This edition is the first to present the text as it originally appeared, indicating the changes Carlyle made to later editions. Appendices contain Carlyle's own extensive commentaries on his work.

Introduction -- Globalization, human rights and the environment -- Human rights : moral authority and philosophical doubts -- The contemporary human rights regime : some criticisms and an alternative -- Environmental sustainability and environmental values -- The institutions of sustainability : citizenship, democracy and justice -- Rights or sustainability; rights and sustainability?

This book provides students with a concise introduction to the philosophy of methodology. The book stands apart from existing methodology texts by clarifying in a student-friendly and engaging way distinctions between philosophical positions, paradigms of inquiry, methodology and methods. Building an understanding of the relationships and distinctions between philosophical positions and paradigms is an essential part of the research process and integral to deploying the methodology and methods best suited for a research project, thesis or dissertation.

This research compares and analyzes the verbal commentary of televised coverage of two women's and men's athletic events: the “final four” of the women's and men's 1989 National Collegiate Athletic Association basketball tournaments and the women's and men's singles, women's and men's doubles, and the mixed-doubles matches of the 1989 U.S. Open tennis tournament. Although we found less overtly sexist commentary than has been observed in past research, we did find two categories of difference: gender marking and a “hierarchy of (...) naming” by gender and, to a certain extent, by race. These differences are described and analyzed in light of feminist analyses of gendered language. It is concluded that televised sports commentary contributes to the construction of gender and racial hierarchies by marking women's sports and women athletes as “other,” by infantilizing women athletes, and by framing the accomplishments of women athletes ambivalently. (shrink)

Certainly I am in no way opposed to philosophy, or metaphysics in the sense that Wm. James defined it as a particularly intense effort to think clearly. Indeed, Klein would like to say that what I am talking about is nothing but metaphysics. But the kind of philosophy/metaphysics that is needed here is of a particular kind: a kind that does not separate philosophy/metaphysics and physics into two disjoint realms. It is of the kind that seeks to construct useful testable (...) physical theories that are adequately connected to what we can know. (shrink)

Is there life after death? Can we prove the big bang theory? In his engrossing and accessible style, Dr Kerry Spackman uses everyday examples to answer these questions and other diverse issues. the Ant and the Ferrari is a magical tour-de-force that takes on the big questions in life and answers them in Dr Kerry Spackman's easily accessible writing style. this is one of those rare books that will change your beliefs - and in doing so will change (...) your life. tHE ANt AND tHE FERRARI offers readers a clear, navigable path through the big questions that confront us all today. What is the meaning of life? Can we be ethical beings in today's world? Can we know if there is life after death? Is there such a thing as Absolute truth? What caused the Big Bang and why should you care? (shrink)

Written by specialist practitioners with vast teaching experience, this is a unique, timely and accessible text that reinforces a contemporary focus on professionalism in medical practice.

Volume 1 (c2015) The heavens and the earth -- Nature, number and substance -- The shape and motion of the heavens -- Harmony and complexity -- Earth at the center of the world -- The world of Ptolemy -- Measuring the tropical Year -- Geometrical tools -- The sun, the moon and the calendar -- From Astronomy to cartography -- Climates and continents -- Heliocentrism: hypothesis or truth? -- Earth as a wandering star -- Re-ordering the heavenly spheres -- Celestial (...) physics -- Broken spheres -- Kepler's third law -- Kepler's first and second laws -- Mountains on the moon -- The Medician stars -- The luminosity of variable stars -- Galactic spectra -- Measuring astronomical distances -- A new theory of gravity -- Euclid, Gauss and Mercury's orbit -- A finite universe with no boundary -- The structure of the universe -- Measuring the potentially infinite -- The birth of the Big Bang -- The primeval atom. (shrink)

Explains how and why laws against human germline modification will do more harm than good.

This book is hoped to be only the beginning of explorations of the ancient Egyptian notion of upholding Order (Ma'at) through violence. Because of the scope of the topic, this study is limited to the most extreme measure of violence perpetrated in the service of Order: sanctioned killing. This study explores texts that affirm the proper occasions for such killings, and the religious framework behind these actions."--Publisher's website.

