In this chapter, I make the case for platonic realism, the thesis that there are properties that lack spatial locations. After criticizing the one-over-many argument for realism and Lewis's argument for realism, I endorse a modal argument that derives the existence of platonic properties from considerations involving necessary truth. I then defend this argument from various objections. Finally, I argue that epistemic considerations and considerations of parsimony favor a weak form of platonic realism on which there are platonic properties, but (...) each property could have had an instance, and would have been located in its instances if it had any. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a theory on which each of a thing’s abundant properties is immanent in that thing. On the version of the theory I will propose, universals are abundant, each instantiated universal is immanent, and each uninstantiated universal is such that it could have been instantiated, in which case it would have been immanent. After setting out the theory, I will defend it from David Lewis’s argument that such a combination of immanence and abundance is absurd. I (...) will then advocate the theory on the grounds that it accomplishes all of Lewis’s “new work” while providing a gain in parsimony and a new account of fine-grained content. I will close with a discussion of how the theory also affords a new reply to two objections to uninstantiated universals: Armstrong’s charge that they are inconsistent with naturalism, and a Benacerraf-Field-style objection about epistemic access. (shrink)

In _Psychoanalytic Therapy as Health Care_, a timely and trenchant consideration of the clash of values between managed care and psychoanalysis, contributors elaborate a thoughtful defense of the therapeutic necessity and social importance of contemporary psychoanalytic and psychodynamic approaches in the provision of mental health care. Part I begins with the question of where psychoanalytic treatments now stand in relation to health care; contributors offer explanations of the current state of affairs and consider possible directions of future developments. Part II (...) looks directly at the conundrums that have resulted from the attempt to integrate psychotherapy and managed care, with contributors examining the ethical and legal dimensions of confidentiality, privacy, and reporting to third parties. Part III opens to wider consideration of the experiences of psychoanalysts under health care systems throughout the world. Finally, Part IV demonstrates the relevance of contemporary psychoanalytic approaches to a variety of contemporary patient populations, with contributors focusing on the applicability of analytically oriented treatment to AIDS patients, seriously disturbed young adults, and inner-city clinic patients. Collectively, the contributors to _Psychoanalytic Therapy as Health Care_ convincingly refute the claim that psychoanalytically informed therapy is an esoteric treatment suited only to the "worried well." Drawing on a wide range of clinical and empirical evidence, they forcefully argue that contemporary psychoanalytic approaches are applicable to seriously distressed persons in a variety of treatment contexts. Failure to include such long-term therapies within health care delivery systems, they conclude, will deprive many patients of help they need - and help from which they can benefit in enduring ways that far transcend the limited treatment goals of managed care. (shrink)

Relative to an ordinary context, an utterance of the sentence ‘Everything is in the car’ communicates a proposition about a restricted domain. But how does this work? One possibility is that quantifier expressions like 'everything' are context sensitive and range over different domains in different contexts. Another possibility is that quantifier expressions are not context sensitive, but have a fixed, absolutely general meaning, and ordinary utterances communicate a restricted content via Gricean mechanisms. I argue that, contrary to received opinion, the (...) latter view has both a number of methodological and also intuitive advantages over the former. I then reply to three objections to the latter view: the binding argument (due to Stanley and Szabo), the availability-based attack (due to Recanati), and an argument based on Recanati’s scope principle. (shrink)

In Singh v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that defendant Blue Cross/Blue Shield's peer review practices satisfied the immunity standard for professional review actions according to the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, and the First Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.After Blue Cross/Blue Shield merged with Bay State Health Care, Blue Cross began to offer “Bay (...) State Health Care” to former Bay State subscribers. Blue Cross denied the plaintiff, Dr. Kunwar Singh, participation in the Bay State Healthcare Network due to poor utilization review. Singh sought reconsideration, and Blue Cross agreed to audit his practices before making a final decision. (shrink)

In Singh v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that defendant Blue Cross/Blue Shield's peer review practices satisfied the immunity standard for professional review actions according to the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, and the First Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.After Blue Cross/Blue Shield merged with Bay State Health Care, Blue Cross began to offer “Bay (...) State Health Care” to former Bay State subscribers. Blue Cross denied the plaintiff, Dr. Kunwar Singh, participation in the Bay State Healthcare Network due to poor utilization review. Singh sought reconsideration, and Blue Cross agreed to audit his practices before making a final decision. (shrink)

