Speeches delivered in Tamil at various schools in Tamil Nadu, during 2010-2015, by A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, 1931-2015, former President of India.

Eating disorders are mental illnesses that can have a significant and persistent physical impact, especially for those who are not treated early in their disease trajectory. Although many persons w...

While there has been much work on cosmological arguments, novel objections will be presented against the modern day rendition of the Kalām cosmological argument as standardly articulated by William Lane Craig. The conclusion is reached that this cosmological argument and several of its variants do not lead us to believe that there is inevitably a supernatural cause to the universe. Moreover, a conditional argument for atheism will be presented in light of the Big Bang Theory.

The Kalām cosmological argument deploys the following causal principle: whatever begins to exist has a cause. Yet, under what conditions does something ‘begin to exist’? What does it mean to say that ‘X begins to exist at t’? William Lane Craig has offered and defended various accounts that seek to establish the necessary and sufficient conditions for when something ‘begins to exist.’ I argue that all of the accounts that William Lane Craig has offered fail on the following grounds: either (...) they entail that God has a cause or they render the Kalām argument unsound. Part of the problem is due to Craig’s view of God’s relationship to time: that God exists timelessly without creation and temporarily with creation. The conclusion is that Craig must abandon either the Kalām argument or his view of God’s relationship to time; he cannot consistently hold both. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Did the Universe Begin to Exist? Everything That Begins to Exist Has a Cause The Cause of the Universe Properties of the First Cause Objections Conclusion References.

Criticism of Qur'an hermeneutics method by Averroës, an Islamic philosopher.

This book offers a discussion of the kalām cosmological argument, and presents a defence of a version of that argument after critically evaluating three of the most important versions of the argument. It argues that, since the versions of the kalām cosmological argument defended by Philoponus (c. 490–c. 570), al-Ghazālī (1058– 1111), and the contemporary philosopher, William Lane Craig, all deny the possibility of the existence of an actual infinite, these arguments are incompatible with Platonism and the view that God (...) foreknows an endless future. This conclusion, however, is not a problem for the proponents of the kalām cosmological argument, for the book shows how the argument can be defended without denying the possibility of the actual infinite. -/- In order to offer a comprehensive analysis of Philoponus and al-Ghazālī’s cosmological arguments, the book draws on recent English translations of some of their works. Next, the book advances a detailed argument against the popular argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite. Finally, the book offers a unique defence of the kalām cosmological argument by defending philosophical arguments for a beginning of time that do not deny the actual infinite, evaluating which hypothesis best explains the discoveries of modern cosmology, and offering an argument in support of the premise that, if the universe came into existence, then God brought it into existence. (shrink)

The kalam cosmological argument-perhaps the most discussed philosophical argument for God's existence in recent decades-maintains that whatever begins to exist must have a cause. And since the universe began to exist, there must be a transcendent cause of its beginning, a conclusion which is confirmatory of theism. So this medieval argument for the finitude of the past has received fresh wind in its sails from recent scientific discoveries. This collection reviews and assesses the merits of the latest scientific evidences (...) for the universe's beginning. It ends with the kalam argument's conclusion that the universe has a cause-a personal cause with properties of theological significance. (shrink)

In this article, we evaluate various responses to a noteworthy objection, namely, the infinite God objection to the kalām cosmological argument. As regards this objection, the proponents of the kalām argument face a dilemma—either an actual infinite cannot exist or God cannot be infinite. More precisely, this objection claims that God’s omniscience entails the existence of an actual infinite with God knowing an actually infinite number of future events or abstract objects, such as mathematical truths. We argue, however, that the (...) infinite God objection is based on two questionable assumptions, namely, that it is possible for an omniscient being to know an actually infinite number of things and that there exist an actually infinite number of abstract objects for God to know. (shrink)

