In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE VIRTUES OF MAN THE ANIMAL SOCIALE: AFFABILITAS AND VERITAS IN AQUINAS 1 KEVIN WHITE Catholic University of America Washington, D.C. XSTOTLE'S definition of man as the 'qlov '1ToAmKov 2the city-dwelling animal-undergoes an interesting transformation in the scholastic Latin of St. Thomas Aquinas : while the epithet of the definition occasionally appears in Aquinas's writings as transliterated, in animal politicum, or as thoroughly domesticated, in William of Moerbeke's (...) translation animal civile, his preferred version of the Aristotelian formula is animal sociale, though he sometimes says politicum et sociale, politicum vel sociale and sociale et politicum.8 For these uses of the term sociale, Aquinas is indebted not only to earlier writers of Latin but also to the genius of the language itself, whose words sociale and societas seem to have no equivalent in Aristotle's Greek. Less formal and explicit than the polis or civitas, what is meant by societas is rather the pervasive and mostly unacknowledged element within which cities are founded and continue, and which consists in the specifically human way of being together or, as Heidegger says, Mitsein. It is easy to discern in Aquinas's opposition between politicum and sociale the ancestor of our own commonplace and sharp contrast between " politics " and " so1 This paper was read in Buenos Aires on September 14, 1991, as a contribution to the sixteenth annual Semana Tomista of the Sociedad Tomista Argentina. 2 Politics I, 1, 1153a2-3. a For a survey of texts, see Edgar Scully, "The Place of the State in Society According to St. Thomas Aquinas," The Thomist 45 (1981): 407-429. The present discussion may be regarded as a gloss on the theme of this article that the social is prior to the political. 641 642 KEVIN WHITE ciety," though we should be careful not to identify our way of speaking with his: whereas we view " society " as a historical product, and so distinguish among different societies, societas for him, as for the ancient Romans, primarily connotes the universally human activity of coming together in association or alliance : it names that essential feature of human combination which is prior to institutions and to recognitions of special friendship, but which, just because it is a good of our nature, prevents human togetherness from being reduced to a bare co-presence. An illustration of the way in which Aristotle's reflections on human nature are both complicated and enriched, in Aquinas's appropriation of them, by the Roman notion of societas may be seen by comparing the differing treatments which the latter gives of the " social " virtues of truthfulness and friendliness in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics and in the Summa Theologiae. In both texts, to be sure, these virtues pale in significance beside such impressive qualities as courage and moderation; nevertheless, a notable increase in their importance seems to occur between the commentary, where, in keeping with the order of Aristotle's text, they appear as members of a series of virtues related to merely secondary matters, and the Summa, where they are elevated to a status among the " potential parts " of the virtue of justice and are distinguished by their relevance to the needs of man the animal sociale. Let us consider this difference in presentation, bearing in mind that the two texts were composed approximately simultaneously and fairly late in Aquinas's career, that is, during his second Parisian sojourn in 1269-72." I The commentary on the Ethics introduces the fourth book of the work as a sequel to the third : after discussing courage and moderation, which concern those things by which the very life of man is preserved, Aquinas says, here, in Book IV, the Philos4 For the chronology, see James A. Weisheipl, O.P., Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought and -YVorks, with Corrigenda and Addenda (Washington, 198~)' pp. 361, 380. AFFABILITAS AND VERITAS IN AQUINAS 643 opher treats of other "intermedaries," namely seven virtues and the feeling of shame, which are related to " certain secondary goods or evils." 5 Among the seven virtues, the first four have to do with external things, whether the external goods of wealth and honor or the external evils... (shrink)

The end of human history is an event that has been foreseen or announced by both messianics and dialecticians. But who is the protagonist of that history that is coming—or has come—to a close? What is man? How did he come on the scene? And how has he maintained his privileged place as the master of, or first among, the animals? In _The Open_, contemporary Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben considers the ways in which the “human” has been thought of as (...) either a distinct and superior type of animal, or a kind of being that is essentially different from animal altogether. In an argument that ranges from ancient Greek, Christian, and Jewish texts to twentieth-century thinkers such as Heidegger, Benjamin, and Kojève, Agamben examines the ways in which the distinction between man and animal has been manufactured by the logical presuppositions of Western thought, and he investigates the profound implications that the man/animal distinction has had for disciplines as seemingly disparate as philosophy, law, anthropology, medicine, and politics. (shrink)

The paper aims to examine the construction, circulation, and transformation of knowledge about man (anthropological knowledge) in human-technology interaction in the 20th century. The analysis focuses on the prerequisites of the industrial working world and its implicit knowledge about human beings. However, the basis and starting point of technical adaptation is usually ignored: The concepts of “man” and the anthropological knowledge gained experimentally from a anthropocentric designed interface. Based on the concept of an intuitive interface design this problem will be (...) investigated. The questions posed by this article as well as the objectives associated with them open up an interdisciplinary framework between philosophy of technology, philosophical anthropology and history of science given that they not only focus – by means of historical reconstruction – on historical changes in technological developments. They also address the issue of generation and transformation of anthropological knowledge in the definitions and interactions of “man” and “technology”. (shrink)

The negativity of nature -- Perfectible man as the subject of lack -- Constructing political identities -- The ethics of democracy -- Rethinking the universal -- Constructing the general will -- The democratic paradox: the legislator -- Rousseau's radical democracy.

‘What is Man?’ That was the half-secret question motivating political theory in the nineties and the aughts.1 Sometimes, critics glossed the question as one of ‘subjectivity’, ‘the theory of the su...

