SUMMARYThe aim of this article is to analyse the complex roots of Carl Schmitt's theory on dictatorship in the classical world through the lens of classical receptions. It argues that Schmitt was deeply engaged with the classical tradition in formulating his theory on dictatorship. Knowingly or unknowingly, Schmitt legitimates his theory through a foundation in both the Roman idealisation of the virtuous dictators of the early Republic as well as the long tradition of the narrative of the enlightened sovereign as (...) a guarantor of law, present in both Greek and Roman antiquity and in the subsequent European tradition. Schmitt skilfully repurposed the Roman historical tradition on dictators but glossed over the traditional antipathy of Roman republicanism towards sovereign rule. The claim that this article is presenting is that even though it has been overlooked by earlier scholars, Schmitt was both directly and indirectly influenced by the classical tradition of dictatorship and utilised their mythical and symbolic dimensions in the later Roman and the subsequent European legal and political traditions. The reason for this omission was that Schmitt, like his contemporaries, belonged to one of the last generations to be groomed in the classical tradition of literature. (shrink)

This concluding article draws together some of the connecting strands between the preceding four articles, seeking to outline a number of fundamental issues common to them all and ultimately the legal concept of universality in general. I argue that there is a fundamental Eurocentrism present that has a number of implications, ranging from the hierarchical worldview and its ingrained evolutionary basis to the notion of communities beyond the nation state which would in the guise of benevolence impose and dictate both (...) law and values with an universal reach and finally, an idea that legal concepts were in an by themselves universal. What these had in common was that they were based on an understanding of humanity as universal, a certain concept of concept as universal and, finally, resorting to a very particular concept of universal rights. However, despite the manifold claims of universality, the practical application and interpretation of these rights was exceedingly limited to a certain group and a certain time and a place. (shrink)