There is a fear of death that persistently eludes adequate explanation by contemporary philosophers of death. The reason for this is their focus on mortal harm issues, such as why death is bad for the person who dies. Claims regarding the fear of death are assumed to be contingent on the resolution of questions about the badness of death. In practice, however, consensus on some mortal harm issues has not resulted in comparable clarity on mortal fear. I contend we cannot (...) do justice to fear of death unless we detach it from theories about the badness of death, including the overwhelmingly-popular deprivation theory. The case for this involves disambiguation of certain aspects of mortal harm, a broad conception of what is involved in accounting for an emotion, and close attention to the nature of the fear in question. The source of fear of death is our departure from a context in which self-directed emotions have coherent application; our attitudes become ‘unmoored,’ in Samuel Scheffler’s phrase. While this does not result in a fear that is sui generis, it does demand that we remove the object of fear from the realm of well-being in order to make sense of it. (shrink)

Adorno's philosophical project hinges on two claims about the mimetic impulse: it is a universal impulse, from which we cannot be liberated; and it is historically mediated, which means that, over time, it takes different forms. Western philosophy, according to Adorno, has repressed the role of mimesis in human life. As a result, reified subjectivity is often misrecognized as freedom. Adorno develops a materialist ethic that exposes and counters the Idealist narratives involved in this suppression. Further, this materialist ethic identifies (...) how mimesis itself might be altered to bring about our liberation from coercive social relations, which are themselves perpetuated by mimesis. I argue that Adorno's materialist ethic is an ethic of love: more specifically, an ethic of a love toward things. A love toward things (modeled in part upon Hegel's freedom toward the object and Kierkegaard's sermon on our love for the dead) involves a subject who practices a respectful restraint toward the object. The individual is able to engage in a mimetic relation of love toward the other, while resisting the urge to enter into a seamless unity with it. As a love toward things, mimesis becomes the motor of dialectical mediation between the separate entities of subject and object, consequently contributing to their reconciliation. Freed from the need to dominate or be dominated, the subject is then able to exist peacefully with the object even in their utter difference from each other. (shrink)

Theoretische Philosophie aus phänomenologischer Perspektive Das Verhältnis von Phänomenologie und Metaphysik ist ambivalent. Einerseits richtet sich phänomenologische Deskription gegen leere Spekulation. Andererseits betonen Husserl und seine Nachfolger die Möglichkeit einer kritischen Erneuerung der Metaphysik. Die zwanzig Beiträge dieses Kompendiums untersuchen das Problem einer phänomenologischen Metaphysik von Husserl bis in die Gegenwart und bieten so Antworten auf die Frage, was phänomenologische Metaphysik sein kann und sein sollte.

This book provides an overview of the recent free will debate and considers the consequences of neuroscientific research for the problem of freedom. In the process of surveying the field, the author develops an original position. He takes issue with the broad philosophical consensus that at least one kind of freedom is incompatible with the scientific worldview -- namely, the ability to make decisions one way or another exactly the same circumstances. The book argues that, on closer examination, this so-called (...) libertarian view of freedom (which we accept in our everyday lives) does not contradict any facts but only philosophical doctrines. Although we're unable to alter physical laws, nor are we 'first movers,' this isn't required for us to have acted otherwise under the same circumstances. (shrink)

Back cover: Meister Eckhart betont in seinen Predigten und Traktaten die Gelassenheit als einen radikal freien Lebensvollzug in geistiger Tätigkeit. Anna Keiling vollzieht diese Konzeption anhand des Leitparadigmas der Musse nach. So können Darstellungen der Abgeschiedenheit, Gelassenheit, ledecheit und ruowe in mystischer Literatur in ihrem spezifischen Zusammenhang gesehen werden.