Part of the kalam cosmological argument draws upon the claim that an actual infinite cannot exist. Classical theists also maintain both that some individuals will earn eternal life and that God infallibly foreknows the future. The claim that these latter two theses do not require that an actual infinite exists because God possesses an intuitive, rather than propositional intellect, is examined and rejected. Although the future is potential, rather than actual, classical theism requires that the future be, in a (...) sense, actually infinite. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn the late 1970s the big bang model of cosmology was widely accepted and interpreted as implying the universe had a beginning. At the end of that decade William Lane Craig revived an argument for God known as the Kalam Cosmological Argument based on this scientific consensus. Furthermore, he linked the big bang to the supposed biblical concept of creation ex nihilo found in Genesis. I shall critique Craig's position as expressed in a more recent update and argue that (...) contemporary cosmology no longer understands the big bang as the ultimate beginning, seriously undermining the KCA. I will further contend that book of Genesis should not be understood as describing creation ex nihilo anyway. (shrink)

U ovom clanku bice izlozena polemika o kalam kosmoloskom argumentu, koja je razvijena u srednjovekovnoj islamskoj teologiji i filozofiji. Glavni momenti ove polemike bili su izlozeni stolecima pre u Filoponovoj kritici Aristotelove teze da je svet vecan i da nije moguca aktuelna beskonacnost. Filopon prihvata tezu da je aktuelna beskonacnost nemoguca, ali on misli da, upravo zbog toga, svet ne moze biti vecan. Naime, prema Filoponu, nesto ne moze da nastane ako njegovo po?stojanje zahteva prethodno postojanje beskonacnog broja drugih (...) stvari, od kojih jedna dolazi posle druge. Filopon i njegovi sledbenici u srednjevekovnoj islamskoj teologiji, zvani kalam teolozi, ponudili su argumente protiv koncepcije temporalno beskonacnog univerzuma, koji bi bio shvacen kao sukcesivni kauzalni lanac. S druge strane, srednjovekovni islamski mislioci, zvani falasifah /filozofi/ ili aristotelijanci ponudili su argumente u prilog Aristotelove koncepcije vecnosti univerzuma. Odlucujuci problem u raspravi izmedju kalam i falsafa srednjovekovnih muslimanskih mislilaca bio je problem beskonacnosti. U ovom clanku bice prikazani neki od krucijalnih momenata tih argumenata. (shrink)

This paper is a reply to Professor William Lane Craig's “Graham Oppy On The kalām Cosmological Argument” Sophia 32.1, 1993, pp. 1–11. Further references to the literature are contained therein.

According to the orthodox interpretation of bounce cosmologies, the universe was born from an entropy-reducing phase in a previous universe. To defend the thesis that the whole of physical reality was caused to exist a finite time ago, Craig and Sinclair have argued the low-entropy interface between universes should instead be understood as the beginning of two universes. Here, I present Craig and Sinclair with a dilemma. On the one hand, if the direction of time is reducible, as friends of (...) the Mentaculus—for example, Albert, Loewer, and Papineau—maintain, then there is reason to think that the direction of time and the entropic arrow of time align. But on that account, efficient causation is likely reducible to non-causal phenomena. In consequence, contrary to Craig and Sinclair’s theological aims, things can begin to exist without causes. On the other hand, if the direction of time is not reducible, Craig and Sinclair’s interpretation of bounce cosmologies is unjustified. Lastly, a reply to a potential objection motivates a discussion of how to interpret bounce cosmologies on the tensed theory of absolute time favoured by Craig and Sinclair. I offer two interpretations of bounce cosmologies that, given a tensed theory of absolute time, are preferable to those Craig and Sinclair offer, yet inconsistent with their project in natural theology; on one interpretation, the universe does not require a supernatural cause and, on the other, bounce cosmologies represent the universe as never having begun to exist. (shrink)

An application of some recent work on the science of generic thought.

