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In his paper "What Metaphors Mean", Donald Davidson attacks various theories of the metaphorical meaning. His radical thesis is that the metaphor has except the literal meaning no other (metaphorical or secondary) meaning. He refuses primarily the idea that the metaphor is some sort of communication-the speaker puts a hidden message in it and the recipient have to decode it. Davidson supported this negative attitude with a number of more or less conclusive arguments. I would like to discuss some of (...) them in this essay. My interpretation of Davidson's argumentation can be summed up as that the idea of the metaphorical meaning is not nonsensical, but it is unsuitable for explaining the intricate role of metaphors in our language. A positive theory of metaphor was only suggested by Davidson, but not properly elaborated. This was a task of his followers, in the first place of Richard Rorty. He emphasized, however, the causal character of a metaphorical effect, which radicalizes Davidson's account. As opposed to Rorty, Davidson shared with his predecessors an opinion that in a metaphor one thing is seen as another thing. None of the authors was able to explain this metaphorical definition of the metaphor. (shrink)

This paper investigates the issue whether metaphors have a metaphorical or secondary meaning and how this question is related to the borderline between philosophy and linguistics. On examples by V. Woolf and H. W. Auden, it will be shown that metaphor accomplishes something more than its literal meaning expresses and this “more” cannot be captured by any secondary meaning. What is essential in the metaphor is not a secondary meaning but an internal relation between a metaphorical proposition and a description (...) of its effects. In order to understand metaphors, we have to share an ability to construe metaphorical meanings at once. The aim of this ability is to uncover an internal relation, which lies behind a particular metaphor. (shrink)

V této kritické studii bych se chtěl zamyslet nad knihou Stefanie Dach Nespoutaná slova. Richard Rorty, post-analytická filosofie a jazykový idealismus (ZČU v Plzni, 2013). V první, deskriptivní části studie shrnu obsah knihy, druhá část mé studie pak bude zaměřena více kriticky. Nakonec bude následovat několik úvah o smyslu debaty mezi jazykovým realismem a idealismem.

We cannot but begin this volume with Wittgenstein’s famous remark that “Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different.” (MDC: p.157) This is, however, a casual remark, and it seems that we should not put too much emphasis on it. (For a discussion of how the remark should properly be understood, see Chapter 20.) In (...) compiling this collection of essays we adopted from this remark the idea that the problem of difference in identity is the common topic between Hegel and Wittgenstein. The remark presents a certain interplay (or, one might say, dialectics) of identity and difference. And it is questions of identity and difference between Hegel and Wittgenstein (with respect to certain aspects of their works, under certain interpretations, etc.) that are addressed by the essays in this volume. (shrink)

I provide a distinctively Wittgensteinian interpretation of Hegel’s Subjective Logic, including the parts on the concept, the judgement and the syllogism. I argue that Wittgenstein implicitly recognised the moments of universality, particularity and individuality; moreover, he was sensitive to Hegel’s crucial distinction between abstract and concrete universals. More specifically, for Wittgenstein the moment of particularity has the status of a paradigmatic sample which mediates between a universal concept and its individual instances. Thus, a concrete universal is a universal that includes (...) every individual via its paradigmatic sample. Next, I provide a generic account of the emergence of concrete universals through a series of negations that follows the basic structure of Hegel’s judgement—“the individual is the universal”—and the syllogism—“the individual is the universal mediated by the particular”. This development is illustrated with examples from Hegel (a plant, Socrates, Caesar, a Stoic sage, Jesus) as well as from Wittgenstein (colour samples, the standard metre, works of art). I take Wittgenstein’s argument against private language as implying that we cannot do without paradigms in our epistemic practices. If the conclusion of the section “Subjectivity” in Hegel’s Science of Logic is that the moment of particularity cannot be ignored or dispensed with, then it would mean that we cannot do without paradigms in our epistemic practices: that is, that private rules are impossible. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Augustine’s concept of self-knowledge or self-awareness in non-rational animals through examining the relation between external senses, internal sense and rationality. The explanation of what causes motion in non-rational living beings is quite puzzling in the case of animal’s self-perception – for what reason do they move, sense or live. This motivation is also connected to the self-preservation principle, which is one of the two sources of confusion regarding self-perception in animals; the other one is the ability (...) of internal sense or anima to perceive themselves, other animals and humans as alive – in spite of the fact that this can in no way be sensory information. (shrink)

