In this paper, I explore both Kant's and Collingwood's accounts of themind-body problem. I discuss how both philosophers think that this problem arises and how it can be resolved. I start by discussing the similarities between the attempts of the two philosophers at solving philosophical problems through analysing the conceptual structures that make experience possible. I then turn to the differences between the views of the two philosophers, paying particular attention to Kant's claims that a combination of a natural (so-called (...) 'transcendental') illusion and commitment to a faulty philosophical framework (transcendental realism) give rise to philosophical problems such as the mind-body problem. I argue, ultimately, that Kant's account is more compelling than Collingwood's. This is because Collingwood's account can only explain the mind-body problem as arising because certain concepts conflict with each other and compete as explanations of the same phenomena. Kant's account, on the other hand, states that the problem arises as a result of both an inevitable illusion and a misapplication of concepts. Both philosophers claim that the problem is perennial but Kant's reason for claiming this is more convincing. (shrink)