We are developing the Neurological Disease Ontology (ND) to provide a framework to enable representation of aspects of neurological diseases that are relevant to their treatment and study. ND is a representational tool that addresses the need for unambiguous annotation, storage, and retrieval of data associated with the treatment and study of neurological diseases. ND is being developed in compliance with the Open Biomedical Ontology Foundry principles and builds upon the paradigm established by the Ontology for General Medical Science (OGMS) (...) for the representation of entities in the domain of disease and medical practice. Initial applications of ND will include the annotation and analysis of large data sets and patient records for Alzheimer’s disease, multiple sclerosis, and stroke. (shrink)

We have begun work on two separate but related ontologies for the study of neurological diseases. The first, the Neurological Disease Ontology (ND), is intended to provide a set of controlled, logically connected classes to describe the range of neurological diseases and their associated signs and symptoms, assessments, diagnoses, and interventions that are encountered in the course of clinical practice. ND is built as an extension of the Ontology for General Medical Sciences — a high-level candidate OBO Foundry ontology that (...) provides a set of general classes that can be used to describe general aspects of medical science. ND is being built with classes utilizing both textual and axiomatized definitions that describe and formalize the relations between instances of other classes within the ontology itself as well as to external ontologies such as the Gene Ontology, Cell Ontology, Protein Ontology, and Chemical Entities of Biological Interest. In addition, references to similar or associated terms in external ontologies, vocabularies and terminologies are included when possible. Initial work on ND is focused on the areas of Alzheimer’s and other diseases associated with dementia, multiple sclerosis, and stroke and cerebrovascular disease. Extensions to additional groups of neurological diseases are planned. The second ontology, the Neuro-Psychological Testing Ontology (NPT), is intended to provide a set of classes for the annotation of neuropsychological testing data. The intention of this ontology is to allow for the integration of results from a variety of neuropsychological tests that assay similar measures of cognitive functioning. Neuro-psychological testing is an important component in developing the clinical picture used in the diagnosis of patients with a range of neurological diseases, such as Alzheimer’s disease and multiple sclerosis, and following stroke or traumatic brain injury. NPT is being developed as an extension to the Ontology for Biomedical Investigations. (shrink)

This paper argues that emotions can play an epistemic role as justifiers of evaluative beliefs. It also presents the heuristics theory of emotion as an empirically informed explanation of how emotions can play such a role and why they in practice usefully complement non-affective evaluative judgments. As such, the heuristics theory represents a form of moderate rationalism: it acknowledges that emotions can be epistemically valuable, even privileged in some sense, but denies that they would be uniquely privileged. I argue that (...) judgments and emotional responses pick out different but correlated kinds of evaluative properties and therefore emotional responses and non-affective evaluative judgments play mutually complementary rather than mutually exclusive roles. It follows that emotional responses can be legitimately drawn upon to support evaluative beliefs, but they lack supreme epistemic authority. (shrink)

Research into mathematics often focuses on basic numerical and spatial intuitions, and one key property of numbers: their magnitude. The fact that mathematics is a system of complex relationships that invokes reasoning usually receives less attention. The purpose of this special issue is to highlight the intricate connections between reasoning and mathematics, and to use insights from the reasoning literature to obtain a more complete understanding of the processes that underlie mathematical cognition. The topics that are discussed range from the (...) basic heuristics and biases to the various ways in which complex, effortful reasoning contributes to mathematical cognition, while also considering the role of individual differences in mathematics performance. These investigations are not only important at a theoretical level, but they also have broad and important practical implications, including the possibility to improve classroom practices and educational outcomes, to facilitate people's decision-making, as well as the clear and accessible communication of numerical information. (shrink)

Recent studies have shown that deductive reasoning skills are related to mathematical abilities. Nevertheless, so far the links between mathematical abilities and these two forms of deductive inference have not been investigated in a single study. It is also unclear whether these inference forms are related to both basic maths skills and mathematical reasoning, and whether these relationships still hold if the effects of fluid intelligence are controlled. We conducted a study with 87 adult participants. The results showed that transitive (...) reasoning skills were related to performance on a number line task, and conditional inferences were related to arithmetic skills. Additionally, both types of deductive inference were related to mathematical reasoning skills, although transitive and conditional reasoning ability were unrelated. Our results also highlighted the important role that ordering abilities play in mathematical reasoning, extending findings regarding the role of ordering abilities in basic maths skills. These results have implications for the theories of mathematical and deductive reasoning, and they could inspire the development of novel educational interventions. (shrink)