The growth of autistic self-advocacy and the neurodiversity movement has brought about new ethical, theoretical and ideological debates within autism theory, research and practice. These debates have had genuine impact within some areas of autism research but their influence is less evident within early intervention research. In this paper, we argue that all autism intervention stakeholders need to understand and actively engage with the views of autistic people and with neurodiversity as a concept and movement. In so doing, intervention researchers (...) and practitioners are required to move away from a normative agenda and pay diligence to environmental goodness-of-fit, autistic developmental trajectories, internal drivers and experiences, and autistic prioritized intervention targets. Autism intervention researchers must respond to these debates by reframing effectiveness, developing tools to measure autistic prioritized outcomes, and forming partnerships with autistic people. There is a pressing need for increased reflection and articulation around how intervention practices align with a neurodiversity framework and greater emphasis within intervention programmes on natural developmental processes, coping strategies, autonomy, and well-being. (shrink)

If folk science means individuals having well worked out mechanistic theories of the workings of the world, then it is not feasible. Laypeople’s explanatory understandings are remarkably coarse, full of gaps, and often full of inconsistencies. Even worse, most people overestimate their own understandings. Yet recent views suggest that formal scientists may not be so different. In spite of these limitations, science somehow works and its success offers hope for the feasibility of folk science as well. The success of science (...) arises from the ways in which scientists learn to leverage understandings in other minds and to outsource explanatory work through sophisticated methods of deference and simplification of complex systems. Three studies ask whether analogous processes might be present not only in laypeople but also in young children and thereby form a foundation for supplementing explanatory understandings almost from the start of our first attempts to make sense of the world. (shrink)

Many candidates have been tried out as proximate causes of actions: belief-desire pairs, volitions, motives, intentions, and other kinds of pro-attitudes. None of these mental states or events, however, seems to be able to do the trick, that is, to get things going. Each of them may occur without an appropriate action ensuing. After reviewing several attempts at closing the alleged “causal gap”, it is argued that on a correct analysis, there is no missing link waiting to be discovered. On (...) the counterfactual account of singular causation, the onset of belief or desire may perfectly well cause an action, although no kind of mental antecedent is ever a causally sufficient condition for a specific kind of action to occur. (shrink)

Philosophie ist der Versuch, durch überzeugendes und durchsichtiges Argumentieren bestimmte Fragen zu lösen. Philosophische Grundthemen sind Fragen nach dem Verständnis der Welt im Ganzen und unserer Stellung in ihr. Diese Fragen können prinzipiell nur kontrovers beantwortet werden. Die Reihe Grundthemen Philosophie möchte der Diskussion solcher philosophischen Grundthemen einen Ort geben. Anstelle einer umfassenden einführenden Darstellung werden in den einzelnen Bänden in Auseinandersetzung mit ausgewählten historischen Positionen die jeweiligen Probleme analysiert und Lösungsmöglichkeiten diskutiert. Dabei setzt der Verfasser/die Verfasserin eigene Akzente und (...) bezieht Stellung, so dass sich nicht bloß ein Blick auf die Geschichte der Philosophie, sondern zugleich auch ein systematischer Beitrag zur Problemdiskussion ergibt. Zur Zeit sind weitere Bände zu den Themen Beziehungen, Kultur, Wissenschaft und Moralbegründung geplant. Die Bände der Reihe richten sich gleichermaßen an Studierende der Philosophie und anderer Fächer sowie an professionelle Philosophen. Außerdem wendet sich die Reihe an alle, die an Grundthemen der Philosophie interessiert sind. (shrink)

Die von Kant vorgeschlagene Auflösung der Freiheitsantinomie gehört zu denjenigen Theoriestücken, die auch für den transzendentalen Idealismus aufgeschlossene Philosophen schwer zu verteidigen finden. Dies gilt insbesondere für die Lehre von der nichtzeitlichen Verursachung. Nach dieser Doktrin hebt die »Causalität der Vernunft im intelligibelen Charakter […] nicht zu einer gewissen Zeit an, um eine Wirkung hervorzubringen«. In diesem Beitrag wird nicht Kants Auflösung der Freiheitsantinomie im Mittelpunkt stehen, sondern die Frage, wie das Junktim zwischen Freiheitsrettung und transzendentalem Idealismus allererst motiviert ist. (...) Ich werde zunächst eine Reihe von Gründen dafür anführen, dieses Junktim zu lösen. Kant konstruiert in der dritten Antinomie ein idiosynkratisches Vereinbarkeitsproblem, das auf angreifbaren kausalitätstheoretischen und metaphysischen Vorannahmen beruht. In den Abschnitten 3.-5. versuche ich zu zeigen, dass die transzendental-idealistische Auflösung der Freiheitsantinomie nur nötig wird, weil Kant für Freiheit Erstverursachung fordert, die Gesetzesauffassung der Kausalität für einen analytischen Bestandteil des Kausalbegriffs hält, das Kausalprinzip mit dem Determinismusprinzip identifiziert und mit der Auszeichnung des Kausalprinzips als synthetischen Satz a priori zugleich den deterministischen Charakter des »Naturmechanismus« erwiesen zu haben glaubt. Danach werde ich die Frage erörtern, ob die noumenale »Kausalität aus Freiheit « im Sinne von Akteurskausalität bzw. Substanzkausalität rekonstruiert werden kann. Abschließend werde ich tentative Überlegungen dazu anstellen, ob zumindest einige transzendental-idealistische Elemente eine alternative Rolle in der Freiheits- und Handlungstheorie spielen können. (shrink)