I argue for an account of grasping, or understanding that, on which we grasp via a higher-order mental act of Husserlian fulfillment. Fulfillment is the act of matching up the objects of our phenomenally presentational experiences with those of our phenomenally representational thought. Grasping-by-fulfilling is importantly different from standard epistemic aims, in part because it is phenomenal rather than inferential. (I endorse Bourget’s 2017 arguments to that effect.) I show that grasping-by-fulfilling cannot be a species of propositional knowledge or belief, (...) and that it is not essentially connected to justification. I motivate a revisionary epistemology on which achieving propositional knowledge and coming to grasp are dual epistemic aims. My account makes sense of a common occurrence—that we are often unmoved to act on our beliefs until we come to phenomenally experience them in some way. It also explains puzzling features of human inquiry. (shrink)

While provisions of youth sports concussion laws are very similar, little is known as to how they are being implemented, factors that promote or impede implementation, or the level of compliance in each jurisdiction. We aimed to describe state experiences with implementation in order to inform ongoing efforts to reduce the harm of sports-related traumatic brain injury and to guide future evaluations of the laws’ impacts and the development of future public health laws. We conducted key-informant interviews in 35 states (...) with recently enacted concussion legislation. States varied considerably in their readiness and capacity for implementation. Factors facilitating implementation included existing partnerships, procedures, and resources; centralized implementation authority; prior related efforts; and involvement in the policymaking process by those now charged with implementation. Inhibitors included ambiguous statutory language, unclear delegation of authority, and compliance difficulties. Ongoing challenges persist, including primary prevention; determining which providers are qualified to make return-to-play assessments and contents of those assessments; compliance difficulties in rural and under-served areas; and unclear responsibility for enforcement. Despite the similarity of youth sports concussion laws, early evidence suggests there is considerable variation in their implementation. These findings are critical for ongoing empirical investigations to accurately evaluate the laws’ provisions and to identify successful legal approaches to protecting young athletes. (shrink)

Over the past decade, a flurry of media stories devoted to sports-related concussions have drawn attention to the previously “silent epidemic” of traumatic brain injury in athletes. From 2001 to 2009, the annual number of sports-related TBI emergency department visits in individuals age 19 and under climbed from 153,375 to 248,414, an increase of increase of 62 percent. Multiple head injuries place youth athletes at risk for serious health conditions, including cerebral swelling, brain herniation, and even death — postconcussive conditions (...) that have collectively been referred to as “second impact syndrome.” Studies have shown that children and teens — and girls, in particular — are more likely to sustain a concussion and have a longer recovery time than adults. Recent research also suggests that even subconcussive hits in children and adolescents may result in longer-term health effects such as decreased cognitive functioning, increased rates of depression, memory problems, and mild cognitive impairment. (shrink)

The pull to coordinate with other individuals is fundamental, serving as the basis for our social connectedness to others. Discussed is a dynamical and ecological perspective to joint action, an approach that embeds the individual’s mind in a body and the body in a niche, a physical and social environment. Research on uninstructed coordination of simple incidental rhythmic movement, along with research on goal‐directed, embodied cooperation, is reviewed. Finally, recent research is discussed that extends the coordination and cooperation studies, examining (...) how synchronizing with another, and how emergent social units of perceiving and acting are reflected in people’s feelings of connection to others. (shrink)