Though remembered chiefly as author of the Declaration of Independence and the president under whom the Louisiana Purchase was effected, Thomas Jefferson was a true revolutionary in the way he thought about the size and reach of government, which Americans who were full citizens and the role of education in the new country. In his new book, Kevin Gutzman gives readers a new view of Jefferson--a revolutionary who effected radical change in a growing country. Jefferson's philosophy about the size (...) and power of the federal system almost completely undergirded the Jeffersonian Republican Party. His forceful advocacy of religious freedom was not far behind, as were attempts to incorporate Native Americans into American society. His establishment of the University of Virginia might be one of the most important markers of the man's abilities and character. He was not without flaws. While he argued for the assimilation of Native Americans into society, he did not assume the same for Africans being held in slavery while--at the same time--insisting that slavery should cease to exist. Many still accuse Jefferson of hypocrisy on the ground that he both held that "all men are created equal" and held men as slaves. Jefferson's true character, though, is more complex than that as Kevin Gutzman shows in his new book about Jefferson, a revolutionary whose accomplishments went far beyond the drafting of the Declaration of Independence. (shrink)

Part one. The Dunayevskaya-Marcuse correspondence, 1954-78: the early letters: debating Marxist dialectics and Hegel's absolute idea; Dunayevskaya's Marxism and freedom and beyond; on technology and work on the eve of Marcuse's One-dimensional man; the later correspondence: winding down during the period of the New Left -- Part two. The Dunayevskaya-Fromm correspondence, 1959-78: the early letters: on Fromm's Marx's concept of man and his socialist humanism symposium; dialogue on Marcuse, on existentialism, and on socialist humanism in Eastern Europe; on Hegel, Marxism, (...) and the Frankfurt School in the period of Dunayevskaya's philosophy and revolution; the final letters: on critical theory and on Rosa Luxemburg, gender, and revolution. (shrink)

A classic debate concerns whether reasonableness should be understood statistically (e.g., reasonableness is what is common) or prescriptively (e.g., reasonableness is what is good). This Article elaborates and defends a third possibility. Reasonableness is a partly statistical and partly prescriptive “hybrid,” reflecting both statistical and prescriptive considerations. Experiments reveal that people apply reasonableness as a hybrid concept, and the Article argues that a hybrid account offers the best general theory of reasonableness. -/- First, the Article investigates how ordinary people judge (...) what is reasonable. Reasonableness sits at the core of countless legal standards, yet little work has investigated how ordinary people (i.e., potential jurors) actually make reasonableness judgments. Experiments reveal that judgments of reasonableness are systematically intermediate between judgments of the relevant average and ideal across numerous legal domains. For example, participants’ mean judgment of the legally reasonable number of weeks’ delay before a criminal trial (ten weeks) falls between the judged average (seventeen weeks) and ideal (seven weeks). So too for the reasonable num- ber of days to accept a contract offer, the reasonable rate of attorneys’ fees, the reasonable loan interest rate, and the reasonable annual number of loud events on a football field in a residential neighborhood. Judgment of reasonableness is better predicted by both statistical and prescriptive factors than by either factor alone. -/- This Article uses this experimental discovery to develop a normative view of reasonableness. It elaborates an account of reasonableness as a hybrid standard, arguing that this view offers the best general theory of reasonableness, one that applies correctly across multiple legal domains. Moreover, this hybrid feature is the historical essence of legal reasonableness: the original use of the “reasonable person” and the “man on the Clapham omnibus” aimed to reflect both statistical and prescriptive considerations. Empirically, reasonableness is a hybrid judgment. And normatively, reasonableness should be applied as a hybrid standard. (shrink)

The article criticises various interpretations of Epicurus's claim that belief in determinism is self-invalidating: -/- - 'The man who says that all things come to pass by necessity cannot criticise one who denies that all things come to pass by necessity, for he admits that this too happens of necessity.' - -/- especially Ted Honderich's argument that the real force of the Epicurean claim is that if belief acquisition is causally necessitated, we will be excluded from possible facts and inquiries (...) that might have produced new knowledge and might have shown some of what we take to be knowledge to be false. Honderich's argument fails to consider that undetermined inquirers might fail to make discoveries that determined inquirers could not fail to make. Determinism would not, therefore, put us in a worse position as seekers of knowledge than indeterminism. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: A Bad Sign? Pictures of the Future on Your Skin Never a Tattooed Man Like This Tattoos and Human Nature Covered with Rare and Significant Beauties Creativity, Creativity, Creativity Can't You Recognize the Human in the Inhuman?

This paper examines the creation of what I have called “The Other Average Man” of nineteenth-century science. This other average man was created during the course of the career of the Belgian polymath Adolphe Quetelet (1796–1874) and his development of physique sociale and the controversial l’homme moyen. Rather than discuss Quetelet’s abstract average man, which has received considerable attention, the paper focuses on the real average men that Quetelet imagined would do the work of providing data for physique sociale. To (...) do so, it investigates three moments in Quetelet’s administrative career in Belgium: his early life in Ghent and Brussels during the brief polity of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, his remarkable transformation of the Académie Royale de Belgique in the 1820s, and an 1846 debate at the Academy on the possible determinism entailed by Quetelet’s statistical account of human behavior. These stories not only point to the creation of another average man in Quetelet’s social physics, but also demonstrate the importance of Belgium’s unique historical context for understanding one of nineteenth-century Europe’s most enduring contributions to the social sciences. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.2 (2004) 225-226 [Access article in PDF] John H. Zammito. Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. Pp. x + 576. Cloth, $68.00. Paper, $29.00. Zammito's book continues two recent trends in the study of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German philosophy, viz., the reassessment both of Kant's pre-Critical thought and of his contemporaries. Zammito situates Kant's later pre-Critical (...) work within the "popular philosophy" tradition, especially those elements of the tradition that could be broadly construed as anthropological in focus. If Zammito is correct, during the late 1760s Kant was a popular philosopher of a sort whose influence was greater than generally recognized. In this light, he reexamines Kant's influence on Johann Herder as well as Herder's reception of Kant. The terminus of the study is the emergence of anthropology as a discipline and the roles that Kant and Herder played therein.Zammito's interpretation of this period (roughly, 1762 to 1773) marshals a vast array of material (notes and a bibliography number nearly 200 pages), which sheds light on both the intellectual climate of the time and Kant's and Herder's place within the same. Beginning with a useful survey of the Aufklärung during the 1760s, Zammito focuses on the growth of "popular philosophy" (which opposed the "school philosophy" and focused on the ethical and socio-historical dimension of the Aufklärung). Popular philosophy emerged as a self-styled defense of enlightenment values at a time when both the university and scholar faced crises of self-image and self-justification. Zammito juxtaposes these crises with the breakdown of Kant's attempt to construct a system of metaphysics. His point is that an "altogether different Kant," to use Vorländer's expression, emerged during the mid and late 1760s, a Kant qua popular philosopher.Zammito's Kant of this period was an essayist more interested in the "vocation of man" than in traditional metaphysics. Focusing on the period from the Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime to the curious Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, he outlines Kant's encounter with popular philosophy. The discussion of Rousseau's influence on Kant is both useful and fascinating, and supports Zammito's interpretation nicely. Furthermore, by placing Kant in the context of his contemporaries Zammito sheds light on the scope and originality of Kant's work of this period. But Zammito's point is also that Kant faced personal and professional crises that led to this experiment with popular philosophy. He discusses at some length Kant's relation with women and an alleged "repression" that was thereby produced. These are some of the weaker (because more speculative) sections of the book. [End Page 225] Zammito claims that we must read Kant's texts of this period with the eyes of a psychologist as well as those of a philosopher, but such excursions detract from the clarity of this effort at intellectual history.Kant's "critical turn" is given an interesting interpretation. His foray into popular philosophy seemed to be leading him toward anthropology as a foundational discipline. But, as Zammito claims, though this might have been the logical extension of Kant's focus during this period, Kant's more traditional interest in providing a foundation for metaphysics and meeting the skeptic's challenge won out. Zammito is deft in addressing the clash of these interests, and explicates how Kant's anthropology lectures from 1772-73 provide a touchstone for understanding why metaphysics trumped anthropology for Kant. As Zammito concludes, "Kant created the 'critical philosophy' at the cost of forsaking the 'science' of anthropology" (348).Herder's own development is discussed in the context of this Kantian backdrop. "It [is] possible," Zammito claims, "to see Herder as fulfilling the promise that Kant abandoned" (7). Indeed, Zammito sees in Herder's hermeneutic historicism a "road not taken" by Kant, a road that privileged anthropology over philosophy. The discussion of Herder is illuminating, and does a fine job of detailing his... (shrink)

