In two often neglected passages of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant submits that the Critique is a 'treatise' or a 'doctrine of method'. These passages are puzzling because the Critique is only cursorily concerned with identifying adequate procedures of argument for philosophy. In this book, Gabriele Gava argues that these passages point out that the Critique is the doctrine of method of metaphysics. Doctrines of method have the task of showing that a given science (...) is indeed a science because it possesses 'architectonic unity' – which happens when it realizes the 'idea' of a science. According to Gava's novel approach, the Critique establishes that metaphysics is capable of this unity, and his reading of the Critique from this perspective not only illuminates the central role of the Transcendental Doctrine of Method within it, but also clarifies the relationship between the different parts of the work. (shrink)

Published in 1797, the Doctrine of Right is Kant's most significant contribution to legal and political philosophy. As the first part of the Metaphysics of Morals, it deals with the legal rights which persons have or can acquire, and aims at providing the grounding for lasting international peace through the idea of the juridical state. This commentary analyzes Kant's system of individual rights, starting from the original innate right to external freedom, and ending with the right to (...) own property and to have contractual and family claims. Clear and to the point, it guides readers through the most difficult passages of the Doctrine, explaining Kant's terminology, method and ideas in the light of his intellectual environment. One of the very few commentaries on the Doctrine of Right available in English, this book will be essential for anyone with a strong interest in Kant's moral and political philosophy. (shrink)

Published in 1797, the Doctrine of Right is Kant's most significant contribution to legal and political philosophy. As the first part of the Metaphysics of Morals, it deals with the legal rights which persons have or can acquire, and aims at providing the grounding for lasting international peace through the idea of the juridical state. This commentary analyzes Kant's system of individual rights, starting from the original innate right to external freedom, and ending with the right to (...) own property and to have contractual and family claims. Clear and to the point, it guides readers through the most difficult passages of the Doctrine, explaining Kant's terminology, method and ideas in the light of his intellectual environment. One of the very few commentaries on the Doctrine of Right available in English, this book will be essential for anyone with a strong interest in Kant's moral and political philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Kant’s doctrine of definitions, as it is developed in theTranscendental Doctrine of Method(TDM) and in the lectures on logic, lays down the semantic background of the problem of the objective reality of the categories and of the solution Kant provides for it in theTranscendental Analytic. The distinction between nominal and real definitions introduces a two-dimensional element in Kant’s theory of concepts, and this, I argue, provides a compelling explanation for the assumption (...) Kant makes in §13 that it is possible to possess a concept without knowing the conditions of its legitimate application. This view is supported by the parallels between Kant’s discussion of empirical, mathematical, and philosophical concepts in §13 and in theTDM. And, it allows clarifying the sense in which the arguments that prove the objective reality of the categories are, at the same time, counterfactual reflections that give us (incomplete) insight into their real definitions. (shrink)

This paper deals primarily with theDoctrine of Method(DM) of Kant’sDoctrine of Virtue. First, I present an overview of theDM(1.1) and an explanation of how it is possible to teach virtue (1.2). Second, I address the following issues: Why is aDMnecessary at all (2.1)? How does theDMrelate to what Kant calls casuistry (2.2)? I will argue that wide duties have two essential characteristics: They command the right kind of moral motivation in terms of a moral maxim, and they allow for (...) latitude. The fact that wide duties command the right kind of motivation leads to theDM; the latitude of wide duties, however, leads to casuistry. To unfold this interpretation, it must also be shown that both imperfect and perfect duties are wide duties. (shrink)

This volume provides an extensive translation of the notes and fragments that survived Kant's death in 1804. These include marginalia, lecture notes, and sketches and drafts for his published works. They are important as an indispensable resource for understanding Kant's intellectual development and published works, casting fresh light on Kant's conception of his own philosophical methods and his relations to his predecessors, as well as on central doctrines of his work such as the theory of space, time (...) and categories, the refutations of scepticism and metaphysical dogmatism, the theory of the value of freedom and the possibility of free will, the conception of God, the theory of beauty, and much more. (shrink)