It is known that there are different concentrations of Muslims in European countries. However, Germany has a special importance in these countries due to the numerical excess of Muslims and the existence of our compatriots due to the economic migration from Turkey to Germany that started in the 1960s. For this reason, in our article, the educational activity carried out on Islamic theology, in particular kalam, in the example of Germany will be discussed. In Germany, Islamic religious education departments (...) were opened in three different universities to train teachers to teach Islamic religion in primary, secondary and high school schools, and to provide Imam education in order to eliminate the language and adaptation problems experienced by mosque officials coming from abroad. The process that started with Osnabrück University, Westfälische Wilhelm Münster University and Friedrich-Alexander University has progressed beyond the initial aim of training Islamic religion teachers with the seven universities reached today. In addition to the influence of the German Islamic Conference on the formation of the theoretical infrastructure of this process, the impact of the 2010 recommendation of the Scientific Committee is also known. The originality, scientific impartiality and conformity of Islamic Theology in Germany are the issues that are emphasized in the discussions. As a matter of fact, for this reason, the discussion of the science of of kalām in these centers is of particular importance in the debates. Because kalām is a science that shapes the understanding of religion and offers the opportunity to develop a correct intellectual perspective on religion. It is possible to say that the content of kalām in these centers and the studies carried out will affect the understanding of Islam that will emerge in Europe, especially in Germany, in the next century. For this reason, in our article, the study areas of theology professors in seven Islamic Theology centers and theses which they supervise will be discussed, on the other hand, researches, projects and collaborations that reflect the intellectual perspective of the Islamic Theology center will be highlighted. This article aims not only to criticize the said centers in Germany, but also to determine what kind of mutual contributions they might have with the theological accumulation in Turkey. As a matter of fact, it is obvious that the courses given, the theses managed and the fields of study will shape the future of Islamic theology in Europe, as well as having an impact on Islamic theology in Turkey given that today global scientific interaction is at the highest level. It is not possible to think the issues currently studied in Islamic Theology in Germany independently of the realities and needs of the country in which they flourish. As a matter of fact, although there are historical studies on Islamic theology schools, especially Maturidism, Ash'arism and Mu'taziliism, in different universities, the existence of studies on subjects that can be called “practical theology” draws attention. In addition, due to the fact that Germany creates a multi-religious and multicultural environment, it is seen that a supra-denominational approach is adopted and thus it is aimed to ensure a pluralism that allows different views. (shrink)

According to the orthodox interpretation of bounce cosmologies, the universe was born from an entropy-reducing phase in a previous universe. To defend the thesis that the whole of physical reality was caused to exist a finite time ago, Craig and Sinclair have argued the low-entropy interface between universes should instead be understood as the beginning of two universes. Here, I present Craig and Sinclair with a dilemma. On the one hand, if the direction of time is reducible, as friends of (...) the Mentaculus—for example, Albert, Loewer, and Papineau—maintain, then there is reason to think that the direction of time and the entropic arrow of time align. But on that account, efficient causation is likely reducible to non-causal phenomena. In consequence, contrary to Craig and Sinclair’s theological aims, things can begin to exist without causes. On the other hand, if the direction of time is not reducible, Craig and Sinclair’s interpretation of bounce cosmologies is unjustified. Lastly, a reply to a potential objection motivates a discussion of how to interpret bounce cosmologies on the tensed theory of absolute time favoured by Craig and Sinclair. I offer two interpretations of bounce cosmologies that, given a tensed theory of absolute time, are preferable to those Craig and Sinclair offer, yet inconsistent with their project in natural theology; on one interpretation, the universe does not require a supernatural cause and, on the other, bounce cosmologies represent the universe as never having begun to exist. (shrink)

This paper examines the Kalam Cosmological Argument, as expounded by,William Lane Craig, insofar as it pertains to the premise that it is metaphysically impossible for an infinite set of real entities to exist. Craig contends that this premise is justified because the application of the Cantorian theory to the real world generates counterintuitive absurdities. This paper shows that Craig’s contention fails because it is possible to apply Cantorian theory to the real world without thereby generating counterintuitive absurdities, provided one (...) avoids positing that an infinite set of real entities is technically a set within the meaning of such theory. Accordingly, this paper proposes an alternative version of the application of Cantorian theory to the real world thereby replacing the standard version of such application so thoroughly criticized by Craig. (shrink)

Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm al-Zāhid al-Ṣaffār is one of the important representatives of the Kalām thought of the Ḥanafī-Māturīdī School. He was born in A.H. 450/ C.E. 1058 in Bukhara that is one of the city of Transoxiana/Mawara al-nahr where Maturidi School has emerged around this socio-cultural environment. He completed his education and served as a leader (rais/ ṣadr) of the Hanafite scholars there until he was exiled to the city of Marv. Upon his return from exile, he passed away in (...) Bukhara in A.H. 534/ C.E. 1139. The present study aims to determine his method in Kalām. The introduction outlines the subject, significance, purpose, method, and sources of the research. In this study, it was employed a method that focuses on a person in which he/she is examined with his/her views and thoughts by taking into account his/her socio-cultural factors. By doing this, the first chapter of this study deals with the political, socio-economic, and scientific situation in Transoxiana, and the activities of diverse religions, sects, and philosophical schools in this region in A.H. V-VI/C.E. XI-XII. In the second chapter, it studies al-Ṣaffār’s life, scientific personality, works as well as the sources that he made references to in his works in detail. In the third chapter, the kalām method of al-Ṣaffār has been tried to be determined. For this purpose, it analyzes his extant works, Talkhīṣ al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd and Risālah fī al-kalām and elaborates first on his defense of the Kalām that gives great importance to reason (ʿaql) and to intellectual debates, if necessary, in theological issues. Then it explores his theory of knowledge with his ideas on the definition, possibility, sources, and types of knowledge, and the epistemological understandings he defensed or criticised. Furthermore, to determine his Kalām method, it evaluates his approach towards the value of ‘aql and naql (Qurʾān-Ḥadīth) as sources of knowledge. Since this issue is a distinctive tool for unveiling the kalām methods of different mutakallims and Muslim sects. Finally, it finds out the types of istidlāl, meaning inference of one thing from the other that he used when he argues and defends his views, and illustrates with examples. (shrink)

This article evaluates the discussion concerning the relationship between the Kalām Cosmological Argument and Divine Omniscience in recent articles in Sophia, 263–272, 2016; Erasmus Sophia, 57, 151–156, 2018a). I argue that, in his latest article, Erasmus is guilty of shifting the focus of the discussion from the KCA to the Infinity Argument. I contribute to the discussion by replying to the four difficulties Erasmus Sophia, 57, 151–156, mentions against my defence of the notion that God has an undivided intuition of (...) all reality. I show that Erasmus has failed to allay the worry that the redefinition of omniscience by Erasmus and Verhoef is unmotivated and problematic. (shrink)

Huduth argument (in contemporary Western philosophy known as Kalam Cosmological argument) is an argument for the existence of God which rests on the idea that the universe has a beginning in time. Some theists have claimed that modern science, particularly modern cosmology and second law of thermodynamics supports the key premise of the argument which argues that universe began to exist. On the other hand, some atheists have claimed that Quantum Mechanics have demonstrated that particles can be created without (...) cause falsifying the causal principle of the Kalam cosmological argument which states that everything that begins to exist has a cause. In this article we will evaluate these claims and try to determine what modern science has to say about this argument developed by medieval Muslim theologians. (shrink)

Kalam philosophy, theological thought in Islam on postmodernism.

