5 found
  1.  17
    Perception and preference in short-term word priming.David E. Huber, Richard M. Shiffrin, Keith B. Lyle & Kirsten I. Ruys - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (1):149-182.
  2.  48
    Reflecting on the action or its outcome: Behavior representation level modulates high level outcome priming effects on self-agency experiences.Anouk van der Weiden, Henk Aarts & Kirsten I. Ruys - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):21-32.
    Recent research suggests that one can have the feeling of being the cause of an action’s outcome, even in the absence of a prior intention to act. That is, experienced self-agency over behavior increases when outcome representations are primed outside of awareness, prior to executing the action and observing the resulting outcome. Based on the notion that behavior can be represented at different levels, we propose that priming outcome representations is more likely to augment self-agency experiences when the primed representation (...)
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  3.  31
    Prime and probability: Causal knowledge affects inferential and predictive effects on self-agency experiences.Anouk van der Weiden, Henk Aarts & Kirsten I. Ruys - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1865-1871.
    Experiences of having caused a certain outcome may arise from motor predictions based on action–outcome probabilities and causal inferences based on pre-activated outcome representations. However, when and how both indicators combine to affect such self-agency experiences is still unclear. Based on previous research on prediction and inference effects on self-agency, we propose that their contribution crucially depends on whether people have knowledge about the causal relation between actions and outcomes that is relevant to subsequent self-agency experiences. Therefore, we manipulated causal (...)
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  4.  50
    Perceiving an exclusive cause of affect prevents misattribution.Kirsten I. Ruys, Henk Aarts, Esther K. Papies, Masanori Oikawa & Haruka Oikawa - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):1009-1015.
    Affect misattribution occurs when affective cues color subsequent unrelated evaluations. Research suggests that affect misattribution decreases when one is aware that affective cues are unrelated to the evaluation at hand. We propose that affect misattribution may even occur when one is aware that affective cues are irrelevant, as long as the source of these cues seems ambiguous. When source ambiguity exists, affective cues may freely influence upcoming unrelated evaluations. We examined this using an adapted affect misattribution procedure where pleasant and (...)
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  5.  28
    The dynamic interaction of conceptual and embodied knowledge.Daniël Lakens & Kirsten I. Ruys - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (6):449-450.
    We propose the SIMS model can be strengthened by detailing the dynamic interaction between sensorimotor activation and contextual conceptual information. Rapidly activated evaluations and contextual knowledge can guide and constrain embodied simulations. In addition, we stress the potential importance of extending the SIMS model to dynamic social interactions that go beyond the passive observer.
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