'if AI is outside your field, or you know something of the subject and would like to know more then Artificial Intelligence: The Basics is a brilliant primer.' - Nick Smith, Engineering and Technology Magazine November 2011 Artificial Intelligence: The Basics is a concise and cutting-edge introduction to the fast moving world of AI. The author Kevin Warwick, a pioneer in the field, examines issues of what it means to be man or machine and looks at advances in robotics (...) which have blurred the boundaries. Topics covered include: how intelligence can be defined whether machines can 'think' sensory input in machine systems the nature of consciousness the controversial culturing of human neurons. Exploring issues at the heart of the subject, this book is suitable for anyone interested in AI, and provides an illuminating and accessible introduction to this fascinating subject. (shrink)

To address the question of the nature and function of conventions, this essay explores a possible systematic link between Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology and Foucault’s historical ontology. It argues that these analyses establish, contra to the cognitivist interpretation, dominant then and now, that conventions are properly understood not as “common knowledge” nor even as “jointly accepted beliefs” —that they are not, at least at their most fundamental layer, cognitive states at all—but are instead bodily dispositions that are forged by historically shifting (...) entwinements of practices of power and forms of knowledge. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HAPPINESS: THE NATURAL END OF MAN? KEVIN M. STALEY St. Anslem Oollege Manchester, New Hampshire I AONG THE QUESTIONS the philosopher considers, none perhaps ris more important than that of ' the good life.' This question looks for the distinguishing marks of a. life which is fully human and which constitutes the actualization of one's uniquely human potential. For the ancient philosophers, such a life was considered the (...) highest good that one could achieve, the end and the raison d' etre of one's activity. This end was known as happiness. As a Christian theologian well versed in the writings of the ancients, Thomas Aquinas also had occasion to reflect on the nature of happiness. His inquiry possessed a dimension which was completely lacking to the ancients, namely, the belief that man is destined to enjoy the ' face to face ' vision of God. Thomas left no doubt that this, man's most ultimate end, was to be possessed after death through the gifts of grace. On the other hand, in his Sententia Libri Ethicorum he gives Aristotle his due, commenting with approval on many 0£ Aristotle's conclusions. In his discussion of happiness in the Summa Theo~ logiae, one can also find the Philosopher's doctrine of happiness, here distinguished from ·supernatural beatitude as imperfect from perfect beatitude. Are we to assume then that inquiry rinto the nature of happiness is twofold, admitting of a. theological and philosophical dimension? A philosopher would, on this showing, be concerned ·with the natural, albeit imperfect, end and the theologian with the supernatural end of man. Many philosophers within the Thomistic tradition have ~15 216 KEVIN M. STALEY been comfortable with this assumption. Recently, for example, John Finnis has stated, St. Thomas very plainly says, the task of ' considering and determining the ultimate end of human life and human affairs' belongs to the principle practical science; Aristotle called it ethics and Thomas moral philosophy.1 Others do not share Finnis' confidence in this regard. Alan Dona.gan, for example,,argues to the contrary that Thomas' final word on the end of man was that Aristotle was simply mistaken. According to Donagan, Thomas saved Aristotle's thesis that the ultimate end of human life is eudaimonia by two drastic amendments. First, he reinterpreted eudaimonia as what he called beatitudo: the total satisfaction of desires of an intellectual creature by a vision of God's essence.... Secondly, he denied that human beings could either attain beatitudo, or even learn what it really is, except by grace.2 If Donagan is correct, then the philosopher is clearly not competent to discuss the end o£ man, since the consideration of supernatural beatitude lies beyond the power of unaided.reason. Finnis recognizes the distinction between perfect and imperfect beatitude, and his position need only entail that it is the latter which is the concern of philosophy proper. However, although the notion of 'imperfect beatitude' served well Thomas' purpose of integrating the thought of the Philosopher within the framework of Christian theology, the fact remains that Thomas did not disengage this notion from its theological context. That is rto say, he did not carry out 'an explicit treatment of imperfect beatitude as the natural end of man. In itself, this need not imply that such an inquiry is impossible or ill-conceived. Nevertheless, the notion of ' imperfect beatitude ' (construed as some sort of natural end of man 1" Practical Reasoning, Human Goods, and the End of Man", Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Society, v. 58, 1984, p. 26. 2 Human lilnds and Human Actions (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1985), p. 38. HAPPINESS: THE NATURAL END OF MAN? 217 amenable to philosophical treatment), is still quite problematic ; and Finnis himself has recognized the difficulty. Happiness signified, even for Aristotle, a good which is perfect and in every way final.3 Finnis observes that "the 'perfect,' the 'fully satisfactory,' is what the concept of eudaimooia /bemitudo is about; an 'imperfect beatitude' is, by definition, a state which is not ' adequate to the aspira.tion of human nature '." 4 Thus, the very concept of ' imperfect happiness ' appears at best to be paradoxical, at worst self-contradictory -at least to the philosopher. This... (shrink)