Die verästelte Diskussion über den Naturalismus in der Gegenwartsphilosophie lässt sich grob in einen theoretischen und einen praktischen Zweig gliedern: ›Naturalismus‹ heißt in der theoretischen Philosophie etwas anderes als in der Ethik. Die theoretische Philosophie grenze ich dabei durch das Kriterium ab, dass in ihr die Frage, was wir tun sollen, keine Rolle spielt. Die erste Hälfte des Beitrags ist der Unterscheidung dreier Spielarten des Naturalismus in der theoretischen Philosophie gewidmet, die man ›metaphysischen Naturalismus‹, ›Scientia mensura-Naturalismus‹ und ›analytischen Naturalismus‹ nennen (...) kann. Im dritten und vierten Abschnitt gehe ich auf erklärtermaßen naturalistische Positionen ein, die sich auf die Natur des Menschen berufen. In diesen Positionen kommt der Naturbegriff auf andere Weise ins Spiel als in den drei genannten Varianten des Naturalismus. Wo von der menschlichen Natur die Rede ist, wird ›Natur‹ nicht als Bereichsbezeichnung verstanden, sondern im Sinne von ›Wesen‹ oder ›eigentliche Beschaffenheit‹. Der Schlussteil des Beitrags handelt vom neoaristotelischen oder kurz aristotelischen Naturalismus, der mit einem normativ gehaltvollen Begriff der menschlichen Natur operiert, was auch immer das heißen mag. Der aristotelische Naturalismus wird gewöhnlich als eine Form des ethischen Naturalismus aufgefasst. Auf den zweiten Blick ist die Zuordnung nicht so klar, weil der aristotelische Naturalismus Elemente enthält, die zur Unterscheidung zwischen deskriptiv-anthropologischen und normativen Aussagen quer liegen. Hauptziel des Beitrags ist es, die Naturalismen der menschlichen Natur, den aristotelischen eingeschlossen, im Kreis der anderen Naturalismen zu verorten und insbesondere zu klären, mit welcher Rechtfertigung sie ›naturalistisch‹ genannt werden. (shrink)

Several current theories have essences as primary drivers of inductive potential: e.g., people infer dogs share properties because they share essences. We investigated the possibility that people take occupational roles as having robust inductive potential because of a different source: their position in stable social institutions. In Studies 1–4, participants learned a novel property about a target, and then decided whether two new individuals had the property (one with the same occupation, one without). Participants used occupational roles to robustly generalize (...) rights and obligations, functional behaviors, personality traits, and skills. In Studies 5–6, we contrasted occupational roles (via label) with race/gender (via visual face cues). Participants reliably favored occupational roles over race/gender for generalizing rights and obligations, functional behaviors, personality traits, and skills (they favored race/gender for inferring leisure behaviors and physiological properties). Occupational roles supported inferences to the same extent as animal categories (Studies 4 and 6). In Study 7, we examined why members of occupational roles share properties. Participants did not attribute the inductive potential of occupational roles to essences, they attributed it to social institutions. In combination, these seven studies demonstrate that any theory of inductive potential must pluralistically allow for both essences and social institutions to form the basis of inductive potential. (shrink)