Though, the tradition of Muslim religious-scientific work in the Indian Subcontinent can be traced back to 12th century, especially Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindī, Shaykh Abd al-Haqq Muhaddith Dihlawī, Shaykh Abdur Rahim and Shah Waliullah are the most important figures of 18th century and later. Examined carefully the works on aqaid and ‘ilm al-kalām written by these scholars of Sunni tradition, in the light of the method adopted by them, it is seen that they are either regarded as traditionalist, modernist or rationalist. (...) Meanwhile, Shiism, which was already present in the Subcontinent since the rise of the Safavid Dynasty with scholars from Ithnā ‘Ashariyah (Twelver Shiites) and Ismā‘ilīyah, is also influential in the region with their thoughts and works. Similarly, considering the works of later Shiite scholars, it can be said that some are considered to have a traditionalist perspective while others to have modernist. Apart from all these, Qādiyānīs, except Lahor branch, took also place in the history of Indian Subcontinent thought as a heretic formation within the Islamic tradition. The aim of this study which was prepared via the data obtained by the support of Erciyes University Scientific Research Projects Coordination Unit under grant number 8217 is to present a bibliographical survey of the works on aqâid and ‘ilm al-kalām focusing on the development of Islamic thought in the Indian Subcontinent, especially after Shah Waliullah. (shrink)

The present article discusses the Department of Kalam, its foundation, academic structuring, philosophy, and contribution to religious thought at the national and international level since the establishment of Ankara University Faculty of Divinity. The process regarding the field of Kalam since the establishment of Ankara University Faculty of Divinity in 1949 has been studied over two historical periods. The first is the period from its being taught as a course under the Chair of the History of Islam and (...) Sects during the establishment of the Faculty of Divinity to 1974 when it turned into an independent chair, and the second is the process from 1974 to the present. Higher religious education was continued in the Faculty of Theology, established under the Istanbul Dārulfunūn, which was constructed in the western style instead of the madrasahs that were closed in accordance with the Law of Unification of Education (Tawhid Tadrisāt) adopted on March 3, 1924.The faculty in question was closed in 1933 due to the shortage of students. Until Ankara University Faculty of Theology, which started its teaching activities in November 1949, was opened, there was no higher religious education for 16 years in Turkey. During this time, the need for experts trained in the field of religion emerged. In order to meet this need, Ankara University Faculty of Theology was opened. In the newly opened faculty, it is aimed to train theologians with versatile knowledge and perspective by teaching philosophy, psychology, sociology, foreign languages, as well as teaching disciplines related to the field of theology. One of the chairs in the faculty’s academic structure opened for this purpose was the chair of History of Islam and Sects. In Ankara University Faculty of Theology, where the academic structuring was organized according to the chair system, the science of Kalam was taught as a course within the Chair of the History of Islam and Sects until 1974. Within this chair, the teachings of Principles of Islam, the history of Islamic sects, and Kalam lessons were carried out. The first instructor of the chair was Prof. Yusuf ZiyaYörükân. Although there were changes in the academic staff during the process, one of the important names that contributed to the field of kalam until 1974 was Muhammad Tavît al-Tanji. These scholars not only made significant contributions to the field of Kalam in terms of method and content with their own studies but also taught scholars to work in this field after them.The doctoral advisor of HüseyinAtay, who is the founder of the Kalam Chair/Department, is M. Tavît al-Tancî. In 1974, when HüseyinAtay became a professor, the Kalam course was separated from the Chair of Islam and Sects and gained the status of an independent chair. HüseyinAtay is the architect of the transformation of Kalam from a lecture to a chair.As a result of Atay’s efforts, being a theologian in Turkey has turned into an identity rather than being a member of an academic discipline. In the studies carried out by Yörükân, Tancî, Atay and the academicians taught by them in Ankara University Faculty of Theology Department of Kalam, the emphasis on the Quran and reason, the importance of critical thinking in the field of theology, the human-centered theological thought, the effort to find solutions to current problems, the researches on Mu‘tazila and Maturidism, the study and translation activities that are carried out to bring the classical theology to the present day come to the fore. In the essence of academic studies conducted within this framework, the importance of correctly determining the distinction between the divine and human in the analysis of religious thought is emphasized. In addition, it is aimed to give a perspective on the meaning and value of human life. In the Department of Kalam, where the human-centered understanding of kalam is systematically dealt with on the basis of individual, responsibility, and morality, the science of kalam is structured not only as a system of thought consisting of abstract fictions but a discipline that has the function of developing and gaining a perspective on what is happening around us and in the World. (shrink)