Rose and Schaffer (forthcoming) argue that teleological thinking has a substantial influence on folk intuitions about composition. They take this to show (i) that we should not rely on folk intuitions about composition and (ii) that we therefore should not reject theories of composition on the basis of intuitions about composition. We cast doubt on the teleological interpretation of folk judgments about composition; we show how their debunking argument can be resisted, even on the assumption that folk intuitions have a (...) teleological source; and we argue that, even if folk intuitions about composition carry no weight, theories of composition can still be rejected on the basis of the intuitions of metaphysicians. (shrink)

This paper brings Karl Rahner’s understanding of human ex-sistence (L. ex ‘out, forth’ and sistere ‘to stand’)—that is, human ‘standing forth’—to bear upon the phenomenon of black rage in the United States. The reason for this application is the emancipatory potential of Rahner’s transcendental realism, which basically understands human life as a dynamism at once rooted ‘in the world’ and yet called, in obediential potency, to the qualitative ‘more’. Rahner’s anthropological understanding allows for an investigation of the existential struc ture (...) and possibilities of black rage which may benefit black ex-sistence by showing how the dynamism of human life accounts for and justifies this rage as well as what liberating possibilities open up for the enraged. (shrink)

In teaching courses on Karl Rahner to undergraduates, I have come to appreciate the importance of finding a starting point with which students readily connect. After much thought, I begin these courses with an extended consideration of the human person. This starting point has the advantage not only of being Rahner’s but also of being one which seems attractive to students. I have found little evidence that students have to be convinced about the importance of self-concern. I am careful to (...) emphasize, however, that in Rahner’s understanding of the dynamism of conversio and reditio this starting point never allows for any form of narcissistic subjectivism. Starting with the concreteness of our lives naturally leads to other considerations which also seem attractive to students: the burden of self-responsibility, the sense of awe and wonder, the need for hope. These are among some of the concerns which I try to address when teaching Rahner. (shrink)

When some objects are the parts of another object, they compose that object and that object is composite. This article is intended as an introduction to the central questions about composition and a highly selective overview of various answers to those questions. In §1, we review some formal features of parthood that are important for understanding the nature of composition. In §2, we consider some answers to the question: which pluralities of objects together compose something? As we will see, the (...) dominant answers are all of them and none of them. In §§3-4, we examine one of the main arguments that has driven philosophers to these extreme answers: the argument from vagueness. In §5, we turn to the question of whether composition is unique: is it sometimes the case that some things compose more than one thing? Finally, in §6, we turn from the question of which composites exist to the question of which composites exist fundamentally. (shrink)

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The special composition question is the question, ‘When do some things compose something?’ The answers to this question in the literature have largely been at odds with common sense, either by allowing that any two things compose something, or by denying the existence of most ordinary composite objects. I propose a new ‘series-style’ answer to the special composition question that accords much more closely with common sense, and I defend this answer from van Inwagen's objections. Specifically, I will argue that (...) the proposed answer entails the transitivity of parthood, that it is non-circular, and that it casts some light on the ancient puzzle about the Ship of Theseus. (shrink)

The ancient puzzle of Dion and Theon has given rise to a surprising array of apparently implausible views. For example, in order to solve the puzzle, several philosophers have been led to deny the existence of their own feet, others have denied that objects can gain and lose parts, and large numbers of philosophers have embraced the thesis that distinct objects can occupy the same space, having all their material parts in common. In this paper, I argue for an alternative (...) approach: I claim that human beings have ordinary parts—hands, heads, feet, and so on—but no extraordinary parts, such as ‘foot-complements’, the existence of which is essential to the puzzle. I rebut three objections to this approach: an objection that it is unacceptably metaphysically arbitrary, an objection that the view is incompatible with versions of the puzzle involving decapitation, and an objection concerning masses of matter. If we can believe that there are such things as hands and feet without involving ourselves in paradox, and without accepting large numbers of co-located material objects that share all their material parts, then that is what we should do. My view is the only known alternative which allows this. (shrink)

According to the traditional bundle theory, particulars are bundles of compresent universals. I think we should reject the bundle theory for a variety of reasons. But I will argue for the thesis at the core of the bundle theory: that all the facts about particulars are grounded in facts about universals. I begin by showing how to meet the main objection to this thesis (which is also the main objection to the bundle theory): that it is inconsistent with the possibility (...) of distinct qualitative indiscernibles. Here, the key idea appeals to a non-standard theory of haecceities as non-well-founded properties of a certain sort. I will then defend this theory from a number of objections, and finally argue that we should accept it on the basis of considerations of parsimony about the fundamental. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that there are universals. I begin (Sect. 1) by proposing a sufficient condition for a thing’s being a universal. I then argue (Sect. 2) that some truths exist necessarily. Finally, I argue (Sects. 3 and 4) that these truths are structured entities having constituents that meet the proposed sufficient condition for being universals.