Employee attributions and emotional reactions to unethical behavior of top leaders in an organization recently involved in a highly publicized ethics scandal were examined. Participants (n = 76) from a large southern California government agency completed an ethical climate assessment. Secondary data analysis was performed on the written commentary to an open-ended question seeking employees' perceptions of the ethical climate. Employees attributed the organization's poor ethical leadership to a number of causes, including: lack of moral reasoning, breaches of trust, hypocrisy, (...) and poor ethical behavior role modeling. Emotional reactions to corruption included cynicism, optimism, pessimism, paranoia and fear, and were targeted at top leaders, organizational practices (i.e., the old boy network, nepotism, and cronyism) and ethics interventions. Implications for leadership training and other organizational ethics interventions are discussed. (shrink)

Vague expressions are omnipresent in natural language. As such, their use in legal texts is virtually inevitable. If a law contains vague terms, the question whether it applies to a particular case often lacks a clear answer. One of the fundamental pillars of the rule of law is legal certainty. The determinacy of the law enables people to use it as a guide and places judges in the position to decide impartially. Vagueness poses a threat to these ideals. In borderline (...) cases, the law seems to be indeterminate and thus incapable of serving its core rule of law value. -/- In the philosophy of language, vagueness has become one of the hottest topics of the last two decades. Linguists and philosophers have investigated what distinguishes "soritical " vagueness from other kinds of linguistic indeterminacy, such as ambiguity, generality, open texture, and family resemblance concepts. There is a vast literature that discusses the logical, semantic, pragmatic, and epistemic aspects of these phenomena. Legal theory has hitherto paid little attention to the differences between the various kinds of linguistic indeterminacy that are grouped under the heading of "vagueness ", let alone to the various theories that try to account for these phenomena. -/- The paper is an introduction to a book of the same title. Bringing together leading scholars working on the topic of vagueness in philosophy and in law, the book fosters a dialogue between philosophers and legal scholars by examining how philosophers conceive legal ambiguity from their theoretical perspective and how legal theorists make use of philosophical theories of vagueness. (shrink)

Heid eg ger führt die Wahrheitsthematik am Ende des ersten Abschnitts von Der Ursprung des Kunstwerks ein. In der Beschreibung des Gemäldes von Van Gogh findet sich zum ersten Mal jene axiomatische Definition, die mehrmals wiederkehrt: Die Kunst ist das „Sich-ins-Werk-Setzen der Wahrheit“ (GA 5, 21; vgl. 25, 44 , 59, 62, 63, 65, besonders 70). Heid eg ger geht, wenn er die ästhetische Wirkung des Gemäldes beschreibt, zur Neubestimmung von Kunst und Wahrheit über. Das Gemälde ist keine bloße Abbildung (...) von Schuhen, sondern „Van Goghs Gemälde ist die Eröffnung dessen, was das Zeug, das Paar Bauernschuhe, in Wahrheit ist. Dieses Seiende tritt in die Unverborgenheit seines Seins heraus.“ (GA 5, 21) Was es heißt, dass „Seiendes“ wie das Paar Schuhe in eine „Unverborgenheit“ kommt, die die „Unverborgenheit“ dieses Seienden in seinem Sein ist, wird erst am Ende des Textes ganz deutlich. Dann wird sich auch klären, wie genau Wahrheit hier als Unverborgenheit im Unterschied zum gängigen Wahrheitsbegriff der Übereinstimmung verstanden werden soll: Einer Auffassung von Wahrheit als Übereinstimmung, Adäquation oder Korrespondenz zufolge wäre ein Kunstwerk wie Van Goghs Gemälde etwas, das (wie ein Aussagesatz) wahr oder falsch sein könnte, weil es mit dem übereinstimmt, was der Fall ist. Das Bild würde, wenn es ‚wahr‘ im Sine der Übereinstimmung wäre, die Wirklichkeit so abbilden, wie ein wahrer Satz einen Sachverhalt richtig wiedergibt.... (shrink)

