Fifteen philosophers look at the deeper issues raised in the highly popular TV drama, including common morality, legal correctness and legal ethics, discussing the gray areas of legal battles and maneuvering.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A COMMENT ON POLANYI AND KUHN MABEN WALTER POIRIER Concordia University Montreal, Quebec FOR SOME TIME NOW we have noted tha:t the names Michael Polanyi and Thomas S. Kuhn are frequently mentioned together in articles and books dealing with specialized topics in the philosophy of science. And if we genera.Ily accept what is said in these publications, there appears to be a belief afield, which is broadly shared amongst (...) students of scientific thought, to the effect that the philosopher of science, Michael Polanyi, and the historian of science, Thomas Kuhn, are in some fundametal manner in accord with one another as to the chara.cter and nature of scientific thinking. In fact, there seems to be no disputing this question amongst some of the most prestigious philosophers of science, nor does there seem to be even the slightest suspicion that maybe Polanyi does not belong to the same school of thought as Kuhn. We are told explicitly, or we are led to believe, that PoJanyi and Kuhn are in lea;gue to do battle against empiricism and empiricists, and that as a result they share a number of perspectives on scientific thinking. This is taken to mean tha;t they broadly hold the same point of view when it comes to thinking about various issues. Now, it is largely true that both are opposed to empiricism, and to the understanding that empiricists have about the way that scientific knowledge is advanced. However, this does not mean that Polanyi and Kuhn are in funOLANYI AND KUBN ~6'/ cessive the,ories grow ever closer to, or approximate more and more closely to, the truth. Apparently generalizations like that refer not to the puzzle-solutions and the concrete predictions derived from a theory but rather to its ontology, to the match, that is, b~tween the entities with which theory populates nature and what is " really there." · Perhaps there is some other way of salvaging the notion of ' truth' for application to whole theories, but this one will not do. There is, I think, no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like 'really there'; the notion of a match between the ontology of a theory and its "real" counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in principle.6 This is no afterthought with Kuhn, nor is it a course correction which he may have felt was required when he wrote "Postscript-1969," for we read the following in the main part of his magnum opus1 in which there are many similar passages: We may,... have to relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigm carry scientists and those who learn from them closer and closer to the truth [and to the real].1 Clearly this is not Michael Polanyi's point of view on this matter. Polanyi may not be an empiricist, but he is by no means a relativist either, radical or otherwise. He is simply not prepared to deny the existence of reality, or to claim that it is nothing more than a fabrication of the creative imagination of practicing natural scientists, great though they ma.y be. He repeatedly makes it very clear that natural scientists investigate what is real-what exists independently of themselves, in the world 'beyond their minds-and not some subjective entity which is a construction of their minds. It is true that Polanyi believ,es that it is very difficult to establish beyond a doubt that this is what the natural scientist investigates, but the fact is that at no point does Polanyi sa.y or even imply that the natural scientist is exploring, either in an arbitrary or reasonable manner, his imaginative constructions. For Polanyi, scientists are simply not engaged in the exploration of s Thomas S. Kuhn, The Btruoture of Boientifio Revolutions, p. 206. 1 Ibid., p. 170. 268 MABEN W.ALTER POIRIER imaginative constructions which are resident in the mind. They are involved in the exploration of what is other and of what is real. He makes this point in many ways and on a number of different occasions during his career as a philosopher of ·science. For example, in the following paissage from his work The... (shrink)

The question of whether or not God exists is profoundly fascinating and important. Now two articulate spokesmen--one a Christian, the other an atheist--duel over God's existence in an illuminating battle of ideas. In God? A Debate between a Christian and an Atheist, William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong bring to the printed page two debates they held before live audiences, preserving all the wit, clarity, and immediacy of their public exchanges. Avoiding overly esoteric arguments, they directly address issues such (...) as religious experience, the Bible, evil, eternity, the origin of the universe, design, and the supposed connection between morality and the existence of God. Employing sharp and humorous arguments, each philosopher strikes quickly to the heart of his opponent's case. For example, Craig claims that we must believe in God in order to explain objective moral values, such as why rape is wrong. Sinnott-Armstrong responds that what makes rape wrong is the harm to victims of rape, so rape is immoral even if there is no God. By assuming a traditional concept of God in their discussion, the authors ensure that they are truly addressing each other's viewpoints and engaging in a disagreement over a unified issue. The book is composed of six chapters that alternate between Craig and Sinnott-Armstrong, so that each separate point can be discussed as it arises. Ideal for courses in the philosophy of religion and introduction to philosophy, this lively and direct dialogue will stimulate students and anyone interested in the existence of God, regardless of whether or not they believe in God. (shrink)