This volume provides the first ever extensive translation of the notes and fragments that survived Kant's death in 1804. These include marginalia, lecture notes, and sketches and drafts for his published works. They are important as an indispensable resource for understanding Kant's intellectual development and published works, casting new light on Kant's conception of his own philosophical methods and his relations to his predecessors, as well as on central doctrines of his work such as the theory of (...) space, time and categories, the refutations of skepticism and metaphysical dogmatism, the theory of the value of freedom and the possibility of free will, the conception of God, the theory of beauty, and much more. (shrink)

The verificationist defense of Kant's refutation of idealism is a specimen of the reconstructive work that needs to be done in evaluating Kant's transcendental philosophy. It is necessary to proceed piecemeal in the critical examination of each of Kant's arguments, fitting it to the proposed indirect proof model, and rethinking its soundness or unsoundness. There may be few conclusions that can stand just as they are. The justification of Kant's transcendental proof that there are unknowable things (...) in themselves establishes an important first step in this continuing inquiry. (shrink)

In her groundbreaking Kant’s Conception of Pedagogy, G. Felicitas Munzel finds extant in Kant’s writings the so-called missing critical treatise on education; it appears in the Doctrines of Method with which he concludes each of his ...

The Metaphysics of Morals is Kant's major work in applied moral philosophy in which he deals with the basic principles of rights and of virtues. It comprises two parts: the 'Doctrine of Right', which deals with the rights which people have or can acquire, and the 'Doctrine of Virtue', which deals with the virtues they ought to acquire. Mary Gregor's translation, revised for publication in the Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy series, is the only complete (...) translation of the whole text, and includes extensive annotation on Kant's difficult and sometimes unfamiliar vocabulary. A new introduction by Roger Sullivan sets the work in its historical and philosophical context. This volume will be of wide interest to students of ethics and of legal and political philosophy. (shrink)

Kant characterizes Critique of Pure Reason as “a treatise on the method”. But he does not clearly work out the Doctrine of Method of the Critique. Most interpreters of the Critique do not work out the Doctrine of Method either. This paper outlines the systematic place and significance of the Doctrine of Method within the structure of the Critique. It suggests that the Doctrine of Method supplies the methodological conditions, or systematic (...) laws, of possible cognitions of reason. In other words, the Doctrine of Method is the primary locus of critique or reason’s self-cognition, i.e., reason’s cognition of the laws that make its possible cognitions systematic. (shrink)

Like previous theorists of natural law, Kant believes in the possibility of a rational theory of ius, but also claims that the very concept of ius naturae and the method of investigation of its principles must be thoroughly reformulated. I will maintain that Kant solves the methodological problem of natural law theories by stating that a rational doctrine of Right concerns pure rational knowledge. Right must be conceived as a metaphysical doctrine in which its principles and laws (...) are determined a priori. By conceiving the idea of a “metaphysics of morals” and linking Right with it, he finds a way both to conserve the notion of ius naturae ) and to purify it from any empirical or anthropological element. (shrink)

My response to Gabriele Gava’s Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics (2023) focuses on Kant’s conception of the role of critique in the Critique of Pure Reason. On my account, Gava’s emphasis on the constructive elements of the Critique downplays the critique of former metaphysics elaborated in all three parts of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements. After some comments on Kant’s conception of the Critique as a doctrine of method, I support this (...) view by discussing the relation between transcendental philosophy and transcendental critique, Kant’s analysis of the faculties, and his transcendental deduction of space. (shrink)