ExcerptQueer theory has a problem. This problem does not belong uniquely to queer theory, for it is common to and has consequences for all theory— social, psychological, literary, natural scientific, or otherwise—that seeks categories for the explanation of human phenomena. Queer theory, however, encounters and embodies this problem in uniquely significant ways. Queer theory seems, in fact, to have developed largely out of the friction generated by this problem in other earlier forms of theory—and may thus, ironically, contain the only (...) adequate answer to it.1 This problem is also hardly new, for it has exercised philosophers and critics from Kierkegaard to Feyerabend, from Kant to Žižek, from Schelling to de Man, Adorno, and Butler. It is the misery and the majesty of all theory. It is the tyranny of the universal over the particular. (shrink)

Schelers Anatomie des Herzens ist neben derjenigen seines Zeitgenossen Shand, die gründlichste, die das zwanzigste Jahrhundert vorzuweisen hat. Sie ist aufs Engste mit einer Ontologie, einer Metaphysik, einer Erkennt- nis- und Wahrnehmungslehre, einer Wert- und Normenlehre, einer Analy- se des Strebens, Überlegens, Wählens und Handelns, einer Sozialphiloso- phie und einer Anthropologie verwachsen. Aufgrund der deskriptive Klarheit und Vielfalt, die sie über weite Strecken auszeichnen, kann sie aber auch unabhängig von diesen Verbindungen betrachtet werden.

The personal identity relation is of great interest to philosophers, who often consider fictional scenarios to test what features seem to make persons persist through time. But often real examples of neuroscientific interest also provide important tests of personal identity. One such example is the case of Phineas Gage – or at least the story often told about Phineas Gage. Many cite Gage’s story as example of severed personal identity; Phineas underwent such a tremendous change that Gage “survived as a (...) different man.” I discuss a recent empirical finding about judgments about this hypothetical. It is not just the magnitude of the change that affects identity judgment; it is also the negative direction of the change. I present an experiment suggesting that direction of change also affects neuroethical judgments. I conclude we should consider carefully the way in which improvements and deteriorations affect attributions of personal identity. This is particularly important since a number of the most crucial neuroethical decisions involve varieties of cognitive enhancements or deteriorations. (shrink)

La guerre qui fait actuellement rage en Ukraine a initié un changement d’échelle dans le recours aux investigations numériques. Elle est le premier conflit de haute intensité qui se déroule dans une zone aussi largement couverte par Internet, et où l’utilisation des réseaux sociaux par les individus est une pratique habituelle. Manœuvres, assauts et exactions sont ainsi documentés en temps quasi réel et fournissent aux journalistes et observateurs des données sur le déroulement du conflit. Cependant, ces mêmes données sont analysées, (...) recoupées, interprétées et utilisées par les belligérants pour optimiser leurs stratégies de contrôle territorial en temps de guerre. (shrink)

Award-winning poet and critic Kevin Young traces the history of the hoax as a peculiarly American phenomenon--the legacy of P.T. Barnum's 'humbug' culminating with the currency of Donald J. Trump's 'fake news'. Disturbingly, Young finds that fakery is woven from stereotype and suspicion, with race being the most insidious American hoax of all. He chronicles how Barnum came to fame by displaying figures like Joice Heth, a black woman whom he pretended was the 161-year-old nursemaid to George Washington, and (...) 'What Is It?', an African American man Barnum professed was a newly discovered missing link in evolution. Bunk then turns to the hoaxing of history and the ways that forgers, plagiarists, and journalistic fakers invent backstories and falsehoods to sell us lies about themselves and about the world in our own time, from pretend Native Americans like Nasdijj to the deadly imposture of Clark Rockefeller, from the made-up memoirs of James Frey to the identity theft of Rachel Dolezal. This brilliant and timely work asks what it means to live in a post-factual world of 'truthiness' where everything is up for interpretation and everyone is subject to a pervasive cynicism that damages our ideas of reality, fact, and art."--Dust jacket flap. (shrink)

A good deal of discussion about the existence of God among contemporary continental philosophers centres on the anthropological conditions that precede the affirmation or denial of such a being. The starting point is the person centred world of the existentialists, the phenomenologists and the personalists, and not the cosmological centred universe of the medieval world. It is one’s view of man and what one considers to be most profound in man, that leads some philosophers to affirm the existence of God (...) today and which leads others to deny his existence. More specifically it is their views on intersubjectivity, that is on the relationships between persons, that marks the parting of the ways between these two groups of philosophers today. (shrink)

What does it mean to be a Christian in this day and age? How does this affect the way we relate to one another? In the face of so many different moral views, Kevin Kelly affirms the common ground behind them: the dignity of the human person. He looks at the relationship between experience and the development of morality, and highlights women's indispensable contribution. He also examines the place for morality in the Church's teaching.

The 2012 film The Sessions tells the story of a man with polio who loses his virginity by undergoing Surrogate Partner Therapy (SPT). In light of ensuing controversy surrounding the legal and moral status of SPT, this article uses Norman Daniels’ framework of fair equality of opportunity in health to argue that SPT is a legitimate form of treatment for sexual dysfunctions and should be evaluated alongside other such treatments. I begin by showing how sexual dysfunctions constitute deviations in normal (...) species functioning. I then show that sexual capacities are a matter of fair equality of opportunity because they affect the ability to cultivate the sexual intimacy that is crucial for forming a family and often necessary for maintaining a healthy one. Recognizing that some might object to SPT as a form of prostitution, I proceed by showing how the treatment might avoid some of the objections raised against prostitution, and conclude by affirming that societies committed to fair equality of opportunity in health should work to make SPT legal and safe. (shrink)

