Individuals with conditions like borderline personality disorder experience chronic, pervasive impairments that interfere with moral functioning. Even in recovery these individuals are plagued by residual symptoms, requiring diligence and management. First, I stipulate that some individuals who recover from BPD act morally. I argue that by acting morally while managing residual symptoms these individuals expand the boundaries of traditional Aristotelian virtue. Individuals who recover from BPD are simultaneously virtuous and outside the boundaries of traditional Aristotelian virtue if they meet the (...) following conditions: they experience marked, unchangeable morally-relevant difference in moral faculties; act morally at approximately the same rate or better than other moral agents; and act morally for the right reasons. These individuals challenge the boundaries of traditional Aristotelian virtue by demonstrating that many views of temperance and virtue are too restrictive. I evaluate multiple interpretations of McDowell’s [1] silencing view and call for a more inclusive virtue ethics that embraces continence in the vein of Foot’s [2] corrective view. (shrink)

Both woody and Wharne provided insightful commentary on my view that survivors of trauma have a duty to repair any impaired natural powers caused by symptoms of trauma by seeking empirically informed treatment. While Woody agrees with the main aspects of my view, they disagree with the motivation for seeking treatment. Woody argues that the “helplessness” caused by symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder should motivate survivors to pursue treatment. I disagree with this characterization and will discuss my concerns in the (...) first part of this reply.Wharne contends that the symptoms of PTSD should be characterized as understandable responses to trauma rather than deviations from normal experience. We should... (shrink)

Abstract:Most mental health conditions, though appropriate targets of treatment, do not generate a moral obligation to seek treatment. Trauma, in contrast, is caused (at least in part) by an external event that can happen at any point in the individual’s life. Survivors often experience diverse and enduring symptoms that adversely affect their cognitive, social, emotional, and physical functioning (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). These global impairments diminish an individual’s ability to respond appropriately to morally relevant reasons and stimuli. Fortunately, symptoms of (...) trauma respond well to treatment (Bradley, Greene, Russ, Dutra, & Westen, 2005). The external etiology and effectiveness of treatment allows us examine the moral duties of someone with impaired moral faculties due to trauma within a Kantian framework. The symptoms of trauma interfere with their ability to cultivate what Kant calls “natural powers” of spirit, soul, and body (DoV 6:444–6:445). Kant’s discussion of the natural powers implies that we must possess a baseline level of functioning in these areas in order to fulfill our moral duties (DoV 6:444–446). By Kant’s own reasoning it seems that individuals who experience impairments in any of the three powers are morally obligated to cultivate these capacities. Using Johnson’s (2011) discussion of Kant’s duties to self and careful analysis of available treatments for trauma, I argue that individuals who experience symptoms of trauma and suffer from impairments in Kantian natural powers have an imperfect duty to themselves to repair these powers through empirically informed trauma treatment. (shrink)