Feminist literature sometimes posits that competition and cooperation are opposites. This dichotomy is important in that it is often invoked in order to explain why mainstream economics has focused on market activity to the exclusion of non-market activity, and why this fascination or focus is sexist. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the competition/cooperation dichotomy is false. Once the dichotomy is dissolved, those activities which are seen as competitive (masculine) and those which are seen as cooperative (feminine) (...) are no longer mutually exclusive but are, in fact, dependent upon one another. It is shown that the outcome of competition (more and better knowledge) enhances, and in some cases makes possible, cooperation. The function of battle is destruction; of competition, construction. Ludwig von Mises. (shrink)

This article compares representations of war in Walter Flex’ The Wanderer between Two Worlds, Ernst Jünger’s Storm of Steel, and Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on the Western Front. It shows the extent to which these representations are shaped by political and ideological convictions. The difference between the romantic idealism of Flex and Jünger’s “soldierly nationalism”,which he proposed as a model for the time to come, reflects a major shift during World War I itself. By contrast, neither past nor future (...) seem to be of any use in Remarque’s famous antiwar novel, in which the war generation surprisingly is described as having nothing else to live for beyond the present, i.e. beyond war. Finally, the article suggests how these different representations of war each, in their own way, contributed to the aesthetics and ideology of fascism. (shrink)

This light revision of Bornholdt's doctoral thesis (Würzburg, 2015) is effectively a medievally-oriented follow-up to Richard Gaskin’s 'The Sea Battle and the Master Argument' (1995). The book is stimulating from a philosophical point of view, but the exegesis is disappointingly unreliable.

When does a person qualify for protected and continuing life? At a time when technology can sustain marginal life, it is ever more important to understand what constitutes a person.

Shamik Dasgupta (2016) proposes to tame the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) to apply to only non-autonomous facts, which are facts that are apt for explanation. Call this strategy to tame the PSR the taming strategy. In a recent paper, Della Rocca (2020a) argues that proponents of the taming strategy, in attempting to formulate a restricted version of the PSR, nevertheless find themselves committed to endorsing a form of radical monism, which, in turn, leads right back to an untamed-PSR. Suppose, (...) for the sake of argument, that Della Rocca is right. My question is this: Is there reason to believe the principle of sufficient reason (in its untamed version)? In this paper, I argue that it is impossible for there to be a reason to believe the untamed-PSR. (shrink)

Are a material object, such as a statue, and its constituting matter, the clay, parts of one another? One wouldn't have thought so, and yet a number of philosophers have argued that they are. I review the arguments for this surprising claim showing how they all fail. I then consider two arguments against the view concluding that there are both pre-theoretical and theoretical considerations for denying that the statue and the clay are mutual parts.

Resumo: Este estudo analisa as narrativas radiofônicas de Walter Benjamin, como forma e conteúdo através do qual o autor buscou proporcionar para a infância de seu tempo uma possibilidade de experiência com o contemporâneo. Ao se pensar as peças do ponto de vista didático e do ponto de vista da aprendizagem, pode-se encontrar nelas a intencionalidade de Benjamin, bem como a atenção e o cuidado dado por ele a elementos aparentemente irrelevantes para o esclarecimento como Aufklärung, no cotidiano prosaico das (...) massas. Esse cuidado o levou a questionar, a exercitar e a experimentar a transmissão do conhecimento por meios novos e metodologias inovadoras para a época, sem perder de vista a perspectiva dos vencidos, em sua batalha diária, ou seja, em seu cotidiano. As peças, portanto, não são modelos apenas em sua estrutura narrativa, mas também de uma intencionalidade pedagógica emancipadora que pode dialogar com a criança, mediante a ludo-linguagem de domínio e fluência das crianças. A infância, nesse sentido, é signo de uma nova subjetividade fortalecida e, assim, capaz de resistir e de se desviar dos encantos e das promessas do populismo fascista que, no século XXI, não deixou de rondar a todos. Palavras-chave: Narrativas Radiofônicas; Experiência; Walter Benjamin Radiophone tales: the emergency of a modern form of narration in Benjamin Abstract: This study analyzes Walter Benjamin's radio narratives as a form and content through which the author sought to provide the childhood of his time with a possibility of experiencing the contemporary. Whenever thinking about the pieces from the didactic point of view and from the learning point of view, it could find Benjamin's intentionality among it, as well as the attention and care given by him to elements apparently irrelevant to the clarification, such as Aufklärung, in the prosaic daily life of masses. This care led him to question, exercise and experiment with the transmission of knowledge through new means and innovative methodologies for the time, without losing sight of the perspective of the losers, in their daily battle, that is, in their daily lives. The plays, therefore, are not models only in their narrative structure, but also of an emancipatory pedagogical intentionality that can dialogue with the child, through the ludo-language of mastery and fluency of children. Childhood, in this sense, is a sign of a new, strengthened subjectivity and, consequently, capable of resisting and deviating from the charms and promises of fascist populism that, in the 21st century, did not cease to haunt everyone. Keywords: Radio Narratives; Experience; Walter Benjamin Cuentos radiofónicos: la emergencia de una forma moderna de narración en Benjamin Resumén: Este estudio analiza las narrativas radiofónicas de Walter Benjamin, como forma y contenido a través del cual el autor buscó proporcionar para la infancia de su tiempo una posibilidad de experiencia con lo contemporáneo. Al pensar en las piezas, desde el punto de vista didáctico y desde el punto de vista del aprendizaje, se puede encontrar en ellas la intencionalidad de Benjamin, así como la atención y el cuidado dado por él a elementos aparentemente irrelevantes para el esclarecimiento como Aufklärung, en el prosaico diario de las masas. Ese cuidado lo llevó a cuestionar, a ejercitar y a experimentar la transmisión del conocimiento por medios nuevos y metodologías innovadoras para la época, sin perder de vista la perspectiva de los vencidos, en su batalla diaria, o sea, en su cotidiano. Las piezas, por lo tanto, no son modelos solo en su estructura narrativa, sino también de una intencionalidad pedagógica emancipadora que puede dialogar con el niño, mediante el Ludo lenguaje de dominio y fluidez de los niños. La infancia, en ese sentido, es signo de una nueva subjetividad fortalecida y, así, capaz de resistir y de desviarse de los encantos y de las promesas del populismo fascista que, en el siglo XXI, no dejó de rondar a todos. Palabras clave: Narrativas Radiofónicas; Experiencia; Walter Benjamin Data de registro: 07/03/2023 Data de aceite: 22/11/2023. (shrink)