About St. Thomas Aquinas, Pope John XXII said: “A man can derive more profit in a year from his books than from pondering all his life the teaching of others.” And Pope Pius XI added: “We now say to all who are desirous of the truth: ‘Go to St. Thomas.’ ” But when we do go to Thomas – when we open his massive Summa Theologica or another of his works – we’re quickly overwhelmed, even lost. If we find him (...) hard to read, how can we even begin to “think like Aquinas?” Now comes Kevin Vost — the best-selling author of The One-Minute Aquinas — armed with a recently rediscovered letter St. Thomas himself wrote – a brief letter to young novice monk giving practical, sage advice about how to study, how to think, and even how to live. In this letter written almost 800 years ago, St. Thomas reveals his unique powers of intellect and will, and explains how anyone can fathom and explain even the loftiest truths. Vost and St. Thomas will teach you how to dissect logical fallacies, heresies, and half-truths that continue to pollute our world with muddy thinking. Best of all, you’ll find a fully-illustrated set of exercises to improve your intellectual powers of memory, understanding, logical reasoning, shrewdness, foresight, circumspection, and practical wisdom. You’ll also learn: The four steps to training your memoryHow to know your mental powers – and their limitsWhy critical thinking alone is insufficient for reaching the truthTwenty common fallacies – and how to spot themThe key to effectively reading any bookHow to set your intellect free by avoiding worldly entanglementsHow to commit key truths to memory Pius XI called St. Thomas Aquinas the “model” for those who want to “pursue their studies to the best advantage and with the greatest profit to themselves.” Leo XIII urged us all to “follow the example of St. Thomas.” Over the centuries, dozens of other popes have praised him. Surely it is time to listen to these good men, time to “go to Thomas,” to learn to think like him, and, yes, even to live like him. (shrink)

Many churches are being asked to support new environmental initiatives, including those of the new food movement. In today’s cultural environment, it requires courage even to raise a question about programs to save the planet, protect helpless animals, or feed developing nations. Yet it is important for Christians to be aware of the agenda behind these initiatives, which looks to creation not for visible signs of God’s power and divinity but with a view to immortalizing the earth itself as the (...) source of life. It sees man not as uniquely made in the image and likeness of God, with the responsibility for stewardship over His creation, but as an animal himself, co-equal with other animals. Environmentalism has become in effect a new religion, with the food movement its frontier mission. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.3 (Autumn 2011): 465–475. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE ARISTOTELIAN FIRST PRINCIPLE OF PRACTICAL REASON KEVIN L. FLANNERY, S.J. Pontijicia Universitas Gregoriana Rome, Italy INTRODUCTION* I N THE Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2,1 Thomas Aquinas identifies what is often spoken of as "the first principle of practical reason"-that is, "that good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." Thomas explains: All other precepts of the natural law are based (...) upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) *I am grateful to Peter Ryan, S.J. and Stephen Brock for commenting on a draft of this paper. 1I shall use a number of abbreviations: ST= Summa Theologiae; An.Post. =Posterior analytics; An.Pr. =Prior analytics; DA =De anima; EE =Eudemian ethics; EN = Nicomachean Ethics; GA =De generatione animalium; lnsomn. =De insomniis; Int. = De interpretatione; Metaph. =Metaphysics; MM= Magna moralia; Phys. =Physics; R. =Republic; Rhet. =Rhetorica; SE =Sophistici elenchi; FPPR =the first principle of practical reason; PNC =the principle of non-contradiction. I also use a number of transliterated Greek terms such as akolasia (depravity), akolastos (depraved person), akrasia (weakness of will), akrates (person subject to weakness of will), egkrateia (continence in spite of temptation), egkrates (person who remains continent in spite of temptation ), and phronesis (practical wisdom). I use them for brevity's sake and since they have also found their way into the standard philosophical vocabulary, at least in Aristotelian studies. I also speak in this essay as if Aristotle was the author of MM. For an argument in favor of a qualified understanding of this thesis, see note 14. For the Greek text of the works of Aristotle I have for the most part used the Oxford Classical Texts. The one major exception is Susemihl's edition of the MM: Franz Susemihl, ed., Aristotelis: Magna moralia (Leipzig: Tuubner, 1883). For most (but not all) of the translations from Aristotle, I have made use of Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle: the Revised Oxford Translation, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). For English translations of Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, I have used the translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1920). 441 442 KEVIN L. FLANNERY, S.J. belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided. Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law.' As its name suggests, the first principle of practical reason (FPPR) is no incidental tenet. Thomas compares it in this same article to the first principle of theoretical reason, better known as the principle of non-contradiction (PNC): "that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time."3 On the other hand, it is also commonly acknowledged that Thomas's (philosophical) ethical theory is Aristotelian. How is it then that we never hear of an Aristotelian first principle of practical reason, either in the secondary literature or (as it seems) in Aristotle himself? I shall argue in this essay that there is such a principle in Aristotle's ethical theory and that it has the logical status that Thomas attributes to it. It is none other than the well-known paradoxical Socratic principle that no one deliberately does wrong4-understood in a certain way. (I shall refer to this principle as "the Socratic Principle.") I shall also argue that Aristotle has a fairly elaborate theory about how, psychologically, a person accommodates himself to a violatiqn of the first principle of practical reason. I shall leave one issue unaddressed: whether (as in the question from ST above) Aristotle's FPPR includes "all other precepts of the natural law." It will be apparent, however, 2 The best exegesis of this article of ST is Germain Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A... (shrink)