Although the name of Immanuel Kant has survived in the history of culture as the name of one of the greatest philosophers of modern times, Kant's role as a scientist is also very important. His work in the field of cosmology and physics is directly related to philosophy. Kant's development of the transcendental method was a direct result of thinking about the relationship between mathematics and experiment. Transcendentalism and Kant's theory of subjectivity continue the development of (...) physics from Galileo to Newton and Leibniz. This is especially true of his theory of space and time. All this should have turned transcendental aesthetics into a turning point in the development of mathematical natural science. However, in practice, the alienation of the natural sciences from philosophy has only intensified. An analysis of the scientific revolution at the beginning of the 20th century shows the enormous role of Kant's ideas in it in repulsing scientists from Kantianism. Weinert, a researcher of the relationship of 20th century physics to Kant's philosophy, shows that Einstein, being a Kantian as a philosopher, opposed Kantianism as a physicist. He enthusiastically accepted the Kantian idea of the autonomy of theoretical knowledge, but did not accept the concept a priori. An approach in which experience and theory do not precede each other, but are in constant interaction, is defined in the article as experimental transcendentalism. With the methodological difference between physics and philosophy, the concept of space and time in modern physics has a deep similarity with the transcendental doctrine. The definition of the qualitative structure of space (Analysis Situs), including the theoretical substantiation of its three dimensions, was the subject of reflections of scientists from Galileo, Leibniz and Kant to Einstein and Poincaré. (shrink)

I raise three objections for Gava’s thesis that the primary task of the Critique of Pure Reason is to develop a doctrine of method for metaphysics, understood as an account of the special kind of unity that a body of cognitions must exhibit to count as a science. First, I argue that this thesis has difficulty accommodating Kant’s concern with explaining the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements. This concern is motivated by a question that is prior to (...) the issue of scientific unity. Second, I argue that the context of the passage in which Kant calls the Critique a treatise on method makes clear that the remark concerns the Copernican Turn. This suggests that the method treated in the book is the procedure required by the Copernican Turn. Third, I dispute Gava’s claim that the idea that confers unity on metaphysics is the cosmopolitan concept of philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper I extend the case for a necessitation account of particular laws in Kant's philosophy of science by examining the relation between reason's hypothetical use in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and the legitimate hypotheses identified in the Doctrine of Method. Building on normative accounts of reason's ideas, I argue that reason's hypothetical use does not describe the connections between objects and their grounds, which lie beyond the reach of the understanding, but merely prescribes (...) the relations between appearances and their conditions, for which the understanding must seek. A legitimate hypothesis, I suggest, is a proposition we hold to be true that fills in one or several of those relations. The problematic character of hypotheses requires that we evaluate our reasons for holding them to be true. While natural modality is grounded in the nature of things, which cannot be fully known, our reasons for assent can and must be grounded on features of objects that are epistemically available to us. (shrink)

In this paper I extend the case for a necessitation account of particular laws in Kant's philosophy of science by examining the relation between reason's hypothetical use in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and the legitimate hypotheses identified in the Doctrine of Method. Building on normative accounts of reason's ideas, I argue that reason's hypothetical use does not describe the connections between objects and their grounds, which lie beyond the reach of the understanding, but merely prescribes (...) the relations between appearances and their conditions, for which the understanding must seek. A legitimate hypothesis, I suggest, is a proposition we hold to be true that fills in one or several of those relations. The problematic character of hypotheses requires that we evaluate our reasons for holding them to be true. While natural modality is grounded in the nature of things, which cannot be fully known, our reasons for assent can and must be grounded on features of objects that are epistemically available to us. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

The present study is the result of two questions which arose in dealing with the Critique of Pure Reason. What is the relationship of the “Doctrine of Method” to the “Doctrine of Elements?” Does the “Doctrine of Method” tell us anything important about Kant and his philosophy? It will be the contention of this paper that the second half of the Critique relies heavily on the “Doctrine of Elements,” and is a natural expansion of (...) the first half of the Critique. In effect, this is a tentative denial of Norman Kemp Smith’s patchwork thesis. With respect to the second question mentioned above, we shall see that Kant does have a very special place for methodology in his philosophy. This methodology of philosophy has implications for a theory of the division of the sciences and the method proper to each of them. (shrink)