Synaesthesia is a neurodevelopmental condition characterised by anomalous sensory perceptions and associated alterations in cognitive function. This chapter summarises what is known about the familial transmission of synaesthesia and its genetic underpinnings. Early familiality studies showed evidence for a strong genetic predisposition, a highly skewed female: male ratio, and an absence of male-to-male transmission. These patterns supported an early hypothesis of a single-gene X-linked dominant mode of inheritance with male lethality. Subsequent analyses in larger samples indicated that the mode of (...) inheritance was likely to be more complex, with both the strong female skew and absence of male-to-male transmission brought into question. We review in detail the first whole genome linkage scan for auditory-visual synaesthesia and a subsequent family linkage study on coloured sequence synaesthesia. Together these results suggest linkage to five chromosomes but give no support for linkage to the X-chromosome. We discuss candidate genes within these regions and potential implications for the aetiology of synaesthesia. We also discuss the implications of these pioneering genome scans for our understanding of synaesthesia and of how different synaesthetic phenotypes may arise from different genetic predispositions interacting with other genes and with the environment. (shrink)

David Lewis (1986) criticizes moderate views of composition on the grounds that a restriction on composition must be vague, and vague composition leads, via a precisificational theory of vagueness, to an absurd vagueness of existence. I show how to resist this argument. Unlike the usual resistance, however, I do not jettison precisificational views of vagueness. Instead, I blur the connection between composition and existence that Lewis assumes. On the resulting view, in troublesome cases of vague composition, there is an object, (...) which definitely exists, about which it is vague whether the relevant borderline parts compose it. (shrink)

An important figure in the natural law tradition and in the Scottish Enlightenment, Gershom Carmichael defended a strong theory of rights and drew attention to Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke. Gershom Carmichael was a teacher and writer who played an important role in the Scottish Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. His philosophy focused on the natural rights of individuals--the natural right to defend oneself, to own the property on which one has labored, and to services contracted for with others. (...) Carmichael argued that slavery is incompatible with the rights of men and citizens, and he believed that subjects have the right to resist rulers who exceed the limits of their powers. Although he appealed to the authority of Grotius and Locke, the grounds on which he defended natural rights were distinctively his own. He drew upon the Reformed or Presbyterian theology to propose that, in respecting the natural rights of individuals, one shows one’s reverence for God’s creation. Inasmuch as all of mankind longs for lasting happiness, which can be found only in worship of or reverence for God, such reverence is the natural law which obliges all to respect the rights of all. Natural Rights includes Supplements and Observations on Pufendorf (1724), Natural Theology (1729), Logic (1722), two theses, and a manuscript on teaching, all in English for the first time. Gershom Carmichael (1672-1729) was the first professor of moral philosophy at the University of Glasgow, preceding Hutcheson, Smith, and Reid. James Moore is Professor of Political Science at Concordia University in Montreal. Michael Silverthorne is Honorary University Fellow in the School of Classics at the University of Exeter. Knud Haakonssen is Professor of Intellectual History and Director of the Centre for Intellectual History at the University of Sussex, England. (shrink)

This is a new release of the original 1930 edition.

I will argue that internalism about justification entails the apparently absurd conclusion that it is possible to know specific facts about the external world—for example, that there is a tree in the quad—on the basis of introspection and a priori reflection. After a brief characterization of internalism (§1), I will set out the problem (§2). I will then discuss three replies: one that denies the form of doxastic voluntarism involved in the problem (§3), one that denies that knowledge of higher-order (...) facts about justification can justify corresponding first-order beliefs (§4), and, finally, one that involves biting the bullet (§5). I will argue that each reply fails. (shrink)

Theft, grievances and absenteeism show the need to examine mutual loyalty and establish a‘win‐win’policy.