The number of colleges and universities with campus agriculture projects in the US has grown from an estimated 23 in 1992 to nearly 300 today with possible increased numbers predicted. The profile emerging from campus agriculture projects looks a lot different from the traditional land grant colleges of agriculture. In spite of this emergent trend and staunch advocacy for campus agriculture projects, limited empirical research on agriculture-based learning in higher education exists outside agriculture degrees and theoretical work of scholars such (...) as Liberty Hyde Bailey and David Orr. This study explored the diversity of characteristics and pedagogical objectives of emerging campus agriculture projects through a nationwide compilation, surveying campus agriculture project directors and educators, and multiple case studies. Data collected gives empirical evidence supporting claims agriculture is taking on a different identity in higher education. Issues of sustainability, food, and agriculture are not only influencing the physical workings of colleges and universities, but pedagogy on a departmental and institutional scale. Findings illustrate a re-visioning of how higher education is interfacing with agriculture and agriculture-based education beyond traditional agriculture degrees at land grant colleges of agriculture to focus teaching sustainability, critical thinking and inquiry skills, and fostering a sense of belonging to community. (shrink)

I explore the view that metaphysics is essentially imaginative. I argue that the central goal of metaphysics on this view is understanding, not truth. Metaphysics-as-essentially-imaginative provides novel answers to challenges to both the value and epistemic status of metaphysics.

In this article, I address concerns that the ontological priority claims definitive of ontic structural realism are as they stand unclear, and I do so by placing these claims on a more rigorous formal footing than they typically have been hitherto. I first of all argue that Kit Fine’s analysis of ontological dependence furnishes us with an ontological priority relation that is particularly apt for structuralism. With that in place, and with reference to two case studies prominent within the structuralist (...) literature, I consider whether any of structuralism’s distinctive priority claims may be regarded as warranted. The discussion as a whole has largely negative implications for the radical structuralism of French and Ladyman (including their ‘eliminativist’ interpretation of it), largely positive implications for the moderate structuralism primarily advocated by Esfeld and Lam, and some broad lessons for contemporary fundamentalist metaphysics as a whole. 1 Introduction2 The Right Priority Relation for Structuralism: Supervenience or Dependence?3 Introducing Ontological Dependence4 Fine’s System5 The Priority of Structure 1: Entangled Quantum Particles6 The Priority of Structure 2: The Group-Theoretic Conception of Elementary Particles7 Concluding Remarks. (shrink)

I first quickly outline what I think grasping is, and suggest that it is both among our basic aims of inquiry and not essentially tied to belief, justification, or knowledge. Then, I briefly look at some places in the metaphysics of science in which it looks like our aim of grasping and our aim in knowing—or perhaps more specifically in knowing the explanations for things—might seem to conflict. I will use this conflict to support a broader view: sometimes, we might (...) develop philosophical views or theories—and even endorse them—in order to better grasp them, regardless of whether we genuinely believe them, or are justified in so doing. At other times, we may be aiming at propositional knowledge. These aims can come apart, and perhaps even systematically come apart. A pluralism about the value of those aims doesn’t entail an “anything goes” attitude with respect to how we think about what philosophical views to put forward, defend, or endorse, however—far from it. Instead, it suggests that what counts as a virtue of a philosophical theory depends on our aims in espousing it. If philosophers have distinct aims at the meta-level, it will be hard for them to engage in joint theory evaluation at the first-order level. At least all three of theoretical virtues, evaluative judgments of philosophical views, and what attitudes we ought to have towards the views we ourselves espouse will vary according to our guiding metaphilosophical aims. (shrink)

Ontic structural realism is a thesis of fundamentality metaphysics: the thesis that structure, not objects, has fundamental status. Claimed as the metaphysic most befitting of modern physics, OSR first emerged as an entreaty to eliminate objects from the metaphysics of fundamental physics. Such elimination was urged by Steven French and James Ladyman on the grounds that only it could resolve the ‘underdetermination of metaphysics by physics’ that they claimed reduced any putative objectual commitment to a merely ‘ersatz’ form of realism. (...) Few, however, have joined French and Ladyman either in acknowledging that such underdetermination exists or in attributing to it such drastic consequences. However, an alternative view that physics does sanction objects, albeit merely as ontologically secondary entities, represents a different and seemingly less extreme route to the same conclusion regarding the fundamentality of structure. But since what it means to be ‘ontologically prior’ is itself a vexed philosophical question, a stance must be taken as to how we are to understand priority before its prospects may be evaluated. In an earlier paper, I outlined how Fine’s notion of ontological dependence might be utilized to defend the priority-based approach to structuralism. Since then, however, I have become convinced that that ontological dependence is not a relation of priority after all. As a result, the arguments outlined in that paper stand in need of reassessment. In this work, I consider the prospects for priority-based structuralism when expressed in the idiom of determination. My conclusion will be that it has yet to be vindicated by our best physical theories, owing to the failure of symmetry structures to determine the world’s inventory of fundamental kinds. Nevertheless, the same symmetry considerations point towards there being renewed prospects for eliminativism—an eliminativism, moreover, of more naturalistic appeal than that hitherto associated with OSR. 1Introduction 2Structuralist Strategies 3Defining Ontological Priority: Dependence or Determination? 4Structuralism in the Idiom of Determination 4.1Determining plurality 4.2Determining kind properties 5A Reinvigorated Eliminativism. (shrink)