The chapter first discusses the general meaning of a 'doctrine of method' in Kant’s work, as well as the specific goals of the Doctrine of Method of the second Critique. The central section, then, focuses on the notion of 'receptivity to morality', which here has a central role and a quite distinct meaning. I argue that Kant’s main point in his account of how to 'make objective practical reason subjectively practical' (5:151) is that one ought to (...) lead the individual agent to become aware of his own dignity as a moral being. In Kant’s view, recognition of this point is relevant to the overall aim of the second Critique – to show that pure reason is practical – and of moral theory itself. The task of the Doctrine of Method is to show how it is possible to make agents aware of their basic moral capacities, and through that awareness to instil genuine moral dispositions. Accordingly, the Doctrine of Method is the completion of the Critique, confirming the conclusions of the Analytic through the common use of pure practical reason and connecting them with the experience of every moral agent. (shrink)

칸트의 『도덕형이상학』 덕론 편에 있는 윤리학적 교수법은 윤리학적 방법론의 핵심으로서 덕의 획득에 대한 칸트의 교육방법을 이해하는데 필수적인 부분이다. 본 논문에서는 윤리학적 교수법에 대한 덕론의 설명에 포함된 모호하거나 논쟁적인 부분들을 검토하면서 윤리학적 교수법의 성격과 실천적 의의를 탐색한다. 먼저 덕이 획득되는, 일종의 후천적인 도덕성인 이유와 덕의 획득을 위해 이론적 가르침에 해당하는 윤리학적 교수법과 수양적 훈련에 해당하는 윤리학적 수양법이 필요한 이유를 살펴보면서 윤리학적 방법론의 구조를 탐색한다. 또한 목표와 내용, 그리고 방법의 차원에서 윤리학적 교수법을 면밀히 검토하여 그 성격을 규명하고 윤리학적 교수법을 대표하는 도덕적 문답법이 (...) 도덕원칙에 대한 이해라는 목표에 한정되지 않는다는 점, 강제적이거나 독단적이지 않다는 점, 그리고 소크라테스적 방법에 해당한다는 점 등을 밝힌다. 나아가서 도덕원칙과 덕규칙에 대한 이해에서 의무를 준수하려는 결단으로 나아갈 수 있도록 돕는 요인들 그리고 그러한 이해가 간접적으로 야기하는 감정 교육적 효과 등을 논의하면서 윤리학적 교수법의 실천적 의의를 고찰한다. (shrink)

This major study of Kant provides a detailed examination of the development and function of the doctrine of transcendental illusion in his theoretical philosophy. The author shows that a theory of 'illusion' plays a central role in Kant's arguments about metaphysical speculation and scientific theory. Indeed, she argues that we cannot understand Kant unless we take seriously his claim that the mind inevitably acts in accordance with ideas and principles that are 'illusory'. Taking this claim seriously, we can (...) make much better sense of Kant's arguments and reach a deeper understanding of the role he allots human reason in science. (shrink)

The author briskly gives the principles of criticism which he will follow in examining Kant's theory of time, and the distinctions between absolute time, psychological time, and the duration of events and processes which must be made in order to deal with the time theories of Kant and his great predecessors Newton and Leibniz and their defenders. Al-Azm then follows Kant's writings from 1747 through his brief conversion to the Newtonian "receptacle" theory, through the critical period. He considers (...) the Dissertation of 1770, at least in so far as it deals with space and time, to belong to the latter. The principles of criticism are especially relevant to Al-Azm's interpretation of Kant's time doctrine in the critical period. He holds that we must carefully bear in mind Kant's alternation of analytic and synthetic methods, and their dialectic interplay. If we do so, we can explain away the "patchwork" theory of Kemp Smith and others, as the obscurities and apparent inconsistencies and paradoxes which are resolvable in the light of the roles played for Kant by the approaches he employs. Within the first Critique, the teachings on time in the Aesthetic and the Analytic constitute a "genuine dialectic of a highly complex order." Thus, Kant's final position should be sought in the progressive modifications of the preliminary position. Al-Azm regards the Aesthetic as offering merely provisional statements on the subject of time, reached by a process of analysis, at an early dialectical stage, and offering a starting point for a fresh stage in analysis which aims "at the unveiling of the synthetic processes of the understanding." This is accomplished in the Analytic. In a last section, on the first Antinomy, the author considers Strawson's essay, The Bounds of Sense, published in 1966, and cites passages which he feels defend Kant's theory of time, seen in its relation to the critical philosophy, as successfully against Strawson's interpretation as against the claims of its Leibnizian and Newtonian rivals.--M. B. M. (shrink)

