kisielewicz. I point to the similarity of some of the radical assessments presented in Logic and Arguments to one of the criticisms by Kazimierz Twardowski published a hundred years earlier. (shrink)

The aim of the article is the discussion on similarities between Popperian philosophy of science and French conventionalism. I start with describing Popper's view on Duhem's and Poincaré's philosophy, and I point mistakes in interpretation committed by author of Logik der Forschung. The general conclusion from this study consists in drawing attention to significant similarity between Popperian and classical conventionalism ideal of scientific knowledge. The main difference I see in Popper's paradoxical stance on the problem of existence of experimentum crucis.