This article is about the place of kalām (theology) within the general structure of al-Fārābī's metaphysics. In this framework, the article consists of two parts. The first part examines the position of metaphysics within the framework of al-Fārābī's idea of perfection. In the second part, a close reading of al-Fārābī's al-Ibāna ʿan ġarażi Arisṭuṭālīs fī kitābi mā baʿda al-ṭabīʿa is made and al-Fārābī's approach to the theoretical aspect of theology within the theory of milla is analyzed. Since al-Fārābī's theories of (...) perfection and meaning are the theories that affect a major part of his philosophy, the article shows the effects of these two theories on al-Fārābī's analysis of metaphysics without examining their general position in al-Fārābī's philosophy. In this framework, the article examines the idea that al-Fārābī's metaphysics should be evaluated in view of the background of his theories of perfection and meaning, based on the secondary literature on the subject. As evidence for this claim, al-Fārābī's description of the philosophical sciences as the steps of intellectual perfection is shown in the article. The article emphasizes that al-Fārābī's evaluations of the relationship between kalām and metaphysics are based on the theory of perfection. A close reading of the relevant passages in Taḥṣīl al-saʿāda, Treatise on Intellect (Risāla fi-l ‘aql), and Kitāb al-Ḥurūf shows how al-Fārābī's theories of perfection and meaning form the background of his analysis of metaphysics through the philosopher's arguments. On the other hand, the article shows how al-Ibāna might be understood within al-Fārābī's metaphysical construct by showing the extensions of the theories of perfection and meaning in this work. For al-Fārābī, metaphysics, which constitutes the last step of intellectual perfection, is also the highest science. This process is indicated by the concept “al-naẓar al-ilāhī” (divine thinking/thought). In this framework, kalām cannot gain the title of metaphysics because it is a science that does not emerge in the course of intellectual perfection. In this article, this approach is justified by considering the relevant passages in al-Ibāna. Al-Fārābī's distinction between the science of divine oneness (tawḥīd) and metaphysics in this work has been a subject of debate among scholars. Regarding what al-Fārābī meant by the definition of universal knowledge, the article emphasizes that the relationship of metaphysics with the theories of perfection and meaning influenced al-Fārābī's approach to universal knowledge. In the last part of the article, al-Fārābī’s theory of milla is considered in the context of the theory of meaning. For this aim, the article suggests that al-Fārābī’s idea of milla as a copy or similitude of philosophy makes the science of kalām an intermediate science that acts between the verbal and the philosophical areas of meaning. (shrink)

Did the universe begin to exist? If so, did it have a cause? Or could it have come into existence uncaused, from nothing? These questions are taken up by the medieval-though recently-revived-kalam cosmological argument, which has arguably been the most discussed philosophical argument for God's existence in recent decades. The kalam's line of reasoning maintains that the series of past events cannot be infinite but rather is finite. Since the universe could not have come into being uncaused, there (...) must be a transcendent cause of the universe's beginning, a conclusion supportive of theism. This anthology on the philosophical arguments for the finitude of the past asks: Is an infinite series of past events metaphysically possible? Should actual infinites be restricted to theoretical mathematics, or can an actual infinite exist in the concrete world? These essays by kalam proponents and detractors engage in lively debate about the nature of infinity and its conundrums; about frequently-used kalam argument paradoxes of Tristram Shandy, the Grim Reaper, and Hilbert's Hotel; and about the infinity of the future. (shrink)