The standard semantics for counterfactuals ensures that any counterfactual with a true antecedent and true consequent is itself true. There have been many recent attempts to amend the standard semantics to avoid this result. I show that these proposals invalidate a number of further principles of the standard logic of counterfactuals. The case against the automatic truth of counterfactuals with true components does not extend to these further principles, however, so it is not clear that rejecting the latter should be (...) a consequence of rejecting the former. Instead I consider how one might defuse putative counterexamples to the truth of true-true counterfactuals. (shrink)

Is A & C sufficient for the truth of ‘if A were the case, C would be the case’? Jonathan Bennett thinks not, although the counterexample he gives is inconsistent with his own account of counterfactuals. In any case, I argue that anyone who accepts the case of Morgenbesser's coin, as Bennett does, should reject Bennett’s counterexample. Moreover, I show that the principle underlying his counterexample is unmotivated and indeed false. More generally, I argue that Morgenbesser’s coin commits us to (...) the sufficiency of A & C for the truth of the corresponding counterfactual. (shrink)

I sketch here an intuitive picture of repeatable artworks as created types, which are individuated in part by historical paths (re)production. Although attractive, this view has been rejected by a number of authors on the basis of general claims about abstract objects. On consideration, however, these general claims are overgeneralizations, which whilst true of some abstracta, are not true of all abstract objects, and in particular, are not true of created types. The intuitive picture of repeatable artworks as created types (...) is, then, left in place. (shrink)

Dorothy Edgington’s work has been at the centre of a range of ongoing debates in philosophical logic, philosophy of mind and language, metaphysics, and epistemology. This work has focused, although by no means exclusively, on the overlapping areas of conditionals, probability, and paradox. In what follows, I briefly sketch some themes from these three areas relevant to Dorothy’s work, highlighting how some of Dorothy’s work and some of the contributions of this volume fit in to these debates.

Locke argued that religious belief ought to be compatible with reason, that no king, prince or magistrate rules legitimately without the consent of the people, and that government has no right to impose religious beliefs or styles of worship on the public. Locke’s defense of religious tolerance and freedom of thought was revolutionary in its time. Even today, his letter poses a challenge to religious intolerance, whether state-sponsored or originating from religious dogmatists. Based on both Locke’s original Latin and the (...) seventeenth-century English translation of William Popple, this edition offers a reader-friendly version that remains loyal to the original text. In addition to a forty-page introduction that situates the _Letter_ in its historical and philosophical contexts, this edition includes excerpts from writings on religious toleration by William Penn, Baruch Spinoza, Pierre Bayle, and Samuel von Pufendorf, as well as generous selections from the famous Locke-Proast debates on religious toleration. (shrink)

A festschrift for Dorothy Edgington, containing contributions from Cleo Condoravdi, Dorothy Edgington, Kit Fine, Alan Hájek, John Hawthorne, Sabine Iatridou, Nick Jones, Rosanna Keefe, Angelika Kratzer, David Over, Daniel Rothschild, Robert Stalnaker, Scott Sturgeon, and Timothy Williamson.

