Aworkshop was held August 26–28, 2015, by the Earth- Life Science Institute (ELSI) Origins Network (EON, see Appendix I) at the Tokyo Institute of Technology. This meeting gathered a diverse group of around 40 scholars researching the origins of life (OoL) from various perspectives with the intent to find common ground, identify key questions and investigations for progress, and guide EON by suggesting a roadmap of activities. Specific challenges that the attendees were encouraged to address included the following: What key (...) questions, ideas, and investigations should the OoL research community address in the near and long term? How can this community better organize itself and prioritize its efforts? What roles can particular subfields play, and what can ELSI and EON do to facilitate research progress? (See also Appendix II.) The present document is a product of that workshop; a white paper that serves as a record of the discussion that took place and a guide and stimulus to the solution of the most urgent and important issues in the study of the OoL. This paper is not intended to be comprehensive or a balanced representation of the opinions of the entire OoL research community. It is intended to present a number of important position statements that contain many aspirational goals and suggestions as to how progress can be made in understanding the OoL. The key role played in the field by current societies and recurring meetings over the past many decades is fully acknowledged, including the International Society for the Study of the Origin of Life (ISSOL) and its official journal Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres, as well as the International Society for Artificial Life (ISAL). (shrink)

In this article Kobayashi Toshiaki discusses the importance in all periods of Karatani’s oeuvre of the notion of an “exterior” that necessarily falls beyond the bounds of a system, together with the notion of “singularity” as that which cannot be contained within a “universal.” The existential dread vis-à-vis the uncanny other that Karatani in his early works of literary criticism had initially found to be the underlying tone in Sōseki’s works remained with Karatani himself throughout his career and is (...) what had drawn him closer to philosophy. This sense of the “exterior” to—or other than—the normality of consciousness and the meaningfulness of the world is then extended and applied as the “exterior to systems” in his analyses of logical, mathematical, and linguistic systems, in his reading of Marx’s discussion of capitalist economics, and most recently in his analysis of commodity exchange between communities. (shrink)

The propositional fragment L 1 of Leniewski's ontology is the smallest class (of formulas) containing besides all the instances of tautology the formulas of the forms: (a, b) (a, a), (a, b) (b,). (a, c) and (a, b) (b, c). (b, a) being closed under detachment. The purpose of this paper is to furnish another more constructive proof than that given earlier by one of us for: Theorem A is provable in L 1 iff TA is a thesis of first-order (...) predicate logic with equality, where T is a translation of the formulas of L 1 into those of first-order predicate logic with equality such that T(a, b) = FblxFax (Russeltian-type definite description), TA B = TA TB, T A = TA, etc. (shrink)

I first present a historical summary on the complex issue called “sustainable development.” Then, I discuss my understanding of Gash’s propositions that radical constructivism facilitates ….

How is it possible to say that truth can be of one kind at the conventional level and totally different in the ultimate plane? As Matilal ( 1971 , p. 154) points out, Kumārila (ca. 600–650), a Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, claims that the Buddhist doctrine of two truths is “a kind of philosophical ‘double-talk’.” It is Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750–810), a Buddhist logician, who tries to give a direct answer to this question posed by Kumārila from the Buddhist side. He argues that (...) even a Mīmāṃsaka cannot demonstrate the validity ( prāmāṇya ) of the Veda without accepting two truth levels. His point is this. Consider the proposition to be proved: the Veda is valid. If the Veda is already known as valid, then it is useless to prove this proposition. But if it is already known as invalid, then it is impossible to prove this proposition. Therefore in the argument to prove the proposition, the Veda is not to be regarded either as valid or as invalid. This means that at the first stage of the argument one has the concept of the Veda as neutral in validity. However, as soon as one acquires the knowledge of the Veda as valid through the argument, one has to repudiate such a conception of the Veda. The acceptance of the Veda as neutral in validity is to the acceptance of the Veda as valid as the conventional truth is to the ultimate truth. (shrink)

It has been suggested that preparing to teach and teaching are conditionally effective in enhancing one’s own learning. This paper focuses on interactivity—the level of teacher-student interaction in expected or actual teaching—as the potential key to understanding and controlling the variability in the effectiveness of learning by preparing to teach and teaching. By summarizing and reanalyzing the results of previous studies, I suggest that the learning benefits of studying with the expectation of direct teaching (i.e., teaching a student face-to-face) are (...) greater than those of studying with the expectation of indirect teaching (i.e., teaching a student indirectly by creating a lecture video, providing written explanations, or using other means) and that learning by direct teaching surpasses learning by explaining to oneself or indirect teaching at least after preparing to do so. Next, three candidate explanations for the impact of interactivity are discussed: the advantages of asking and answering questions, obtaining additional information about and from one’s student, and enhancing one’s motivation to process learning material deeply while preparing to teach and teaching. Finally, I conclude with the remaining questions and directions for future research. (shrink)