This paper argues that group attitudes can be assessed in terms of standards of rationality and that group-level rationality need not be due to individual-level rationality. But it also argues that groups cannot be collective epistemic agents and are not collectively responsible for collective irrationality. I show that we do not need the concept of collective epistemic agency to explain how group-level irrationality can arise. Group-level irrationality arises because even rational individuals can fail to reason about how their attitudes will (...) combine with those of others. In some cases they are morally responsible for this failure, in others they are not. Moreover, the argument for collective epistemic agency is incoherent because reasons-for-groups are ipso facto reasons-for-individual. Instead of talking about reasons-for-groups, we should therefore distinguish between self-regarding reasons and group-regarding reasons. Both kinds of reasons are reasons-for-individuals. These conceptual considerations in favour of moderate individualism are strengthened by an analysis of our moral practice of responding to collective shortfalls of rationality and by the unpalatable moral implications of collectivism about epistemic agency. There is no need to change the subject. Groups can be rational or irrational, but they do not reason. (shrink)

Bernard Williams was one of the great philosophical figures of the second half of the 20th century and remains deeply influential. This edited volume brings together new articles from prominent scholars that focus on the innovative ideas and methods that Williams developed as part of his distinctive "outlook" in ethics. The chapters in the first section examine Williams's attempts to explore theoretical options beyond the confines of what he called the "morality system." The contributors show how, through a critical confrontation (...) with this system, Williams found new ways to think about moral obligation, morally relevant emotions such as shame, the relevance of the history of philosophy, and also how these new ways of thinking are linked to Williams's novel metaethical ideas concerning the possibility and limits of moral knowledge. In the second section, contributors explore Williams's discussions of freedom and responsibility, the role of luck in our moral lives, and the reasons that agents can be said to have. Williams's concerns about the morality system still loom large here. For example, Williams was skeptical about the prospects of putting our responsibility practices, and the conception of free will with which they are associated, on a firm footing. But as more than one contributor shows, Williams's skepticism is largely confined to conceptions of free will and responsibility that are conditioned by the morality system's uneasiness with luck. Williams has a more vindicatory story to tell about the prospects for freedom and responsibility once these concepts have been untethered from the assumptions of this system. With a cast of well known contributors, and an introduction by the editors placing Williams's work in broad context, this volume should appeal to a wide range of ethicists and moral philosophers. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie aktualnego stanu wiedzy na temat spektrum ludzkich reakcji poznawczych, afektywnych oraz wyrażonych behawioralnie w obliczu kryzysu klimatycznego. Różnorodność postaw wobec zmian klimatu i stopień zaangażowania w działania, by tym zmianom przeciwdziałać, wynika z poziomu wiedzy i przekonań na temat aktualnej sytuacji, w tym stopnia wiary w mity klimatyczne. Konsekwencją świadomości niebezpieczeństwa, jakie stanowi postępujący kryzys ekologiczno-klimatyczny, jest nasilenie trudnych emocji i złożonych stanów uczuciowych, takich jak solastalgia, depresja klimatyczna czy ekożałoba. W odniesieniu do tej wiedzy wskazano, (...) w jaki sposób można zapobiegać doświadczaniu kryzysu klimatycznego w kategoriach osobistego kryzysu i jak mobilizować do działania w odpowiedzi na wyzwania sytuacji klimatycznej. (shrink)

We investigated, by means of the Reverse Correlation Task, visual representations of the culturally dominating group of local people held by sojourners as a function of their degree of cross-cultural adaptation. In three studies, using three different methods with three independent samples of sojourners and seven independent samples of Portuguese and US-American raters, we gathered clear evidence that poor adaptation goes along with more negative representations of locals. This indicates that sojourner adaptation is reflected, at a social-cognitive level, in the (...) valence of outgroup representations. (shrink)

The aim of the study was to verify hypotheses about time changeability of dream characteristics depending on the participants’ age and affective value of the dream. The study was conducted online. Participants of the study were 68 individuals between the age of 17 and 85. The participants were asked to prepare detailed descriptions of their dreams, next they had to identify elements of the dreams, refer them to their real life, and assess their affective value. In the dreams of late (...) adolescents, and young and middle-aged adults the most frequently recalled period in a positive context turned out to be late adolescence and early adulthood, whereas in a negative context the participants would recall their present developmental phase and the period of late childhood. Unpleasant dreams of older individuals were mainly connected with the period of middle adulthood, whereas those pleasant ones referred to various periods of their entire life. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Pattison behandelt in dem letzten Band seiner Philosophie des christlichen Lebens die titelgebende Frage nach einer Metaphysik der Liebe. Die Diskussion fokussiert sich auf eine Wiedergabe dreier zentraler Gedankengänge und Elemente: Zunächst auf die Rolle der Sprache mit ihren Formen als Ruf und Versprechen sowie anschließend auf das Verhältnis von Liebe und Zeit als Chronos und Kairos, in deren Verbindung Pattison seine Gedanken von einer individuellen auf eine kirchliche Ebene ausweitet. Schließlich wird nachgezeichnet, inwiefern für Pattison aus seinen dargelegten (...) Gedanken eine unumgängliche menschliche Solidarität folgt. Kritisch wird hinterfragt, wieso eine universale Liebe, wie sie Pattison vorschwebt, Selbstliebe generell ausschließt. (shrink)