In Part One of Immanuel Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, the so-called thesis of innate evil notoriously plays a central role. Yet in the General Remark closing that part, Kant minimizes the weight of that thesis. In his view, it is of no use in moral dogmatics, and also in moral discipline its meaning is of a limited nature. Consequently, the thesis of innate evil is both relegated to a short footnote in the Introduction and completely passed (...) over in silence in the Doctrine of the methods of ethics in Kant’s Metaphysical Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue. This article investigates Kant’s assessment of the use of the thesis of innate evil in moral philosophy. It explores Kant’s semantics of the thesis in order to find out why the thesis makes no difference in moral philosophy, and tries to demonstrate why it is silenced furthermore in the methods of ethics. (shrink)

Kant’s discussion of the highest good is subject to continuous disagreement between the proponents of two interpretations of this concept. According to the secular interpretation, Kant conceived of the highest good as a political ideal which can be realized through human agency alone, albeit only from the Critique of the Power of Judgement onwards. By way of contrast, proponents of the theological interpretation find Kant’s treatment of the highest good in his later works to be wholly coherent with the discussions (...) of this concept found in the second Critique. In their view, however, Kant never conceived of the highest good as a political ideal, and some go as far as to argue that it is the work of God alone. In this article, I defend a theologico-political account of the highest good that avoids the pitfalls of both readings. (shrink)

In this chapter I highlight the apparent tensions between Kant’s very stringent critique of metaphysical speculation in the “Discipline of Pure Reason” chapter and his endorsement of Belief (Glaube) and hope (Hoffnung) regarding metaphysical theses in the subsequent “Canon of Pure Reason.” In the process I will examine his distinction between the theoretical and the practical bases for holding a “theoretical” conclusion (i.e. a conclusion about “what exists” rather than “what ought to be”) and argue that the position is subtle (...) but coherent. In the second part of the paper I focus on Kant’s account of rational hope in the Doctrine of Method: its nature, scope, conditions, and role in the philosophy of religion generally. (shrink)

Sally Sedgwick presents a fresh account of Hegel's critique of Kant's theoretical philosophy. She argues that Hegel offers a compelling critique of and alternative to the conception of cognition that Kant defended in his 'Critical' period, and explores Hegel's claim to derive from Kantian doctrines clues to a superior form of idealism.

This paper analyzes Kant's thesis in the Tugendlehre that there are certain ends that we are obligated to adopt. It contends that none of the three arguments which Kant advances in support of this thesis succeeds and that the attempted reconstruction by Nelson Potter likewise fails. It then maintains that the argument does work, if one brings in, as an implicit premise, transcendental freedom. Finally, it is argued that this late doctrine of obligatory ends marks a significant advance (...) over the treatment of broad duties in the Grundlegung and can serve as a basis for defending Kant's ethics against the familiar emptiness charge. Der Beitrag untersucht die These Kants in der Tugendlehre , daß es bestimmte Zwecke gibt, zu deren Verfolgung wir verpflichtet sind. Dabei stellt sich heraus, daß keines der drei Argumente, die Kant zur Stützung dieser These verwendet, durchgreift und daß der diesbezügliche Rekonstruktionsversuch von Nelson Potter ebenso fehlschlägt. Es wird weiterhin die Ansicht vertreten, daß die Argumentation dann überzeugt, wenn man die transzendentale Freiheit als Prämisse einbezieht. Schließlich wird gezeigt, daß diese späte Lehre Kants von den Zwecken, die zugleich Pflicht sind, einen erheblichen Fortschritt gegenüber der Behandlung der weiten Pflichten in der Grundlegung bedeutet und eine Grundlage dafür bietet, Kants Ethik gegen den üblichen Vorwurf des leeren Formalismus in Schutz zu nehmen. (shrink)

