In the comments presented below, I consider critically to Srzednicki’s epistemological realism, and his modernistic and anti-dialectical fundamentalism.

Artykuł jest refleksją nad warunkami możliwości zaistnienia twórczości indywidualnej i zbiorowej, genialnej i nie genialnej. Twórczość jest rozpatrywana w relacji do warunków moralnych, polityczno-ekonomicznych, pedagogicznych i psychologicznych. Czy te warunki pozwalają rozwinąć się twórczym potencjom, czy też je tłamszą? Zastanawiam się też nad ewentualną hierarchią genialności: czy twórczość może być mniej, względnie bardziej genialna?

Rozpatruję problemy emergencji nowości w świecie organizmów żywych w perspektywie monadologicznej. Jest to zupełnie swoista perspektywa, bo chodzi tu o nową interpretację samej monadologii.

W artykule proponuję nową wersję transcendentalizmu, uwzględniającą współczesny stan nauki oraz filozofii. Idee tego transcendentalizmu prezentuję w toku dyskusji z P. Churchlandem, J. Kimem, K. Popperem, J. Searlem, S. Pinkerem, E. Husserlem, I. Kantem i J. Konorskim.

Witkacy znany jest ze swego krytycznego stosunku do metafizyki Whiteheada. Jednak w artykule autor skupia się na możliwości dokonania syntezy poglądów obu myślicieli.

Maxwell’s program is beautiful and noble, but is it realizable?

W artykule autor rysuje syntezę ontologii Witkiewicza z ontologią brytyjskiego ewentysty. Zaznacza wspólne podejście obu filozofów do Einsteina, a także podobne rozwiązanie problemu stosunku logiki do intuicji, ale odróżnia fundamentalizm monadologiczny od ewentystycznego. Czy te fundamentalizmy są nie do pogodzenia? Przyjmuje się że kwanty energii wcale nie muszą być czymś antymonadycznym, a ewolucję naszego wszechświata utożsamia się z ekspandowaniem kwantów energii i ich transformacją w materię martwą i żywą – przy czym materia martwa albo zawierałaby monadyczne potencje, albo byłaby jakąś (...) ich postacią. Autor częściowo akceptuje stappowską interpretację whiteheadowskiej ontologii.Jednak zamiast whiteheadowskiego panpsychizmu autor proponuje witkiewiczowską psychobiologię. Czy można wyjaśnić aktualizowanie się spotencjalizowanych zdarzeń-monad za pomocą mechanizmów dekoherencyjnych i zasad kwantowego darwinizmu? (shrink)

David Bloor’s thesis claiming that the construction of the progressive vision of mathematical history is something artificial, because it does not take into account the civilizing and social discontinuities and variations. The author shows that the opposite declaration is equally true. He namely claims that the history emphasizing only incommensurabilities, differences and variations is something artificial.

David Bloor’s thesis claiming that the construction of the progressive vision of mathematical history is something artificial, because it does not take into account the civilizing and social discontinuities and variations. The author shows that the opposite declaration is equally true. He namely claims that the history emphasizing only incommensurabilities, differences and variations is something artificial.

Several authors have investigated the question of whether canonical logic-based accounts of belief revision, and especially the theory of AGM revision operators, are compatible with the dynamics of Bayesian conditioning. Here we show that Leitgeb's stability rule for acceptance, which has been offered as a possible solution to the Lottery paradox, allows to bridge AGM revision and Bayesian update: using the stability rule, we prove that AGM revision operators emerge from Bayesian conditioning by an application of the principle of maximum (...) entropy. In situations of information loss, or whenever the agent relies on a qualitative description of her information state - such as a plausibility ranking over hypotheses, or a belief set - the dynamics of AGM belief revision are compatible with Bayesian conditioning; indeed, through the maximum entropy principle, conditioning naturally generated AGM revision operators. This mitigates an impossibility theorem of Lin and Kelly for tracking Bayesian conditioning with AGM revision, and suggests an approach to the compatibility problem that highlights the information loss incurred by acceptance rules in passing from probabilistic to qualitative representations of beliefs. (shrink)

The introspective devices framework proposed by Kammerer and Frankish (this issue) offers an attractive conceptual tool for evaluating and developing accounts of introspection. However, the framework assumes that different views about the nature of introspection can be easily evaluated against a set of common criteria. In this paper, I set out to test this assumption by analysing two formal models of introspection using the introspective device framework. The question I aim to answer is not only whether models developed outside of (...) philosophy can be successfully evaluated against the set of conceptual criteria proposed by Kammerer and Frankish, but also whether this kind of evaluation can reveal some limitations inherent to the framework. (shrink)

