1. Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Performance: What Exactly Constitutes a “Critical Mass?”.Jasmin Joecks, Kerstin Pull & Karin Vetter - 2013 - Journal of Business Ethics 118 (1):61-72.
    The under-representation of women on boards is a heavily discussed topic—not only in Germany. Based on critical mass theory and with the help of a hand-collected panel dataset of 151 listed German firms for the years 2000–2005, we explore whether the link between gender diversity and firm performance follows a U-shape. Controlling for reversed causality, we find evidence for gender diversity to at first negatively affect firm performance and—only after a “critical mass” of about 30 % women has been reached—to (...)
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    Female Executives and Perceived Employer Attractiveness: On the Potentially Adverse Signal of Having a Female CHRO Rather Than a Female CFO.Anja Iseke & Kerstin Pull - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 156 (4):1113-1133.
    We investigate whether female executives influence perceived employer attractiveness for female job seekers. Drawing on signaling theory, we argue that female members in top management may signal organizational justice and organizational support and may therefore enhance perceived employer attractiveness. Findings from a scenario experiment with 357 participants indicate that female job seekers are more attracted to an organization with a female executive holding a non-stereotypical office [such as Chief Financial Officer ] as compared to an organization with an all-male top (...)
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    Entitlement and the Efficiency-Equality Trade-Off: An Experimental Study. [REVIEW]Agnes Bäker, Werner Güth, Kerstin Pull & Manfred Stadler - 2014 - Theory and Decision 76 (2):225-240.
    When randomly assigning participants to experimental roles and the according payment prospects, participants seem to receive “manna from heaven.” In our view, this seriously questions the validity of laboratory findings. We depart from this by auctioning off player roles via the incentive compatible random price mechanism thus avoiding the selection effect of competitive second price auctions. Our experiment employs the generosity game where the proposer chooses the size of the pie, facing an exogenously given own agreement payoff, and the responder (...)
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