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Kent Hurtig [6]Kent Ingvar Hurtig [1]
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  1.  32
    The Fitting Attitudes Analysis of Value: An Explanatory Challenge.Kent Hurtig - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3241-3249.
    This paper is concerned with the implication from value to fittingness. I shall argue that those committed to this implication face a serious explanatory challenge. This argument is not intended as a knock-down argument against FA but it will, I think, show that those who endorse the theory incur a particular explanatory burden: to explain how counterfactual favouring of actual value is possible. After making two important preliminary points I briefly discuss an objection to FA made by Krister Bykvist a (...)
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  2.  74
    Internalism and Accidie.Kent Ingvar Hurtig - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (3):517 - 543.
    Bernard Williams has famously argued that there are only “internal” reasons for action. Although Williams has produced several, slightly different versions of internalism over the years, one core idea has remained the same: the reasons a person has for acting must be essentially linked to, derived from, or in some other way connected to, that person’s “subjective motivational set”. I have two aims in this paper. First, after having cleared up some initial ambiguities, I try to show that Williams’s internalism (...)
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  3. The Wrong Kind of Value.Kent Hurtig - unknown
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  4. Why Internalists About Reasons Should Be Humeans About Motivation.Kent Hurtig - 2010 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan.
  5.  28
    Correction To: The Fitting Attitudes Analysis of Value: An Explanatory Challenge.Kent Hurtig - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3251-3252.
    Few errors were identified in the original publication of the article. The corrections are as follows.
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  6.  23
    Why Should I Be Moral? : Toward a Defence of the Categoricity and Normative Authority of Moral Considerations.Kent Hurtig - 2004 - Dissertation, St. Andrews
    Can we ever be fully practically justified in acting contrary to moral demands? My contention is that the answer is 'no'. I argue that by adopting a 'buck-passing' account of wrongness we can provide a philosophically satisfying answer to the familiar 'why should I be moral?'. In working my way toward the buck-passing account of wrongness, I outline the metaethical and 'metanormative' assumptions on which my theory stands. I also consider and reject the 'internalist' answer to 'why should I be (...)
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  7.  60
    On Prima Facie Obligations and Nonmonotonicity.Kent Hurtig - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (5):599 - 604.