Approximately 1500 years ago John Philoponus proposed a simple and compelling argument for the existence of God: (1) Whatever comes to be has a cause of its coming to be; (2) The universe came to be; (3) Therefore, the universe has a cause of its coming to be. Due to the influence of William Lane Craig — analytic philosopher, Christian apologist, champion of Philoponus’s position, and author of The Kalam Cosmological Argument — this argument and the family of subarguments (...) that support it have come to be known as the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA). The term kalam comes from Medieval Arabic philosophy and broadly means "natural theology" or "philosophical theism." Despite being one of the most widely discussed and hotly debated arguments in philosophy today, it has been more than twenty-five years since any systematic presentation of the argument as a whole has been attempted. The present book helps remedy that situation, laying bare the logical structure of the KCA as it has emerged from continuous philosophical refinement. A handy taxonomy of major objections and replies to the KCA has been included as an aid to understanding the argument and its background literature. This book breaks new ground by arguing that future progress on the KCA requires that the argument be situated within a substance-based metaphysics. In addition to providing an analytic account of substances, this book describes a modal theory sensitive to the possibilities and necessities that obtain for substances. With these conceptual tools, the characteristic thought-experiments supporting the KCA can be properly assessed. (shrink)

This paper contains a critique of the 'Kalam' Cosmological Argument for a first cause of the universe as a whole. I argue that one of its major premises (that the universe began to exist) cannot be justified a priori from the paradoxes of the actual infinite, nor by appeal to current cosmological theories. But those who wish to infer from cosmology to the non-existence of a first cause also fail to make their case. I conclude with some morals for (...) the project of natural theology. (shrink)

In this long-awaited volume, on which he worked for twenty years, Mr. Wolfson describes the body of doctrine known as the Kalam.

Approximately 1500 years ago John Philoponus proposed a simple and compelling argument for the existence of God: (1) Whatever comes to be has a cause of its coming to be; (2) The universe came to be; (3) Therefore, the universe has a cause of its coming to be. Due to the influence of William Lane Craig — analytic philosopher, Christian apologist, champion of Philoponus’s position, and author of The Kalam Cosmological Argument — this argument and the family of subarguments (...) that support it have come to be known as the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA). The term kalam comes from Medieval Arabic philosophy and broadly means "natural theology" or "philosophical theism." Despite being one of the most widely discussed and hotly debated arguments in philosophy today, it has been more than twenty-five years since any systematic presentation of the argument as a whole has been attempted. The present book helps remedy that situation, laying bare the logical structure of the KCA as it has emerged from continuous philosophical refinement. A handy taxonomy of major objections and replies to the KCA has been included as an aid to understanding the argument and its background literature. This book breaks new ground by arguing that future progress on the KCA requires that the argument be situated within a substance-based metaphysics. In addition to providing an analytic account of substances, this book describes a modal theory sensitive to the possibilities and necessities that obtain for substances. With these conceptual tools, the characteristic thought-experiments supporting the KCA can be properly assessed. (shrink)

Approximately 1,500 years ago John Philoponus proposed a simple argument for the existence of God. The argument runs thus: Whatever comes to be has a cause of its coming to be. The universe came to be. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its coming to be. ;Due to the influence of William Lane Craig, this argument and the family of arguments that support it have come to be known as the "kalam" cosmological argument . Craig's account of the (...) KCA incorporates features that serve to distinguish his version as a significant advance. First, conceptual advances in mathematics now permit a clearer presentation of the argument than was previously possible. Second, contemporary Big Bang cosmology confirms the central contention of the KCA, namely, that the past existence of the universe is finite. Reflection upon the implications of using Cantorian transfinite mathematics to model physical processes allowed Craig to develop a distinctively philosophical version of the KCA which is relatively independent of changes in contemporary scientific cosmology. This dissertation is intended as a critical investigation and development of this philosophical strand of the KCA. The literature relating to the KCA has grown however to a significant bulk, and there is now danger of duplication and misassessment due to the plurality of interpretations that the argument has received. Part I of the dissertation addresses this need by laying bare the underlying logical structure of the KCA and by providing a comprehensive "state of the question" . Part II of the dissertation, comprising chapters 3 through 6, focuses upon an important species of objection made to the KCA. This species of objection relies upon thought-experiments designed to show that an actual infinity is possible. I reply: this objection is effectively answered by introducing a metaphysics of substances. In the course of presenting a systematic response I develop an interpretation of the notion of substance that is useful for analytic philosophy, present a general account of the logical requirements of KCA thought-experiments, and outline a theory of logical modality suited to the metaphysical requirements of the KCA. (shrink)