W marcu 2020 roku Katarzyna Michalak i Magdalena Świerczyńska-Dolot rozpoczęły pracę nad projektem Nie słyszę, który stał się dźwiękową opowieścią o tym, jakiś dźwięków słuchaczom zabrakło w czasie kwarantanny i co to zmieniło, a jakie odgłosy pojawiły się w zamian. Z nadesłanych opowieści stworzyły reportaż radiowy. Artykuł jest omówieniem projektu, zarówno w postaci mininarracji zamieszczanych na blogu, jak i powstałego z nich reportażu radiowego. Przedstawia tematykę Nie słyszę, a także formalne rozwiązania zastosowane w reportażu dla uwypuklenia danych treści. Analiza projektu (...) wpisana została w trzy perspektywy badawcze: rozważania na temat artystycznych gatunków radiowych, pejzażu dźwiękowego i filozofii braku. Artykuł podkreśla oryginalność pomysłu audialnego i ukazuje go jako element w dyskursie na temat roli mediów czasów pierwszego etapu pandemii. (shrink)

1. rész, 1. köt. A tudományos gondolkodás forradalma.

A major challenge for Dual Process Theories of reasoning is to predict the circumstances under which intuitive answers reached on the basis of Type 1 processing are kept or discarded in favour of analytic, Type 2 processing (Thompson 2009 ). We propose that a key determinant of the probability that Type 2 processes intervene is the affective response that accompanies Type 1 processing. This affective response arises from the fluency with which the initial answer is produced, such that fluently produced (...) answers give rise to a strong feeling of rightness. This feeling of rightness, in turn, determines the extent and probability with which Type 2 processes will be engaged. Because many of the intuitions produced by Type 1 processes are fluent, it is common for them to be accompanied by a strong sense of rightness. However, because fluency is poorly calibrated to objective difficulty, confidently held intuitions may form the basis of poor quality decisions. (shrink)

The concept of exploitation and potentially exploitative real-world practices are the subject of increasing philosophical attention. However, while philosophers have extensively debated what exploitation is and what makes it wrong, they have said surprisingly little about what might be required to remediate it. By asking how the consequences of exploitation should be addressed, this article seeks to contribute to filling this gap. We raise two questions. First, what are the victims of exploitation owed by way of remediation? Second, who ought (...) to remediate? Our answers to these questions are connected by the idea that exploitation cannot be fully remediated by redistributing the exploiter's gain in order to repair or compensate the victim's loss. This is because exploitation causes not only distributive but also relational harm. Therefore, redistributive measures are necessary but not sufficient for adequate remediation. Moreover, this relational focus highlights the fact that exploitative real-world practices commonly involve agents other than the exploiter who stand to benefit from the exploitation. Insofar as these third parties are implicated in the distributive and relational harms caused by exploitation, there is, we argue, good reason to assign part of the burden of remediation to them. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Social theory has paid little attention to air, despite its centrality to bodily existence and air pollution being named the world’s biggest public health crisis. Where attention to air is found, the body is largely absent. On the other hand, conceptualizing the body without life-sustaining breath fails to highlight breathing as the ongoing metabolic bodily act in which the materiality of human and more-than-human intermingle and transmute one another. Political ecology studies how unequal power structures and knowledge production reproduce human–environment (...) relations, including a nascent focus on the body and air – but as separate issues. This article argues that a political ecology of air would productively fuse with a political ecology of the body to bring the visceral realm into intersectional analysis of air’s contemporary materialities. A feminist political ecology situates explicitly air-and-breathing-bodies, their intimately posthuman, relational, elemental and corpomaterial intra-action, at the heart of such analysis. (shrink)