We argue that the proper context for understanding Collingwood’s The Principles of Art is his claim that it has bearing “upon the condition of art in England in 1937”. We thus argue that he formulated a philosophical argument that underpins avant-garde dramatic poetry and theatrical practices (Eliot, Auden and the Group Theatre), taking his interpretation of Spinoza’s Ethics 5 prop. 3 to be the book’s central thesis: it is through art that one knows, against the ‘corruption of consciousness’, what emotions (...) one feels and recognizes them as one’s own. Collingwood further believed that this could only be achieved through collaboration between the artist and the community, validating new theatrical practices involving interaction with the audience. We analyse these views in the context of England in 1937: in an era marked by the rise of Fascism and Nazism, Collingwood believed that art thus conceived could help restoring emotional support for the defense of liberal democracies. We conclude with an exploration of parallels with and divergences from the Spinozist idea of ‘mobilizing affects’ in contemporary ‘left populism’ (Mouffe). (shrink)

Cet article examine le rapport entre l’Idée platonicienne du Bien et l’au-delà de l’essence de Levinas.

The title of Marnie Hughes-Warrington's study, 'How Good an Historian Shall I Be?', is taken from a 1930 pam-phlet by Collingwood, in which, assuming that 'there are as many historians as there are human beings', he inferred that 'the question is not 'Shall I be an historian or not?' but How good an historian shall I be?'' . Hughes-Warrington takes this to be 'probably the most important question we can ask' . Indeed, she believes that 'historical education' is 'a duty (...) that we all must bear for our sake and for the sake of civilisation' . Hughes-Warrington thus situates proper histori-cal education within the wider process of civilization; this leitmotif being taken from Collingwood, for whom educa-tion is the means 'by which a civilisation keeps itself alive from one generation to the next'. (shrink)

The Fist-Edge-Palm task, a manual hand task, has been used to detect frontal dysfunctions in clinical situations: its performance failures are observed in various prefrontal cortex -related disorders, including schizophrenia. However, previous imaging studies reported that the performance of the FEP task activated motor-related areas, but not the PFC. Here, we aimed to investigate the relationships between the performance of the FEP task and PFC functions. Hemodynamic activity in the PFC, including the dorsolateral PFC and frontal pole, was recorded. Healthy (...) young subjects performed the FEP task as well as a palm tapping task three times. The subjects also completed a Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and Schizotypal Personality Scale questionnaire. We found that hemodynamic activity in the PFC increased in the first trial of the FEP task but decreased considerably in the second and third trials compared to the PT task. The number of performance errors in the FEP task also decreased in the second and third trials. Error reduction in the FEP task between the first and second trials was negatively correlated with schizotypal trait and the number of perseveration errors in the WCST. Furthermore, changes in the PFC hemodynamic activity between the first and second trials were positively correlated with error reduction in the FEP task between the first and second trials, and negatively correlated with the number of perseveration errors in the WCST. These results suggest that learning in the FEP task requires PFC activation, which is negatively associated with perseveration errors in the WCST. The results further suggest that the FEP task, in conjunction with near-infrared spectroscopy, may be useful as a diagnostic method for various disorders with PFC dysfunction. (shrink)

In this chapter, Kobayashi and Marion first provide reasons to reject the many readings of Collingwood that sought to draft him as a participant in the Hempel-Dray debate about the status of covering laws in history. After all, this debate was not part of Collingwood’s context and, although one can pry from his writings a contribution to it, one may simply, by doing so, misunderstand what he was up to. In the second part, they present the Gabbay-Woods Schema for (...) abductive reasoning, as it occurs in the context of inquiry, as triggered by an ignorance problem, and as being ‘ignorance preserving’. They then argue that this allows us better to see the point of Collingwood’s ‘logic of questions and answers’, as derived from his own practice in archaeology, and his use of the ‘detective model of the historian’, as opposed to merely focussing on understanding what ‘re-enactment’ could mean as a contribution to the Hempel-Dray debate. (shrink)