Abstrakt/Abstract Na příkladu dvou myslitelů ze zcela odlišných období dějin filosofie lze předvést otázku nejobecnějších podmínek pravdivé řeči, které se projevují na pomezí sémantiky v užším slova smyslu a utváření širšího pojmu světa jakožto pojmu, k němuž patří vytyčení jasných mezí smysluplného vypovídání o tom, co je. Od této velmi obecné otázky se příspěvek obrací k užšímu tématu negace čili k pravidlům užití řeči, která je sice správná a v některých případech pravdivá, avšak postrádá svůj vlastní a specifický korelát v (...) plné osnově skutečnosti samé. Výchozími texty jsou zlomky Parmenidovy básně O jsoucím a její moderní výklady od čtení Russellova až po tzv. modální interpretaci, kladoucí důraz na motivy nutného jsoucího a nemožného nejsoucího, a dále pasáže z Wittgensteinova Traktátu i Filosofických zkoumání (§ 50). Podrobnější srovnání postoje obou myslitelů k negaci umožňuje prohloubit i rozšířit starší srovnávání Parmenidova argumentu o nemožnosti mluvit o tom, co není, a Wittgensteinova důrazu na nutnou existenci jednoduchých objektů. Choosing two thinkers from two entirely different periods of the history of philosophy, one can fruitfully illustrate the issue of the most general conditions of truthful speech, which take effect on the crossroad of the narrowly conceived semantics and a broadly construed concept of the world as a concept that implies the posting of neat limits of the meaningful linguistic articulation of what there is. From this very general issue, the article turns to the narrower question of negation, and thus of the rules of the use of the correct and sometimes true speech that, nevertheless, lacks its specific referent in the full structure of reality. The texts under scrutiny are the fragments of Parmenides’ poem On Being and its modern exegeses ranging from Russell to the modal interpretation that emphasizes the necessary being and the impossible not-being, plus passages from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and also his Philosophical Investigation (§ 50). A more detailed comparison of the attitude of both thinkers towards negation helps to both deepen and expand the earlier suggested parallel between Parmenides’ argument about the impossibility to speak about what is not and Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the necessary existence of simple objects. (shrink)

In the Philebus, Plato elaborates an image of our soul as a book where a scribe and a painter are constantly at work. This book examines the implicit premises of this image and aims at overcoming the general polarity of ancient phantasia and modern imagination.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the difficult task of balancing access to misinformation with respect for patient decision-making. Due to its innate antagonism, the paradigm of “physician paternalism” versus “patient autonomy” may not adequately capture the clinical relationship. The authors hypothesized that most patients would, in fact, prefer significant physician input as opposed to unopinionated information when making medical decisions. There is a lack of empirical data corroborating this in the United States. To that end, a survey was distributed to (...) 650 individuals through Amazon Mechanical Turk, of which 499 responses met pre-determined quality criteria. Most respondents believed their doctor's insight would be better than their own if injured or gravely ill. When asked to affirm preferences separately, a significantly higher proportion of respondents preferred guidance from their doctor when making medical decisions compared to being presented with unopinionated information ( p < 0.001). Encouragingly, 93.1% believed that the doctor's primary goal was their health. When asked directly to compare physician guidance to unopinionated information, 69.1% respondents stated they would prefer physician guidance. We found a consistent association between educational/economic background and affirmative responses ( p < 0.001), suggesting particular attention should be paid to patients that are disadvantaged with respect to these demographic factors. The belief in a shared goal, and a consistent preference for physician input, suggests that patients endorse a more collaborative view of the clinical dynamic than is suggested by the paternalism-autonomy paradigm. This pilot study suggests physicians should not be afraid to communicate conviction with regard to treatment decisions. (shrink)

Public debate on acceptable farm animal husbandry suffers from a confusion of tongues. To clarify positions of various stakeholder groups in their joint search for acceptable solutions, the concept of animal welfare was split up into three notions: no suffering, respect for intrinsic value, and non-appalling appearance of animals. This strategy was based on the hypothesis that multi-stakeholder solutions should be based on shared values rather than on compromises. The usefulness of such an artificial value distinction strategy was tested in (...) a small series of experiments. The results demonstrate that the chosen concept to distinguish between values is effective in a stakeholder context. Farmers’ views on doing good to animals appeared to be largely based on their value to prevent suffering and predominantly focused on the provision of regular care. Their priority for this value is clearly shared with other stakeholders, providing a basis for joint solutions. The concept of intrinsic value does not play a discernable role in farmers’ considerations. Based on the varying views on welfare, it can be inferred that there is a gradual rather than a principal difference between government legislation and farmers’ values, whereas public perception and acceptance of farm practices remains complicated. Distinction between value groups and focusing on a selected notion (such as no suffering) proved to be effective in bringing representatives of stakeholder groups together, but is unlikely to bridge the emotional gap between commercial farm practices and public ideals. (shrink)

1. T. Differenz Marx'sche Philosophie zur Hegelschen Philosophie -- 2. T. Differenz Marxistische Philosophie zur Hegelschen Philosophie (2 v.) -- 3. T., 4. Buch. Philosophischer Seinsbegriff und historische Dominanz von Weltanschauungen. 5. Buch. Anlagen, weltanschauliche Dominanz in historischer Auswirkung.