THE CONGRESS The infrastructure of the colonial territories obeyed the logic of economic exploitation, territorial domain and commercial dynamics among others that left deep marks in the constructed landscape. The rationales applied to the decisions behind the construction of infrastructures varied according to the historical period, the political model of colonial administration and the international conjuncture. This congress seeks to bring to the knowledge of the scientific community the dynamics of occupation and transformation of colonial territory, especially related to and (...) resulting from the war effort, which involved not only the agency of architecture and urbanism but also of military apparatus, and its repercussions in the same territories as independent countries. Colonial infrastructures will be addressed to question, for instance, how housing production during armed conflict has conditioned future spatial models of the independent countries or what options taken by colonial administrations were abandoned or otherwise strengthened after independence. The congress is part of the ongoing research project entitled “ARCHWAR - Dominance and massviolence through Housing and Architecture during colonial wars. The Portuguese case (GuineaBissau, Angola, Mozambique): colonial documentation and post independence critical assessment” funded by ‘Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia’ (FCT - Foundation for Science and Technology), ref. PTDC/ART-DAQ/0592/2020, in which Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation (FCG) is a partner. The general goal of the congress is to debate on the repercussions of the decisions taken by the colonial states in the area of territorial infrastructures – in particular through the disciplines of architecture and urbanism – in post-independence spatial and urban models and the formation of independent countries with a colonial past. (shrink)

Sixteen years ago, Prahalad and Hart introduced the possibility of both profitably serving the poor and alleviating poverty. This first iteration of the Bottom/Base of the Pyramid approach focused on selling to the poor. In 2008, after ethical criticisms leveled at it, the field moved to BoP 2.0, instead emphasizing business co-venturing. Since 2015, we have witnessed some calls for a new iteration, with the focus broadening to a more sustainable development approach to poverty alleviation. In this paper, we seek (...) to answer the question: How has the BoP approach evolved over the past 16 years, and has it delivered on its early promise? We conducted a systematic review of 276 papers published in journals in this period, utilizing a rigorous correspondence analysis method to map key trends, and then further examined the 22 empirical studies conducted on the BoP approach. Our results suggest that the field has evolved, passing through a number of trends and coming full circle—with our analysis pointing to more recent BoP literature emphasizing similar themes to those espoused in the initial BoP iteration, rather than reflecting the principles espoused in either BoP 2.0 or BoP 3.0. Our analysis also points to a lack of clear evidence that the BoP concept has delivered on its promise either to businesses or to BoP participants. (shrink)

Porter and Kramer :78–92, 2006; Harv Bus Rev 89, 62–77, 2011) introduced ‘shared value’ as a ‘new conception of capitalism,’ claiming it is a powerful driver of economic growth and reconciliation between business and society. The idea has generated strong interest in business and academia; however, its theoretical precepts have not been rigorously assessed. In this paper, we provide a systematic and thorough analysis of shared value, focusing on its ontological and epistemological properties. Our review highlights that ‘shared value’ has (...) spread into the language of multiple disciplines, but that its current conceptualization is vague, and it presents important discrepancies in the way it is defined and operationalized, such that it is more of a buzzword than a substantive concept. It also overlaps with many other concepts and lacks empirical grounding. We offer recommendations for defining and measuring the concept, take a step toward disentangling it from related concepts, and identify relevant theories and research methods that would facilitate extending the knowledge frontier on shared value. (shrink)

The proposal that probabilistic inference and unconscious hypothesis testing are central to information processing in the brain has been steadily gaining ground in cognitive neuroscience and associated fields. One popular version of this proposal is the new theoretical framework of predictive processing or prediction error minimization, which couples unconscious hypothesis testing with the idea of ‘active inference’ and claims to offer a unified account of perception and action. Here we will consider one outstanding issue that still looms large at the (...) core of the PEM framework: the lack of a clear criterion for distinguishing conscious states from unconscious ones. In order to fulfill the promise of becoming a unifying framework for describing and modeling cognition, PEM needs to be able to differentiate between conscious and unconscious mental states or processes. We will argue that one currently popular view, that the contents of conscious experience are determined by the ‘winning hypothesis’, falls short of fully accounting for conscious experience. It ignores the possibility that some states of a system can control that system’s behavior even though they are apparently not conscious. What follows from this is that the ‘winning hypothesis’ view does not provide a complete account of the difference between conscious and unconscious states in the probabilistic brain. We show how this problem for the received view can be resolved by augmenting PEM with Daniel Dennett’s multiple drafts model of consciousness. This move is warranted by the similar roles that attention and internal competition play in both the PEM framework and the multiple drafts model. (shrink)