My aim in this paper is to investigate Hegel’s relation to Spinoza’s account of teleology by discussing Spinoza and Hegel’s stance to two straightforward objections against teleological views of reality: the anthropomorphism objection and the backward causation objection. I show that both argue against a teleological account that would be committed to the anthropomorphism objection by raising the same argument: such a divine intelligence would lack what it desires to realize. I then argue that their dealing with the backward causation (...) objection differs. Whereas Spinoza finds the backward causation objection against natural purposiveness to be valid, Hegel uses this objection to build his own case: natural purposiveness obtains to a different aspect of reality than effective causality. In contrast, Spinoza defends the backward causation objection because he believes there is only one fundamental principle that reality is subject to. Not only has the issue of Spinoza and Hegel’s relationship on teleology been neglected, I also argue that such a discussion can prove illuminating with respect to Hegel’s stance to monism, as, in contrast to Spinoza, Hegel must assume that there are different fundamental principles governing reality and not merely one. (shrink)

This article is an investigation into Hegel's claim that teleology is the truth of mechanism, which Hegel puts forward in the objectivity section in the Science of Logic. Contrary to most accounts of this section of the Logic, I make a case for a reading of Hegel's conception of external purposiveness according to which the latter makes a positive contribution to the structural development of the concepts of the Logic. I argue that external purposiveness plays a major role in understanding (...) the Hegelian claim of teleology as the truth of mechanism. More specifically, I argue that structures of external purposiveness provide the conditions for the individuation of mechanical objects. (shrink)

Das Subjekt ist einer der zentralen Begriffe der Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften überhaupt, gleichzeitig jedoch auch einer, der besonders schwierig zu fassen ist. Nicht nur lassen sich philosophiehistorisch stark variierende Bedeutungen desselben ausmachen, darüber hinaus stellt es eine besondere Herausforderung dar, das Subjekt ins Verhältnis zu anderen zentralen Begriffen der Philosophie zu setzen, wie etwa Person, Selbst, Ich, Substanz, Gehirn und Individuum. Die weit verbreitete Unklarheit über diesen Begriff und seine doch nicht zu leugnende Relevanz gaben uns Anlass zu diesem Projekt (...) - die ihm inne liegenden Spannungsverhältnisse den Ausgangspunkt. Subject is one of the most central concepts in contemporary philosophy and the humanities, though at the same time one which is especially hard to grasp. Not only does the meaning of this concept vary throughout history, furthermore it poses a great challenge to determine its relation to concepts such as mind, the self and the individual. The ambiguity of this concept, its inherent relationship of tension as well as its undeniable relevance, gave us occasion for this project. (shrink)