This article addresses a still unsolved puzzle in private law regarding the proper explanation of cases in which courts make substantial awards of damages to claimants whose rights have been infringed, but who appear to have suffered no factual loss in consequence of the infringement. The paradigm examples tend to involve awards of ‘user’, license fee or ‘hypothetical bargain’ damages in cases involving interference with property rights. It suggests that existing explanations of such cases are all unsatisfactory in one or (...) another respect and posits a new and potentially more powerful explanatory thesis, drawing on Hohfeld. Such awards, it argues, compensate right-holders for the loss of legal powers associated with their primary claim-rights—in particular, the loss of powers they are accorded by the law to ‘prevent’ the infringement of certain types of primary claim right ex ante. Legal powers are thus to be regarded as assets or amenities, the loss of which is amenable to monetary compensation. (shrink)

Restatements of the law are usually considered a uniquely American phenomenon, explained by the complexities and uncertainties of a multi-jurisdictional common law system. They have also been subject to the accusation from legal realists that they are misleading, conservative and formalistic exercises. This review interrogates the role of the restatement in a jurisdiction with a singular common law tradition, focusing on Andrew Burrows’ recent Restatement of the English law of Unjust Enrichment. It compares and contrasts his restatement with previous American (...) restatements and with other types of ‘public statement’ of private Law, such as codes and legal treatises. It concludes that there may be good (and particular) reasons for restating unjust enrichment law in England and that Burrows’ work is unique in its form and purposes. This article’s central thesis is that a restatement can provide an important public platform for intellectual debate and a powerful centripetal force addressing legal fragmentation and uncertainty even in a singular common law jurisdiction. It further suggests that modernist doctrinal enterprises of this type may be more sympathetic to the critical insights of legal realism than is sometimes suggested. (shrink)

The English Court of Appeal is currently faced with three analytically distinct approaches to the question of when one party owes another a duty of care in respect of her economic interests, all of which bear the authority of the House of Lords. Unable to choose between them, it has recently adopted a fourth approach combining which combines them, in the apparent belief that the combination will eradicate any individual deficiencies. Against the background of a recent case, the author argues (...) that this is a holding strategy at best and methodologically deficient. He also challenges the continuing lip-service paid by courts to models of liability based upon ‘assumptions of responsibility,’ examining and criticising the causes of their persistence in the law in the face of widespread academic criticism. Instead, the author argues, the House of Lords should now clearly endorse a single reasoning strategy to economic loss cases based on the three-stage approach in Caparo Industries v Dickman. Properly understood, this approach offers the best prospect of facilitating consistent and transparent decision-making in the longer term. (shrink)