This provocative work provides a radical reassessment of the emergence and nature of Christian sexual morality, the dominant moral paradigm in Western society since late antiquity. While many scholars, including Michel Foucault, have found the basis of early Christian sexual restrictions in Greek ethics and political philosophy, Kathy L. Gaca demonstrates on compelling new grounds that it is misguided to regard Greek ethics and political theory—with their proposed reforms of eroticism, the family, and civic order—as the foundation of Christian (...) sexual austerity. Rather, in this thoroughly informed and wide-ranging study, Gaca shows that early Christian goals to eradicate fornication were derived from the sexual rules and poetic norms of the Septuagint, or Greek Bible, and that early Christian writers adapted these rules and norms in ways that reveal fascinating insights into the distinctive and largely non-philosophical character of Christian sexual morality. Writing with an authoritative command of both Greek philosophy and early Christian writings, Gaca investigates Plato, the Stoics, the Pythagoreans, Philo of Alexandria, the apostle Paul, and the patristic Christians Clement of Alexandria, Tatian, and Epiphanes, freshly elucidating their ideas on sexual reform with precision, depth, and originality. Early Christian writers, she demonstrates, transformed all that they borrowed from Greek ethics and political philosophy to launch innovative programs against fornication that were inimical to Greek cultural mores, popular and philosophical alike. The Septuagint's mandate to worship the Lord alone among all gods led to a Christian program to revolutionize Gentile sexual practices, only for early Christians to find this virtually impossible to carry out without going to extremes of sexual renunciation. Knowledgeable and wide-ranging, this work of intellectual history and ethics cogently demonstrates why early Christian sexual restrictions took such repressive ascetic forms, and casts sobering light on what Christian sexual morality has meant for religious pluralism in Western culture, especially among women as its bearers. (shrink)

We examine the perceived importance of three organizational preconditions theorized to be critical for ethics program effectiveness. In addition, we examine the importance of ethical leadership and congruence between formal ethics codes and informal ethical norms in influencing employee perceptions. Participants from a large southern California government agency completed a survey on the perceived effectiveness of the organization’s ethics program. Results suggest that employee perceptions of organizational preconditions, ethical leadership and informal ethical norms were related to perceptions of ethics program (...) effectiveness. Based on these findings, organizations should evaluate the presence of essential preconditions and take steps to ensure that leaders model espoused organizational values to foster perceptions of effective ethics programs. (shrink)

Judith Butler's Kritik der ethischen Gewalt represents a significant refinement of her position on the relationship between the construction of the subject and her social subjection. While Butler's earlier texts reflect a somewhat restricted notion of agency, her Adorno Lectures formulate a notion of agency that extends beyond mere resistance. This essay traces the development of Butler's account of agency and evaluates it in light of feminist projects of social transformation.

What remains as an ongoing project, Weeks contends, is creating a theory of the constitution of subjects to account for the processes of social construction. This book presents one such account.

People feel they understand complex phenomena with far greater precision, coherence, and depth than they really do; they are subject to an illusion—an illusion of explanatory depth. The illusion is far stronger for explanatory knowledge than many other kinds of knowledge, such as that for facts, procedures or narratives. The illusion for explanatory knowledge is most robust where the environment supports real‐time explanations with visible mechanisms. We demonstrate the illusion of depth with explanatory knowledge in Studies 1–6. Then we show (...) differences in overconfidence about knowledge across different knowledge domains in Studies 7–10. Finally, we explore the mechanisms behind the initial confidence and behind overconfidence in Studies 11 and 12, and discuss the implications of our findings for the roles of intuitive theories in concepts and cognition. (shrink)

Since its inception, the concept of `intersectionality' — the interaction of multiple identities and experiences of exclusion and subordination — has been heralded as one of the most important contributions to feminist scholarship. Despite its popularity, there has been considerable confusion concerning what the concept actually means and how it can or should be applied in feminist inquiry. In this article, I look at the phenomenon of intersectionality's spectacular success within contemporary feminist scholarship, as well as the uncertainties and confusion (...) which it has generated. Drawing upon insights from the sociology of science, I shall show how and why intersectionality could become a feminist success story. I shall argue that, paradoxically, it is precisely the concept's alleged weaknesses — its ambiguity and open-endedness — that were the secrets to its success and, more generally, make it a good feminist theory. (shrink)

What would it be like to have never learned English, but instead only to know Hopi, Mandarin Chinese, or American Sign Language? Would that change the way you think? Imagine entirely losing your language, as the result of stroke or trauma. You are aphasic, unable to speak or listen, read or write. What would your thoughts now be like? As the most extreme case, imagine having been raised without any language at all, as a wild child. What—if anything—would it be (...) like to be such a person? Could you be smart; could you reminisce about the past, plan the future? (shrink)