Als zu Beginn des Jahrhunderts der Realismus wieder ernst genommen wurde, gab es viele Philosophen, die sich mit der Ontologie der Wahrheit befaßten. Unabhängig von der Bestimmung der Wahrheit als Korrespondenzbeziehung wollten sie herausfinden, inwieweit zur Erklärung der Wahrheit von Sätzen besondere Entitäten herangezogen werden müssen. Einige dieser Entitäten, so zum Beispiel Bolzanos ‘Sätze an sich’, Freges ‘Gedanken’ oder die ‘propositions’ von Russell und Moore, wurden als Träger der Eigenschaften Wahrheit und Falschheit aufgefaßt. Einige Philosophen jedoch, wie Russell, Wittgenstein im (...) ›Tractatus‹ und Husserl in den ›Logischen Untersuchungen‹, argumentierten, zusätzlich zu den Wahrheitsträgern bzw. an ihrer Stelle müßten Entitäten angenommen werden, auf Grund deren Sätze und/oder ‘Propositionen’ wahr sind. Solchen Entitäten gab man verschiedene Namen, insbesondere ‘fact’, ‘Tatsache’, ‘state of affairs’ und ‘Sachverhalt’. 1 Wir wollen einer Entscheidung über die Angebrachtheit dieser Ausdrücke nicht vorgreifen und daher zunächst eine neutralere Terminologie verwenden: Alle Entitäten, die für diese zweite Rolle in Frage kommen, wollen wir ‘Wahrmacher’ nennen. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:EOONOMICS, WISDOM AND THE TEACHING OF THE BISHOPS IN THE THEOLOGY OF THOMAS AQUINAS* KEVIN A. McMAHON St. Anselm OoZZege Manchester, New Hampshire WHEN IN 1985 the American bishops came out with the first drait of thcir pastoiral letter on the economy, and ithen a year Later when they ~ssued the final text,1 they drew fire from groups both within and outside the Church. Much of the criticism, (...) on the popular front at least, seemed to concern the impropriety of religious leaders involving themselves in seoular.affairs (1and technical affairs at that). But while ithe bishorps were quick to admit their Lack of technical expertise, they claimed for rthemselves a special authority to teach regarding the principles tha.t underlie a just economic life. Far from sitepping outside their proper sphere, it is their obligation, they sruid, to speak on these issues, and to a.ddress not only membel'IS of the Ca.tholic Church in America, 1but the nation as a whole. It is a requirement of their ofHce that ithey be concerned with the weHare and security of all individuals,,and they effectively promorte this end iby setting forth the word of God recorded in Scriipture and handed on by the Church's tramtion.2 There,are two points in prurticu1ar that are implied by this statement. F1irst, knowledge of revelation is an aid to estab- " The substance of this article was first presented as a paper at the College Theology Society convention, held in Newport, Rhode Island, in May 1985. i "Economic Justice for All: Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy," Origins, vol. 16, no. 24 (November 27, 1986), 412-455.. 2 Pastoral Message to accompany the letter, sections 4-9, 12-19, 29; Pastoral Letter, sections 5, 22-27. 91 9~ KEVIN A. MCMAHON lishing peace and justice in the community at large because of the iin.sight into 1the good for man that the Gospel offers. Second, reason alone will not suffi,ce the community ·as a guide in interpel'lsonal activity, even in the area of economics, so it makes great sense for the citizen 1 to ·attend to rthe bishop, who in his teaching expresses the Church's foilith. The bishops' letter on economics does not fully draw out either of these points. And Aquinas nowhere expressly deaLs with the authority of the bishop in economic matteiis. But he does have something to say about rthe nature and soul'lce of episcopal authority, and of the need in the community for moral teachers. Priv.ate property, commercial trading, the use of moneyfor Thoma.s,aJl o[ these institutions or practices were devised by communities for the 1 sake of individual and general wellbeing. They conform to right reason, they are products of right reason, and they are governed by the virtue of justice. It would seem that practical rea:son,,all by itself, is sufficient in their regaOO.. Take priViate propecl;y a:s an e~ample. Thomas offers three arguments in irts defens·e in his Summa theologiae. First, people work more diligently when they own the product of their lrubor. Second, if people work in the first instance for their own sake, roncentrarting on their own needs, there.WJill be less confusion than if everyone has responsibility for the group. Thiird, to quote Thomais, "quarrels arise more frequently where there is no division of the things possessed." 3 Note that Thomais is not.arguing for the rubsolute necessity of private property. He defends private property as a social institution without prejudicing eiither :the right of specific individuals to hold property in common, or the good of their doing so. After all, Thomas himself belonged to a religious order whose members take a vow of poverty. All he iis claiming is that the institution of private property makes sense.4 If pria 2-2, q. 66, a. 2, c. "Odon Lottin writes that Thomas was unusual in regarding human nature, even after the Fall, as indifferent to the institution of private property; the natural la.w neither commands nor prohibits it. Rather, men cross-cul- BISHOPS' TEACHING ROLE IN ECONOMICS 93 vate ownership is so common, Aquinas might say... (shrink)

In contemporary philosophy of science many theories of explanation are rooted in positivist or post-positivists accounts of explanation. This paper attempts to ground a phenomenological account of scientific explanation by using the works of Werner Heisenberg and Patrick Heelan. To explain something for Heisenberg is to describe what can be intersubjectively observed and conceptualized in an adequate language. However, this needs to be qualified, as not any adequate account will do. While Heisenberg thinks that Kant is right to think that (...) a priori concepts are the conditions which make science, and thus explanation, possible, he also believes pure a priori concepts have a limited range of applicability. Neils Bohr shared this belief with Heisenberg, but thinks human thought can go no further. However, Heisenberg never gave up on the idea that we could create new concepts that act as a priori grounds for quantum entities. To go beyond Heisenberg, I believe that we should look to Husserl’s account of Evidenz and the material a priori to help us think about a phenomenological account of explanation. (shrink)