Logical realism is the view that there is logical structure in the world. I argue that, if logical realism is true, then we are deeply ignorant of that logical structure: either we can’t know which of our logical concepts accurately capture it, or none of our logical concepts accurately capture it at all. I don’t suggest abandoning logical realism, but instead discuss how realists should adjust their methodology in the face of this ignorance.

Many philosophers take purportedly logical cases of ground ) to be obvious cases, and indeed such cases have been used to motivate the existence of and importance of ground. I argue against this. I do so by motivating two kinds of semantic determination relations. Intuitions of logical ground track these semantic relations. Moreover, our knowledge of semantics for first order logic can explain why we have such intuitions. And, I argue, neither semantic relation can be a species of ground even (...) on a quite broad conception of what ground is. Hence, without a positive argument for taking so-called ‘logical ground’ to be something distinct from a semantic determination relation, we should cease treating logical cases as cases of ground. (shrink)

Abstract‘Logical Realism’ is taken to mean many different things. I argue that if reality has a privileged structure, then a view I call metaphysical logical realism is true. The view says that, first, there is ‘One True Logic’; second, that the One True Logic is made true by the mind‐and‐language‐independent world; and third, that the mind‐and‐language‐independent world makes it the case that the One True Logic is better than any other logic at capturing the structure of reality. Along the way, (...) I discuss a few alternatives, and clarify two distinct kinds of metaphysical logical realism. (shrink)

A priori metaphysics has come under repeated attack by naturalistic metaphysicians, who take their closer connection to the sciences to confer greater epistemic credentials on their theories. But it is hard to see how this can be so unless the problem of theory change that has for so long vexed philosophers of science can be addressed in the context of scientific metaphysics. This paper argues that canonical metaphysical claims, unlike their scientific counterparts, cannot meaningfully be regarded as ‘approximately true,’ and (...) that this means that the epistemic progress that science arguably enjoys through episodes of theory change cannot be expected to transfer to its metaphysics. What the value of engaging in metaphysics of science before the emergence of a final theory becomes correspondingly unclear. (shrink)

Anthropology of Consciousness, EarlyView.

A suite of questions concerning fundamentality lies at the heart of contemporary metaphysics. The relation of grounding, thought to connect the more to the less fundamental, sits at the heart of those debates in turn. Since most contemporary metaphysicians embrace the doctrine of physicalism and thus hold that reality is fundamentally physical, a natural question is how physics can inform the current debates over fundamentality and grounding. This Element introduces the reader to the concept of grounding and some of the (...) key issues that animate contemporary debates around it, such as the question of whether grounding is 'unified' or 'plural' and whether there exists a fundamental level of reality. It moves on to show how resources from physics can help point the way towards their answers - thus furthering the case for a naturalistic approach to even the most fundamental of questions in metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper proposes a reformulation of the treatment of boundaries, at parts and aggregates of entities in Basic Formal Ontology. These are currently treated as mutually exclusive, which is inadequate for biological representation since some entities may simultaneously be at parts, boundaries and/or aggregates. We introduce functions which map entities to their boundaries, at parts or aggregations. We make use of time, space and spacetime projection functions which, along the way, allow us to develop a simple temporal theory.