When Philip Sidney defends poetry by defending the methods used by poets and lawyers alike, he relies on the traditional association between fiction and legal procedure--an association that begins with Aristotle. In this study Kathy Eden offers a new understanding of this tradition, from its origins in Aristotle's Poetics and De Anima, through its development in the psychological and rhetorical theory of late antiquity and the Middle Ages, to its culmination in the literary theory of the Renaissance. Originally published (...) in 1986. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

In a number of articles, Hans-Johann Glock has argued against the »lingualist« view that higher mental capacities are a prerogative of language-users. He has defended the »assimilationist« claim that the mental capacities of humans and of non-human animals differ only in degree. In the paper under discussion, Glock argues that animals are capable of acting for reasons, provided that reasons are construed along the lines of the new »objectivist« theory of practical reasons.

This paper argues that Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) do not compromise the agent’s ability to decide otherwise. In his attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, Frankfurt relied on what Austin called the ‘all-in’ sense of ‘can’, and misconstrued the agent’s inability to do otherwise as an all-in can’t. Like the new dispositionalists, I maintain that the agent’s relevant abilities are ‘masked’ rather than lost in Frankfurt cases. The argument from masked abilities, however, is not confined to a compatibilist construal of (...) the relevant abilities. On a libertarian construal, Black deprives Jones of the opportunity to use his two-way power of choice to a different outcome than he actually uses it. I argue that being deprived of this opportunity is immaterial to what free will requires. In the second half of the paper, I relate my approach to the ‘flicker of freedom’ strategy. On closer look, we do find a residual ability that Jones not only possesses but also exercises in cases where Black intervenes. I argue that Jones tries to decide otherwise in these cases, that Black only thwarts the success of Jones’s attempt, and that being snatched from the wheel at the very last moment does not compromise Jones’s free will. (shrink)

Essays in Memory of Richard Helgerson: Laureations brings together new essays by leading literary scholars of the British and European middle ages and early modern period who have been influenced by the groundbreaking scholarship of Richard Helgerson. The contributors evince the ongoing impact of Helgerson's work in critical debates including those of nationalism, formal analysis, and literary careerism.

Animals are used in biomedical research to study disease, develop new medicines, and test them for safety. As the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics’ review Normalising the Unthinkable acknowledges, many great strides in medicine have involved animals. However, their contribution has not always been positive. Decades of attempts to develop treatments for diseases including asthma, cancer, stroke, and Alzheimer’s using animals have failed to translate to humans, leaving patients with inadequate treatments or without treatments at all. As Normalising the Unthinkable (...) points out, we have to confront the fact that animal research may have hindered progress, at least in some respects. For example, animal tests have been shown to have very little ability to predict the safety of medicines for human patients. A dramatic illustration of this failing is TGN1412, which almost killed 6 clinical trial volunteers in 2006, after crab-eating macaques showed the drug to be safe, even at massive doses. This failing contributes to adverse drug reactions, which are now one of the world’s leading causes of death, killing hundreds of thousands of people every year and hospitalizing millions. A revolution in science and technology has produced a new generation of more relevant and predictive tools, which could be used to create safer medicines more quickly and at less cost: a win-win situation that should be supported by everyone. The obstacle preventing this from happening is governments’ continued insistence on animal testing. Yet the evidence is clear that reliance on animals as surrogate humans puts patients at risk, can delay medical progress, and can cause effective treatments to be wrongly discarded. There is a compelling case to be made that animal research is an ethical issue for humans as well as for animals. (shrink)

Many businesses, including professional sport teams, are designing and engaging in socially responsible initiatives which benefit stakeholders as well as the businesses themselves. Gaining insight into stakeholders' expectations regarding corporations' corporate social responsibility initiatives through dialogue is important as the way a business is viewed and evaluated by stakeholders underlies subsequent interactions. Based on semi-structured interviews with 42 diverse stakeholders involved in a professional sport team's CSR initiative we found that stakeholders' expectations of the team's involvement in the community related (...) to social and institutional norms, values, and benefits. The team also appeared to be meeting stakeholder expectations about being socially responsible in the community. This study provides new insights into a firm's CSR expectations through engaging in stakeholder management and interaction. Future research directions and practical suggestions are offered for organizations attempting to understand and meet stakeholders' expectations in the area of CSR. (shrink)