15 found
Order:
  1.  42
    Necessary Gratuitous Evil: An Oxymoron Revisited.Keith Chrzan - 1994 - Faith and Philosophy 11 (1):134-137.
  2.  53
    Debunking CORNEA.Keith Chrzan - 1987 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 21 (3):171 - 177.
  3.  30
    When is a Gratuitous Evil Really Gratuitous?Keith Chrzan - 1988 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 24 (1/2):87 - 91.
  4.  69
    The Irrelevance of the No Best Possible World Defense.Keith Chrzan - 1987 - Philosophia 17 (2):161-167.
    Certainly NBPW can justify metaphysical evil, which is all Leibniz intended it to do. Probably, as suggested by Bruce Reichenbach, NBPW can rebut an atheistic argument from the non-existence of the best possible world. It could even augment a GGD by defending against a divine obligation to have created a “larger” world. But NBPW by itself cannot serve to derail the logical problem of evil in any way whatsoever; theists must find refuge in a GGD if they are to find (...)
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  5.  10
    When is Gratuitous Evil Really Gratuitous?Keith Chrzan - 1991 - Sophia 30 (2-3):23-29.
  6.  15
    Plantinga on Atheistic Induction.Keith Chrzan - 1988 - Sophia 27 (2):10-14.
  7.  38
    An Atheistic Argument From the Quantity of Evil in the World.Keith Chrzan - 1999 - Philosophia 27 (1-2):177-181.
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  8.  23
    Comment on Langtry's 'God, Evil and Probability'.Keith Chrzan - 1993 - Sophia 32 (2):54-58.
  9.  29
    Linear Programming and Utilitarian Theodicy.Keith Chrzan - 1986 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 20 (2/3):147 - 157.
  10.  12
    Perishability, the Actual World, and the Non-Existence of God.Keith Chrzan - 1985 - Sophia 24 (2):45-49.
  11.  67
    Plantinga and Probabilistic Atheism.Keith Chrzan - 1991 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 30 (1):21 - 27.
    Plantinga underestimates the prospects for probabilistic atheism. He employs a flawed mathematical rendition of the atheist's crucial claim, (1) and he misunderstands the utility (1) would have for the atheist.
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  12.  24
    God and Gratuitous Evil: A Reply to Yandell: Keith Chrzan.Keith Chrzan - 1991 - Religious Studies 27 (1):99-103.
    In his recent paper ‘Gratuitous Evil and Divine Existence’. Keith Yandell declares the deductive argument from evil solved. He notes, however, that what persists is a probabilistic version of the argument from evil, one concluding from the evidence of evil that it is ‘highly improbable’ that God exists. Yandell attempts to refute this probabilistic argument from gratuitous evil; as shown below, however, he fails.
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  13.  23
    God and Gratuitous Evil: A Reply to Yandell.Keith Chrzan - 1991 - Religious Studies 27 (1):99 - 103.
  14.  24
    Vindicating the “Principle of Relative Likelihood”.Keith Chrzan - 1984 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1):13 - 18.
  15.  4
    Hudson on “Too Much” Evil.Keith Chrzan - 1987 - International Philosophical Quarterly 27 (2):203-206.