Kant’s investigations into so‐called a priori judgments of pure mathematics in the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV) are mainly confined to geometry and arithmetic both of which are grounded on our pure forms of intuition, space, and time. Nevertheless, as regards notions such as irrational numbers and continuous magnitudes, such a restricted account is crucially problematic. I argue that algebra can play a transcendental role with respect to the two pure intuitive sciences, arithmetic and geometry, as the condition of their (...) possibility. It follows that Kant’s schematism of the concept of magnitude ought to be quantitatively represented in algebraic formulas in general, and also undergo several modifications in order to suit continuities. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

For a long time, Kant’s Doctrine of Right languished in relative neglect, even among Kantians. The work was best known for its uncompromising views on punishment and revolution, and for a seemingly limited and not particularly original emphasis on private property. Kant’s more interesting political claims were often said to be located elsewhere: in the third Critique (Hannah Arendt, Patrick Riley), or the structure of the critical project (Onora O’Neill). When John Rawls explained why his theory of justice could (...) be given a ‘Kantian interpretation’, he drew on concepts found just in Kant’s moral philosophy, bypassing the Doctrine of Right entirely. -/- In recent years, however, there has been an expanding body of work on the Doctrine of Right, by writers like B. Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruschka, Arthur Ripstein, Elisabeth Ellis, and Lea Ypi. Ripstein and Ellis, in particular, have sought to reframe the arguments of Kant’s text in terms more congenial to contemporary legal and political theory. But can Kant’s arguments really be applied to twenty-first-century political debates? -/- The authors in this collection of essays explore this question in different ways, by looking at different aspects of Kant’s text. What is distinctive about Kant’s conception of the social contract, or human rights? Can a Kantian political philosophy concern itself with poverty and welfare rights? Can a Kantian affirm a conception of civil disobedience? What kind of view should a Kantian have of international relations? Can Kant’s views on punishment be reconciled with a conception of forgiveness? What would a Kantian position be in contemporary debates about marriage? -/- The authors of this volume do not always agree with one another, but they always seek to be faithful to the text, and to understand what a political position grounded in the Doctrine of Right would look like in twenty-first-century terms. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show the unity and consistency of Kant’s reflections throughout all three sections of the Canon of Pure Reason. More specifically, I argue that Section 3, which is devoted to the issue of Fürwahrhalten, or taking-to-be-true, is crucial to achieving the methodological goal of the Canon, which is to justify the legitimacy of the speculative assumptions of pure reason. After examining the historical roots of Kant’s notion of a transcendental doctrine of method, (...) I focus on the methodological role that the practical element plays in the first two sections of the Canon. I then show how the limitations of Kant’s argument necessitate the introduction of a third crucial section, which serves both an analytic and an orientative function. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant's final publication in ethics was The Doctrine of Virtue, Part II of the 1797 The Metaphysics of Morals. This text presents Kant's normative ethical theory. This guide is meant to be read alongside Kant's text, combining accessible explanations and novel interpretations of this difficult text. It is the first book in English devoted to The Doctrine of Virtue, one of Kant's most significant works. -/- Timmons divides the guide into five parts. Part (...) I reviews Kant's life, the history and significance of The Doctrine of Virtue, and situates Kant's ethics within his general metaphysical and epistemological views. Part II is devoted to the General Introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals, which is essential for understanding Kant's ethics. Part III and Part IV turn to The Doctrine of Virtue itself, exploring Kant's defense of a system of duties and corresponding virtues. Part V examines Kant's conception of moral education, the practice of virtue, and the conclusion to the book where Kant explains why the discipline of ethics does not include religion as a doctrine of duties to God. Timmons concludes the book highlighting key aspects of The Doctrine of Virtue, situating Kant's ethical theory in relation to other normative ethical theories. This guide is a vital resource for both students and scholars interested in ethics and the history of philosophy. (shrink)