Much of the neuroimaging research has focused on how mathematical operations are performed. Although this body of research has provided insight for the refinement of pedagogy, there are very few neuroimaging studies on how mathematical operations should be taught. In this article, we describe the teaching of algebra in Singapore schools and the imperatives that led us to develop two neuroimaging studies that examined questions of curricular concerns. One of the challenges was to condense issues from classrooms into tasks suitable (...) for neuroimaging studies. Another challenge, not particular to the neuroimaging method, was to draw suitable inferences from the findings and translate them into pedagogical practices. We describe our efforts and outline some continuing challenges. (shrink)

Ontic structural realism is at its core the view that “structure is ontologically fundamental.” Informed from its inception by the scientific revolutions that punctuated the 20th century, its advocates often present the position as the perspective on ontology best befitting of modern physics. But the idea that structure is fundamental has proved difficult to articulate adequately, and what OSR's claimed naturalistic credentials consist in is hard to precisify as well. Nor is it clear that the position is actually supported by (...) our most fundamental physical theories. What is clear, however, is that structuralists have revealed a seam of material at the core of modern physics that is replete with implications for metaphysics. This article will survey some positions subsumed under the rubric of OSR, considering both their warrant and the interconnections that exist between them. It will be argued that the fundamental kind properties pose a challenge to ontic structuralism, because it seems that these properties do not supervene upon the relevant structures. But it will also be argued that the development of structuralist metaphysics will require both an engagement with the details of modern physical theories and the deployment of tools more typically developed in a priori metaphysics. As such, it seems armchair metaphysicians have not just a stake in whether OSR's claims may ultimately be shown to stand up, but a crucial role to play in getting them to the point where they can be subjected to scrutiny in the first place. (shrink)

This study presents a critical discourse analysis of YouTube comments below five videos of the Johnny Depp v Amber Heard trial, which was live streamed by the platform in April and May 2022. The analysis examines the discursive resources used by commenters to construct domestic abuse. Commenters draw on three interpretive repertoires: ‘Perfect Victim’, ‘Mutual Abuse’ and ‘Dangerous Women’. The analysis explores the way these repertoires are used to rebut Heard’s allegations of abuse by mobilising the perfect victim repertoire to (...) refute any claim she has to this experience, and the mutual abuse repertoire to implicate Heard in the abuse and minimise blame for Depp. Through establishing gender-symmetry in domestic abuse and drawing on traditional gender norms for each party, commenters construct the dangerous women repertoire to depict Heard as crazy, pathological and violent. The key implication of this study is that public constructions of domestic abuse can directly impact the attitudes and treatment of both victims and perpetrators. In this instance, they serve to maintain the oppression and control of women within anti-feminist narratives of female dominance, currently led by men’s rights activists and conservative outlets. (shrink)

The hypothesis that play behavior is more prevalent in larger-brained animals has recently been challenged. It may be, for example, that only certain brain structures are related to play. Here, we analyze social play behavior with regards to the cerebellum: a structure strongly implicated in motor-development, and possibly also in cognitive skills. We present an evolutionary analysis of social play and the cerebellum, using a phylogenetic comparative method. Social play frequency and relative cerebellum size are positively correlated. Hence, there appears (...) to be a link between the evolutionary elaboration of social play and the cerebellum. (shrink)

This paper aims to open up discussion on the relationship between fundamentality and naturalism, and in particular on the question of whether fundamentality may be denied on naturalistic grounds. A historico-inductive argument for an anti-fundamentalist conclusion, prominent within contemporary metaphysical literature, is examined; finding it wanting, an alternative ‘internal’ strategy is proposed. By means of an example from the history of modern physics - namely S-matrix theory - it is demonstrated that this strategy can generate similar anti-fundamentalist conclusions on more (...) defensible naturalistic grounds, and that fundamentality questions can be empirical questions. Some implications and limitations of the proposed approach are discussed. (shrink)

