Yesul ch'ŏrhak (1983) -- Yesul kwa mi -- Yesul ŭi yangsiktŭl kwa mihak.

Torat Ḥovot ha-levavot / ḥibro Baḥye ben Yosef ibn Paḳudah -- Lev Yiśraʼel / [me-et Aharon Yiśraʼel Ḳahan] -- Nefesh Avigdor / liḳuṭ mi-shiʻure Avigdor Miller.

Maʼamarim she-hevi ha-Ḥo. ha-l. be-shem aḥerim -- Maʼamarim she-katav ha-Ḥo. ha-l. be-ʻatsmo.

Algorithms can now identify patterns and correlations in the (big) datasets, and predict outcomes based on those identified patterns and correlations with the use of machine learning techniques and big data, decisions can then be made by algorithms themselves in accordance with the predicted outcomes. Yet, algorithms can inherit questionable values from the datasets and acquire biases in the course of (machine) learning, and automated algorithmic decision-making makes it more difficult for people to see algorithms as biased. While researchers have (...) taken the problem of algorithmic bias seriously, but the current discussion on algorithmic fairness tends to conceptualize ‘fairness’ in algorithmic fairness primarily as a technical issue and attempts to implement pre-existing ideas of ‘fairness’ into algorithms. In this paper, I show that such a view of algorithmic fairness as technical issue is unsatisfactory for the type of problem algorithmic fairness presents. Since decisions on fairness measure and the related techniques for algorithms essentially involve choices between competing values, ‘fairness’ in algorithmic fairness should be conceptualized first and foremost as a political issue, and it should be (re)solved by democratic communication. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to explicitly reconceptualize algorithmic fairness as a political question and suggest the current discussion of algorithmic fairness can be strengthened by adopting the accountability for reasonableness framework. (shrink)

內容介紹 本書為作者的清華大學博士論文。朴柄久對孟子與丁若鏞「內聖外王」思想的成因、內容、性質作了系統的梳理。全書既有對文本與史實的宏觀把握，又有有深度的理論分析，在此基礎上對孟子、丁若鏞「內聖外王」思想的理論 架構、基本內涵、兩者異同、繼承關係以及丁若鏞「內聖外王」思想的積極成分、消極成分作了客觀評價，對丁若鏞「內聖外王」思想的現實價值有精闢的論述，基本上做到了「持之以故、言之成理」。.

2. Saebyŏngnyŏk chʻodang esŏ on pʻyŏnji.

Cultural differences pose a serious challenge to the ethics and governance of artificial intelligence from a global perspective. Cultural differences may enable malignant actors to disregard the demand of important ethical values or even to justify the violation of them through deference to the local culture, either by affirming the local culture lacks specific ethical values, e.g., privacy, or by asserting the local culture upholds conflicting values, e.g., state intervention is good. One response to this challenge is the human rights (...) approach to AI governance, which is intended to be a universal and globally enforceable framework. The proponents of the approach, however, have so far neglected the challenge from cultural differences or left out the implications of cultural diversity in their works. This is surprising because human rights theorists have long recognized the significance of cultural pluralism for human rights. Accordingly, the approach may not be straightforwardly applicable in “non-Western” contexts because of cultural differences, and it may also be critiqued as philosophically incomplete insofar as the approach does not account for the role of culture. This commentary examines the human rights approach to AI governance with an emphasis on cultural values and the role of culture. Particularly, I show that the consideration of cultural values is essential to the human rights approach for both philosophical and instrumental reasons. (shrink)

A closer look at the theories and questions in philosophy of technology and ethics of technology shows the absence and marginality of non-Western philosophical traditions in the discussions. Although, increasingly, some philosophers have sought to introduce non-Western philosophical traditions into the debates, there are few systematic attempts to construct and articulate general accounts of ethics and technology based on other philosophical traditions. This situation is understandable, for the questions of modern sciences and technologies appear to be originated from the West; (...) at the same time, the situation is undesirable. The overall aim of this paper, therefore, is to introduce an alternative account of ethics of technology based on the Confucian tradition. In doing so, it is hoped that the current paper can initiate a relatively uncharted field in philosophy of technology and ethics of technology. (shrink)

Ch'ŏrhak iran muŏt in'ga (1976) -- Hyŏnsanghak kwa punsŏk ch'ŏrhak (1977) -- Inyŏm kwa chilli, kŭrigo todŏk.