Maurice Blanchot is perhaps best known as a major French intellectual of the twentieth century: the man who countered Sartre's views on literature, who affirmed the work of Sade and Lautreamont, who gave eloquent voice to the generation of '68, and whose philosophical and literary work influenced the writing of, among others, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and Michel Foucault. He is also regarded as one of the most acute narrative writers in France since Marcel Proust. In __Clandestine Encounters__, Kevin (...) Hart has gathered together major literary critics in Britain, France, and the United States to engage with Blanchot's immense, fascinating, and difficult body of creative work. Hart's substantial introduction usefully places Blanchot as a significant contributor to the tradition of the French philosophical novel, beginning with Voltaire's _Candide _in 1759, and best known through the works of Sartre. __Clandestine Encounters_ _considers a selection of Blanchot's narrative writings over the course of almost sixty years, from stories written in the mid-1930s to _L'instant de ma mort_. Collectively, the contributors' close readings of Blanchot's novels, _recits_, and stories illuminate the close relationship between philosophy and narrative in his work while underscoring the variety and complexity of these narratives. "Blanchot's narratives are here read with the care, patience, and thoroughness they deserve. The collection sustains a remarkable intensity of engagement throughout, in so doing opening these narratives out to their necessary contexts--philosophical, of course; but also literary, political, theological, and biographical--with welcome dedication and integrity. The volume makes a timely and decisive contribution to its field, where it will form a major point of reference." --_Martin Crowley, Queens' College, University of Cambridge_ "This outstanding collection--lucid, engaging, generous--illuminates Blanchot and the very notion of 'the philosophical.' " --_Gerald Prince, University of Pennsylvania_ "This collection contains some very important pieces on a major figure of twentieth-century modernism. Blanchot now has a much wider audience in North American than he did even a few years ago when it was mostly experimental fiction writers like Paul Auster, Lydia Davis, R. M. Berry, and Steve Tomasula--not literary critics--who took an interest in Blanchot's literary writings. The focus on the 'narratives' sets this volume apart from, and makes it a good deal more stimulating than, other recent collections of essays on Blanchot." --_Gerald Bruns, University of Notre Dame _. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Thales of Miletus: The Beginnings of Western Science and PhilosophyKevin RobbPatricia F. O’Grady. Thales of Miletus: The Beginnings of Western Science and Philosophy. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2002. Pp xxii + 310. Paper, $84.95.This book has a consistent thesis: Thales of Miletus was the first Western scientist and philosopher not just for what he began, but for what he himself said (or, as O'Grady believes, wrote). On this view, (...) Thales made significant contributions to metaphysics ("He asked the question: 'What is real?' no less than Plato and Aristotle did," 249), cosmology (on the earth and earthquakes, 87 ff.), astronomy (notably the eclipse, 126 ff.), mathematics (Proclus attributes Euclidean theorems to Thales, 191 ff.), psychology (on psyche) and theology (on "full of the gods," 108 ff.). O'Grady's thesis is that we know enough about Thales' thoughts in these areas (each a treacherous minefield of scholarly dispute, as O'Grady admits) that, after a clarified understanding of "Scientificity and Rationality" (her awkward title for Chapter 11), we can confidently conclude that philosophy and science were well begun by Thales. "I believe I have drawn a clear and detailed picture of a brilliant, veracious, and courageously speculative Greek. I see him as a questioner of almost everything, an investigator of nature...Thales is not the mere shadowy figure of Guthrie's perception. He is a man of substance, a man of distinction and of lasting importance" (251).O'Grady had early noted that W. K. C. Guthrie considered Thales a shadowy figure historically, made all the more so, Guthrie believed, because the legend kept expanding. For example, a sixth-century Thales as the seeker after the material archê, and so the first important physikos, is unknown before fourth-century Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha, and by the time Euclidean theorems are attributed to Thales the tendency to foist imposing discoveries on famous persons was prevalent.This raises the major issue concerning O'Grady's exhaustively researched book. To what extent can the doxographic sources (the "A" sections of Diels's 1903Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker), be used to interpret the Presocratics, especially if the original wording from a thinker perished (any "B" section quotations). It is clear that in the fourth century nothing in writing from Thales survived for the Lyceum to read and catalogue although its scholars clearly sought it; the repeated legetai ("it is said") of Aristotle in Metaphysics Alpha and elsewhere is decisive. It is his standard way of indicating that no written work on the matter survives to be consulted, but stories or oral accounts do.O'Grady's thesis requires that the "A" section material be exploited fully, especially to present Thales as a philosopher (29-70). Many historians will be unwilling to take the entire journey with her. Some (Harold Cherniss) would balk at the first step. The demand for confirming ipsissima verba (or "B" quotations) to reconstruct the thought of any Presocratic with real confidence (as once proposed by G. S. Kirk) threatens to exclude Thales from histories of philosophy, an unsatisfactory result. Even so, Harold Cherniss proposed that drastic solution in 1935 in his magisterial Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratric Philosophy. Presocratic philosophy, he argued, should begin with Anaximander (375).The heart of Cherniss's numbingly exhaustive argument (400 + pages) was that Aristotle's purpose in surveying his predecessors's views was never historical, but dialectical. His intent was to argue for a fourfold causality (on the grounds only four archai had been turned up by all his predecessors, starting with Thales' material cause), and to fit those predecessors's views into a theory of natural causality as he had finally formulated it in his sophisticated, [End Page 107] largely technical vocabulary. Aristotle's "historical" notices on which all later accounts must depend were, thus, never history; the problem and the solution, along with their language, were Aristotle's alone. If Theophrastus paraphrased what he found in Aristotle (McDiarmid), and if the post-Aristotelian doxographic notices were largely dependent on Theophrastus (so already Diels in 1879, in Doxographi Graeci), then any attempt to extract a philosophical Thales from the later doxographic sources (or Aristotle) is methodologically doomed from... (shrink)

Abstract“[A]n der Front des Kampfes um den Menschen selbst”. Anthropogenetics and Anthropotechnics in Soviet Thought. The period between 1920 and 1930 reveals in Russia a practical manifestation of the technologies of the self, which see the body not only in a poetic‐symbolical way, but practically as a material of shaping and rebuilding. In this bio‐social discourse of a genetically perfected ‘new man’, Russian theorists of eugenics are looking back on traditional parallels of animal and plant breeding. The most influential group (...) of eugenics were the Russian biologists, especially the key players and the founders of the Russian genetics research Nikolai Kol′tsov (1872–1940) and Aleksandr Serebrovskii (1892–1948). It will be demonstrated that ‘human breeding’ (Russ. ‘Antropotekhnika’) is based both on the semantics and on the methodology of traditional animal and plant breeding. (shrink)

Discontented people might talk of corruption in the Commons, closeness in the Commons and the necessity of reforming the Commons, said Mr. Spenlow solemnly, in conclusion; but when the price of wheat per bushel had been the highest, the Commons had been the busiest; and a man might lay his hand upon his heart, and say this to the whole world, – ‘Touch the Commons, and down comes the country!’.