In the current paper, we present and discuss a series of experiments in which we investigated people’s willingness to ascribe intentions, as well as blame and praise, to groups. The experiments draw upon the so-called “Knobe Effect”. Knobe [2003. “Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language.” Analysis 63: 190–194] found that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of actions influences people’s assessment of whether those side-effects were brought about intentionally, and also that people are more willing to assign blame (...) for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise for positive side-effect of actions. Building upon this research, we found evidence that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of group actions influences people’s willingness to attribute intentions to groups, and that people are more willing to assign blame to groups for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise to groups for positive side-effects of... (shrink)

How has the current crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic affected R&D and innovation in Poland? Numerous international studies conducted after the Great Depression in 2008–2010 show a strong procyclicality of investments in R&D and innovation in companies: investments rise during the economic upturn and fall sharply during the crisis. This procyclicality is driven within firms both by internal financial resources and by differences in market incentives to innovate. It seems likely that the COVID-19 crisis caused financial weakness for many (...) actors, having the most significant impact on the willingness or ability of smaller firms to support R&D and innovation. However, where firms are able to sustain these investments, evidence from the crisis a decade ago suggests that they will be more likely to survive, grow more strongly, and have higher profitability. Based on the analysis of the literature and macroeconomic data, this paper presents several recommendations that, if implemented by R&D actors, could help increase the efficiency of operations, even in times of crisis. (shrink)

Many believe that values are crucially dependent on emotions. This paper focuses on epistemic aspects of the putative link between emotions and value by asking two related questions. First, how exactly are emotions supposed to latch onto or track values? And second, how well suited are emotions to detecting or learning about values? To answer the first question, the paper develops the heuristics-model of emotions. This approach models emotions as sui generis heuristics of value. The empirical plausibility of the heuristics-model (...) is demonstrated using evidence from experimental psychology, evolutionary anthropology and neuroscience. The model is used then to answer the second question. If emotions are indeed heuristics of value, then it follows that emotions can be an important and useful source of information about value. However, emotions will not be epistemically superior in the sense of being the highest court of appeal for the justification of axiological beliefs (the latter view is referred to as the Epistemic Dependence Thesis, or EDT for short). The paper applies the heuristics-model to celebrated cases from the philosophy of emotions literature arguing that while the heuristics-model offers a good explanation of typical patterns of emotional reactions in such cases, advocates of EDT will have a hard time accounting for these patterns. The paper also shows that the conclusions drawn from special cases generalize. The paper ends by arguing that skepticism about the metaethical significance of emotions is compatible with a commitment to the importance of emotions in first-order normative ethics. (shrink)

Individualists hold that moral responsibility can be ascribed to single human beings only. An important collectivist objection is that individualism is morally deficient because it leaves a normative residue. Without attributing responsibility to collectives there remains a “deficit in the accounting books” (Pettit). This collectivist strategy often uses judgment aggregation paradoxes to show that the collective can be responsible when no individual is. I argue that we do not need collectivism to handle such cases because the individualist analysis leaves no (...) responsibility-deficit. Harm suffered in such situations can have only two sources. Harm is either due to culpable wrongdoing by individuals. Harm is then redressed by holding these individuals responsible. Or harm does not result from culpable wrongdoing. Such harm may have to be redressed too, but not because anyone is responsible for it. Therefore, the charge of moral insensitivity against individualist accounts can be rejected. Furthermore, in the last section of the chapter I will show that collectivist talk about moral responsibility can be used for ethically questionable purposes as well. Collectivists cannot claim the moral high ground. (shrink)

Preface to the Special Issue on Free Will and Epistemology written by Robert Lockie.

Sentimentalists believe that values are crucially dependent on emotions. Epistemic sentimentalists subscribe to what I call the final-court-of-appeal view: emotional experience is ultimately necessary and can be sufficient for the justification of evaluative beliefs. This paper rejects this view defending a moderate version of rationalism that steers clear of the excesses of both “Stoic” rationalism and epistemic sentimentalism. We should grant that emotions play a significant epistemic role in justifying evaluations. At the same time, evaluative justification is not uniquely or (...) especially dependent on emotions. The anti-sentimentalist argument developed in this paper is based on the indeterminacy thesis. The thesis states that the evaluative properties picked out by our emotional responses are too indeterminate to play a central role in our evaluative practices. I argue that while the indeterminacy thesis undermines the final-court-of-appeal view it supports the claim that emotional responses can provide prima facie justification for evaluative beliefs. (shrink)

