The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between education and technological rationality from the perspective of the philosophy of education, and to show that while education is deeply related to technique, skills, or technology, it can never be reduced to technical knowledge, and that there are things in education that overflow technical knowledge. I will here ask why there is something in education that overflows technical knowledge — I will define it as knowledge of pathos — and (...) why it is necessary to redefine the meaning of education in terms of knowledge of pathos. In order to address this issue, I will first examine the relationship between technology and transcendence in the world of education in Kei Hachiya’s Education and Transcendence. Second, I will show that recent outstanding theoretical achievements of Japanese philosophers of education — Satoji Yano’s Education from the Perspectives of Gift and Exchange, Yasuo Imai’s Medial Perspective on Education, and Tsunemi Tanaka’s Clinical Theory of Human Becoming — are all located within the problematic area of ‘technology-pathos-education’. Finally, I would like to propose a ‘philosophy of education built on fragile parts’, with a view to redefining education through the knowledge of pathos, paying attention to the experience of pathei mathos and the opportunity of weakness in the philosophy of education. (shrink)

v. 1. A critical edition of Mimamsa-Slokavarttika ad 1.1.2 (Codanasutra) -- v. 2. An annotated translation of Mimamsa-Slokavarttika ad 1.1.2 (Codanasutra).

A method for sharing private data through personalized searches is described. This method enables users to retrieve access-controlled private data as well as publicly available data by submitting a single query to a conventional search engine. Seamless integration of the method into current search services through a prototype on the Mozilla Firefox web browser, without any changes to existing search functions, such as crawling, indexing, and matching, is also described. Evaluations showed that the additional storage requirement is only 10% and (...) that the system implementing the method responds in 10 s with 1,000 dummy results for anonymization. (shrink)

Hospital ethics committees (HECs) are expected to play extremely broad and pivotal roles such as case consultation, education of staffs on healthcare ethics, and institutional policy formation. Despite the growing importance of HECs, there are no standards for setup and operation of HECs, and composition and activities of HECs at each institution are rarely disclosed in Japan. In addition, there is also a lack of information sharing and collaboration among HECs. Therefore, the authors established the Consortium of Hospital Ethics Committees (...) (CHEC) in October 2020, which has been regularly hosting a couple of core activities. One is the Healthcare Ethics Forum, held monthly online for CHEC members to freely discuss HECs and healthcare ethics consultation. The other is the Collaboration Conference of Hospital Ethics Committees, intended to provide a place for HEC members and administrative officers from across Japan to exchange information of their HECs, learn from each other, and cooperate to operate HECs appropriately. In this paper, the authors introduced CHEC as well as reported the results of a questionnaire survey conducted at the first conference among participating facilities, suggesting the diverse structures and activities of HECs in Japan. (shrink)

Some modal logics based on logics weaker than the classical logic have been studied by Fitch [4], Prior [7], Bull [1], [2], [3], Prawitz [6] etc. Here we treat modal logics based on the intuitionistic propositional logic, which call intuitionistic modal logics.

This edited volume focuses on what Hannah Arendt famously called “the raison d’être of politics”: freedom. The unique collection of essays clarifies her flagship idea of political freedom in relation to other key Arendtian themes such as liberation, revolution, civil disobedience, and the right to have rights. -/- In addressing these, contributors to this volume juxtapose Arendt with a number of thinkers from Isaiah Berlin, John Rawls and Philip Pettit to Karl Marx, Frantz Fanon and Geoffroy de Lagasnerie. They also (...) consider the continuing relevance of Arendt’s work to some of the most dramatic events in recent years, including the current global refugee crisis, the Arab uprisings of the 2010s, and the ongoing crisis of liberal democracy in the West and beyond. -/- Contributors include Keith Breen, Joan Cocks, Tal Correm, Christian J. Emden, Patrick Hayden, Kei Hiruta, Anthony F. Lang Jr., Shmuel Lederman, Miriam Leonard, Natasha Saunders, William Smith, and Shiyu Zhang. (shrink)