Verstehen ist nicht nur ein Grundbegriff menschlicher Lebensfuhrung und Lebenswelt, sondern besitzt auch in der Philosophie und den verschiedenen Wissenschaften eine zentrale Bedeutung. Die Frage nach der Moglichkeit von Verstehen ist dabei immer auch die Frage nach dem Subjekt und Objekt des Verstandnisses. Wer versteht wen oder was? Ist "Verstehen" also nur rationales Erfassen, Erkennen tieferer Einsichten und komplexerer Zusammenhange oder impliziert es mehr? Versteht man den Anderen, den Fremden, aber auch den Text wirklich so einfach? Und wenn ja, wie (...) strukturiert sich dieses Verstehen? Es soll in dem interdisziplinaren Band versucht werden, mit den genannten Fragen Anschlussfahigkeit zu evozieren, so dass die Vieldimensionalitat des Verstehens thematisiert und nach Funktion, Leistung und Grenzen des Verstehens vor allem in Philosophie, Geistes- und Naturwissenschaft gefragt werden kann. Mit Beitragen von Christina Brandt, Selin Gerlek, Julia Gruevska, Felix Huttemann, Bernhard Irrgang, Gudrun Kuhne-Bertram, Hans-Ulrich Lessing, Kevin Liggieri, Kate Meyer-Drawe, Sabine Ohlenbusch, Tobias Schlicht, Gunter Scholtz und Volker Steenblock. (shrink)

This volume considers the numerous philosophical ideas and arguments found in and inspired by the critically acclaimed series Breaking Bad. This show garnered both critical and popular attention for its portrayal of a cancer-stricken, middle-aged, middle-class, high school chemistry teacher’s drift into the dark world of selling methamphetamine to support his family. Its characters, situations, and aesthetic raise serious and familiar philosophical issues, especially related to ethics and morality. The show provokes a bevy of rich questions and discussion points, such (...) as: What are the ethical issues surrounding drugs? What lessons about existentialism and fatalism does the show present? How does the show grapple with the concept of the end ‘justifying’ the means? Is Walt really free not to ‘break bad’? Can he be redeemed? What is the definition and nature of badness itself? Contributors address these and other questions as they dissect the legacy of the show and discuss its contributions to philosophical conversations. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Nancy identifies Rousseau as the first to conceive community as a lost state of immediacy and transparency. Rousseau’s conception has allegedly shaped the western ideal of an immanent community. Nancy deconstructs that ideal, arguing that immanence would suppress community; its oneness would block the being-with which enables our ontological being-in-common. This article argues that Rousseau never posits a lost community but actually explores, like Nancy, the political closure of immanence. Man’s distinguishing trait of perfectibility, which renders him finite, always (...) open to change for better or worse, rejects the self-enclosure of immanence as does the constant willing of the general will which defines a community’s political life. If citizens could form an immanent whole, they would have nothing left to will, reaching an inhuman situation without liberty, reflection and responsibility. A community’s vitality, as Rousseau’s discussion of Poland suggests, does not come from closure to th.. (shrink)

The Abolition of Man, C. S. Lewis's masterpiece in ethics and the philosophy of science,warns of the danger of combining modern moral skepticism with the technological pursuit of human desires. The end result is the final destruction of human nature. From Brave New World to Star Trek, from Steampunk to starships, science fiction film has considered from nearly every conceivable angle the same nexus of morality, technology, and humanity of which C. S. Lewis wrote. As a result,science fiction film has (...) unintentionally given us stunning depictions of Lewis's terrifying vision of the future. In Science Fiction and the Abolition of Man: Finding C. S. Lewis in Sci-Fi Film and Television, scholars of religion, philosophy, literature, and film explore the connections between sci-fi film and the three parts of Lewis's book:how sci-fi portrays "Men Without Chests" incapable of responding properly to moral good, how it teaches the Tao or "The Way," and how it portrays "The Abolition of Man.". (shrink)

Tommy J. Curry’s Another white Man’s Burden presents a rigorous intellectual history of Josiah Royce’s essays on race. Curry explains the several arguments that Royce made on this topic between 1900 and 1908, and he situates these within Royce’s social philosophy and some contemporaneous literatures on racism. The result is a comprehensive theory of cultural assimilation informed by an idealist metaphysics. Royce, namely, disdained segregation and rejected biological accounts of racial difference. But Royce scholars have wrongly taken these observations, Curry (...) argues, as evidence that their hero held progressive views on race. Royce rather began from the premise of Anglo-American cultural superiority, and... (shrink)

in early 2019, the josiah royce society arranged two Author Meets Critics sessions on Tommy J. Curry’s Another white Man’s Burden: Josiah Royce’s Quest for a Philosophy of white Racial Empire. The first was held in New York City, at the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting. The second was at the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, in Columbus, Ohio. The sessions were vibrant and well-attended. With the exception of a few tendentious questions at (...) the close of the second meeting, however, our sessions lacked the element of controversy that is customary in discussions of racism in the history of philosophy. The panelists and the audience alike rather... (shrink)

This paper argues that two distinct models of resistance are to be found in Foucault's work. The first, tactical reversal, is predicated on the idea that conflict is inherent to power relations, the strategical model of power, and thus that a specific configuration of power and knowledge can be thwarted by reversing the mechanisms whereby this relation is sustained. The second, the aesthetics of existence, is based in the governmental model of power and holds that it is possible to forge (...) autonomous forms of life in and through such techniques of governance. I argue that Foucault came to favor the latter of these two alternatives because the model of power underlying resistance as tactical reversal proved insufficient both historically and conceptually. It was thus on this basis that he was able to work out the governmental conception of power relations and thereby accord a fundamental role to the concept of resistance as autonomy or self-formation. The key to understanding how this project is not only practical, but is also our obligation lies in the genealogy of the critical attitude that Foucault was developing in his final years. (shrink)

The target article appeals to recent empirical data to support the idea that there is more to phenomenality than is available to access consciousness. However, this claim is based on an unwarranted assumption, namely, that some kind of cortical processing must be phenomenal. The article also considerably weakens Block's original distinction between a truly nonfunctional phenomenal consciousness and a functional access consciousness. The new form of phenomenal consciousness seems to be a poor-man's cognitive access.

Ulrich liebt sich selbst nicht. Die Sympathie ist ihm fremd. Durch seine Liebe zu Agathe lernt er eine Art Selbstliebe kennen. Wie verhalten sich diese drei Eigenschaften Ulrichs zueinander? Wie verhalten sie sich zu Ulrichs Verhältnis zu Möglichkeiten und zu dem, was er sein und nicht sein soll ? Wie soll man solche Fragen beantworten?