It is sometimes said that certain hard moral choices constitute tragic moral dilemmas in which no available course of action is justifiable, and so the agent is blameworthy whatever she chooses. This paper criticizes a certain approach to the debate about moral dilemmas and considers the metaethical implications of the criticisms. The approach in question has been taken by many advocates as well as opponents of moral dilemmas who believe that analysing the emotional response of the agent is the key (...) to the debate about moral dilemmas. The metaethical position this approach is most naturally associated with is sentimentalism. Sentimentalists claim that evaluation, and in particular moral evaluation, crucially depends on human sentiment. This paper is not concerned with the question whether moral dilemmas exist, but rather with emotion-based arguments used on both sides of the debate. The first aim of the paper is to show that emotion-based arguments by friends or foes of moral dilemmas cannot garner support from sentimentalism. The second aim is to show that this constitutes a serious problem for sentimentalism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is finding an answer to a question how the current crises caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and changes in the energy sector have affected research and development and innovation? It seems likely that the COVID-19 crisis caused financial weakness for many actors, having the most significant impact on the willingness or ability of smaller firms to support R&D and innovation. However, where firms are able to sustain these investments, they will be more likely to survive, (...) grow more strongly, and have higher profitability. A big challenge that companies face is energy changes. While the post-pandemic effects were slowly brought under control by enterprises, the energy crisis poses new challenges to companies. And here the most important challenge is not just financing, but sometimes a complete change in the line of products offered, by moving away from traditional energy sources based on oil and gas. The subjects of the analysis are companies in Poland engaged in continuous research and development activities and implementing innovations. This research was conducted by the Ayming Institute in several editions, starting in 2020, and the surveyed companies belonged to seven identified sectors: Chemical and Civil Engineering, IT & Telecoms, Energy & Biotech, Automotive & Industrial, Consumer Goods & Manufacturing, Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals and Finance & Capital. (shrink)

We analyze a frequent but undertheorized form of structural injustice, one that arises due to the difficulty of reaching numerically equitable representation of underrepresented subgroups within a larger group. This form of structural injustice is significant because it could occur even if it were possible to completely eliminate bias and overt discrimination from hiring and recruitment practices. The conceptual toolkit we develop can be used to analyze such situations and propose remedies. Specifically, based on a simple mathematical model, we offer (...) a new argument in favour of quotas, explore implications for policy-making, and consider the wider philosophical significance of the problem. We show that in order to reach more equitable representations, quota-based recruitment may often be practically unavoidable. Assuming that members of groups in statistical minority are more likely to quit due to their marginalization, their proportions can stabilize at a low level, preventing a shift towards more equal representation and conserving the minority status of the subgroup. We show that this argument has important implications for addressing, preventing, and remediating the structural injustice of unfair representation. (shrink)

Author: Kaśkiewicz Kinga Title: IMMANUEL KANT AND FRIEDRICH SCHILLER ON THE BEAUTY OF HUMAN BODY (Immanuel Kant i Fryderyk Schiller o pięknie ludzkiego ciała) Source: Filo-Sofija year: 2005, vol:.5, number: 2005/1, pages: 105-123 Keywords: KANT, SCHILLER, BEAUTY OF HUMAN BODY, KANTIAN AESTHETIC Discipline: PHILOSOPHY Language: POLISH Document type: ARTICLE Publication order reference (Primary author’s office address): E-mail: www:The essay deals with the question of the beauty of the bodily form, the notion of perfection of the human species and its (...) moral expression as well as with other problems connected with this aspect of aesthetic experience. In the XVIII century the problems were undertaken particularly by Friedrich Schiller, who on the grounds of Kantian aesthetics tried to show the difference between the free and dependant beauty, and between the natural beauty and fine arts, which led him to establish the notions of grace and of dignity as the aesthetic expression of human spirit. The essay is based chiefly on the following works: Schiller’s On Grace and Dignity and Critic of Judgment and Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime by Kant. (shrink)

This commentary addresses omissions in De Neys's model of fast-and-slow thinking from a metacognitive perspective. We review well-established meta-reasoning monitoring (e.g., confidence) and control processes (e.g., rethinking) that explain mental effort regulation. Moreover, we point to individual, developmental, and task design considerations that affect this regulation. These core issues are completely ignored or mentioned in passing in the target article.

This paper attempts to show that the diachronic temporality introduced in the second major work of Levinas is profoundly influenced by the genetic dimension of the Husserlian account of time. It is argued that the different phenomena of this genetic-diachronic temporality, like the past which was never present, the originary retention, and the unpredictable present, are sustaining not just the central idea of Otherwise than being, that of an originary ethical subject, but alsothe description of the relation with the other, (...) and the phenomenology of language present in this work. (shrink)