According to Dignāga, the word “cow” makes one understand all cows in a general form by excluding non-cows. However, how does one understand the non-cows to be excluded? Hattori answers as follows: “On perceiving the particular which is endowed with dewlap, horns, a hump on the back, and so forth, one understands that it is not a non-cow, because one knows that a non-cow is not endowed with these attributes.” Hattori regards observation of a dewlap, etc. as the cause of (...) excluding non-cows. Akamatsu presents a view similar to Hattori’s. Tanizawa, however, criticises Akamatsu by pointing out that then the apohavādin would have accepted positive elements such as a dewlap as defining characteristics of a cow. Stating that X is not a cow because it is not endowed with a dewlap, etc., amounts to accepting that the dewlap, etc. are the defining characteristics of a cow. Instead of a real universal cowness the apohavādin would have accepted a dewlap, etc. Akamatsu’s understanding of apoha, if it was correct, implies Tanizawa, would destroy the essence of the Buddhist theory of apoha. Continuing the view of Hattori and Akamatsu, Yoshimizu recently published two articles on Dignāga’s theory of apoha. He claims that “the word “cow” excludes all horses by virtue of the fact that horns are never seen on them.” Thus, “the word “cow” can exclude all of them collectively by virtue of the fact that none of them has all the members of the set of characteristics that form the worldly definition of “cow”.” Horns, one of the characteristic features of cows, are indeed mentioned by Dignāga in PS 5:43. Yoshimizu understands Dignāga’s semantics as being parallel to the modern semantics of componential analysis. A question arises: what does Dignāga, the founder of the Buddhist theory of apoha, really think regarding this issue? The present article sheds light on the incompatibility of the two interpretations by investigating the relevant source texts. It further shows that the issue Tanizawa deals with was already discussed by Dignāga. Examining Dignāga’s discussions shows that Tanizawa is right in his understanding of apoha. The interpretation by Hattori and other scholars is not supported by Dignāga’s text. The present conclusion is also supported by Mādhava, Uddyotakara and Kumārila. None of them assumes Dignāga’s theory to be as Hattori, etc. take it. (shrink)

Estonia is a democratic, parliamentary republic with a health care system that is built on the principle of compulsory, solidarity-based insurance and the all-round availability of services of private service providers. Estonia has specific biobank legislation as well as oversight via data protection laws. Its population-based biobank, the Estonian Genome Center, established in 2001, is one of the largest biobanks in Europe, and its database may be used only for scientific research, public health research, and statistics. The EGCUT can issue (...) data to a third party, but only in coded form. This comprehensive database of genotypic, phenotypic, health, and genealogical information represents about 5% of Estonia's adult population, and is the largest cohort ever gathered in Estonia. Government approval is required for international data sharing, and sharing can be further limited by the requirement of ethics approval and permission from Estonian government. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to investigate how we can reunite social philosophy and philosophy of science to address problems in science and technology. First, referring to Don Howard?s, George Reisch?s, and Philip Mirowski?s works, I shall briefly explain how philosophy of science was depoliticised during the cold war. Second, I shall examine Steve Fuller?s criticism of Thomas Kuhn. Third, I shall scrutinise Philip Kitcher?s view of well-ordered science. Fourth, I shall emphasise the importance of autonomy and argue that (...) philosophy of science needs to cultivate a critical attitude towards authority. Fifth, drawing upon Ian Jarvie?s social reading of Karl Popper, I shall argue that Popper?s philosophy can be a model for reuniting social philosophy and philosophy of science. (shrink)

Kei Yoshida critically assesses five different theoretical approaches to cultural interpretivism and conclusions on rationality. This book reveals the need for a cogent solution to the problem of rationality and urges social scientists to interpret symbolic systems' or agents’ intentions as well as explain the consequences of human actions.

This paper will defend scientific study of the social by scrutinizing Clifford Geertz's interpretive anthropology, and evolutionary psychologists' criticism of it. I shall critically examine Geertz's identification of anthropology with literary criticism, his assumption that a science of society is possible only on a positivist model, his view of the relation between culture and mind, and his anti anti-relativism. Then I shall discuss evolutionary psychologists' criticism of Geertz's view as an exemplar of the so-called "Standard Social Science Model." Finally, I (...) shall claim that both Geertz and evolutionary psychologists misunderstand the aim of the social sciences, which is to explain the unintended consequences of human actions in institutional contexts. Key Words: Clifford Geertz • evolutionary psychology • interpretive anthropology • positivism • Standard Social Science Model (SSSM). (shrink)

Both Ambrose St. John (1815–1875) and John Henry Newman (1801–1890), who were received into the Roman Catholic Church in 1845, became members of the Birmingham Oratory. Newman’s closest companion for over three decades, St. John’s death was extremely painful for Newman, not only because it was unexpected, but because of his devotion to Newman as well as his dedication to his spiritual duties. Along with presenting Newman’s narrative of the last few weeks of St. John’s life, this essay raises the (...) question: why did Newman write this “account.”. (shrink)

John Henry Newman has rightly been hailed as a giant in the Catholic intellectual tradition. His contributions to theology, literature, and education have been studied at length; however, his contribution to philosophy has not received appropriate attention. This essay 1) explores Newman’s unique philosophical insights in terms of the phenomenological tradition of Edmund Husserl; 2) analyzes the transcendental approach of certain British scientists—notably Ronald Knox and Charles Darwin; and 3) discusses how Newman might be considered a phenomenologist.