In this classic text, Kant sets out to articulate and defend the Categorical Imperative - the fundamental principle that underlies moral reasoning - and to lay the foundation for a comprehensive account of justice and human virtues. This new edition and translation of Kant's work is designed especially for students. An extensive and comprehensive introduction explains the central concepts of Groundwork and looks at Kant's main lines of argument. Detailed notes aim to clarify Kant's thoughts and to (...) correct some common misunderstandings of his doctrines. (shrink)

At the present time, there are several interpretations and modes of Kant’s transcendental philosophy (TP). Which of these interpretations and modes of transcendentalism most adequately express the spirit of TP, i.e. can claim the title of the transcendental ones? For the explication of the ‘idea of transcendental philosophy’ [KrV, A1], here I distinguish two transcendental shifts: methodological and metaphysical ones, which in their totality predetermine the essence and set the specificity of Kant’s transcendental idealism. The methodological transcendental shift that Kant (...) postulates in his definitions of TP in the Critique of Pure Reason [KrV, A11; B25] represents a shift from studying of objects to the analysis and justification of our mode of cognition of objects. This shift sets a fairly wide range of a la Kantian a priori doctrines and predetermines the transcendental turn (Re–Transcendentalising) of modern philosophy. The metaphysical transcendental shift that can be correlated with “the altered method of our way of thinking [in metaphysics]” [KrV, BXVIII], is associated with the splitting of the “thing” into the actual object (or Kantian thing-in-itself) and object of experience (or Kantian appearance), and involves a transition from the study of thing-in-itself to the analysis of the appearance. More precisely, this shift finds its expression in the transcendental triad “object (thing-in-itself; Ding an sich) – appearance (Erscheinung) – representation (Vorstellung)”, which determines the ‘idea’ (essence) of transcendental idealism/metaphysics. (shrink)

The doctrine of idols is one of the most famous aspects of Bacon's thought. Yet his claim that the idols lead to madness has gone almost entirely unnoticed. This paper argues that Bacon's theory of idols underlies his diagnosis of the contemporary condition as one of ‘universal madness’. In contrast to interpretations that locate his doctrine of error and recovery within the biblical narrative of the Fall, the present analysis focuses on the material and cultural sources of the (...) mind's tendency towards error. It explains the idols in terms of Bacon's materialist psychology and his exposé of the debilitating effects of language and traditional learning. In so doing, it highlights the truly radical nature of the idols. For Bacon, the first step towards sanity was to alert people to the prevailing madness. The doctrine of idols was intended as a wake-up call, preparing the way for a remedy in the form of his new method of inquiry. The paper concludes by indicating how Bacon's method aimed to treat ‘universal madness’, and it suggests that his diagnosis influenced John Locke. (shrink)

Kant uses the term reason’s "interest" to designate human efforts to represent "the absolute totality of conditions for any conditioned thing" and the "unconditioned ground" for such totality. in the "critique of judgment" ("91), he identifies three such representations-the highest good, god, and immortality-as the only ones which can be called "things of faith"; one other-freedom-is accorded the unique status of a "fact" of reason. an analysis of the function of these representations in the answer kant gives to the question (...) "what may i hope?" will provide essential features in justification of the following claim: kant has constructed an account of hope which accords it the status of a fundamental form of human rational activity-on a par with knowing and willing-when directed toward its appropriate objects: the highest good, god, and immortality. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.