Margaret Cavendish's prolific and wide-ranging contributions to seventeenth-century intellectual culture are impossible to contain within the discrete confines of modern academic disciplines. Paying attention to the innovative uses of genre through which she enhanced and complicated her writings both within literature and beyond, this collection addresses her oeuvre and offers the most comprehensive and multidisciplinary resource on Cavendish's works to date. The astonishing breadth of her varied intellectual achievements is reflected through elegantly arranged sections on History of Science, Philosophy, Literature, (...) Politics and Reception, and New Directions, together with an Afterword by award-winning novelist Siri Hustvedt. The first book to cover nearly all of Cavendish's major works in a single volume, this collection brings together a variety of expert perspectives to illuminate the remarkable ideas and achievements of one of the most fascinating and prolific figures of the early modern period. (shrink)

_The Age of Reason_ is one of the most influential defences of Deism ever written. This edition presents Part 1, Paine’s controversial philosophical argument against revealed religion, with representative excerpts of his biblical analysis from Parts 2 and 3. Appendices include numerous selections from Paine’s other religious writing, his Deist influences, and his contemporary opposition.

The debate over Hypothetical Syllogism is locked in stalemate. Although putative natural language counterexamples to Hypothetical Syllogism abound, many philosophers defend Hypothetical Syllogism, arguing that the alleged counterexamples involve an illicit shift in context. The proper lesson to draw from the putative counterexamples, they argue, is that natural language conditionals are context-sensitive conditionals which obey Hypothetical Syllogism. In order to make progress on the issue, I consider and improve upon Morreau’s proof of the invalidity of Hypothetical Syllogism. The improved proof (...) relies upon the semantic claim that conditionals with antecedents irrelevant to the obtaining of an already true consequent are themselves true. Moreover, this semantic insight allows us to provide compelling counterexamples to Hypothetical Syllogism that are resistant to the usual contextualist response. (shrink)

Ebejer and Morden (Paternalism in the Marketplace: Should a Salesman Be His Buyer's Keeper?, Journal of Business Ethics 7, 1988) propose limited paternalism as a sufficient regulative condition for a professional ethic of sales. Although the principle is immediately appealing, its application can lead to a counter-productive ethical quandary I call the Pontius Pilate Plight. This quandary is the assumption that ethical agents' hands are clean in certain situations even if they have done something they condemn as immoral. Since limited (...) paternalism can give rise to this queer conclusion in the salesperson/buyer relationship, the principle is suspect. It may be a necessary condition for ethical sales, but is not sufficient. This discussion concludes by suggesting two additional criteria which, when complemented by the limited paternalism principle, are jointly sufficient. (shrink)

Moti Mizrahi (2013) presents some novel counterexamples to Hypothetical Syllogism (HS) for indicative conditionals. I show that they are not compelling as they neglect the complicated ways in which conditionals and modals interact. I then briefly outline why HS should nevertheless be rejected.

Are counterfactuals with true antecedents and consequents automatically true? That is, is Conjunction Conditionalization: if (X & Y), then (X > Y) valid? Stalnaker and Lewis think so, but many others disagree. We note here that the extant arguments for Conjunction Conditionalization are unpersuasive, before presenting a family of more compelling arguments. These arguments rely on some standard theorems of the logic of counterfactuals as well as a plausible and popular semantic claim about certain semifactuals. Denying Conjunction Conditionalization, then, requires (...) rejecting other aspects of the standard logic of counterfactuals, or else our intuitive picture of semifactuals. (shrink)

: In 1998, researchers discovered that embryonic stem cells could be derived from early human embryos. This discovery has raised a series of ethical and public-policy questions that are now being confronted by multiple international organizations, nations, cultures, and religious traditions. This essay surveys policies for human embryonic stem cell research in four regions of the world, reports on the recent debate at the United Nations about one type of such research, and reviews the positions that various religious traditions have (...) adopted regarding this novel type of research. In several instances the religious traditions seem to have influenced the public-policy debates. (shrink)

Most important, James W. Walters compares and contrasts Buber's and feminism's personalist ethics in light of two considerations: the lack of attention by ...

This book presents a comprehensive overview of what the criminal law would look like if organised around the principle that those who deserve punishment should receive punishment commensurate with, but no greater than, that which they deserve. Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan argue that desert is a function of the actor's culpability, and that culpability is a function of the risks of harm to protected interests that the actor believes he is imposing and his reasons for acting in (...) the face of those risks. The authors deny that resultant harms, as well as unperceived risks, affect the actor's desert. They thus reject punishment for inadvertent negligence as well as for intentions or preparatory acts that are not risky. Alexander and Ferzan discuss the reasons for imposing risks that negate or mitigate culpability, the individuation of crimes, and omissions. (shrink)