I argue that, in order for us to be justified in believing that two theories are metaphysically equivalent, we must be able to conceive of them as unified into a single theory, which says nothing over and above either of them. I propose one natural way of precisifying this condition, and show that the quantifier variantist cannot meet it. I suggest that the quantifier variantist cannot meet the more general condition either, and argue that this gives the metaphysical realist a (...) way to rule out theses like quantifier variance without appealing to fundamentality, grounding, or "levels" of reality. (shrink)

In metaphysics, the fundamental is standardly equated with that which has no explana- tion – with that which is, in other words, ‘brute’. But this doctrine of brutalism is in tension with physicists’ ambitions to not only describe but also explain why the fundamental is as it is. The tension would ease were science taken to be incapable of furnishing the sort of explanations that brutalism is concerned with, given that these are understood to be dis- tinctively ‘metaphysical’ in character. (...) But to assume this is to assume a sharp demarcation between physics and metaphysics that surely cannot be taken for granted. This paper sets out to examine the standing of brutalism from the perspective of contem- porary fundamental physics, together with theories of explanation drawn from philosophy of science and metaphysics. Focusing on what fundamental kinds the world instantiates and how physicists go about determining them, I argue that a partial explanation, in Hempel’s sense, may be given of this fundamental feature. Moreover, since this partial explanation issues, at least in part, from stipulations as to the essential nature of the kinds involved, I claim that it has as much right to be regarded as a metaphysical explanation as do grounding explanations. As such, my conclusion will be that the doctrine of brutalism can no longer be regarded as tenable: at least modulo certain plausible essentialist assumptions, it is no longer the case that no explanation can be given of the fundamental. (shrink)

The view that it is symmetries, not particles, that are fundamental to nature is frequently expressed by physicists. But comparatively little has been written either on what this claim means or whether it should be regarded as true. After placing the claim into a general fundamentality framework, I consider whether the priority of symmetries over particles can be defended. The conclusions drawn are largely negative.

Psychiatric patients may try (or express a desire) to injure themselves in hospital in order to cope with overwhelming emotional pain. Some health care practitioners and patients propose allowing a controlled amount of self-injury to occur in inpatient facilities, so as to prevent escalation of distress. Is this approach an example of professional assistance with harm? Or, is the approach more likely to minimise harm, by ensuring safer self-injury? In this article, I argue that health care practitioners who use harm-minimisation (...) can be considered to be helping physical injury to occur, although they do not encourage the act. I consider why there are compelling reasons to believe that a patient who self-injures is not maximally autonomous in relation to that choice. However, I then move onto argue that allowing a degree of self-injury may enable engagement with psychotherapy (enhancing autonomy) and behavioural change. In these circumstances, allowing injury (with precautions) may not be harm, all things considered. (shrink)

The most striking region of structural differentiation of a eukaryotic chromosome is the kinetochore. This chromosomal domain plays an integral role in the stability and propagation of genetic material to the progeny cells during cell division. The DNA component of this structure, which we refer to as the centromere, has been localized to a small region of 220–250 base pairs within the chromosomes from the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae. The centromere DNA (CEN) is organized in a unique structure in the cell (...) nucleus and is required for chromosome stability during both mitotic and meiotic cell cycles. The centromeres from one chromosome can stabilize small circular minichromosomes or other yeast chromosomes. The centromeres may therefore interact with the same components of the segregation apparatus regardless of the chromosome in which they reside. The CEN DNA does not encode any regulatory RNAs or proteins, but rather is a cis‐acting element that provides genetic stability to adjacent DNA sequences. (shrink)

We claim that if a complete philosophy of evidence-based practice is intended, then attention to the nature of causation in health science is necessary. We identify how health science currently conceptualises causation by the way it prioritises some research methods over others. We then show how the current understanding of what causation is serves to constrain scientific progress. An alternative account of causation is offered. This is one of dispositionalism. We claim that by understanding causation from a dispositionalist stance, many (...) of the processes within an evidence-based practice framework are better accounted for. Further, some of the problems associated with the health research, e.g. external validity of causal findings, dissolve. (shrink)