In ‘Professor Mackie and the Kalam Cosmological Argument’ , 367–75), Professor William Lane Craig undertakes to demonstrate that J. L. Mackie's analysis of the kalam cosmological argument in The Miracle of Theism is ‘superficial’, and that Mackie ‘has failed to provide any compelling or even intuitively appealing objection against the argument’ . I disagree with Craig's judgement; for it seems to me that the considerations which Mackie advances do serve to refute the kalam cosmological argument. Consequently, the (...) purpose of this paper is to reply to Craig's criticisms on Mackie's behalf. (shrink)

Scholars of kalām have divided the knowledge into two as qadīm (eternal) and hādith (temporal) and correlated "al-‘ilm al-hādith" with humanbeings. They never regarded eternal and temporal knowledge as two distinct types of knowledge, rather they established the framework that eternal knowledge encompasses temporal knowledge. According to this definition, all the knowledge voluntarily emanate from humans are parts of "al-‘ilm al-hādith". Fundamental disciplines have emerged by addressing the same subject-matter from different perspectives and by using different methods. However, as the (...) knowledge these disciplines has accumulated, they became autonomous forgetting the epistemological axis to which they belonged and their interdisciplinary paradigm-based divergence has deepened gradually, resulting an epistemological disruption. Every discipline by starting a process of forming their own "reality", this divergence between the disciplines have deepened paving the way for the stage of "differentiation". This negative network of interrrelational structure between the disciplines has also affected the human interactions causing an institutionalisation in that regard. Throughout history, kalām has always sought to ensure an integration between different disciplines; therefore, it is obliged to put forth the disadvantages that were formed or will be formed by epistemological disruptions using its normative language. Thus, this work deals theoretically with the possibility of kalām being an epistemological axis for this regard. (shrink)

Craig (1981) presents and defends several different kalam cosmological arguments. The core of each of these arguments is the following ur argument.

This book reconstructs the kalām theories of matter, space, and void in the tenth and eleventh centuries A.D., using texts that have only recently become available.

This article examines the development and critique of analogical arguments in the kalām tradition. There are two basic positions on analogical arguments: one holds that if analogical arguments yield certainty, then they are analyzable as deductive inferences, rendering the analogy itself redundant. Proponents of this view thus hold that if the analogy is useful at all, it will never yield the certainty demanded in the rational sciences; another holds that the analogy remains useful even when the argument is deductively sound, (...) either because the universal premise is epistemically dependent on the source case, or, because the source case is useful in dialectical contexts. The exploration of these themes will center around Juwaynī’s formalization and subsequent critique of analogical arguments in the kalām tradition. (shrink)

Many assumptions believe that classical Islamic theology is no longer relevant in the contemporary era, either because its discussion tends to be theocentric and far from the progress of humanism or because it is considered no longer relevant to answer contemporary issues such as secularism, pluralism, globalization, or neo-atheism. Departing from these problems, efforts have emerged for new readings of classical theology by paying more attention to the context and needs of the times. Among these efforts is the renewal of (...) theology by highlighting its methodological aspects, as was done by a contemporary Moroccan theologian and philosopher, Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān. This study attempts to describe and analyze the style of renewal of theology from the perspective of Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān. This research is a character study using qualitative methods, in which the existing data is analyzed critically. This article shows that Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān’s style of renewal of ‘ilm al-kalām focuses on efforts to reform the methodology of classical kalam by reforming the method of dialogue science (munaẓarah) through contemporary linguistic and logical tools, rearranging analogy patterns (qiyas), and building a logic of kalam based on the principle’s logic and morality as well as the amalgamation of theoretical aspect and practical aspect. The significance of Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān’s renewal in contemporary Islamic theology lies in the theorizing of concepts in classical theology with a contemporary approach as well as the construction of the methodology of contemporary Islamic theology to answer ever-evolving theological issues. (shrink)