The nucleolus is a region of the nucleus with high protein density and it acts as a ribosome factory. The nucleolus contains a distinct region of the genome, the ribosomal RNA gene repeats (rDNA) that supply ribosomal RNA (rRNA) molecules. The rDNA is the most‐abundant gene and occupies a large part of the genome, for example, there are thousands of rDNA copies in the genomes of plant cells. Therefore, it is natural to suppose that the condition of the rDNA, such (...) as its stability, might affect cellular functions. Here I would like to propose a new model regarding the roles of the rDNA and nucleolus. The key point of this model is that they act to preserve genome stability and trigger aging. BioEssays 30:267–272, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to clarify Prajñākaragupta’s view of mental perception ( mānasapratyakṣa ), with special emphasis on the relationship between mental perception and self-awareness. Dignāga, in his PS 1.6ab, says: “mental [perception] ( mānasa ) is [of two kinds:] a cognition of an [external] object and awareness of one’s own mental states such as passion.” According to his commentator Jinendrabuddhi, a cognition of an external object and awareness of an internal object such as passion are here equally (...) called ‘mental perception’ in that neither depends on any of the five external sense organs. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, considers mental perception to be a cognition which arises after sensory perception, and does not call self-awareness ‘mental perception’. According to Prajñākaragupta, mental perception is the cognition which determines an object as ‘this’ ( idam iti jñānam ). Unlike Dharmakīrti, he holds that the mental perception follows not only after the sensory perception of an external object, but also after the awareness of an internal object. The self-awareness which Dignāga calls ‘mental perception’ is for Prajñākaragupta the cognition which determines as ‘this’ an internal object, or an object which consists in a cognition; it is to be differentiated from the cognition which cognizes cognition itself, that is, self-awareness in its original sense. (shrink)

Social or relational egalitarians try to defend democracy non-instrumentally as a constitutive element of a society where no one stands as inferior or superior to anyone else. However, they face an instrumentalist challenge from within: Why not uphold a non-democratic regime if it outperforms democracy in protecting or promoting egalitarian social relations, for example, by stably producing substantive political decisions that guard against social hierarchies? This article explores the best response to this challenge from the social egalitarian non-instrumentalist standpoint. It (...) argues that the instrumentalist challenge can be accommodated without abandoning the essential non-instrumentalist commitment to democracy; while a nondemocratic regime may be justified under less-than-ideal circumstances as a contingently effective means to realize more social equality, democracy can nevertheless be viewed as a necessary condition for the realization of full social equality. (shrink)

In particular, as we shall see, Collingwood is often dismissed as having held an indefensible, outmoded ‘ideal’ theory, according to which the work of art is primarily ‘mental’, while his potential role in current debates is simply ignored. I will argue that this view is largely mistaken.

We investigate stationarity of types over models in simple theories. In particular, we show that in simple theories with finite SU-rank, any complete type over a model having Cantor-Bendixson rank is stationary.

Après un bref survol de l’esthétique britannique au xxe siècle, les objections de Wollheim à la théorie « idéelle » de l’art, qu’il attribue à Croce et à Collingwood, sont présentées. Dans une deuxième partie, les critiques de Bosanquet à l’endroit de la théorie de Croce sont examinées, pour en conclure qu’on ne peut pas lui attribuer la théorie « idéelle ». Il en va de même pour Collingwood, dont les grandes lignes de son esthétique sont présentées dans la troisième (...) partie, dont le but accessoire est de montrer que sa théorie est par ailleurs plus satisfaisante que celle de Bosanquet ; elle est en réalité très proche de celle de Wollheim, malgré les dires de ce dernier. Dans la conclusion, on revient sur le motif des théories de l’art des idéalistes britanniques, à savoir le rôle social que doit jouer l’oeuvre d’art, pour montrer toute l’actualité de la théorie de Collingwood, pour qui l’oeuvre d’art est le produit non pas de l’artiste seul, mais de l’artiste et de son audience.After a brief survey of British aesthetics in the XXth century, Wollheim’s objections to the ‘ideal’ theory, which he imputes to Croce and Collingwood, are presented. In the second part, Bosanquet’s critique of Croce’s theory is presented in order to show that one cannot attribute to him the ‘ideal’ theory. The same goes for Collingwood, whose aesthetic theory is sketched in the third part, which argues accessorily that it is more satisfactory than Bosanquet’s ; it is in fact, his own claims to the contrary notwithstanding, rather close to Wollheim’s. The conclusion comes back to the central motivation for British Idealist theories of art, namely that the work of art has a social role to play, in order to show the actuality of Collingwood, who viewed the work of art not as the product of the artist alone, but from the artist and the audience alike. (shrink)

We build a multiple hierarchical model of a representative democracy in which citizens elect ward representatives, ward representatives elect county representatives, county representatives elect state representatives, and state representatives elect a prime minister. We use our model to show that the policy determined by the final representative can become more extreme as the number of hierarchical levels increases as a result of increased opportunities for gerrymandering. Thus, a sufficiently large number of voters provide a district maker an advantage, enabling her (...) to implement her favorite policy. (shrink)