Following Dharmakīrti’s interpretation, PS I 9ab has been understood as stating a view common to both Sautrāntikas and Yogācāras, i.e. a view that self-awareness is the result of a means of valid cognition. It has also been understood that Dignāga accepts two different views attributed to Sautrāntikas with regard to pramāṇaphala: in PS ad I 8cd he regards the cognition of an external object as the result; in PS ad I 9ab–cd he alternatively presents another view that self-awareness is the (...) result. Dignāga’s text, however, does not support these interpretations. Rather it contradicts them. In fact Dignāga presupposes a single view, and not two, attributed to Sautrāntikas, a view that the cognition of an external object is the result. In I 9ab he is presenting an alternative view that is attributed only to Yogācāras, i.e. a view that is not common to Sautrāntikas. Althogh the Sautrāntika sākāravāda essentially has an internal structure, Dignāga presupposes that an external object can be regarded as the object of cognition because it is similar to the image of object. He assumes that the objects of pramāṇa and phala, both being external objects, are identical. Criticizing Dignāga’s claim that bāhyārthajñāna is the phala, Kumārila points out that there is a serious gap between the objects of pramāṇa and phala. Consequently Dharmakīrti has to admit that even in the Sautrāntika view an external object is not directly cognized and instead proposes as the second view of Sautrāntikas that svasaṃvitti is the phala. At the same time he reinterprets Dignāga and defends from Kumārila’s criticism by introducing the two different levels. When investigating the real nature, i.e. in the paramārtha level, svasaṃvitti is the phala, whereas in the upacāra level, bāhyārthajñāna or bāhyārthaniścaya is the phala. Thus, Dharmakīrti avoids Kumārila’s criticism of Dignāga. Kumārila triggers Dharmakīrti’s new introduction of the second view of Santrāntikas that svasaṃvitti is the phala. (shrink)

This essay considers the theoretical disagreement between Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt on the meaning and value of freedom. Berlin thinks that negative liberty as non-interference is commendable because it is attuned to the implication of value pluralism that man is a choice-making creature and cannot be otherwise. By contrast, the political freedom to act is in Arendt’s view a more fulfilling ideal because it is only in political action that man’s potentiality is actualised, his unique identity manifested and his (...) being-in-the-world-with-others reaffirmed. What lies beneath the two thinkers’ dispute over the most satisfactory meaning of freedom, I argue, is a deeper disagreement over human nature itself. The implication of this analysis for the contemporary debate between pluralist liberals and their agonistic critics is briefly discussed in conclusion. (shrink)

This study aimed to identify the ethical issues faced by home care physicians and nurses, and the support they require. It was conducted in collaboration with the Japanese Association for Home Care Medicine from November to December 2020. An e-mail was sent to 2785 physicians and 582 nurses who are members of the society, requesting their participation in a web-based survey targeting physicians and nurses with practical experience in home care; 152 physicians and 53 nurses responded. Home care physicians and (...) nurses face ethical issues, some of which are that “the patient’s wishes cannot be reliably understood owing to their impaired decision-making capacity” and “there is disagreement between the patient and their family members over the necessary healthcare.” The respondents sought “experience with, and insight into, healthcare ethics” and “home care” from people with whom they would consult on ethical issues, but at the time of the actual consultation, those individuals were the main healthcare professionals involved with the patient. In addition, the respondents desired to have “multidisciplinary discussions in the community,” “participation of healthcare ethics experts at meetings,” and “meetings held by healthcare ethics experts” to discuss specific cases. Given these results and the history of healthcare ethics education in Japan—which has been implemented mostly for healthcare providers—we conclude that it is important for academic societies that offer healthcare ethics education to healthcare providers and regional core hospitals with ethics support resources to collaborate to provide ethics consultation services in the community. (shrink)